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THE 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS 


The  Monadology,  New  System  of  Nature , Principles  of  Nature  and 
of  Grace,  Letters  to  Clarke,  Refutation  of  Spinoza , and  his 
other  important  philosophical  opuscides,  together 
with  the  Abridgment  of  the  Theodicy  and 
extracts  from  the  New  Essays  on 
Human  Understanding 

TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  ORIGINAL  LATIN  AND  FRENCH 


OF 


COMPRISING 


WITH  NOTES 


BY 


GEORGE  MARTIN  DUNCAN 


Professor  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  in  Yale  University 


SECOND  EDITION 


NEW  HAVEN 

THE  TUTTLE,  MOREHOUSE  & TAYLOR  COMPANY 

1908 


Copyright,  1908 


BY 

The  Tuttle,  Morehouse  & Taylor  Company 


PREFACE. 


\ci'5. 1 

U 55  5: 


This  translation  has  been  made  with  the  hope  of  rendering  the  specula- 
tions of  one  of  the  greatest  of  modern  thinkers  more  accessible  to  ordinary 
students.  Whatever  estimate  may  be  taken  of  the  intrinsic  merits  of  these 
speculations,  their  influence  has  been  too  marked  to  allow  the  student  of 
philosophy  to  ignore  them.  He  will  here  find  all  that  is  necessary  to 
enable  him  to  gain  a comprehensive  insight  into  Leibnitz’s  own  system 
and  to  understand  the  objections  foimd  by  him  to  the  philosophy  of  his 
great  predecessors,  Descartes,  Malebranche,  Spinoza,  Locke.  All  the 
important  philosophical  opuscules  are  given  entire;  also  the  abridgment 
of  the  Theodicce  and  extracts  from  the  Nouveaux  Essais.  A few  notes 
and  references  have  been  added  to  help  the  student.  The  translations 
have  been  made  directly  from  the  original  Latin  and  French  by  my  wife  and 
myself,  the  only  exception  being  the  Letters  to  Clarke,  which  are  repub- 
lished from  Clarke’s  own  translation.  In  making  the  translations  Erdmann’s 
Leibnitii  Opera  Philosophica  (Berlin,  1840),  Janet’s  Oeuvres  Pliilosopliiques 
de  Leibniz  (Paris,  1866),  Gerhardt’s  Die  philo sophischen  Scliriften  von 
G.  W.  Leibniz  (Berlin,  1875-1890),  and  Foucher  de  Careil’s  Refutation 
Inedite  de  Spinoza  par  Leibniz  (Paris,  1854),  have  been  used. 


Yale  University,  Nov.  30,  1890. 


G.  M.  D. 


Prefatory  Note  to  the  Second  Edition. 

Tins  work  is  reissued  by  the  publishers  in  consequence  of  the  continued 
demand  for  it  from  students  and  teachers  of  philosophy.  The  translations 
have  been  revised;  the  Preface  to  the  Codex  Diplomatics  Juris  Gentium  has 
been  removed  from  the  notes  to  the  body  of  the  work,  where  it  properly 
belongs;  the  extracts  from  the  Y ouveaux  Essais  have  been  inserted  among  the 
other  pieces  in  chronological  order;  and  a few  bibliographical  changes  and 
additions  have  been  made  in  the  notes,  including  a full  list  of  the  English 
renderings  of  Leibnitz’s  writings.  With  these  exceptions  the  work  is  sub- 
stantially unchanged. 

G.  M.  D. 

New  Haven,  1908. 


43554*7 


“One  day  I happened  to  say  that  the  Cartesian  philosophy  in  so  far  as 
it  was  true  was  but  the  ante-chamber  of  the  true  philosophy.  A gentleman 
of  the  company  who  frequented  the  Court,  who  was  a man  of  some  reading 
and  who  even  took  part  in  discussion  on  the  sciences,  pushed  the  figure  to 
an  allegory  and  perhaps  a little  too  far;  for  he  asked  me  thereupon,  if  I did 
not  believe  that  it  might  be  said  that  the  ancients  had  shown  us  the  stairs, 
that  the  modern  school  had  come  as  far  as  into  the  ante-chamber,  and  that 
he  should  wish  me  the  honor  of  introducing  us  into  the  cabinet  of  nature? 
This  tirade  of  parallels  made  us  all  laugh,  and  I said  to  him  ‘You  see,  sir, 
that  your  comparison  has  pleased  the  company;  but  you  have  forgotten 
that  there  is  the  audience  chamber  between  the  ante-chamber  and  the 
cabinet,  and  that  it  will  be  enough  if  we  obtain  audience  without  pretending 
to  penetrate  into  the  interior.’  ” 

Leibnitz,  Letter  to  a friend  on  Cartesianism,  1695. 


TABLE  OF  COETTEATS. 


Translations. 


< I-—  On  the  Philosophy  of  Descartes,  1679-1680,  

II —  Notes  on  Spinoza’s  Ethics,  e.  1679,  

III —  Thoughts  on  Knowledge,  Truth  and  Ideas,  1684,  

IV — On  a General  Principle  useful  in  the  Explanation  of  the  Laws  of 

Nature,  1687,  

V —  Statement  of  personal  views  on  Metaphysics  and  Physics,  1690,  .... 

VI —  Does  the  Essence  of  Body  consist  in  extension?  1691,  

/VII — Animadversions  on  Descartes’  Principles  of  Philosophy,  books  1 

and  2,  1692,  

— VIII — On  the  Notions  of  Right  and  Justice,  1693,  

IX —  Reply  of  Leibnitz  to  the  Extract  of  the  Letter  of  Foueher,  canon 

of  Dijon,  published  in  the  Journal  des  Savants  of  March  16,  1693, 

X— ^On  the  Philosophy  of  Descartes,  1693,  

XI —  On  the  reform  of  Metaphysics  and  on  the  Notion  of  Substance,  1694, 

XII —  A New  System  of  the  Nature  and  of  the  Interaction  of  Substances, 

as  well  as  of  the  Union  which  exists  between  the  Soul  and  the 
Body,  1695,  

XIII —  The  Reply  of  Foueher  to  Leibnitz  concerning  his  New  System, 


Page 

1 

II 

28 


fT) 


34 

38 


42 


47 

66 

70 

72 

74 


77 


1695,  87 

XIV —  Explanation  of  the  New  System,  1695,  91 

XV —  Second  Explanation  of  the  New  System,  1696,  96 

XVI —  Third  Explanation  of  the  New  System,  1696,  98 

XVII —  Observations  on  Locke’s  Essay  on  Human  Understanding,  1696,  100 

7XVIII — On  the  Ultimate  Origin  of  Things,  1697,  106 

XIX —  On  Certain  Consequences  of  the  Philosophy  of  Descartes,  1697,  . . . 114 

XX —  On  Nature  in  Itself,  1698,  119 

XXI —  Ethical  Definitions,  1697-1698,  135  — 

XXII —  On  the  Cartesian  Demonstration  of  the  Existence  of  God,  1700- 

1701,  140 

XXIII — Considerations  on  the  Doctrine  of  a Universal  Spirit,  1702,  ....  147 

XXIV — On  the  Supersensible  in  Knowledge  and  on  the  Immaterial  in 

Nature,  1702,  > 157 


43554*7 


VI  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

Page 

XXV —  Explanation  of  Points  in  liis  Philosophy,  1704,  167 

XXVI —  Extracts  from  the  Nouveaux  Essais,  1704,  171 

XXVII — On  the  Principles  of  Life,  1705,  251 

XXVIII — Necessity  and  Contingency,  1707,  259 

XXIX —  Refutation  of  Spinoza,  e.  1708,  264 

XXX —  Remarks  on  the  Doctrine  of  Malebranclie,  1708,  274 

XXXI —  On  the  Active  Force  of  Body,  on  the  Soul,  and  on  the  Souls  of 

Brutes,  1710,  279 

XXXII — Abridgment  of  the  Theodicy,  1710,  284 

XXXIII — On  Wisdom— the  Art  of  Reasoning,  etc.,  1711,  295 

XXXIV — The  Principles  of  Nature  and  of  Grace,  1714,  299 

XXXV— The  Monadology,  1714,  308 

XXXVI — On  the  Doctrine  of  Malebranche,  1715,  324 

XXXVII — Five  Letters  to  Samuel  Clarke,  1716,  329 


Notes. 


1.  Life  of  Leibnitz,  381 

2.  Leibnitz’s  Writings,  and  English  Translations  of  Them,  382 

3.  Expositions  and  Criticisms  of  Leibnitz’s  Philosophy,  385 

Article  I. 

4.  Leibnitz  and  Descartes,  386 

5.  Literature  on  Descartes  and  his  Philosophy,  386 

6.  The  Search  for  Final  Causes  (p.  1),  388 

7.  Philipp  (p.  2),  . . 388 

8.  The  Epicurus  of  Lseertius  (p.  8),  388 

Article  II. 

9.  Relation  of  Leibnitz  to  Spinoza,  388 

10.  Literature  on  the  Philosophy  of  Spinoza,  389 

11.  The  Conception  of  Contingent  (p.  231,  390 

12.  Natura  naturans  and  natura  naturata  (p.  24),  390 

Article  1IT. 

13.  The  Quality  of  Terms  (p.  28),  391 

14.  Descartes’  Argument  for  proving  the  Existence  of  God  (p.  30), 392 

15.  True  and  False  Ideas  (p.  31),  392 

16.  “Whatever  is  clearly  and  distinctly  conceived  is  true”  (p.  32),  ....  392 

17.  Antoine  Arnauld’s  On  the  Art  of  Thinking  Well  (p.  32), 392 

18.  “Whether  we  see  all  things  in  God”  (p.  33),  392 

19.  Malebranche  and  The  Search  after  Truth  (p.  34),  392 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  Vll 

ARTICLE  IV.  Page 

20.  The  Law  of  Continuity,  393 

Article  V. 

21.  Statement  of  Personal  Views  on  Metaphysics  and  Physics,  393 

Article  VI. 

22.  Does  the  Essence  of  Body  consist  in  Extension?  393 

23.  The  System  of  Occasional  Causes  (p.  45),  394 

Article  VII. 

24.  Descartes’  Principles  of  Philosophy,  394 

25.  Truths  of  Fact  and  Truths  of  Reason  (p.  49), 394 

26.  The  Source  and  Nature  of  Error  (pp.  52-3),  394 

27.  The  Author  of  the  Philosophia  Mosaica  (p.  64),  394 

Article  VIII. 

28.  Leibnitz’s  Preface  to  his  Codex  Diplomaticus  Juris  Gentium,  394 

Article  IX. 

29.  Two  Essays  on  Motion  (p.  64),  394 

Article  X. 

30.  Descartes’  Man  (p.  73),  395 

Article  XI. 

31.  The  Notion  of  Substance,  395 

32.  Mersenne  (p.  75),  395 

Article  XII. 

33.  “One  of  the  greatest  theologians  and  philosophers  of  our  time” 

(p.  77),  395 

34.  “To  find  real  units”  (p.  78),  395 

35.  Swammerdam,  Malpighi,  Leewenhoeck,  Rigis,  Hartsoeker  (p.  80),  ..  395 

36.  The  System  of  Preestablished  Harmony  (pp.  84-85),  395 

Article  XIII. 

37.  Objections  to  the  Doctrine  of  Preestablished  Harmony,  396 

Article  XIV. 

38.  Answers  to  Objections  to  the  Doctrine  of  Preestablished  Harmony,  396 

Articles  XV  and  XVI. 

39.  The  Illustration  of  the  Clocks,  396 


vm 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Article  XVII.  Page 

40.  Leibnitz  and  Locke,  396 

41.  Literature  on  Locke,  397 

42.  The  Function  della  crus, ca  (p.  105),  397 

Article  XVIII. 

43.  The  Law  of  Sufficient  Reason,  397 

Article  XIX. 

44.  On  the  Consequences  of  Certain  Passages  in  Descartes,  398 

Article  XX. 

45.  On  Nature  in  Itself,  etc.,  398 

46.  Aristotle's  Definition  of  Motion  (p.  120),  398 

47.  Imaging  and  Intellectual  Conception  (pp.  123-4),  398 

48.  The  Principle  of  the  “Identity  of  Indiscernibles”  (pp.  130-1),  398 

Article  XXI. 

49.  Ethical  Definitions,  398 

Article  XXII. 

50.  The  Ontological  Argument  for  the  Being  of  God, 39S 

Article  XXIII. 

51.  The  Doctrine  of  a Universal  Spirit,  400 

52.  Molinos,  Angelus  Silesius,  and  Weigel  (p.  147),  400 

Article  XXIV. 

53.  Leibnitz  on  the  Non-Sensuous  Element  in  Knowledge  (p.  157), 400 

Article  XXV. 

54.  Lady  Mashfim,  400 

Article  XXVI. 

55.  The  Nouveaux  Essais,  400 

56.  Analysis  of  the  Second  Chapter  of  Bk.  1,  of  the  Nouveaux  Essais,  . . 401 

Article  XXVII. 

57.  Proof  of  the  Existence  of  God  from  the  Doctrine  of  Preestablished 

Harmony  ( p.  253 ) , 403 

Article  XXVIII. 

58.  Contingency  and  Necessity,  403 

59.  The  Sevennese  Prophets  (p.  262),  404 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  ix 

Article  XXIX.  Page 

60.  “The  Refutation  of  Spinoza  by  Leibnitz,”  404 

61.  Malcuth  in  Maleuth  (p.  272),  404 

Article  XXX. 

62.  Remarks  on  Locke’s  Examination  of  Malebranche,  404 

Article  XXXI. 

63.  Leibnitz  on  the  Nature  of  the  Soul,  404 

64.  The  different  Classes  of  Monads,  404 

65.  Genii  (p.  281),  405 

Article  XXXII. 

66.  Leibnitz’s  Theodicee,  406 

67.  Leibnitz’s  Optimism,  406 

Article  XXXIII. 

68.  Leibnitz’s  Rules  for  the  Conduct  of  the  Mind  and  the  Increase  of 

Knowledge,  406 

Article  XXXIV. 

69.  The  Principles  of  Nature  and  of  Grace,  407 

Article  XXXV. 

70.  The  Monadology,  407 

71.  Analysis  of  the  Monadology.  407 

Article  XXXVI. 

72.  Remond  de  Montmort,  408 

Article  XXXVII. 

73.  Leibnitz’s  Correspondence  with  Clarke,  408 


LEIBNITZ. 


I. 

On  the  Philosophy  of  Descaktes.  1679-16S0. 

[From  tlie  French.] 

As  to  the  Philosophy  of  Descartes,  of  which  you  ask  my 
opinion,  I do  not  hesitate  to  say  absolutely  that  it  leads  to  atheism. 
It  is  true  that  there  are  some  things  very  suspicious  to  me  who 
have  considered  it  attentively:  for  example,  these  two  passages, 
that  final  cause  ought  not  to  be  considered  in  physics,  and  that 
matter  takes^successively  all  the  forms  of  which  it  is  capable. 
There  is  an  admirable  passage  in  the  Phaedo  of  Plato  which  justly 
blames  Anaxagoras  for  the  very  thing  which  displeases  me  in 
Descartes.  For  myself,  I believe  that  the  laws  of  mechanics  which 
serve  as  a basis  for  the  whole  system  depend  on  final  causes ; that 
is  to  say,  on  the  will  of  God  determined  to  make  what  is  most  per- 
fect ; and  that  matter  does  not  take  all  possible  forms  but  only  the 
most  perfect;  otherwise  it  would  be  necessary  to  say  that  there 
wiiPbcf  a time  when  all  will  be  evil  in  turn,  which  is  far  removed 
from  the  perfection  of  the  author  of  things.  As  for  the  rest,  if 
Descartes  had  been  less  given  to  imaginary  hypotheses  and  if  he 
had  been  more  attached  to  experiments,  I think  that  his  physics 
would  have  been  worthy  of  being  followed.  For  it  must  be 
admitted  that  he  had  great  penetration.  As  for  his  geometry  and 
analysis  they  are  far  from  being  as  perfect  as  those  pretend  who 
are  given  but  to  the  investigation  of  minor  problems.  There  are 
several  errors  in  his  metaphysics,  and  he  has  not  known  the  true 
souree  of  truths  nor  that  general  analysis  of  notions  which  Jung, 
in  my  opinion,  has  better  understood  than  he.  Nevertheless,  I 
confess  that  the  reading  of  Descartes  is  very  useful  and  very 


o 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


instructive,  and  that  I like  incomparably  more  to  have  to  do  with 
a Cartesian  than  with  a man  from  some  other  school.  Finally,  I 
consider  this  philosophy  as  the  ante-chamber  of  the  true  philos- 
ophy.-— Extract  from  a letter  to  Philipp,  1679. 

I esteem  Descartes  almost  as  highly  as  it  is  possible  to  esteem  a 
man,  and  although  there  are  among  his  opinions  some  which 
appear  to  me  false  and  even  dangerous,  I do  not  hesitate  to  say 
that  we  owe  almost  as  much  to  Galileo  and  to  him  in  matters 
of  philosophy  as  to  all  antiquity.  I remember  at  present  but 
one  of  the  two  dangerous  propositions  of  which  you  wish  me  to 
indicate  the  place,  viz : Principiorum  Philosophicorum  Part.  3, 
Articulo  ipi , his  verbis:  “Atque  omnino  parum  refert,  quid  hoc 
pacto  supponatur,  quia  postea  justa  leges  naturae  est  mutandum. 
Et  vix  aliquid  supponi  potest  ex  quo  non  idem  effectus,  quanquam 
fortasse  operosius,  cleduci  possit.  Cum  enim  illarum  ope  materia 
formas  omnes  cpaarum  est  capax  successive  assumat , si  formas  istas 
ordine  consideremus,  tandem  ad  illam  quae  est  hujus  mundi  pot.e- 
rimus  devenire,  adeo  ut  liic  nihil  erroris  ex  fals’a  hvpothesi  sit 
timendum.”  I do  not  think  that  it  is  possible  to  form  a more  dan- 
gerous proposition  than  this.  For  if  matter  receive  successively 
all  possible  forms  it  would  follow  that  nothing  so  absurd,  so  strange 
and  contrary  to  what  we  call  justice,  could  be  imagined,  which  has 
not  occurred  or  would  not  some  day  occur.  These  are  exactly  the 
opinions  which  Spinoza  has  more  clearly  explained,  namely,  that 
justice,  beauty,  order  belong  only  to  things  in  relation  to  us,  but 
that  the  perfection  of  God  consists  in  a fullness  of  action  such  that 
nothing  can  he  possible  or  conceivable  which  he  does  not  actually 
produce.  This  is  also  the  opinion  of  ITohbes,  who  maintains  that 
all  that  is  possible  is  past,  or  present,  or  future,  and  that  there  will 
be  no  room  for  relying  on  providence  if  God  produces  all  and 
makes  no  choice  among  possible  beings.  Descartes  took  care  not 
to  speak  so  plainly,  but  he  could  not  help  revealing  his  opinions  in 
passing,  with  such  address  that  he  would  not  be  understood  save  by 
those  who  examine  profoundly  these  kinds  of  subjects.  This,  in 
my  opinion,  is  the  irpwTov  pevSos,  the  foundation  of  atheistic 
philosophy,  which  does  not  cease  to  say  things  beautiful  in  appear- 
ance of  God.  But  the  true  philosophy  ought  to  give  us  an  entirely 


ON  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  DESCARTES.  3 

different  notion  of  the  perfection  of  God  which  could  serve  us 
both  in  physics  and  in  morals ; and  I,  for  my  part,  hold  that  far 
from  excluding  final  causes  from  the  consideration  of  physics,  as 
Descartes  pretends,  Part  1,  Article  28,  it  is  rather  hy  them  that  all 
should  he  determined,  since  the  efficient  cause  of  things  is  intelli- 
gent, having  a will  and  consequently  tending  toward  the  Good ; that 
which  is  still  far  from  the  opinion  of  Descartes  who  holds  that 
goodness,  truth  and  justice  are  so  simply  because  God  by  a free  act 
of  his  will  has  established  them,  which  is  very  strange.  For  if 
things  are  not  good  or  had,  save  hy  an  effect  of  the  will  of  God, 
the  good  will  not  be  a motive  of  his  will  since  it  is  subsequent  to 
the  will.  And  his  will  would  be  a certain  absolute  decree,  with- 
out reason;  here  are  his  own  words,  Eesp.  ad  object,  sext.  n.  8: 
“Attendenti  ad  Dei  immensitatem  manifestum  est,  nihil  omnino 
esse  posse  quod  ad  ipso  non  pendeat,  non  rnodo  nihil  subsistens,  sed 
etiam  nullum  ordinem,  nullam  legam,  nullamve  rationem  veri  et 
boni,  alioqui  enim,  ut  paulo  ante  dicebatur,  non  fuisset  plane 
indifferens  ad  ea  creanda  quae  creavit  [he  was  then  indifferent  as 
regards  the  things  which  we  call  just  and  unjust,  and  if  it  had 
pleased  him  to  create  a world  in  which  the  good  had  been  forever 
unhappy  and  the  wicked  (that  is  to  say,  those  who  seek  only  to 
destroy  the  others)  happy,  that  would  be  just.  Thus  we  cannot 
determine  anything  as  to  the  justice  of  God,  and  it  may  he  that  he 
has  made  things  in  a way  which  we  call  unjust,  since  there  is  no 
notion  of  justice  as  respects  him,  and  if  it  turns  out  that  we  are 
unhappy  in  spite  of  our  piety,  or  that  the  soul  perishes  with  the 
body,  this  will  also  he  just. — He  continues]  : Ham  si  quae  ratio 
boni  ejus  per  ordinationem  antecessisset,  ilia  ipsum  determinasset 
ad  it  quod  optimum  est  faciendum  [without  doubt,  and  this  is  the 
basis  of  providence  and  of  all  our  hopes ; namely,  that  there  is 
something  good  and  just  in  itself,  and  that  God,  being  Wisdom 
itself,  does  not  fail  to  choose  the  best] . Sed  contra  quod  se  deter- 
minavit  ad  ea  jam  sunt  facienda,  idcirco,  ut  habetur  in  Genesi, 
sunt  valde  bona  [this  is  cross  reasoning.  If  things  are  not  good  by 
any  idea  or  notion  of  goodness  in  themselves,  hut  because  God 
wills  them,  God,  in  Genesis,  had  hut  to  consider  them  when  they 
were  made  and  to  be  satisfied  with  his  work,  saying  that  all  was 


4 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


good;  it  would  have  sufficed  for  him  to  say,  I will  it,  or  to  have 
remembered  that  he  willed  them,  if  there  is  no  formal  difference 
between  the  two  things,  to  be  willed  by  God,  and  to  be  good.  But 
it  is  apparent  that  the  author  of  Genesis  was  of  another  opinion, 
introducing  a God  who  would  not  he  content  with  having  made 
them  unless  he  found  further  that  he  had  made  them  well.]  hoc  est 
ratio  eorum  bonitatis  ex  eo  pendet,  quod  voluerit  ipsa  sic  face  re.” 
This  is  as  distinct  an  expression  as  one  could  desire.  But  after 
this  it  is  useless  to  speak  of  the  goodness  and  justice  of  God,  and 
providence  will  he  hut  a chimera.  It  is  evident  that  even  the  will 
of  God  will  be  but  a fiction  employed  to  dazzle  those  who  do  not 
sufficiently  strive  to  fathom  these  things.  For  what  kind  of  a will 
(good  God!)  is  that  which  has  not  the  Good  as  object  or  motive? 
What  is  more,  this  God  will  not  even  have  understanding.  For  if 
truth  itself  depends  only  on  the  will  of  God  and  not  on  the  nature 
of  things,  and  the  understanding  being  necessarily  before  the  will 
(I  speak  de  prioritate  naturae,  non  temporis),  the  understanding  of 
God  will  be  before  the  truth  of  things  and  consequently  will  not 
have  truth  for  its  object.  Such  an  understanding  is  undoubtedly 
nothing  but  a chimera,  and  consequently  it  will  be  necessary  to 
conceive  God,  after  the  manner  of  Spinoza,  as  a being  who  has 
neither  understanding  nor  will,  but  who  produces  quite  indiffer- 
ently good  or  bad,  and  who  is  indifferent  respecting  things  and 
consequently  inclined  by  no  reason  toward  one  rather  than  the 
other.  Thus,  he  will  either  do  nothing  or  he  will  do  all.  But  to  say 
that  such  a God  has  made  things,  or  to  say  that  they  have  been  pro- 
duced by  a blind  necessity,  the  one,  it  seems  to  me,  is  as  good  as  the 
other.  I have  been  sorry  myself  to  find  these  things  in  Descartes, 
but  I have  seen  no  means  of  excusing  them.  I wish  he  could  clear 
himself  from  these,  as  well  as  from  some  other  imputations  with 
which  ]\Iore  and  Parker  have  charged  him.  For  to  wish  to 
explain  everything  mechanically  in  physics  is  not  a crime  nor 
impiety,  since  God  has  made  all  things  according  to  the  laws  of 
mathematics  ; that  is,  according  to  the  eternal  truths  which  are  the 
object  of  wisdom. 

There  are  still  many  other  things  in  the  works  of  Descartes 
which  I consider  erroneous  and  by  which  I judge  that  he  has  not 


OX  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  DESCAKTES. 


0 


penetrated  so  far  in  advance  as  is  imagined.  For  example,  in 
geometry,  I do  not  really  believe  that  lie  has  made  any  paralogism 
(as  yon  inform  me  that  some  one  lias  said  to  you)  ; be  was  a suffi- 
ciently skillful  man  to  avoid  that,  and  you  see  by  this  that  I judge 
him  equitably;  but  he  has  erred  through  too  much  presumption, 
holding  all  for  impossible  at  which  he  saw  no  means  of  arriving; 
for  example,  he  believed  it  was  impossible  to  find  a proportion 
between  a curved  line  and  a straight  line.  Here  are  his  own 
words:  Lib.  2,  Geom.,  articulo  9 fin.  editionis  Schotenianae  de 
anno,  1659,  p.  39:  cum  ratio  quae  inter  rectos  et  curvas  exlstit, 
non  cognita  sit  nec  etiam  ab  hominibus  ut  arbitror  cognosci  queat. 
In  which,  estimating  the  powers  of  all  posterity  by  his  own,  he 
was  very  much  mistaken.  For  a little  while  after  his  death  a 
method  was  found  of  giving  an  infinity  of  curved  lines  to  which 
could  be  geometrically  assigned  equal  straight  lines.  He  would 
have  perceived  it  himself  if  he  had  considered  sufficiently  the  dex- 
terity of  Archimedes.  Fie  is  persuaded  that  all  problems  may  be 
reduced  to  equations  ( quo  memo  per  metliodum  qua  utor,  inquit, 
p.  96,  lib.  3,  Geom.,  id  omne  quod  suh  Geometricam  contempla- 
tionem  cadit,  ad  unum  idemque  genus  problematum  reducatur , 
quod  est  ut  quaeratur  valor  radicum  alien  jus  aequationis) . This 
is  wholly  false,  as  Huygens,  Hudde  and  others  who  thoroughly 
understand  Descartes’  geometry,  have  frankly  avowed  to  me. 
This  is  why  there  is  need  of  much  before  algebra  can  do  all  that  is 
promised  for  her.  I do  not  speak  lightly  and  there  are  few  people 
who  have  examined  the  matter  with  as  much  care  as  I. 

The  physics  of  Descartes  has  a great  defect ; this  is  that  his  rules 
of  motion  or  laws  of  nature,  which  should  serve  as  its  foundation, 
are  for  the  most  part  false.  There  is  demonstration  of  this.  His 
great  principle  also  that  the  same  quantity  of  motion  is  preserved 
in  the  world  is  an  error.  IVhat  I say  here  is  acknowledged  by  the 
ablest  men  of  France  and  England. 

Judge  from  this,  sir,  whether  there  is  reason  for  taking  the  opin- 
ions of  Descartes  for  oracles.  But  this  does  not  hinder  me  from  con- 
sidering him  an  admirable  man,  and  for  saying  between  ourselves 
that  if  be  still  lived  perhaps  he  alone  would  advance  farther  in 
physics  than  a great  number  of  others,  although  very  able  men. 


6 PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBHITZ. 

That  befalls  me  here  which  ordinarily  befalls  moderate  men.  The 
Peripatetics  regard  me  as  a Cartesian,  and  the  Cartesians  are 
surprised  that  I do  not  yield  to  all  their  pretended  insights.  For 
when  I speak  to  prepossessed  men  of  the  school  who  treat  Descartes 
with  scorn,  I extol  the  brilliancy  of  his  qualities ; but  when  I have 
to  do  with  a too  zealous  Cartesian  I find  myself  obliged  to  change 
my  note  in  order  to  modify  a little  the  too  high  opinion  which  they 
have  of  their  master.  The  greatest  men  of  the  time  in  these  matters 
are  not  Cartesians,  or  if  they  have  been  in  their  youth  they  have 
gotten  over  it,  and  I notice  among  the  people  who  make  a profession 
of  philosophy  and  of  mathematics,  that  those  who  are  properly 
Cartesians  ordinarily  remain  among  the  mediocre  and  discover 
nothing  of  importance,  being  but  commentators  on  their  master, 
although  for  the  rest  they  may  be  more  able  than  the  man  of  the 
school. — Letter  to  Philipp,  Jan.,  1680. 

[The  following  is  an  extract  from  a letter  of  about  the  same  date  as  the 
preceding  and  on  the  same  subject,  written  to  an  unknown  correspondent.] 

Sir,  since  you  desire  very  much  that  I express  freely  my 
thoughts  on  Cartesianism,  I shall  not  conceal  aught  of  what  I think 
of  it,  and  which  I can  say  in  few  words ; and  I shall  advance  noth- 
ing without  giving  or  being  able  to  give  a reason  for  it.  In  the 
first  place,  all  those  who  give  themselves  over  absolutely  to  the 
opinions  of  any  author  are  in  a slavery  and  render  themselves  sus- 
pected of  error,  for  to  say  that  Descartes  is  the  only  author  who  is 
exempt  from  considerable  error,  is  a proposition  which  could  be 
true  but  is  not  likely  to  be  so.  In  fact,  such  attachment  belongs 
only  to  small  minds  who  have  not  the  force  or  the  leisure  to  medi- 
tate themselves,  or  will  not  give  themselves  the  trouble  to  do  so. 
This  is  why  the  three  illustrious  academies  of  our  times,  the  Royal 
Society  of  England,  which  was  established  first,  and  then  the 
Academie  Royale  des  Sciences,  at  Paris,  and  the  Academia  del 
Cimento,  at  Florence,  have  loudly  protested  that  they  wish  to  be 
known  neither  as  Aristotelians,  nor  Cartesians,  nor  Epicureans,  nor 
followers  of  any  author  whatever. 

I have  also  recognized  by  experience  that  those  who  are  wholly 
Cartesians  are  not  adepts  in  discovering ; they  are  but  interpreters 
or  commentators  of  their  master,  as  the  philosophers  of  the  school 


OH  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  DESCARTES. 


1 


were  of  Aristotle;  and  of  the  many  beautiful  discoveries  which 
have  been  made  since  Descartes,  I know  of  not  one  which  comes 
from  a true  Cartesian.  I know  these  gentlemen  a little  and  I defy 
them  to  name  one  coming  from  them.  This  is  an  evidence  that 
Descartes  did  not  know  the  true  method  or  that  he  has  not  trans- 
mitted it  to  them. 

Descartes  himself  had  a sufficiently  limited  mind.  Of  all  men 
he  excelled  in  speculations,  but  in  them  he  found  nothing  useful 
for  life  which  is  evident  to  the  senses  and  which  serves  in  the 
practice  of  the  arts.  All  his  meditations  were  either  too  abstract, 
like  his  metaphysics  and  his  geometry,  or  too  imaginary,  like  his 
principles  of  natural  philosophy.  The  only  thing  of  use  which  he 
believed  he  had  given  was  his  telescope,  made  according  to  the 
hyperbolic  line,  with  which  he  promised  to  make  us  see  animals,  or 
parts  as  small  as  animals,  in  the  moon.  Unfortunately  he  was  never 
able  to  find  workmen  capable  of  executing  his  design,  and  since 
then  it  has  even  been  demonstrated  that  the  advantage  of  the  hyper- 
bolic line  is  not  so  great  as  he  believed.  It  is  true  that  Descartes 
was  a great  genius  and  that  the  sciences  are  under  great  obligations 
to  him,  but  not  in  the  way  the  Cartesians  believe.  I must  there- 
fore enter  a little  into  details  and  give  examples  of  what  he  has 
taken  from  others,  of  what  he  has  himself  clone,  and  of  what  he  has 
left  to  be  done.  Drom  this  it  will  be  seen  whether  I speak  without 
knowledge  of  the  subject. 

In  the  filst  place,  his  Ethics  is  a compound  of  the  opin- 
ions of  the  Stoics  and  of  the  Epicureans,  something  not  very 
difficult,  for  Seneca  had  already  reconciled  them  very  well. 
He  wishes  us  to  follow  reason,  or  the  nature  of  things  as 
the  Stoics  said;  with  which  everybody  will  agree.  He  adds 
that  we  ought  not  to  be  disturbed  by  the  things  which  are  not 
in  our  power.  This  is  exactly  the  dogma  of  the  Porch  which 
established  the  greatness  and  liberty  of  their  sage,  so  praised  for 
the  strength  of  mind  which  he  had  in  resolving  to  do  without  the 
things  which  do  not  depend  upon  us  and  to  endure  those  which 
come  in  spite  of  us.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  I am  wont  to 
call  this  ethics  the  art  of  patience.  The  Sovereign  Good,  accord- 
ing to  the  Stoics  and  according  to  Aristotle  himself,  was  to  act  in 


s 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


accordance  with  virtue  or  prudence,  and  the  pleasure  resulting 
therefrom  together  with  the  resolution  mentioned  above  is  prop- 
erly that  tranquility  of  the  soul,  or  calm,  which  the  Stoics  and 
Epicureans  sought  and  equally  recommended  under  different 
names.  One  has  only  to  examine  the  incomparable  Manual  of 
Epictetus  and  the  Epicurus  of  Laertius  to  acknowledge  that 
Descartes  has  not  advanced  the  practice  of  morals.  But  it  seems 
to  me  that  this  art  of  patience,  in  which  he  makes  the  art  of  living 
consist,  is  yet  not  the  whole.  A patience  without  hope  does  not 
endure  and  does  not  console,  and  it  is  here  that  Plato,  in  my 
opinion,  surpasses  others,  for  by  good  arguments  he  makes  us 
hope  for  a better  life  and  approaches  nearest,  to  Christianity.  It  is 
sufficient  to  read  the  excellent  dialogue  on  the  Immortality  of  the 
Soul  or  the  Death  of  Socrates,  which  Theophile  has  translated  into 
French,  to  conceive  a high  idea  of  it.  I think  that  Pythagoras 
did  the  same,  and  that  his  metempsychosis  was  merely  to  accom- 
modate himself  to  the  range  of  common  people,  but  that  among  his 
disciples  he  reasoned  quite  differently.  Also  Ocellus  Lucanus,  who 
was  one  of  them,  and  from  whom  we  have  a small  but  excellent 
fragment  on  the  universe,  says  not  a word  of  it. 

It  will  be  said  that  Descartes  establishes  very  well  the  exist- 
ence of  God  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  But  I fear  that 
we  are  deceived  by  fine  words,  for  the  God,  or  Perfect  Being,  of 
Descartes  is  not  aj&ed.  such  as  we  imagine  him  and  such  as  we 
desire;  that  is  to  say,  just  and  wise,  doing  everything  for  the  good 
of  creatures  as  far  as  is  possible;  but  rather  he  is  similar  to  the 
God  of  Spinoza,  namely,  the  principle  of  things,  and  a certain 
sovereign  power  or  primitive  nature  which  sets  everything  in 
action  and  does  everything  which  is  feasible.  The  God  of  Des- 
cartes has  neither  ivill  nor  understanding , since  according  to  Des- 
cartes he  has  not  the  Good  as  the  object  of  the  will  nor  the  True 
as  object  of  the  understanding.  Also  he  does  not  wish  that  his  God 
should  act  according  to  some  end,  and  for  this  reason  he  rejects 
from  philosophy  the  search  after  final  causes,  under  the  adroit 
pretext  that  we  are  not  capable  of  knowing  the  ends  of  God.  Plato, 
on  the  contrary,  has  very  well  shown  that,  God  being  the  author  of 
things  and  provided  he  acts  according  to  wisdom,  true  physics 


OH  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  DESCARTES. 


9 


is  to  know  tke  ends  and  the  uses  of  things,  for  science  is  the 
knowledge  of  reasons,  and  the  reasons  of  what  has  been  made  by 
an  understanding  are  the  final  causes  or  the  designs  of  him  who 
made  them,  and  these  appear  from  the  use  and  the  function  which 
they  have.  This  is  why  the  consideration  of  the  use  of  parts  is  so 
useful  in  anatomy.  This  is  why  a God  such  as  that  of  Descartes 
leaves  us  no  other  consolation  than  that  of  patience  par  force. 
He  says  in  some  passages  that  matter  passes  successively 
through  all  possible  forms ; that  is  to  say,  that  his  God 
does  everything  which  is  feasible  and  passes,  following  a necessary 
and  fated  order,  through  all  possible  combinations ; hut  for  this 
the  mere  necessity  of  matter  sufficed,  or  rather  his  God  is  nothing 
hut  this  necessity,  or  this  principle  of  necessity,  acting  in  matter  as 
it  can.  It  must  not,  therefore,  he  believed  that  this  God  has  any 
more  care  of  intelligent  creatures  than  of  the  others.  Each  one 
will  be  happy  or  unhappy,  according  as  it  will  find  itself  involved 
in  great  torrents  or  whirlpools ; and  he  is  right  in  recommending 
to  us  patience  without  hope  (in  place  of  felicity). 

But  some  one  of  the  better  class  of  Cartesians,  deluded  by  the 
fine  discourses  of  his  master,  will  say  to  me  that  he  nevertheless 
establishes  very  well  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  con- 
sequently a better  life.  When  I hear  these  things  I am  astonished 
at  the  ease  with  which  the  world  is  deceived,  if  one  can  merely 
play  adroitly  with  agreeable  words,  although  their  meaning  is 
corrupted;  for  just  as  hypocrites  abuse  piety,  heretics  the 
scriptures,  and  the  seditious  the  word  liberty,  so  the  ^Cartesians 
have  abused  those  grand  words,  the  existence  of  God  and  the 
immortality  of  the  soul.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  unravel 
this  mystery  and  to  show  them  that  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  following  Descartes,  is  worth  no  more  than  his  God.  I well 
believe  that  I shall  not  please  some,  for  people  do  not  enjoy 
being  awakened  when  their  minds  are  occupied  with  an  agree- 
able dream.  But  what  is  to  be  done  ? Descartes  teaches  that 
false  thoughts  should  be  uprooted  before  true  ones  are  introduced ; 
his  example  ought  to  be  followed,  and  I shall  think  that  I am  ren- 
dering a service  to  the  public  if  I can  disabuse  them  of  such 
dangerous  doctrines.  I say  then  that  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 


10 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


as  it  is  established  by  Descartes,  is  of  no  use  and  can  in  no  way 
console  us.  For  grant  that  the  soul  is  a substance  and  that  no  sub- 
stance perishes ; this  being  so  the  soul  will  not  perish,  but  in  reality 
also  nothing  perishes  in  nature.  But  like  matter  the  soul  too  will 
change  in  form,  and  as  the  matter  composing  a man  has  at  other 
times  formed  plants  and  other  animals,  so  this  soul  may  be  immor- 
tal in  reality  but  it  will  pass  through  a thousand  changes  and  not 
remember  at  all  what  it  has  been.  But  this  immortality  without 
memory  is  altogether  useless,  viewed  ethically,  for  it  destroys  all 
reward,  all  recompense,  and  all  punishment.  Of  what  use  would 
it  be  to  you,  sir,  to  become  king  of  China  on  condition  of  forgetting 
what  you  have  been.  Would  it  not  be  the  same  thing  as  if  God  at 
the  same  time  that  he  destroyed  you  created  a king  in  China? 
This  is  why,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  hope  of  the  human  race,  it 
must  be  proved  that  God  who  governs  all  is  wise  and  just,  and 
that  he  will  leave  nothing  without  recompense  and  without  punish- 
ment. These  are  the  great  foundations  of  ethics ; but  the  doctrine 
of  a God  who  does  not  act  for  the  Good,  and  of  a soul  which  is 
immortal  without  memory,  serves  only  to  deceive  the  simple  and 
to  pervert  the  spiritually  minded. 

I could,  moreover,  show  mistakes  in  the  pretended  demonstration 
of  Descartes,  for  there  are  still  many  things  to  be  proved  in  order 
to  complete  it.  But  I think  that  at  present  it  is  useless  to  amuse 
one’s  self  thus,  since  these  demonstrations  would  be  of  almost  no 
use,  as  I have  just  shown,  even  if  they  were  good. 


II. 


jSTotes  on  Spinoza's  Ethics. 

[From  the  Latin.] 

Part  I. — Concerning  God. 

Definition  1.  Self-Caused  is  that  tlie  essence  of  which 
involves  existence. 

Definition  2.  That  a thing  is  finite  which  can  he  limited  by 
another  thing  of  the  same  kind,  is  obscure.  For  what  is  thought 
limited  by  thought  ? Or  what  other  greater  than  it  is  given  ? He 
says  that  a body  is  limited  because  another  greater  than  it  can  be 
conceived.  Add  to  this  what  is  said  below,  Prop.  8. 

Definition  3.  Substance  is  that  which  is  in  itself  and  is  con- 
ceived through  itself.  This  also  is  obscure.  For  what  is  it  to  he 
in  itself?  Then  we  must  ask,  Are  to  be  in  itself  and  to  he  con- 
ceived through  itself  conjoined  cumulatively  or  disjunctively? 
That  is,  whether  this  means : Substance  is  that  which  is  in  itself, 
also  substance  is  that  which  is  conceived  through  itself ; or,  indeed, 
whether  it  means : Substance  is  that  in  which  both  these  concur ; 
namely,  that  it  both  is  in  itself  and  is  conceived  through  itself. 
Or  it  will  he  necessary  for  him  to  demonstrate  that  what  has  the 
one,  has  the  other,  when  rather,  on  the  contrary,  it  seems  that 
there  are  some  things  which  are  in  themselves  although  they  are 
not  conceived  through  themselves.  And  so  men  usually  conceive 
substances.  lie  adds  : Substance  is  that,  the  conception  of  which 
does  not  require  the  conception  of  another  thing.  But  there  is 
also  a difficulty  in  this,  for  in  the  following  definition  he  says,  An 
attribute  is  that  which  the  intellect  perceives  of  substance  as  con- 
stituting its  essence.  Therefore  the  concept  of  attribute  is  neces- 
sary for  the  formation  of  the  concept  of  substance.  If  you  say 
that  the  attribute  is  not  the  thing  itself,  but  require  indeed  that 
substance  shall  not  need  the  conception  of  another  thing,  I reply: 
You  must  explain  what  is  called  thing,  that  we  may  understand  the 
definition  and  how  the  attribute  is  not  the  thing. 


L2 


PHILOSOPHICAL,  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


Definition  4.  That  an  attribute  is  that  which  the  intellect  per- 
ceives of  substance  as  constituting  its  essence,  is  also  obscure.  For 
we  ask  whether  by  attribute  he  understands  every  reciprocal  predi- 
cate ; or  every  essential  predicate  whether  reciprocal  or  not ; or, 
finally,  every  first  or  nndemonstrable  essential  predicate.  Vide 
Definition  5. 

Definition  5.  .V  mode  is  that  which  is  in  another  and  is  con- 
ceived through  another.  It  seems,  therefore,  to  differ  from 
attribute  in  this,  that  attribute  is  indeed  something  in  substance, 
yet  is  conceived  through  itself.  And  this  explanation  added,  the 
obscurity  of  Definition  4,  is  removed. 

Definition  (3.  God,  he  says,  I define  as  a being  absolutely 
infinite,  or  a substance  consisting  in  infinite  attributes,  of  which 
each  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essence.  ITe  ought  to  show 
that  these  two  definitions  are  equivalents,  otherwise  he  cannot  sub- 
stitute the  one  in  place  of  the  other.  But  they  will  be  equivalents 
when  he  shall  have  shown  that  there  are  many  attributes  or  predi- 
cates in  the  nature  of  things,  which  are  conceived  through  them- 
selves ; likewise,  when  he  shall  have  shown  that  many  predicates 
can  co-exist.  Moreover,  every  definition  (although  it  may  be  true 
and  clear)  is  imperfect,  which,  although  understood,  allows  of 
doubt  as  to  the  possibility  of  the  thing  defined.  This,  moreover,  is 
such  a definition,  for  thus  far  it  may  be  doubted  whether  being 
does  not  imply  having  infinite  attributes.  Or  for  this  reason, 
because  it  may  be  questioned  whether  the  same  simple  essence  can 
he  expressed  by  many  diverse  attributes.  There  are,  indeed,  many 
definitions  of  compound  things  but  only  a single  one  of  a simple 
thing,  nor  does  it  seem  that  its  essence  can  be  expressed,  except  in 
a single  way. 

Definition  7.  A free  thing  is  that  which  exists  and  is  deter- 
mined to  action  by  the  necessity  of  its  own  nature;  a constrained 
thing  is  that  which  is  determined  to  existence  and  to  action  by 
another. 

Definition  8.  By  eternity  I understand  existence  itself  so  far 
as  it  is  conceived  to  follow  from  the  essence  of  a thing.  These 
definitions  [i.  e.,  7 and  8],  I approve. 

As  to  the  Axioms,  I note  these  things : The  first  is  obscure  as 
long  as  it  is  not  established  what  to  be  in  itself  is.  The  second  and 


13 


NOTES  ON  SPINOZA-’ S “ETHICS.” 


seventh  require  no  comment.  The  sixth  seems  incongruous,  for 
every  idea  agrees  with  its  ideate,  nor  do  I see  what  a false  idea  can 
he.  The  third,  fourth  and  fifth  can,  I think,  be  demonstrated. 

Proposition  1.  Substance  is  by  nature  prior  to  its  modifica- 
tions ; that  is,  modes,  for  in  Def.  5 he  said  that  by  modifications  of 
substance  he  understands  modes.  Still  he  did  not  explain  what  to 
be  by  nature  prior  is,  and  thus  this  proposition  cannot  be  demon- 
strated from  what  precedes.  Moreover,  by  nature  prior  to  another 
seems  to  mean  that  through  which  another  is  conceived.  Besides 
I confess  that  there  is  some  difficulty  in  this,  for  it  seems  that  not 
only  can  posterior  things  he  conceived  through  the  prior,  hut  also 
prior  things  through  the  posterior.  Nevertheless,  prior  by  nature 
may  be  defined  in  this  way,  as  that  which  can  he  conceived 
without  another  thing  being  conceived ; as  also,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  other,  second  thing,  cannot  he  conceived  except 
the  first  itself  be  conceived.  But  if  I may  say  what  the 
matter  is,  prior  by  nature  is  a little  too  broad;  for  example,  the 
property  of  ten,  that  it  is  0 — |— T,  is  by  nature  posterior  to  this,  that 
it  is  6 — (—  3 — 1 (because  the  latter  is  nearer  to  the  first  of  all:  ten  is 


ceived  without  this ; nay,  what  is  more,  it  can  he  demonstrated 
without  it.  I add  another  example:  The  property  in  a triangle, 
that  the  three  internal  angles  are  equal  to  two  right  angles  is  by 
nature  posterior  to  this : that  two  internal  angles  are  equal  to  the 
external  angle  of  the  third,  and  nevertheless  the  former  can  be  con- 
ceived without  the  latter ; nay,  even,  although  not  equally  easily, 
it  can  he  demonstrated  without  it. 

Proposition  2.  Two  substances  whose  attributes  are  diverse 
have  nothing  in  common.  If  by  attributes  he  means  predicates 
which  are  conceived  through  themselves,  I concede  the  proposi- 
tion, it  being  posited,  however,  that  there  are  two  substances,  A 
and  B,  and  that  c is  an  attribute  of  substance  A,  d an  attribute  of 
substance  B ; or  if  c,  e are  all  the  attributes  of  substance  A,  like- 
wise d,  f are  all  the  attributes  of  substance  B.  It  is  not  so  if  these 
two  substances  have  some-  diverse  attributes,  some  common  attri- 
butes, as  if  the  attributes  of  A were  c,  d and  of  B itself  were 
d,  f.  But  if  he  denies  that  this  can  happen,  the  impossibility  must 


and  nevertheless  it  can  be  con- 


14 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


be  demonstrated,  lie  will,  perchance,  in  case  of  objection,  dem- 
onstrate the  proposition  itself  in  this  way : Because  d and  c equally 
express  the  same  essence  (since  ex  hypothesi  they  are  attributes  of 
the  same  substance,  A),  and  for  the  same  reason  also  d and  / (since 
also  ex  hypothesi  they  are  attributes  of  the  same  substance,  B)  ; 
therefore  c and  / express  the  same  essence.  Whence  it  follows 
that  A and  B are  the  same  substance,  which  is  contrary  to  the 
hypothesis  ; therefore  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  two  diverse  substances 
have  anything  in  common.  I reply,  that  I do  not  concede  that 
there  could  be  two  attributes  which  can  be  conceived  through 
themselves,  and  nevertheless  express  the  same  thing.  For  when- 
ever this  happens  then  these  two  attributes,  expressing  the  same 
thing  in  a diverse  way,  can  moreover  be  resolved,  or  at  least  one  or 
the  other  of  them.  This  I can  easily  demonstrate. 

Proposition  3.  Things  which  have  nothing  in  common  cannot 
be  the  one  the  cause  of  the  other,  by  Axioms  5 and  4. 

Proposition  4.  Two  or  more  distinct  things  are  distinguished 
one  from  the  other,  either  by  the  difference  of  the  attributes  of  the 
substances  or  by  the  difference  of  their  modifications.  He  demon- 
strates this  thus  : Everything  which  exists,  exists  either  in  itself  or 
in  something  else,  by  Axiom  1 ; that  is,  by  Defs.  3 and  5,  nothing 
is  granted  in  addition  to  the  understanding,  except  substances  and 
their  modifications.  [Here  I am  surprised  that  he  forgets  attri- 
butes for,  Def.  5,  by  modification  of  substance  he  understands  only 
modes ; it  follows,  therefore,  either  that  he  spoke  ambiguously,  or 
that  attributes  are  not  numbered  by  him  among  the  things  existing 
outside  of  the  understanding,  but  only  substances  and  modes. 
Still  he  could  have  proved  the  proposition  more  easily  if  only  he 
had  added,  that  things  which  can  be  conceived  through  attributes  or 
modifications  are  necessarily  known  and  therefore  distinguished.  J 

Proposition  5.  There  cannot  be  given  in  the  nature  of  things 
two  or  more  substances  having  the  same  nature  or  attribute. 

[I  note  here  what  seems  to  be  obscure  in  this,  viz  : in  the  nature 
of  things.  Hoes  he  mean,  in  the  universe  of  existing  things,  or  in 
the  region  of  ideas  or  possible  essences  ? Then  it  is  not  clear 
whether  he  wishes  to  say  that  many  essences  are  not  given  having* 
the  same  common  attribute,  or  whether  he  wishes  to  say  many 


notes  on  spinoza's  “ethics.” 


15 


individuals  are  not  given  having  the  same  essence.  I wonder 
indeed  why  he  here  employs  the  words  nature  and  attribute  as 
equivalents,  unless  he  understands  by  attribute  that  which  contains 
the  whole  nature.  While  being  posited,  I do  not  see  how  there 
can  be  given  many  attributes  of  the  same  substance  which  may  be 
conceived  through  themselves.]  Demonstration:  If  they  are  dis- 
tinguished, they  are  distinguished  either  by  their  modifications  or 
by  their  attributes ; if  by  their  modifications,  then  since  substance 
is  by  nature  prior  to  its  modifications,  by  Prop.  1,  their  modifica- 
tions being  put  aside,  they  must  still  be  distinguished,  therefore,  by 
their  attributes ; if  by  their  attributes,  then  two  substances  are  not 
given  possessing  the  same  attribute.  I reply  that  a paralogism 
seems  to  lurk  here.  Por  two  substances  can  be  distinguished  by 
attributes,  and  yet  have  some  common  attribute,  provided  they  also 
have  in  addition  some  which  are  peculiar.  For  example,  A and  B ; 

c d d e 

the  attributes  of  the  one  being  c d,  of  the  other,  d e.  I remark  that 
Prop.  1 is  only  useful  for  this.  But  it  might  have  been  omitted 
because  it  suffices  that  substance  can  be  conceived  without  modifi- 
cations whether  it  be  by  nature  prior  or  not. 

Pkoposition  0.  One  substance  cannot  be  produced  by  another 
substance,  for  two  substances,  by  Prop.  5,  do  not  possess  the  same 
attribute,  therefore  they  have  nothing  in  common,  by  Prop.  2 ; 
therefore,  it  cannot  be  that  one  is  the  cause  of  the  other,  by  Axiom 
5.  The  same  in  other  words  and  more  briefly:  Because  what  is 
conceived  through  itself  cannot  be  conceived  through  another  as 
cause,  by  Axiom  I.  But  I reply,  that  I grant  the  demonstration,  if 
substance  is  understood  as  a thing  which  is  conceived  through 
itself;  it  is  otherwise  if  it  is  understood  as  a thing  which  is  in 
itself,  as  men  commonly  understand  it,  unless  it  be  shown  that  to  be 
in  itself  and  to  be  conceived  through  itself  are  the  same  thing. 

Pkoposition  7.  Existence  belongs  to  the  nature  of  substance. 
Substance  cannot  be  produced  by  anything  else,  Prop.  6.  There- 
fore it  is  the  cause  of  itself ; that  is,  by  Def.  1,  its  essence  involves 
existence.  He  is  not  unjustly  censured  because  sometimes  he 
employs  cause  of  itself  as  a definite  something  to  which  he  ascribes 
a peculiar  signification,  Def.  1;  sometimes  he  uses  it  in  the 
common  and  vulgar  meaning.  Nevertheless,  the  remedy  is  easy,  if 


16 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


lie  converts  this'Def.  1 into  an  Axiom  and  says:  Whatever  is  not 
by  another,  is  by  itself  or  of  its  own  essence.  But  here  other  diffi- 
culties still  exist:  the  reasoning,  namely,  is  valid  only  when  it  is 
posited  that  substance  can  exist.  For  it  is  then  necessary  that, 
since  it  cannot  he  produced  by  another,  it  exists  by  itself,  and  thus 
necessarily  exists  ; but  it  must  he  demonstrated  that  it  is  a possible 
substance;  that  is,  that  it  can  he  conceived.  It  seems  that  it  can 
he  demonstrated  from  the  fact  that  if  nothing  can  he  conceived 
through  itself  nothing  also  can  he  conceived  through  another,  and 
hence  nothing  at  all  can  he  conceived.  But  that  it  may  be  shown 
distinctly,  we  must  consider  that  if  a is  posited  as  conceived 
through  b,  there  is  in  the  conception  of  a itself  the  conception  of  b 
itself.  And  again,  if  b is  conceived  through  c,  there  is  in  the  con- 
ception of  b the  conception  of  c itself,  and  thus  the  conception  of  c 
itself  will  be  in  the  conception  of  a itself,  and  so  on  to  the  last. 
But  if  any  one  reply  that  the  last,  is  not  given,  I answer,  neither  is 
the  first,  which  I thus  show.  Because  in  the  conception  of  that 
which  is  conceived  through  another  there  is  nothing  except  what 
belongs  to  the  other,  so  step  by  step  through  many  there  will  either 
be  nothing  at  all  in  it  or  nothing  except  what  is  conceived  through 
it  itself;  which  demonstration,  I think,  is  wholly  new  but  infalli- 
ble. By  this  means  we  can  demonstrate  that  what  is  conceived 
through  itself  can  he  conceived.  But  nevertheless,  thus  far  it  can 
be  doubted  whether  it  be  possible  in  the  way  in  which  it  is  here 
assumed  to  be  possible,  certainly  not  for  that  which  can  he  con- 
ceived, hut  for  that  of  which  some  cause  can  he  conceived,  to  be 
resolved  into  the  first.  For  those  things  which  can  he  conceived 
by  us,  nevertheless  cannot  therefore  all  be  produced,  on  account  of 
others  which  are  preferable  with  which  they  are  incompatible. 
Therefore,  being  which  is  conceived  through  itself  must  be  proved 
to  be  in  actual  existence  by  the  additional  evidence  that  because 
those  things  exist  which  are  conceived  through  another,  therefore 
that  also  through  which  they  are  conceived,  exists.  You  see  what 
very  different  reasoning  is  needed  for  accurately  proving  that  a 
thing  exists  through  itself.  However,  perhaps  there  is  no  need  of 
this  extreme  caution. 


17 


notes  on  spinoza's  “ethics.” 

Proposition  8.  Every  substance  is  necessarily  infinite,  since 
otherwise  it  would  be  limited  by  another  of  the  same  nature,  by 
Def.  2,  and  two  substances  would  be  given  with  the  same  attribute, 
contrary  to  Prop.  5.  This  proposition  must  be  understood  thus : 
A thing  which  is  conceived  through  itself  is  infinite  in  its  own 
kind,  and  thus  is  to  be  admitted.  But  the  demonstration  labors 
not  only  with  obscurity  as  respects  this  is  limited , but  also  with 
uncertainty,  by  reason  of  Prop.  5.  In  the  scholium  he  has  excellent 
reasoning  to  prove  that  the  tiling  which  is  conceived  through  itself 
is  one,  of  course  after  its  kind,  since  many  individuals  are  posited 
as  existing,  therefore  there  ought  to  be  a reason  in  nature  why 
there  are  so  many,  not  more.  The  reason  which  accounts  for  there 
being  so  many  accounts  for  this  one  and  that  one;  hence  also  for 
this  other  one.  But  this  reason  is  not  found  in  one  of  these  rather 
than  in  another.  Therefore  it  is  outside  of  all.  One  objection 
might  be  made,  if  it  were  said  that  the  number  of  these  is  bound- 
less or  none,  or  that  it  exceeds  every  number.  But  it  can  be 
disposed  of,  if  we  assume  only  some  of  these  and  ask  why  these 
exist,  or,  if  we  posit  more  having  something  in  common,  for  exam- 
ple existing  in  the  same  place,  why  they  exist  in  this  place. 

Proposition  9.  The  more  reality  or  being  a thing  has  the 
greater  the  number  of  its  attributes.  [He  ought  to  have  explained 
what  is  meant  by  reality  or  being,  for  these  terms  are  liable  to 
various  significations.]  Demonstration:  It  is  clear  from  Def.  4. 
Thus  the  author.  It  seems  to  me  not  to  be  clear  from  it.  For  one 
thing  may  have  more  of  reality  than  another,  as  what  is  itself 
greater  in  its  own  kind,  or  has  a greater  part  of  some  attribute; 
for  example,  a circle  has  more  extension  than  the  inscribed  square. 
And  still  it  may  be  doubted  whether  there  are  many  attributes  of 
the  same  substance,  in  the  way  in  which  the  author  employs  attri- 
butes. I confess,  however,  that  if  this  be  admitted  and  if  it  is 
posited  that  attributes  are  compatible,  substance  is  more  perfect 
according  as  it  has  more  attributes. 

Proposition  10.  Each  particular  attribute  of  the  one  sub- 
stance must  be  conceived  through  itself,  by  Defs.  4 and  3.  But 
hence  it  follows,  as  I have  several  times  urged,  that  there  is  but  a 
single  attribute  of  one  substance,  if  it  expresses  the  whole  essence. 

2 


IS 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


Proposition  11.  God,  or  substance,  consisting  of  infinite 
attributes,  of  which  each  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essence, 
necessarily  exists.  He  offers  three  demonstrations  of  this.  First, 
because  he  is  substance ; therefore,  by  Prop.  7,  he  exists.  But  in 
this  he  supposes  both  that  substance  necessarily  exists,  which,  up  to 
Prop.  7,  was  not  sufficiently  demonstrated,  and  that  God  is  a possi- 
ble substance,  which  is  not  equally  easy  to  demonstrate.  Second. 
There  must  be  a reason  as  well  why  a thing  is  as  why  it  is  not. 
But  there  can  be  no  reason  why  God  does  not  exist,  not  in  his  own 
nature  for  it  does  not  involve  a contradiction ; not  in  another,  for 
that  other  will  either  have  the  same  nature  and  attribute,  and  hence 
will  be  God,  or  will  not  have  them  and  hence  will  have  nothing  in 
common  with  God,  and  thus  it  can  neither  posit  nor  prevent  his 
existence.  I reply,  1st,  that  it  is  not  yet  proved  that  the  nature  of 
God  does  not  involve  a contradiction,  although  the  author  says  it  is 
absurd  to  assert,  without  proof,  that  it  does.  2d.  There  might  be 
something  having  the  same  nature  with  God  in  some  things,  not  in 
all.  Third.  Pinite  beings  exist  (by  experience)  ; therefore  if  the 
infinite  does  not  exist  there  will  be  beings  more  powerful  than  the 
infinite  being.  It  may  be  answered,  if  it  implies  anything,  infinite 
being  will  have  no  power  at  all.  I need  say  nothing  of  the  impro- 
priety of  calling  the  potentiality  of  existence  a power. 

Propositions  13  and  13.  Ho  attribute  of  substance  can  be 
conceived,  from  which  it  would  follow  that  substance  can  be 
divided ; or  substance  taken  absolutely  is  indivisible.  For  it  will  be 
destroyed  by  division  and  the  parts  will  not  be  infinite  and  hence 
not  substances.  Many  substances  of  the  same  nature  would  be 
given.  I grant  it  of  a thing  existing  through  itself.  TIence  the 
corollary  follows  that  no  substance,  and  therefore  no  corporeal  sub- 
stance is  divisible. 

Proposition  11.  Besides  God,  no  substance  can  be  granted  or 
conceived.  Because  all  attributes  belong  to  God,  nor  are  several 
substances  having  the  same  attribute  given ; therefore,  no  sub- 
stance besides  God  is  given.  All  these  suppose  the  definition  of 
substance,  namely,  being  which  is  conceived  through  itself,  and 
many  others  noted  above  which  are  not  to  be  admitted.  [It  does 
not  yet  seem  certain  to  me  that  bodies  are  substances.  It  is  other- 
wise with  minds.] 


notes  on  spinoza's  “ethics.” 


19 


Corollary  1.  God  is  one. 

Corollary  2.  Extension  or  thought  are  either  attributes  of 
God,  or,  by  Axiom  . . .,  modifications  of  attributes  of  God.  [This 
is  speaking  confusedly ; besides  he  has  not  yet  shown  that  extension 
and  thought  are  attributes  or  conceived  through  themselves.] 

Proposition  15.  Whatever  is,  is  in  God,  and  without  God 
nothing  can  be,  or  be  conceived.  For  since  there  is  no  substance 
except  God,  Prop.  14,  so  all  other  things  will  be  modifications  of 
God,  or  modes,  since  besides  substances  and  inodes  nothing  is  given. 
[Again  he  omits  attributes.] 

Proposition  16.  From  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature  must 
follow  an  infinite  number  of  things  in  infinite  ways ; that  is,  all 
things  which  can  fall  within  the  sphere  of  infinite  intellect,  by 
Def.  6. 

Corollary  1.  Hence  it  follows  that  God  is  the  efficient  cause 
of  all  things  which  fall  under  his  intellect. 

Corollary  2.  God  is  a cause  through  himself,  not  indeed  per 
accidens. 

Corollary  3.  God  is  the  absolutely  first  cause. 

Proposition  17.  God  acts  solely  by  the  laws  of  his  own 
nature  and  is  not  constrained  hv  any  one,  since  there  is  nothing 
outside  of  himself. 

Corollary  1.  Hence  it  follows,  1st,  that  there  can  be  no  cause 
which,  either  extrinsically  or  intrinsically,  besides  the  perfection  of 
his  own  nature,  moves  God  to  act. 

Corollary  2.  God  only  is  a free  cause. 

In  the  Scholiuyc  he  further  explains  that  God  created  every- 
thing which  is  in  his  intellect  (although,  nevertheless,  it  seems  that 
he  has  created  only  those  which  he  wished).  He  says  also  that  the 
intellect  of  God  differs  from  our  intellect  in  essence,  and  that, 
except  equivocally,  the  name  intellect  cannot  be  attributed  to  both, 
just  as  the  Dog,  the  heavenly  constellation,  and  a dog,  a barking 
animal,  differ.  The  thing  caused  differs  from  its  cause  in  that 
which  it  has  from  the  cause.  A man  differs  from  man  as  respects 
the  existence  which  he  has  from  that  man ; he  differs  from  God  as 
respects  the  essence  which  he  has  from  God. 


20 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


Proposition  IS.  God  is  the  immanent,  not  the  transient 
cause  of  all  things.  From  this  it  follows  that  God  only  is  sub- 
stance; other  things  are  its  modes. 

Proposition  19.  God,  or  all  his  attributes  are  eternal.  For 
his  essence  involves  existence,  and  his  attributes  involve  his  essence. 
In  addition,  the  author  cites  and  approves  the  way  in  which  he 
demonstrated  this  in  Prop.  19  of  his  “Principles  of  Descartes.” 

Proposition  20.  The  essence  of  God  and  his  existence  are  one 
and  the  same  thing.  Tie  proves  all  this  from  the  fact  that  the 
attributes  of  God  because  eternal  (by  Prop.  19),  express  existence 
(by  the  definition  of  eternity).  But  they  also  express  essence,  by 
the  definition  of  attribute.  Therefore  essence  and  existence  are 
the  same  thing  in  God.  I answer  that  this  does  not  follow,  hut 
only  that  they  are  expressed  the  same.  I note,  moreover,  that 
this  proposition  supposes  the  preceding,  but  if  in  place  of  the  pre- 
ceding proposition  its  demonstration  be  employed  in  the  demon- 
stration of  this,  a senseless  circumlocution  will  he  apparent.  Thus  : 
I prove  that  the  essence  and  existence  of  God  are  one  and  the  same 
thing,  because  the  attributes  of  God  express  both  existence  and 
essence.  They  express  essence  by  the  definition  of  attribute,  they 
express  existence  because  they  are  eternal ; they  are,  moreover, 
eternal  because  they  involve  existence,  for  they  express  the  essence 
of  God  which  involves  existence.  What  need  is  there,  therefore, 
of  mentioning  the  eternity  of  the  attributes  and  Prop.  19,  when  the 
point  merely  is  to  prove  that  the  existence  and  essence  of  God 
are  one  and  the  same  thing,  since  the  essence  of  God  involves 
existence.  The  rest  is  pompously  introduced  that  it  may  be  fash- 
ioned into  a sort  of  demonstration.  Reasonings  of  this  sort  are 
exceedingly  common  with  those  who  do  not  possess  the  true  art  of 
demonstration. 

Corollary  1.  Hence  it  follows  that  God’s  existence,  like  his 
essence,  is  an  eternal  truth.  I do  not  see  how  this  proposition  fol- 
lows from  the  preceding;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  far  truer  and  clearer 
than  the  preceding.  For  it  is  immediately  apparent  when  it  is 
posited  that  the  essence  of  God  involves  existence,  although  it  may 
not  be  admitted  that  they  are  one  and  the  same. 

Corollary  2.  God  and  all  his  attributes  are  immutable. 
This  the  author  proposes  and  proves  obscurely  and  confusedly. 


21 


notes  on  spinoza's  “ethics.” 

Proposition  21.  All  things  which  follow  from  the  absolute 
nature  of  any  attribute  of  God  must  always  exist  and  be  infinite ; 
or,  in  other  words,  are  eternal  and  infinite  through  the  said  attri- 
bute. He  demonstrates  this  obscurely  and  quite  at  length, 
although  it  is  easy. 

Proposition  22.  'Whatsoever  follows  from  any  attribute  of 
God,  in  so  far  as  it  is  modified  by  a modification  which  exists  nec- 
essarily and  as  infinite  through  the  said  attribute,  must  also  exist 
necessarily  and  as  infinite.  He  says  the  demonstration  proceeds  as 
in  the  preceding.  Therefore,  also  obscurely.  I could  wish  that  he 
had  given  an  example  of  such  a modification. 

Proposition  23.  Every  mode,  which  exists  both  necessarily 
and  as  infinite,  must  necessarily  follow  either  from  the  absolute 
nature  of  some  attribute  of  God,  or  from  some  attribute  modified 
by  a modification  which  exists  necessarily,  and  as  infinite.  That  is, 
such  a mode  follows  from  the  absolute  nature  of  some  attribute 
either  immediately  or  mediately  through  another  such  mode. 

Proposition  24.  The  essence  of  things  produced  by  God  does 
not  involve  existence;  otherwise,  by  Def.  1,  they  would  be  the 
cause  of  themselves,  which  is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis.  This 
from  elsewhere  is  manifest ; hut  this  demonstration  is  a paralogism. 
For  cause  of  itself,  by  his  Def.  1,  has  not  retained  its  common 
meaning,  but  has  received  a peculiar  one.  Therefore  the  author 
cannot  substitute  the  common  meaning  of  the  word  for  the  pecul- 
iar one  assumed  by  him  at  his  will,  unless  he  shows  that  they  are 
equivalent.  [Leibnitz  has  remarked  on  the  margin  of  the  manu- 
script: From  this  proposition  it  follows,  contrary  to  Spinoza  him- 
self, that  things  are  not  necessary.  For  that  is  not  necessary  whose 
essence  does  not  involve  existence. — Gerhardt .] 

Proposition  25.  God  is  the  efficient  cause  not  only  of  the 
existence  of  things  but  also  of  their  essence.  Otherwise  the  essence 
of  things  could  be  conceived  without  God,  by  Axiom  4.  But  this 
proof  is  of  no  moment.  For  even  if  we  concede  that  the  essence 
of  things  cannot  be  conceived  without  God,  from  Prop.  15,  it  does 
not  therefore  follow  that  God  is  the  cause  of  the  essence  of  things. 
For  the  fourth  axiom  does  not  say  this:  That  without  which  a 
thing  cannot  he  conceived  is  its  cause  (which  would  indeed  he 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


22 

false,  for  a circle  cannot  be  conceived  without  a center,  a line  with- 
out a point,  but  the  center  is  not  the  cause  of  the  circle  nor  the 
point  the  cause  of  the  line) , but  it  says  only  this : Knowledge  of  the 
effect  involves  knowledge  of  the  cause , which  is  quite  different. 
For  this  axiom  is  not  convertible  ; not  to  mention  that  to  involve 
is  one  thing,  not  able  to  be  conceived  without  it  is  another.  Knowl- 
edge of  a parabola  involves  in  it  knowledge  of  a focus,  nevertheless 
it  can  be  conceived  without  it. 

Corollary.  Individual  things  are  nothing  but  modifications 
of  the  attributes  of  God,  or  modes  by  which  the  attributes  of  God 
are  expressed  in  a fixed  and  definite  manner.  This,  he  says,  is 
evident  from  Def.  5 and  Prop.  15,  but  it  does  not  appear  in  what 
way  the  corollary  is  connected  with  this  Prop.  25.  Certainly 
Spinoza  is  not  a great  master  of  demonstration.  This  corollary  is 
sufficiently  evident  from  what  was  said  above;  but  it  is  true  if  it 
is  understood  in  a right  sense,  not  indeed  that  things  are  such 
modes,  but  modes  of  conceiving  particular  things  are  determinate 
modes  of  conceiving  divine  attributes. 

Proposition  28.  Every  individual  thing,  or  everything  which 
is  finite  and  has  a conditioned  existence,  cannot  exist  or  be  condi- 
tioned to  act,  unless  it  be  conditioned  for  existence  and  action  by  a 
cause  other  than  itself,  which  also  is  finite,  and  has  a conditioned 
existence;  and  likewise  this  by  another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 
Because  nothing  conditioned,  finite  and  existing  in  a certain  time, 
can  follow  from  the  absolute  essence  of  God.  From  this  opinion 
strictly  taken  many  absurd  consequences  follow.  For  indeed 
things  will  not  follow  in  this  way  from  the  nature  of  God.  For 
the  conditioning  thing  itself  is  again  conditioned  by  another,  and 
so  on  ad  infinitum.  In  no  way,  therefore,  are  things  determined  by 
God.  God  only  contributes  of  himself  certain  absolute  and  gen- 
eral things.  It  would  be  more  correct  to  say,  that  one  particular 
thing  is  not  determined  by  another  in  a progression  ad  infinitum, 
for  otherwise,  indeed,  they  always  remain  indeterminate,  however 
far  you  progress ; but  rather  all  particular  things  are  determined 
by  God.  Eor  are  posterior  things  the  full  cause  of  prior  things, 
but  rather  God  creates  posterior  things  so  that  they  are  connected 
with  the  prior,  according  to  rules  of  wisdom.  If  we  say  that  prior 


23 


NOTES  OX  SPINOZA^S  “ETHICS.” 

things  are  tlie  efficient. causes  of  tlie  posterior,  the  posterior  will  m 
turn  be  in  a way  the  final  cause  of  the  prior,  according  to  the 
view  of  those  who  claim  that  God  operates  according  to  ends. 

Proposition  29.  ]ST othing  in  the  nature  of  things  is  contingent, 
but  all  things  are  conditioned  to  exist  and  operate  in  a particular 
manner  by  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature.  The  demonstration 
is  obscure  and  abrupt,  deduced  from  preceding  propositions  abrupt, 
obscure  and  doubtful.  It  depends  upon  the  definition  of  contin- 
gent, which  he  has  nowhere  given.  I,  with  others,  employ 
contingent  for  that  the  essence  of  which  does  not  involve  existence. 
In  this  meaning,  particular  things  are  contingent,  according  to 
Spinoza  himself,  by  Prop.  24.  But  if  you  employ  contingent 
according  to  the  custom  of  certain  scholastics,  a custom  unknown 
to  Aristotle  and  to  other  men  and  to  the  usage  of  life,  for  that 
which  happens,  so  that  a reason  can  in  no  way  he  given  why  it 
should  occur  thus  rather  than  otherwise;  the  cause  of  which  also, 
all  the  requisites  as  well  within  as  without  it  having  been  posited, 
was  equally  disposed  toward  acting  or  not  acting ; I think  that  such 
a contingent  implies  that  all  things  are  by  their  nature,  according 
to  the  hypothesis  of  the  divine  nature  and  the  condition  of  things, 
certain  and  determinate,  although  unknown  to  us,  and  do  not  have 
their  determination  in  themselves  hut  through  the  supposition  or 
hypothesis  of  things  external  to  them. 

Proposition  30.  The  actual  intellect,  whether  finite  or 
infinite,  must  comprehend  the  attributes  of  God  and  the  modifica- 
tions of  God,  and  nothing  else.  This  proposition,  which  is  suffi- 
ciently clear  from  the  preceding  and  in  a right  sense  true,  our 
author  according  to  his  custom  proves  hv  others  which  are  obscure, 
doubtful  and  remote ; namely,  that  a true  idea  must  agree  with  its 
ideate,  that  is,  as  known  per  se  (so  he  says,  although  I do  not  see 
how  what  is  known  per  se  is  any  the  more  true)  ; that  what  is 
contained  in  the  intellect  objectively  must  necessarily  he  granted 
in  nature;  that  but  one  substance  is  given,  namely,  God.  Never- 
theless, these  propositions  are  obscure,  doubtful  and  far-fetched. 
The  genius  of  the  author  seems  to  have  been  greatly  distorted. 
He  rarely  proceeds  by  a clear  and  natural  road ; he  always  goes  by 
an  abrupt  and  circuitous  one.  And  most  of  his  demonstrations 
rather  surprise  (. surprennent ) the  mind  than  enlighten  it. 


24  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 

Proposition  31.  The  actual  intellect,  whether  finite  or 
infinite,  as  will,  desire,  love,  etc.,  should  he  referred  to  passive 
nature  ( natv.ro,  naturata) , not  to  active  nature  ( natura  naturans). 
ITe  understands  by  active  nature,  God  and  his  absolute  attributes ; 
by  passive  nature,  his  modes.  But  the  intellect  is  nothing  else 
than  a certain  mode  of  thought.  Hence  elsewhere  he  says  that 
God  properly  does  not  know  or  will.  I do  not  assent  to  this. 

Proposition  32.  Will  cannot  be  called  a free  cause,  but  only  a 
necessary  cause,  because,  forsooth,  that  is  free  which  is  determined 
by  itself,  The  will,  moreover,  is  a mode  of  thought  and  so  is  mod- 
ified by  another. 

Proposition  33.  Things  could  have  been  produced  by  God  in 
no  other  manner  or  order  than  that  in  which  they  have  been  pro- 
duced. For  they  follow  from  the  immutable  nature  of  God.  This 
proposition  is  true  or  false  according  as  it  is  explained.  On  the 
hypothesis  of  a divine  will  choosing  the  best  or  operating  most 
perfectly,  certainly  nothing  but  these  could  have  been  produced ; 
but  according  to  the  nature  of  things  regarded  in  themselves,  things 
might  have  been  produced  otherwise.  Just  as  we  say  that  the 
angels  confirmed  [in  holiness]  cannot  sin,  in  spite  of  their  liberty; 
they  can  if  they  will  but  they  do  not  will.  They  may  be  able, 
absolutely  speaking,  to  will  it,  but  in  the  actually  existing  state 
of  affairs  they  are  not  able  to  will  it.  The  author  rightly  acknowl- 
edges in  the  scholium  that  a thing  is  rendered  impossible  in  two 
ways,  either  because  it  implies  it  in  itself  or  because  no  external 
cause  is  given  suitable  for  producing  it.  In  the  second  scholium  he 
denies  that  God  does  all  things  with  the  Good  in  view  ( sub  rations 
boni).  He  certainly  has  denied  to  him  will,  and  he  thinks  that 
those  differing  from  him  subject  God  to  fate,  although  nevertheless 
he  himself  confesses  that  God  does  all  things  by  reason  of  the 
Perfect  (sub  rations  perfecti). 

Proposition  34.  God’s  power  is  his  very  essence,  because  it 
follows  from  the  nature  of  essence  that  he  is  the  cause  of  himself 
and  of  other  things. 

Proposition  35.  Whatever  exists  in  the  power  of  God  exists 
necessarily;  that  is,  follows  from  his  essence. 

Proposition  36.  Nothing  exists  from  whose  nature  some 
effect  does  not  follow,  because  it  expresses  the  nature  of  God  in  a 


25 


NOTES  ON  SPINOZA^  “ETHIC'S.” 

certain  and  determined  mode ; that  is,  by  Prop.  3-t,  the  power  of 
God  [it  does  not  follow,  but  it  is  nevertheless  true]. 

He  adds  an  Appendix  against  those  who  think  that  God  acts 
with  an  end  in  view,  mingling  true  with  false.  For  although  it 
may  be  true  that  all  things  do  not  happen  for  the  sake  of  man, 
nevertheless  it  does  not  follow  that  God  acts  without  will  or  with- 
out knowledge  of  good. 


In  the  copy  of  Spinoza’s  Opera  P osthuma , now  contained  in  the 
royal  library  at  Hanover,  Leibnitz  has  written  the  following  notes  : 

Part  Second  of  the  “Ethics.” 

On  Def.  4,  “By  an  adequate  idea,  I mean  an  idea  which,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  considered  in  itself,  without  relation  to  the  object  has  all 
the  properties  or  intrinsic  marks  of  a true  idea,”  Leibnitz  writes : 
Lie  had  therefore  to  explain  what  a time  idea  is,  for  in  Part  I, 
Axiom  1,  it  is  employed  only  as  agreement  with  its  ideate. 

At  the  end  of  the  Proof  of  Prop.  1,  “Thought  is  an  attribute  of 
God  or  God  is  a thinking  thing,”  Leibnitz  adds : In  the  same  way 
he  will  prove  that  God  fears  and  hopes.  If  you  reply  that,  they 
are  modes  of  thought,  it  can  perhaps  be  said  that  thought  is  a 
mode  of  another  attribute. 

On  Prop.  6,  “The  modes  of  any  given  attribute  are  caused  by 
God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  through  the  attribute  of  which 
they  are  modes,  and  not  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  through  any 
other  attribute,”  Leibnitz  remarks : I doubt  it,  because  it  seems 
that  something  besides  is  required  for  modifying  any  attribute. 
The  reason  is  the  same  with  that  which  concludes  that  not  all 
exist;  on  the  contrary,  that  certain  distinct  ones  exist. 

On  Prop.  12,  “Whatever  conies  to  pass  in  the  object  of  the  idea, 
which  constitutes  the  human  mind,  must  be  perceived  by  the 
human  mind,  or  there  will  necessarily  be  an  idea  in  the  human 
mind  of  this  occurrence.  That  is,  if  the  object  of  the  idea  consti- 
tuting the  human  mind  be  a body,  nothing  can  take  place  in  that 
body  without  being  perceived  by  the  mind,”  is  written : Ideas  do 
not  act.  The  mind  acts.  The  whole  world  is  indeed  the  object 
of  each  mind.  The  whole  world  in  a certain  way  is  perceived  hv 


20  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

each  mind.  The  whole  world  in  a certain  way  is  perceived  hy  any 
mind  whatever.  The  world  is  one,  and  nevertheless  minds  are 
diverse.  Therefore  the  mind  is  made  not  through  the  idea  of  the 
body,  hut  because  God  in  'various  ways  intuites  the  world  as  I do  a 
city. 

To  Prop.  13,  “The  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human 
mind  is  the  body;  in  other  words,  a certain  mode  of  extension 
which  actually  exists,  and  nothing  else,”  Leibnitz  adds : Hence  it 
follows  that  some  mind  is  momentarily,  at  least,  in  the  same  man. 

At  the  end  of  the  Proof  to  Prop.  15,  “The  idea  which  consti- 
tutes the  actual  being  of  the  human  mind,  is  not  simple,  but 
compounded  of  a great  number  of  ideas,”  he  remarks : Therefore, 
also,  the  human  mind  is  an  aggregate  of  many  minds. 

On  Prop.  20,  “The  idea  or  knowledge  of  the  human  mind,  is 
also  in  God,  following  in  God  in  the  same  manner,  and  being 
referred  to  God  in  the  same  manner,  as  the  idea  or  knowledge  of 
the  human  body,”  be  writes : Therefore  the  idea  of  the  idea  is 
given.  Hence  it  would  follow  that  the  thing  would  go  on  in 
infinitum,  if  indeed  the  human  mind  is  an  idea. 

On  the  words  of  the  Scholium  to  Prop.  21,  “That  is,  mind  and 
body  are  one  and  the  same  individual,  conceived  now  under  the 
attribute  of  thought,  now  under  the  attribute  of  extension,”  he 
remarks  : Therefore,  in  fact,  mind  and  body  do  not  differ  any  more 
than  a city  regarded  in  different  ways  differs  from  itself.  It  fol- 
lows that  extension  does  not  in  fact  differ  from  thought,  aToira. 
At  the  end  of  this  scholium  Leibnitz  adds : Hence  it  follows  that 
to  understand  the  idea  of  the  body,  or  the  mind,  there  is  no  need 
of  another  idea. 

On  Prop.  23,  “The  mind  does  not  know  itself,  except  in  so  far 
as  it  perceives  the  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the  body,”  he 
writes : If  the  mind  perceives  itself  in  any  way  whatsoever,  it  fol- 
lows that  there  is  no  idea  of  the  mind  in  God,  other  than  from  the 
mind  itself,  for  it  perceives  itself  in  so  far  as  it  expresses  God  per- 
ceiving the  mind. 

On  the  words  in  the  proof  of  this  proposition,  “The  human  mind 
does  not  know  the  human  body  itself,”  he  remarks : On  the  con- 
trary, just  as  God  or  the  mind  knows  the  body  through  the  ideas 


27 


KOTES  ON  SPIWOZaV  “ETHICS.” 

of  the  modifications  of  the  body,  so  they  know  the  mind  through 
the  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the  mind. 

Part  Third  oe  the  “Ethics.” 

On  Def.  3,  “By  emotion  I mean  the  modifications  of  the  body 
by  which  the  active  power  of  the  body  itself  is  increased  or  dimin- 
ished, aided  or  constrained,  and  also  the  ideas  of  these  modifica- 
tions,” he  remarks : Emotion  is  understood  also  when  we  do  not 
think  of  the  body. 

To  Prop.  23,  “When  we  love  a thing  similar  to  ourselves  we 
endeavor,  as  far  as  we  can,  to  bring  about  that  it  should  love  us  in 
return,”  he  writes : The  reason  why  we  endeavor  to  do  good  to  it 
is  to  bring  about  that  we  may  be  loved.  But  this  can  and  ought 
to  be  proved  otherwise,  for  any  one  can  will  to  do  good  although 
he  does  not  seek  and  think  to  be  loved  in  return. 

On  Def.  2 of  the  Emotions,  “Joy  is  the  transition  of  a man 
from  less  to  greater  perfection,”  he  remarks : I can  increase  the 
perfection  of  the  body,  so  that  I am  not  aware  that  I am  becoming 
more  beautiful  and  that  my  limbs  are  growing  to  greater  strength. 
It  may  be  replied  that  this  transition  is  insensible,  and  so  also  is 
the  joy. 

On  Parts  IV  and  V of  the  Ethics  no  remarks  are  found. 


III. 


Thoughts  oh  Knowledge,  Truth  and  Ideas. 

[From  the  Latin.  Acta  Eruditorum  Lipsiensium , Nov.,  1684.] 

Since  eminent  men  are  to-day  raising  discussions  concerning 
true  and  false  ideas,  and  since  this  subject,  which  even  Descartes 
has  not  always  satisfactorily  explained,  is  of  the  greatest  import- 
ance for  the  knowledge  of  truth,  I propose  to  explain  in  a few 
words,  what,  in  my  opinion,  may  be  said  with  certainty  regarding 
the  distinctions  and  the  criteria  of  our  ideas  and  of  our  knowledge. 
Thus  knowledge  is  either  obscure  or  clear,  and  clear  knowledge  is 
farther  either  confused  or  distinct,  and  distinct  knowledge  is  either 
inadequate  or  adequate,  or  again,  symbolical  or  intuitive;  and  if 
it  is  at  the  same  time  adequate  and  intuitive,  it  is  perfect  in 
every  respect. 

A notion  is  obscure  when  it  is  not  sufficient  to  enable  us  to 
recognize  the  thing  represented ; as  for  example,  where  I should 
have  some  vague  idea  of  a flower  or  of  an  animal  which  I should 
have  already  seen  hut  not  sufficiently  to  be  able  to  recognize  it  if 
offered  to  my  sight,  nor  to  distinguish  it  from  some  neighboring 
one;  or  where  I should  consider  some  term  badly  defined  in 
the  schools,  such  as  the  entelechy  of  Aristotle,  or  cause  in  so  far 
as  it  is  common  to  matter,  to  form,  to  efficient  cause,  or  to  end, 
and  other  expressions  of  which  we  have  no  fixed  definition ; this 
renders  the  proposition  of  which  such  a notion  forms  part  equally 
obscure.  Knowledge  then  is  clear  when  it  is  sufficient  to  enable 
me  to  recognize  the  thing  represented,  and  it  is  farther  either  con- 
fused or  distinct ; confused,  when  I cannot  enumerate  separately 
the  marks  necessary  to  distinguish  one  thing  from  "others,  notwith- 
standing that  the  object  has  in  reality  such  marks,  as  well  as  data 
requisite  to  the  analysis  of  the  notion.  It  is  thus  that  we  recog- 
nize clearly  enough,  colors,  odors,  flavors  and  other  particular 
objects  of  the  senses,  and  that  we  distinguish  the  one  from  the 
other  by  the  simple  testimony  of  the  senses  and  not  by  enunci- 
able  signs.  This  is  why  we  cannot  explain  to  a blind  person  what 


ON  KNOWLEDGE,  TRUTH  AND  IDEAS. 


29 


reel  is,  nor  can  we  make  other  people  recognize  qualities  of  this 
kind  except  by  placing  them  in  direct  communication  with  them, 
that  is,  by  making  them  see,  smell  and  taste,  or  at  least  by 
recalling  to  them  a certain  sensation  which  they  have  already 
experienced;  and  nevertheless  it  is  certain  that  the  notions  of 
these  qualities  are  composite  and  may  be  analyzed,  because  they 
have  their  causes.  Just  so  we  often  see  painters  or  other  artists 
who  judge  very  correctly  that  a work  is  good  or  defective,  without 
being  able  to  account  for  their  judgment,  and  who  reply  to  those 
who  ask  their  opinion,  that  that  of  which  they  disapprove,  lacks 
something,  I know  not  what.  But  a distinct  notion  resembles 
that  which  the  assayers  have  of  gold,  by  the  aid  of  distinctive  signs 
and  of  means  of  comparison  sufficient  to  distinguish  the  object 
from  all  other  similar  bodies.  Such  are  the  means  of  which  we 
make  use  for  notions  common  to  several  senses,  such  as  those  of 
numbers,  of  magnitude  and  of  figure,  as  well  as  for  many  affections 
of  the  mind,  such  as  hope  and  fear : in  a word,  for  all  the  objects 
of  which  we  have  a nominal  definition,  which  is  nothing  else  than 
an  enumeration  of  sufficient  distinctive  marks.  We  have  however 
a distinct  knowledge  of  an  indefinable  thing  when  it  is  primitive, 
or  when  it  is  only  the  mark  of  itself — that  is,  when  it  is  irreducible 
and  is  only  understood  through  itself,  and  consequently  does  not 
possess  the  requisite  marks.  As  for  composite  notions  where  each 
of  the  component  marks  is  sometimes  clearly  known,  although  in 
a confused  way,  as  gravity,  color,  aqua  fortis,  which  form  a part 
of  those  [the  marks]  of  gold,  it  follows  that  such  a knowledge  of 
gold  is  distinct  without  always  being  adequate.  But  when  all  the 
elements  of  a distinct  notion  are  themselves  also  known  distinctly, 
or  when  its  analysis  is  complete,  the  idea  is  adequate.  I do  not 
know  that  men  can  give  a perfect  example  of  this,  although  the 
knowledge  of  numbers  approaches  it  very  nearly.  It  very  often 
happens,  nevertheless,  especially  in  a long  analysis,  that  we  do  not 
perceive  the  whole  nature  of  the  object  at  one  time,  but  substitute 
in  place  of  the  things,  signs,  the  explanation  of  which,  in  any 
present  thought,  we  are  accustomed  for  the  sake  of  abbreviation 
to  omit,  knowing  or  believing  that  we  can  give  it ; thus  when  I 
think  a chiliogon,  or  polygon  with  a thousand  equal  sides,  I do 


30 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


not  always  consider  the:  nature  of  a side,  of  equality,  and  of  the 
number  thousand  (or  of  the  cube  of  ten)  ; but  these  words,  the 
sense  of  which  presents  itself  to  my  mind  in  an  obscure,  or  at  least 
imperfect  manner,  take  the  place  to  me  of  the  ideas  which  I have 
of  them,  because  my  memory  attests  to  me  that  I know  the  signifi- 
cation of  these  words,  and  that  their  explanation  is  not  now  neces- 
sary for  any  judgment.  I am  accustomed  to  call  this  thought 
hjind  or  again  symbolical;  and  we  make  use  of  it  in  algebra,  in 
arithmetic  and  almost  everywhere.  And  assuredly  when  a ques- 
tion is  very  complex,  we  cannot  embrace  in  thought  at  the  same 
time  all  the  elementary  notions  which  compose  it ; hut  when  this 
can  be  done,  or  at  least  as  far  as  this  can  he  done,  I call  this 
knowledge  intuitive.  Vie  can  only  have  an  intuitive  knowledge  of 
a distinct,  primitive  notion,  as  most  often  we  have  only  a sym- 
bolical knowledge  of  composite  ideas. 

From  this  it  clearly  follows  that  even  of  the  things  which  we 
know  distinctly,  we  only  conceive  the  ideas  in  as  far  as  they  form 
the  object  of  intuitive  thought.  Also  it  often  happens  that  we 
imagine  that  we  have  in  our  minds  ideas  of  things,  from  suppos- 
ing, wrongly,  that  we  have  already  explained  to  ourselves  the  terms 
of  which  we  make  use.  And  it  is  not  true,  as  some  say,  or  at  least 
it  is  very  ambiguous,  that  we  cannot  speak  of  anything,  understand- 
ing fully  what  we  say,  without  having  an  idea  of  it.  For  often 
we  vaguely  understand  each  of  the  terms,  or  we  remember  that 
we  have  formerly  understood  them;  but  as  we  content  ourselves 
with  this  blind  thought  and  as  we  do  not  push  far  enough  the 
analysis  of  notions,  it  happens  that  unwittingly  we  fall  into  the 
contradiction  which  the  composite  idea  may  imply.  ■ I have  been 
led  to  examine  this  question  more  closely  by  an  argument,  long 
celebrated  in  the  schools  and  renewed  by  Descartes,  for  proving 
the  existence  of  God.  It  is  as  follows : All  that  follows  from  the 
idea  or  from  the  definition  of  a thing  may  be  affirmed  of  the  thing 
itself.  From  the  idea  of  God  (or  the  most  perfect  being,  or  one  a 
greater  than  whom  cannot  be  conceived),  existence  follows.  (For 
the  most  perfect  being  involves  all  perfections,  among  which  is 
also  existence.)  Therefore  existence  may  be  affirmed  of  God.  But 
it  must  be  known  how  it  comes  about  that  if  God  be  possible , it 


OX  KHOWIEDGE,  TEUTH  AND  IDEAS. 


31 


follows  that  he  exists.  For  in  drawing  conclusions,  we  cannot  safely 
use’ definitions  before  knowing  whether  they  are  real  and  do  not 
involve  any  contradiction.  The  reason  of  this  is,  that  if  the  ideas 
involve  contradiction,  opposite  things  may  be  concluded  at  the 
same  time,  which  is  absurd.  I am  accustomed,  in  order  to  render 
this  truth  clear,  to  make  use  of  the  example  of  quickest  motion, 
which  involves  an  absurdity.  Suppose  then  that  a wheel  turn  with 
the  quickest  motion,  who  does  not  see  that  a spoke  prolonged  will 
move  more  rapidly  at  its  extremity  than  at  the  center  of  the  cir- 
cumference; therefore  the  motion  is  not  the  quickest,  which  is 
contrary  to  the  hypothesis.  However  it  seems  at  first  view,  as  if 
we  might  have  an  idea  of  quickest  motion,  for  we  understand  fully 
what  we  say,  and  yet  we  cannot  have  an  idea  of  impossible  things. 
So  it  does  not  suffice  that  we  think  the  most  perfect  being,  to_ 
assure  us  that  we  have  the  idea  of  such  a being,  and  in  the  demon- 
stration which  we  have  just  produced,  the  possibility  of  the  most 
perfect  being  must  be  shown  or  supposed,  if  the  conclusion  be 
legitimately  drawn.  However  it  is  very  true  both  that^we  have 
an  idea  of  God,  and  that  the  most  perfect  being  is  'possible,  and 
even  necessary ; but  the  argument  is  not  conclusive  and  has  already 
been  rejected,  by  Thomas  Aquinas. 

And  it  is  thus  that  we  find  a difference  between  nominal  defini- 
tions, which  only  contain  the  marks  of  the  thing  which  is"  to  be 
distinguished  from  others,  and  real  definitions  which  show  clearly 
that  the  thing  is  possible.  And  in  this  way  answer  is  made  to 
Hobbes,  who  jn’etencled  that  truths  were  arbitrary,  because  they 
depended  on  nominal  definitions,  not  considering  that  the  reality 
of  the  definition  is  independent  of  arbitrariness,  and  that  notions 
are  not  always  reconcilable  among  themselves.  Hominal  defini- 
tions are  only  sufficient  to  a perfect  science  when  it  is  well 
established  otherwise  that  the  thing  defined  is  possible.  It  is  very 
evident  also  what  a true  idea  is,  what  a false ; the  idea  is  true  when 
the  notion  is  possible ; it  is  false  when  the  notion  involves  contra- 
diction. How  we  know  the  possibility  of  a thing  either  a priori  or 
a posteriori.  A priori,  when  we  resolve  the  notion  into  its 
elements,  or  into  other  notions  of  known  possibility,  and  when  we 
know  that  it  includes  nothing  which  is  incompatible ; and,  to  cite 


82 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


but  one  case,  this  takes  place  when  we  understand  by  what  means  a 
thing  may  be  produced,  a fact  which  makes  causal  definitions  more 
useful  than  any  others : a posteriori,  when  experience  shows  us  the 
thing  actually  existing;  for  that  which  exists  in  fact  is  necessarily 
possible.  Every  time  that  we  have  an  adequate  knowledge,  we 
have  also  knowledge  of  the  possibility  a priori ; for  if  we  push  the 
analysis  to  the  end  and  no  contradiction  appears,  the  notion  is 
necessarily  possible.  ISTow,  is  it  possible  that  men  should  ever  con- 
struct a perfect  analysis  of  notions,  or  that  they  should  reduce  their 
thoughts  down  to  first  possibilities , to  irreducible  notions,  or  what 
is  the  same  thing,  down  to  the  absolute  attributes  of  God;  that  is, 
to  the  first  causes  and  to  the  final  reason  of  things  ? I should  not 
dare  to  actually  decide  this  question.  Most  often  we  content  our- 
selves with  learning  from  experience  the  reality  of  certain  notions, 
from  which  afterwards  we  compose  others,  after  the  example  of 
nature. 

Whence  I think  it  may  be  understood  that  it  is  not  always  safe 
to  appeal  to  ideas,  and  that  many  abuse  this  specious  title  for 
establishing  certain  imaginations  of  their  own.  For  we  have  not 
always  immediately  the  idea  of  the  thing  of  which  we  are  conscious 
of  thinking,  as  we  have  shown  above  in  the  example  of  greatest 
swiftness.  And  I see  that  none  the  less  to-day  do  men  abuse  this 
famous  principle  : Everything  that  I conceive  clearly  and  distinctly 
of  a thing  is  true  or  may  be  predicated  of  it.  For  often  men,  judg- 
ing hastily,  imagine  things  clear  and  distinct  which  are  obscure  and 
confused.  The  axiom  is  therefore  useless  unless  the  criteria  of 
clearness  and  distinctness,  which  we  have  indicated  be  applied,  and 
the  truth  of  the  ideas  be  well  established.  As  for  the  rest,  it  is  not 
necessary  in  the  exposition  of  truth  to  reject  as  criteria  the  rules  of 
ordinary  logic  of  which  geometricians  make  use  and  which  consist 
in  admitting  nothing  as  certain  which  is  not  proved  by  exact  expe- 
rience or  solid  demonstration.  Flow  a solid  demonstration  is  one 
which  observes  the  form  prescribed  by  logic,  without,  however, 
always  having  need  of  syllogisms  disposed  in  the  regular  order  of 
the  schools  (like  those  of  which  Christianas  Herlinus  and  Conradus 
Dasypodius  made  use  for  the  demonstration  of  the  first  six  books 
of  Euclid)  ; hut  at  least  in  a way  that  the  reasoning  is  conclu- 
sive by  virtue  of  its  form — an  example  of  such  reasoning  conceived 


ON  KNOWLEDGE,  TRUTH  AND  IDEAS. 


33 


in  the  regular  form  may  he  found  in  any  legitimate  calculus. 
Thus  no  necessary  premise  will  be  omitted,  and  alb  the  previous 
premises  must  be  either  proved  or  at  least  admitted  as  hypotheses, 
in  which  case  the  conclusion  is  hypothetical.  Those  who  will  care- 
fully observe  these  rules  will  easily  guard  themselves  from 
deceptive  ideas.  It  is  in  accordance  with  such  principles  that  the 
great  genius,  Pascal,  in  an  excellent  dissertation  on  the  Mathemat- 
ical Genius  (a  fragment  of  which  exists  in  the  remarkable  hook  of 
the  celebrated  Antoine  Arnauld,  On  the  Art  of  Thinking  Well), 
says  that  the  geometrician  must  define  all  terms  in  the  least  obscure 
and  prove  all  truths  in  the  least  doubtful.  But  I wish  he  had 
defined  the  limits  beyond  which  a notion  or  an  affirmation  is  no 
longer  in  the  least  obscure  or  doubtful.  However,  we  may  judge 
what  there  is  in  it  by  an  attentive  examination  of  the  considera- 
tions which  we  have  just  mentioned,  for  now  I wish  to  be  brief. 

As  to  the  question  whether  we  see  all  things  in  God  (an  old 
opinion,  too,  which  reasonably  understood  ought  not  to  he 
altogether  rejected),  or  whether  we  have  ideas  of  our  own,  it  must 
be  understood  that  even  if  we  see  all  things  in  God  it  is  none  the 
less  necessary  that  we  have  also  ideas  of  our  own ; that  is,  not  as  it 
were  certain  little  images,  but  affections  or  modifications  of  our 
mind,  answering  to  that  which  we  perceive  in  God.  For  since  our 
thoughts  are  constantly  being  succeeded  by  others,  a certain  change 
is  wrought  in  our  mind ; as  for  the  things  not  actually  conceived 
by  us,  ideas  of  them  are  in  our  mind  as  the  statue  of  Hercules  in 
the  rough  marble.  But  with  God,  on  the  contrary,  must  neces- 
sarily exist  in  actuality  the  idea  not  only  of  absolute  and  infinite 
extension,  but  also  of  each  figure,  which  is  nothing,  else  than  the 
modification  of  absolute  extension.  Moreover,  when  we  perceive 
colors  and  odors  we  have  no  other  perception  but  that  of  figures 
and  motions,  but  so  multiplex  and  delicate  that  our  mind,  in  its 
present  state,  is  incapable  of  distinctly  considering  each  one,  and 
consequently  it  does  not  notice  that  the  perception  is  only  com- 
posed of  extremely  small  figures  and  motions.  So  when,  after 
having  mixed  yellow  powder  with  blue  we  perceive  a green  color, 
we  perceive  nothing  but  the  yellow  and  blue  minutely  mixed, 
although  we  do  not  notice  it,  or  rather  imagine  that  we  perceive 
some  new  entity. 

8 


IV. 


Extract  from  a Letter' to  Bayle,  Concerning  a General 

Principle  useful  in  the  Explanation  of  the  Laws  of 

Nature.  1687. 

[From  the  French.] 

I have  seen  the  reply  of  Malehranche  to  the  remark  which  I 
made  concerning  certain  laws  of  nature  which  he  had  estab- 
lished in  the  Search  after  Truth.  ILe  seems  sufficiently  disposed 
to  abandon  them  himself,  and  this  ingenuousness  is  highly  praise- 
worthy; hut  as  he  gives  reasons  and  restrictions,  which  would 
land  us  in  the  obscurity  from  which  I think  I have  relieved  this 
subject,  and  which  clash  with  a certain  principle  of  general  order 
which  I have  observed,  I hope  that  he  will  have  the  kindness  to 
permit  me  to  avail  myself  of  the  present  opportunity  to  explain 
this  principle,  which  is  of  great  use  in  reasoning  and  which  I think 
is  not  yet  sufficiently  employed  nor  sufficiently  known  in  all  its 
hearing.  It  takes  its  origin  from  the  infinite ; it  is  absolutely  nec- 
essary in  geometry,  hut  it  holds  good  also  in  physics,  for  this  reason 
that  the  sovereign  wisdom  which  is  the  source  of  all  things  acts  as 
a perfect  geometrician,  and  according  to  a harmony  to  which  noth- 
ing can  he  added.  This  is  why  this  principle  often  serves  as  proof 
or  test  to  show  at  first  sight  and  from  without,  the  error  of  a badly 
constructed  opinion,  even  before  coming  to  the  discussion  of  the 
matter  itself.  It  may  be  stated  thus  : When  the  difference  of  two 
cases  may  be  diminished  below  any  magnitude  given  in  datis  or  in 
that  which  is  posited,  it  must  also  be  found  diminished  below  any 
magnitude  given  in  quaesitis  or  in  that  which  results  therefrom. 
Or  to  express  it  more  familiarly,  when  the  cases  (or  that  which  is 
given),  continually  approach  each  other  and  finally  lose  themselves 
one  in  the  other,  the  results  or  events  (or  that  which  is  required), 
must  also  do  the  same.  This  depends  again  on  a more  general 
principle,  to  wit:  datis  ordinatis  etiam  cquaesita  sunt  ordinata. 
But  in  order  to  understand  it  examples  are  necessary. 

It  is  known  that  the  case  of  the  supposition  of  an  ellipse  may 
approach  the  case  of  a parabola  as  much  as  may  be,  so  that 


TI-IE  PKIKCTPLE  OF  COjVTIKTFITY. 


35 


the  difference  of  the  ellipse  and  of  the  parabola  may  become  less 
than  any  given  difference,  provided  that  one  of  the  foci  of  the 
ellipse  be  sufficiently  distant  from  the  other,  for  then  the  radii  com- 
ing from  this  distant  focus  will  differ  from  the  parallel  radii  as 
little  as  may  be,  and  consequently  all  the  geometrical  theorems 
which  are  true  of  the  ellipse  in  general  can  be  applied  to  the 
parabola  by  considering  the  latter  as  an  ellipse,  one  of  the  foci  of 
which  is  infinitely  distant,  or  (to  avoid  this  expression),  as  a figure 
which  differs  from  any  ellipse  less  than  any  given  difference. 
The  same  principle  holds  good  in  physics ; for  example,  rest  may 
he  considered  as  an  infinitely  small  velocity,  or  as  an  infinite  slow- 
ness. This  is  why  all  that  is  true  in  respect  to  slowness  or  velocity 
in  general,  must  be  true  also  of  rest  thus  understood ; so  much  so 
that  the  law  of  rest  ought  to  be  considered  as  a particular  case  of 
the  law  of  motion ; otherwise,  if  this  does  not  hold,  it  will  be  a 
sure  sign  that  the  laws  are  badly  formulated.  So  equality  may  be 
considered  as  an  infinitely  small  inequality,  and  inequality  may  he 
made  to  approach  equality  as  much  as  you  please. 

It  is  among  other  faults  from  oversight  of  this  consideration 
that  Descartes,  very  able  man  as  he  was,  failed  in  more  than  one 
way  in  his  pretended  laws  of  nature.  For  (not  to  repeat  here  what 
I said  before  of  the  other  source  of  his  error,  when  he  took  the 
quantity  of  motion  for  force),  his  first  and  his  second  laws,  for 
example,  do  not  agree.  The  second  says  that  two  bodies,  B and  C, 
meeting  in  the  same  line  with  equal  velocities,  and  B being  as  little 
as  possible  larger,  C will  be  turned  back  with  its  first  velocity, 
but  B will  continue  its  movement ; whereas  according  to  the  first 
law,  B and  C being  equal,  both  will  turn  back  and  retrograde  with 
a velocity  equal  to  that  which  had  carried  them  thither.  But  the 
difference  in  the  results  of  these  two  cases  is  not  reasonable;  for 
the  inequality  of  the  two  bodies  may  be  as  slight  as  you  please, 
and  the  difference  which  is  in  the  suppositions  of  these  two  cases, 
to  wit : the  difference  between  such  an  inequality  and  a perfect 
equality,  could  be  less  than  any  given;  hence,  by  virtue  of  our 
principle,  the  difference  between  the  results  or  outcomes  ought  also 
to  be  less  than  any  given ; notwithstanding  if  the  second  law  were 
as  true  as  the  first  the  contrary  would  happen,  for  according  to 
this  second  law  any  increase,  however  small,  of  body  B before 


36  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

equal  to  C,  makes  a difference  grandissime  in  the  effect,  such  that 
it  changes  absolute  retrogression  into  absolute  continuation,  which 
is  a great  leap  from  one  extremity  to  the  other,  whereas  in  this  case 
body  B ought  to  turn  back  a little  less,  and  body  C a little  more 
than  in  the  case  of  equality,  from  which  this  case  can  hardly  be 
distinguished. 

There  are  many  other  like  incongruities  resulting  from  the  Cai’- 
tesian  laws,  which  the  attention  of  a reader  applying  our  principle 
will  easily  remark,  and  the  like  case  which  I had  found  in  the 
rules  of  the  Search  after  Truth  came  from  the  same  source. 
Malebranche  in  a way  avows  that  there  are  inconsistencies,  but  he 
does  not  cease  to  believe  that  the  laws  of  motion  depending  on 
the  good  pleasure  of  God,  are  regulated  by  his  wisdom,  and  the 
geometricians  would  he  also  almost  as  much  surprised  to  see  those 
kinds  of  irregularities  coining  into  nature  as  to  see  a parabola 
to  which  might  be  applied  the  properties  of  an  ellipse  with  an  infi- 
nitely distant  focus.  Also  such  inconsistencies  will  never  he 
encountered  in  nature,  I think.  The  better  it  is  known  the  more 
it  is  found  to  be  geometrical.  It  is  easy  to  judge  from  this  that 
these  inconsistencies  do  not  properly  come  from  that  which  Male- 
branche asserts  they  do,  to  wit:  from  the  false  hypothesis  of  the 
perfect  hardness  of  bodies,  which  I admit  is  not  found  in  nature. 
Bor  even  if  we  should  suppose  in  it  this  hardness,  regarding  it  as 
infinitely  quick  elasticity,  there  would  result  from  it  nothing  which 
could  not  he  adjusted  perfectly  to  the  true  laws  of  nature  as 
regards  elastic  bodies  in  general,  and  never  shall  we  encounter  laws 
so  little  connected  as  these  in  which  I have  found  something  to 
censure.  It  is  true  that  in  composite  things  sometimes  a little 
change  may  produce  a great  effect ; as  for  example,  a spark  falling 
into  a great  mass  of  gunpowder  is  capable  of  overturning  a whole 
city ; but  this  is  not  contrary  to  our  principle,  and  these  cases  may 
be  accounted  for  by  even  greater  principles,  but  as  respects  ele- 
ments or  simple  things,  nothing  similar  could  happen,  otherwise 
nature  would  not  be  the  effect  of  infinite  wisdom. 

Whence  it  is  seen  (a  little  better  than  in  what  is  commonly  said 
of  it)  how  true  physics  must  be  derived  really  from  the  source  of 
the  divine  perfections.  It  is  God  who  is  the  final  reason  of  things, 
and  the  knowledge  of  God  is  no  less  the  principle  of  the  sciences 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CONTINUITY. 


37 


than  liis  essence  and  his  will  are  the  principles  of  heings.  The 
most  reasonable  philosophers  agree  in  this,  but  there  are  very  few 
of  them  who  can  make  use  of  it  to  discover  truths  of  importance. 
Perhaps  these  little  attempts  will  arouse  some  to  go  much  farther. 
It  is  sanctifying  philosophy  to  make  its  streams  flow  from  the 
fountain  of  the  attributes  of  God.  Far  from  excluding  final  causes 
and  the  consideration  of  a being  acting  with  wisdom,  it  is  from 
thence  that  all  must  be  derived  in  physics.  This  it  is  which 
Socrates  in  the  Pliaedo  of  Plato  has  already  admirably  remarked, 
when  reasoning  against  Anaxagoras  and  other  material  philoso- 
phers who,  after  having  at  first  recognized  an  intelligent  principle 
above  matter,  do  not  employ  it  at  all  when  they  come  to  philoso- 
phize on  the  universe,  and  instead  of  showing  that  this  intelligence 
does  everything  for  the  best,  and  that  this  is  the  reason  of  the 
things  which  it  has  found  good  to  produce  conformably  to  its  ends, 
try  to  explain  everything  by  the  mere  concourse  of  senseless  parti- 
cles, confounding  the  conditions  and  instruments  with  the  true 
cause.  It  is  (said  Socrates)  as  if,  in  order  to  explain  why  I am 
seated  in  prison  awaiting  the  fatal  stroke  and  am  not  on  the 
way  to  the  Boeotians  or  other  peoples,  whither,  it  is  known,  I 
might  have  escaped,  it  should  be  said  that  it  is  because  I have 
bones,  tendons  and  muscles  which  can  he  bent  as  is  necessary  in 
order  to  be  seated.  My  faith  (he  says),  these  bones  and  these  mus- 
cles would  not  be  here,  and  you  would  not  see  me  in  this  posture,  if 
my  mind  had  not  judged  that  it  is  more  worthy  of  Socrates  to 
suffer  what  the  laws  of  the  country  ordain.  This  passage  in  Plato 
deserves  to  be  read  entire,  for  these  are  very  beautiful  and  solid 
reflections.  Nevertheless  I admit  that  particular  effects  of  nature 
may  and  must  be  explained  mechanically,  without  forgetting,  how- 
ever, their  admirable  designs  and  uses  which  Providence  has  known 
how  to  take  care  of ; but  the  general  principles  of  physics  and  even 
of  mechanics  themselves  depend  on  the  direction  of  a sovereign 
intelligence,  and  cannot  be  explained  without  taking  it  into  consid- 
eration. Thus  it  is  that  piety  must  be  reconciled  with  reason,  and 
that  good  people  may  be  satisfied  who  fear  the  results  of  the 
mechanical  or  corpuscular  philosophy,  as  if  it  would  lead  us  from 
God  and  immaterial  substances,  whereas,  with  the  required  correc- 
tions and  everything  well  understood,  it  ought  to  lead  us  to  him. 


Letter  from  Leibnitz  to  Arnaued  in  which  iie  summarizes 
his  Personal  Views  on  Metaphysics  and  Physics.  1690. 

[From  the  French.] 

Sir — I am  now  on  the  point  of  returning  home  after  a long 
journey,  undertaken  at  the  order  of  my  prince  for  the  purpose  of 
historical  researches,  in  which  I found  certificates,  titles  and  indu- 
bitable proofs  sufficient  to  justify  the  common  origin  of  the  illus- 
trious houses  of  Brunswick  and  Este,  which  Messrs.  Juste, 
du  Cange  and  others  had  good  reasons  for  calling  in  question, 
because  there  were  contradictions  and  falsities  in  the  historians  of 
Este  in  this  respect,  together  with  an  utter  confusion  of  times  and 
persons.  At  present  I think  of  returning  and  resuming  my  former 
course  of  life,  and  having  written  to  you  two  years  ago  shortly 
before  my  departure,  I take  the  same  liberty  to-day,  to  inform 
myself  of  your  health,  and  to  make  known  to  you  how  the  idea  of 
your  eminent  merit  is  always  present  in  my  mind.  When  I was  at 
Rome  I saw  the  denunciation  of  a new  heresy  attributed  to  you,  or 
to  your  friends,  and  afterwards  I saw  the  letter  of  reverend  Father 
Mabillon  to  one  of  my  friends,  in  which  there  was  the  statement 
that  the  defense  by  the  reverend  Father  Le  Tellier  of  the  mission- 
aries against  the  practical  morals  of  the  Jesuits,  had  given  to  many 
people  impressions  favorable  to  these  Fathers,  but  that  he  had 
heard  that  you  had  replied  to.it  and  that  it  was  said  that  you  had 
overthrown  by  geometrical  reasoning  the  arguments  of  that  Father. 
All  of  which  leads  me  to  think  that  you  are  still  in  condition  to 
render  service  to  the  public,  and  I pray  God  that  it  may  be  so  for  a 
long  time  to  come.  It  is  true  that  this  is  to  my  interest,  but  it  is  a 
praiseworthy  interest  which  may  give  me  the  means  of  learning, 
whether  it  he  in  common  with  all  others  who  shall  read  your 
works,  or  personally,  when  your  judgments  shall  instruct  me — if 
the  little  leisure  you  have  may  permit  me  again  to  hope  sometimes 
for  that  advantage. 


VIEWS  OH  METAPHYSICS  AND  PHYSICS. 


39 


As  this  voyage  has  in  part  served  to  relieve  my  mind  from  its 
ordinary  occupations,  I have  had  the  satisfaction  of  conversing  on 
matters  of  science  and  erudition  with  several  able  men,  and  I have 
communicated  my  personal  views,  which  you  know,  to  some  in 
order  to  profit  by  their  doubts  and  difficulties ; and  there  have  been 
some  who,  not  satisfied  with  the  common  doctrines,  have  found  an 
extraordinary  satisfaction  in  some  of  my  views.  This  has  led  me 
to  write  them  down  that  they  may  he  the  more  easily  communi- 
cated, and  perhaps  I shall  cause  some  copies  to  be  printed  some 
day  without  my  name,  merely  to  send  them  to  my  friends  in  order 
that  I may  have  their  judgment  on  them.  I would  like  you  to  he 
able  to  examine  them  first,  and  for  that  reason  I have  made  the 
following  abstract : 

A body  is  an  aggregate  of  substances,  and  not  properly  speaking 
one  substance.  It  must  he,  consequently,  that  everywhere  in  body 
there  are  found  indivisible  substances,  ingenerable  and  incorrup- 
tible, having  something  corresponding;  to  souls.  That  all  these  sub- 
stances have  always  been  and  always  will  he  united  to  organic 
bodies  differently  transformable.  That  each  of  these  substances 
contains  in  its-  nature  legem  continuationis  seriei  suarum  opera- 
tionum  and  all  that  has  happened  or  will  happen  to  it.  That  all 
its  actions  come  from  its  own  depths,  except  dependence  on  God. 
That  each  substance  expresses  the  entire  universe,  but  one  more 
distinctly  than  an  other,  especially  each  as  regards  certain  things 
and  according  to  its  own  point  of  view.  That  the  union  of  soul 
with  body,  and  the  operation  also  of  one  substance  on  another, 
consists  merely  in  that  perfect  mutual  accord,  expressly  established 
by  order  of  the  first  creation,  in  virtue  of  which  each  substance 
following  its  own  laws  agrees  in  what  the  others  demand ; and  the 
operations  of  the  one  follow  or  accompany  thus  the  operations  or 
changes  of  the  other.  That  intelligencesmnysouls  capable  of  reflec- 
tion and  of  the  knowledge  of  eternal  truths  and  of  God,  have  many 
privileges  which  exempt  them  from  the  vicissitudes  of  bodies. 
That  for  them  moral  laws  must  be  added  to  physical.  That  all 
things  are  made  principally  for  them.  That  they  form  together  the 
republic  of  the  universe,  of  which  God  is  the  monarch.  That  there 
is  a perfect  justice  and  order  observed  in  this  city  of  God,  and 


40 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


that  there  is  no  wrong  action  without  chastisement,  nor  good  action 
without  proportioned  recompense.  That  the  more  we  come  to 
know  things,  the  more  we  will  find  them  beautiful  and  conformed 
to  that  which  a sage  would  desire.  That  we  should  always  be 
content  with  the  order  of  the  past,  because  it  is  conformed  to  the 
absolute  will  of  God  which  is  known  by  the  event;  hut  that  we 
must  try  to  render  the  future,  as  far  as  it  depends  on  us,  conform- 
able to  the  presumptive  will  of  God  or  to  his  commandments ; to 
beautify  our  Sparta  and  to  labor  to  do  good,  without  being 
depressed,  however,  when  success  fails,  and  this  in  the  firm  belief 
that  God  can  discover  the  times  most  suited  for  changes  for  the 
better.  That  those  who  are  not  satisfied  with  the  order  of  things 
cannot  boast  of  loving  God  as  he  should  be  loved.  That  “justice 
is  but  the  love  of  the  sage.  That  love  is  a universal  benevolence 
which  the  sage  fulfils  conformably  to  the  measure  of  reason,'  to  the 
end  of  obtaining  lasting  contentment,  which  consists  in  a contin- 
ual advance  to  greater  perfection,  or  at  least  in  the  variation  of  a 
like  degree  of  perfection. 

As  regards  physics,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  nature  of 
Tern e,  a thing  entirely  different  from  motion,  which  is  something 
more  relative.  That  this  force  is  to  be  measured  by  the  quantity 
of  effect.  That  there  is  an  absolute  force,  a directive  force  and 
a respective  force.  That  each  of  these  forces  continues  in  the  same 
degree  in  the  universe,  or  in  each  mechanism  not  in  communication 
with  others,  and  that  the  two  latter  forces,  taken  together,  compose 
the  first  or  absolute.  But  that  the  same  quantity  of  motion  is 
not  preserved,  since  I show  that  otherwise  perpetual  motion  would 
be  found,  and  that  an  effect  would  be  more  powerful  than  its  cause. 

It  is  now  some  time  ago  that  I published  in  the  Leipsic  Acta  an 
essay  on  physics,  to  find  the  physical  cause  of  the  motions  of 
the  stars.  I lay  down  as  basal  That,  all  motion-  of  a solid  in  a 
fluid,  taking  place  in  a curved  line  or  the  velocity  of  which  is 
continually  changing,  comes  from  the  motion  off,  the,  fluid 
itself ; whence  I draw  the  inference  that  the  stars  have  different 
but  fluid  orbs.  I have  demonstrated  an  important  general  proposi- 
tion, viz:  that  every  body  that  moves  with  a revolution  which  is 
harmonic  (i.  e.,  such  that  the  distances  from  the  center  being  in 


VIEWS  ON  METAPHYSICS  AND  PHYSICS. 


41 


arithemetical  progression  the  velocities  are  in  harmonic  progres- 
sion, or  inversely  to  the  distances),  and  which  furthermore  has 
a paracentric- -motion,  that  is,  of  gravity  or  of  levity  as  regards 
the  same  center  (a  certain  law  which  this  attraction  or  repulsion 
keeps),  the  said  body  describes  areas  which  vary  necessarily  as 
the  times,  just  as  Kepler  observed  among  the  planets.  Then  con- 
sidering, ex  observationibus,  that  this  movement  is  elliptic,  I find 
that  the  laws  of  paracentric  motion,  which  motion  joined  to  har- 
monic revolution  describes  ellipses,  must  be  such  that  the  gravita- 
tions are  reciprocally  as  the  squares  of  the  distances;  i.  e.,  as  the 
illuminations  ex  sole. 

I shall  say  nothing  to  you  of  my  calculus  of  increments  or  differ- 
ences, hy  which  I determine  the  tangents,  without  eliminating  the 
irrational  quantities  and  fractions  even  when  an  unknown  quan- 
tity is  involved  in  them,  and  by  which  I subject  quadratics  and 
transcendental  problems  to  analysis.  And  I will  not  speak  either 
of  an  entirely  new  analysis  which  belongs  to  geometry  and  is 
entirely  different  from  algebra ; and  still  less  of  some  other  things 
on  which  I have  not  yet  had  time  to  prepare  essays.  All  of  which 
I should  like  to  be  able  to  explain  to  you  in  few  words,  in  order 
to  have  your  opinion,  which  would  be  of  greatest  use  to  me,  on 
them ; if  you  had  as  much  leisure  as  I have  deference  for  your 
judgment.  But  your  time  is  too  precious,  and  my  letter  is  already 
sufficiently  long.  Therefore  I close  here,  and  am,  sir, 

Your  obedient  and  humble  servant, 

Leibnitz. 


Venice,  March  23,  1G90. 


VI 


Letter  on  the  Question,  Whether  the  Essence  of  Body 
Consists  in  Extension.  1691. 

[From  tlie  French.] 

You  ask,  sir,  tlie  reasons  wliicli  I have  for  believing  that  the 
idea  of  body  or  of  matter  is  other  than  that  of  extension.  It  is 
true,  as  yon  sa§|  that  many  able  men  are  to-day  of  the  opinion  that 
the  essence  of  body  consists  in  length,  breadth  and  depth.  Never- 
theless there  are  still  others  who  cannot  he  accused  of  too  much 
attachment  to  scholasticism,  who  are  not  content  with  this  opinion. 

M.  Nicole,  in  a certain  place  in  his  Essais,  states  that  he  is  of 
this  number  and  it  seems  to  him  that  there  is  more  of  bias  than 
of  insight  in  those  who  do  not  appear  repelled  by  the  difficulties 
which  are  therein  encountered. 

It  would  require  a very  full  discourse  to  explain  clearly  what  I 
think  on  the  subject.  However,  here  are  some  considerations 
which  I submit  to  your  judgment,  which  I beg  yon  to  make  known 
to  me. 

If  the  essence  of  body  consisted  in  extension,  this  extension 
alone  ought  to  be  sufficient  to  account  for  all  the  properties  of 
body.  But  this  is  not  so.  We  notice  in  matter  a quality,  called 
by  some  natural  inertia,  by  which  body  resists  in  some  way  motion ; 
so  that  it  is  necessary  to  employ  some  force  to  set  it  in  motion  (even 
making  abstraction  of  the  weight),  and  a large  body  is  moved 
with  more  difficulty  than  a small  body.  For  example: 


Fic  i.  ( j 

A B 

if  body  A,  in  motion,  encounters  body  B,  at  rest,  it  is  evident  that 
if  body  B were  indifferent  to  motion  or  to  rest,  it  would  allow  itself 
to  be  pushed  by  body  A without  resisting  it,  and  without  decreas- 
ing the  velocity  or  changing  the  direction  of  body  A ; and  after 
their  meeting  A would  continue  its  path  and  B would  go  in  com- 


IS  THE  ESSEMCE  OF  BODY  EXTENSION  ? 


43 


pany  with,  it,  preceding  it.  But  it  is  not  thus  in  nature.  The 
larger  body  B is,  the  more  it  will  decrease  the  velocity  with  which 
body  A moves,  even  to  compelling  it  to  retrograde  if  B is  much 
larger  than  A.  How  if  there  were  nothing  in  bodies  but  exten- 
sion, or  situation,  that  is,  that  which  geometricians  recognize  in 
them,  joined  to  the  one  notion  of  change,  this  extension  would  be 
entirely  indifferent  respecting  this  change,  and  the  results  of  the 
meeting  of  bodies  would  be  explained  by  the  mere  geometrical 
composition  of  motions ; that  is  to  say,  the  body  after  the  meet- 
ing would  advance  with  a motion  composed  of  the  impression 
which  it  had  before  the  shock  and  of  that  which  it  received  from 
the  concurrent,  in  order  not  to  hinder  it ; that  is,  in  this  case  of 
meeting  it  would  go  with  the  difference  of  the  two  velocities  and 
from  the  side  of  the  direction. 

As  the  velocity  of  2 A 3 A,  or  2 B 3 B,  in  figure  II,  is  the  differ- 
ence between  1 A 3 A and  1 B 2 B ; and  in  this  case  of  contact, 
figure  III,  the 


7 2 


4 


quicker  would  strike  the  slower  one  which  precedes  it,  the  slower 
would  receive  the  velocity  of  the  other,  and  in  general  they  would 
proceed  always  together  after  the  meeting ; and  in  particular,  as  I 
said  at  the  beginning,  that  one  which  is  in  motion  would  carry  for- 
ward the  one  in  repose,  without  receiving  any  diminution  of  its 
speed,  and  without  the  size,  equality  or  inequality  of  the  two 
bodies  changing  this  in  any  respect ; a thing  utterly  irreconcilable 


44 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBHITZ. 


with  experience.  And  even  if  it  were  supposed  that  size  ought 
to  make  a change  in  the  motion,  there  would  be  no  principle  for 
determining  the  means  of  estimating  it  in  detail,  and  for  knowing 
the  resulting  direction  and  velocity.  In  any  case  there  would  he 
an  inclination  toward  the  opinion  of  the  conservation  of  motion ; 
whereas  I believe  that  I have  proved  that  the  same  force  is  pre- 
served, and  that  its  quantity  is  different  from  the  quantity  of 
motion. 

All  this  shows  that  there  is  in  matter  something  other  than 
what  is  purely  geometrical ; that  is,  than  extension  and  its 
changes  pure  and  simple.  And  when  we  consider  it  well  we 
perceive  that  there  must  be  joined  to  it  some  higher  or  metaphys- 
ical notion,  to  wit:  that  of  substance,  action  and  force;  and  that 
these  notions  show  that  everything  which  suffers  must  act  recipro- 
cal^, and  that  everything  which  acts  must  suffer  some  reaction ; 
and  consequently  that  a body  at  rest  cannot  be  carried  along  by 
another  in  motion  without  changing  something  of  the  direction  and 
of  the  velocity  of  the  agent. 

I agree  that  naturally  every  body  is  extended,  and  that  there  is 
no  extension  without  body.  Nevertheless  the’  notions  of  place,  of 
space,  of  pure  extension,  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  notion 
of  substance,  which  besides  extension  includes  resistance,  that  is, 
activity  [ action ] and  passivity  [ passion ]. 

This  consideration  seems  to  me  important,  not  only  in  order  to 
know  the  nature  of  extended  substance,  but  also  in  order  not  to 
slight  in  physics  the  higher  and  immaterial  principles,  to  the 
prejudice  of  piety.  For  although  I am  persuaded  that  everything 
takes  place  mechanically  in  corporeal  nature  I do  not  cease  to 
believe  also  that  even  the  principles  of  mechanics,  that  is,  the  first 
laws  of  motion,  have  a more  exalted  origin  than  that  which  pure 
mathematics  can  furnish.  And  I imagine  if  this  were  better 
known  or  more  considered  many  pious  persons  would  not  have 
such  a bad  opinion  of  the  corpuscular  philosophy,  and  modern  phi- 
losophers would  join  better  the  knowledge  of  nature  with  that  of 
its  author. 

I do  not  enlarge  upon  other  reasons  touching  the  nature  of  body, 
for  that  would  lead  me  too  far. 


IS  THE  ESSENCE  OF  BODY  EXTENSION  ? 


45 


[Extracts  from  a Letter  in  Support  of  what  he  published  in  the  “Journal  des 
Savants”  of  June  18,  1091.  1093.] 

To  prove  that  the  nature  of  body  does  not  consist  in  extension 
I made  use  of  an  argument  explained  in  the  J ournal  des  Savants  of 
June  18,  1691,  the  gist  of  which  is  that  we  cannot  explain  by  mere 
extension  the  natural  inertia  of  bodies;  that  is,  that  which 
causes  matter  to  resist  motion,  or  in  other  words  that  which 
brings  it  about  that  a body  which  is  already  in  motion  cannot  carry 
along  with  it  another  which  is  at  rest,  without  being  retarded 
thereby.  For  extension  in  itself,  being  indifferent  to  motion 
and  to  rest,  nothing  ought  to  hinder  the  two  bodies  from  going 
along  together  with  all  the  velocity  of  the  first,  and  which  it  tries  to 
impress  upon  the  second.  To  this,  answer  is  made  in  the  Journal 
of  July  16th  of  the  same  year  (as  I learned  only  a short  time  ago), 
that  really  body  ought  to  be  indifferent  to  motion  or  to  rest, 
supposing  that  its  essence  consists  only  in  being  extended;  but  that 
nevertheless  a body  impelling  another  must  be  retarded  by  it  ( not 
because  of  extension  but  because  of  force),  because  the  same  force 
which  ivas  applied  to  one  of  the  bodies  is  now  applied  to  both. 
Noiv  the  force  which  moves  one  of  the  bodies  with  a certain 
velocity  must  move  the  tivo  together  ivith  less  velocity.  It  is  as  if 
it  were  said  in  other  words  that  body,  if  it  consist  in  extension, 
ought  to  be  indifferent  to  motion,  hut  that  in  reality  not  being 
indifferent  to  it,  since  it  resists  that  which  ought  to  give  it  motion, 
it  is  necessary  to  employ,  in  addition  to  the  notion  of  extension, 
that  of  force.  Thus  this  reply  grants  just  what  I wish.  And  in 
truth  those  who  are  in  favor  of  the  system  of  0 ccasional  Causes 
have  already  clearly  perceived  that  force,  and  the  laws  of  motion 
which  depend  on  it,  cannot  he  drawn  from  extension  alone,  and  as 
they  have  taken  for  granted  that  there  is  only  extension  in  matter, 
they  have  been  obliged  to  deny  to  it  force  and  action  and  to  have 
recourse  to  the  general  cause,  which  is  the  pure  will  and  action  of 
God.  As  to  which  it  may  be  said  that  they  have  very  well  rea- 
soned ex  hypothesi.  But  the  hypothesis  has  not  yet  been  proved ; 
and  as  the  conclusion  appears  not  acceptable  in  physics,  there  is 
more  probability  for  saying  that  there  is  a mistake  in  the  hypothesis 
(which  moreover  involves  many  other  difficulties),  and  that  there 


46 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


must  be  recognized  in  matter  something  more  than  what  consists 
in  the  mere  relation  of  extension ; which,  like  space,  is  incapable 
of  action  and  of  resistance,  these  pertaining  only  to  substances. 
Those  who  hold  that  extension  itself  is  a substance  reverse  the 
order  of  words  as  well  as  of  thoughts.  Besides  extension,  there 
must  be  a subject  which  is  extended,  that  is,  a substance  to  which 
it  belongs  to  be  repeated  or  continued.  For  extension  signifies  only 
a repetition  or  continued  multiplication  of  that  which  is  extended ; 
a plurality,  continuity  and  co-existence  of  parts ; and  hence  exten- 
sion is  not  sufficient  to  explain  the  nature  of  the  extended  or 
repeated  substance,  the  notion  of  which  is  anterior  to  that  of  its 
repetition. 


VII. 


Animadversions  on  Descartes'’  Principles  of  Philosophy.  1692. 

[From  the  Latin.] 

On  Article  1.  As  to  wliat  is  said  by  Descartes,  that  we  must 
doubt  all  things  in  which  there  is  the  least  uncertainty,  it  would  be 
preferable  to  express  it  by  this  better  and  more  expressive  precept : 
We  ought  to  think  what  degree  of  acceptance  or  dissent  everything 
merits ; or  more  simply,  We  ought  to  inquire  after  the  reasons  of 
any  dogma.  Thus  the  Cartesian  wranglings  concerning  doubt 
would  cease.  But  perhaps  the  author  preferred  TrapaSo^oXoyelv,  in 
order  that  he  might  excite  the  listless  reader  by  novelty.  But  I 
could  wish  that  he  himself  had  remembered  his  own  precept,  or 
rather,  that  he  had  conceived  its  true  force.  We  shall  explain  it 
and  its  use  best  by  the  example  of  the  geometers.  It  is  agreed 
among  them  that  there  are  axioms  or  postulates,  on  the  truth  of 
which  all  other  things  rest.  We  admit  these,  both  because  they 
immediately  satisfy  the  mind  and  because  they  are  verified  bv 
numberless  examples ; and  nevertheless  it  would  be  of  importance 
to  the  perfection  of  science  that  they  be  demonstrated.  This, 
Apollonius  and  Proclus  in  olden  time  and  recently  Robervallius, 
among  others,  have  attempted.  And  certainly  just  as  Euclid 
wished  to  demonstrate  that  two  sides  of  a triangle  taken  together 
are  greater  than  the  third  (as  a certain  one  of  the  ancients  jest- 
ingly said,  even  asses  know  enough  to  go  after  their  food  by  a 
straight  line,  not  by  a roundabout  way) , because  indeed  he  wished 
that  geometrical  truths  should  rest  not  on  images  of  the  senses  but 
on  reasons ; so  also  he  could  have  demonstrated  that  two  right  lines 
(which  if  extended  do  not  meet)  can  have  only  one  common  point, 
if  he  had  had  a good  definition  of  right.  And  I know  that  the 
demonstrating  of  axioms  is  of  great  use  to  a true  analysis  or  art  of 
discovery.  Thus  if  Descartes  had  wished  to  follow  what  is  best  in 
his  precept,  he  ought  to  have  labored  toward  demonstrating  the 
principles  of  the  sciences,  and  to  have  done  in  philosophy  what 
Proclus  wished  to  do  in  geometry  where  it  is  less  necessary.  But 


-ts  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

it  seemed  preferable  to  our  author  to  have  applause,  rather  than  to 
have  certainty.  For  would  I blame  him  for  being  content  with 
probability,  if  he  had  nob  aroused  our  minds  by  such  a great  pro- 
fession of  strictness  : but  I blame  Euclid  much  less  when  he  makes 
assumptions  without  proof,  for  he  maintained  that  we  know  that  if 
a few  hypotheses  are  admitted,  all  else  is  sure  and  thus  equal  to 
them  in  trustworthiness.  If  Descartes  or  other  philosophers  had 
done  something  similar  to  this,  we  should  not  be  troubled.  And  the 
skeptics  also,  who  condemn  the  sciences  on  the  -pretext  that  they 
use  principles  not  immediately  demonstrated,  ought  to  regard  this 
as  said  to  them.  I,  on  the  contrary,  hold  that  the  geometers  ought 
rather  to  be  praised  because  they  prop  up  the  sciences  by  these,  as 
it  were,  pegs,  and  devise  an  art  of  proceeding  and  of  deducing 
many  things  from  few;  for  if  they  wished  to  defer  the  inven- 
tion of  theorems  or  problems  until  all  axioms  or  postulates  had  been 
demonstrated,  we  should  perhaps  to-day  have  no  geometry. 

On  Article  2.  For  the  rest  I do  not  see  of  what  use  it  is  to 
consider  doubtful  things  as  false.  This  would  not  he  to  cast  aside 
prejudices,  but  to  change  them.  But  if  the  fiction  is  so  understood, 
it  must  not  be  abused,  as,  for  example,  when  later  on  in  Article  S a 
paralogism  will  seem  to  arise  when  the  distinction  of  the  mind 
from  the  body  is  discussed. 

On  Article  4.  Moreover  we  can  neither  know  nor  ought  we 
to  desire  anything  of  sensible  things  than  that  they  harmonize  as 
well  among  themselves  as  with  indubitable  reasons  and  in  such  a 
way  that  future  things  may,  in  a certain  degree,  be  foreseen  from 
past  things.  Any  other  truth  or  reality  will  be  sought  in  them  in 
vain  than  that  which  this  vouches  for,  nor  ought  skeptics  ask  any- 
thing else  nor  the  dogmatics  promise  it. 

On  Article  5.  We  cannot  otherwise  doubt  of  mathematical 
demonstrations  except  as  error  may  be  feared  in  the  reckoning  of 
arithmeticians.  This  cannot  be  remedied  except  by  examining  the 
reckoning  often,  or  by  different  reckonings,  confirming  proofs 
being  added.  This  weakness  of  the  human  mind,  arising  from 
want  of  attention  and  of  memory,  cannot  be  perfectly  removed,  and 
what  is  adduced  by  Descartes  as  a remedy  is  useless.  The  same 
thing  suffices  as  guarantee  in  other  departments  which  suffices  in 


on  Descartes’  “principles.”  49 

mathematics ; indeed  all  reasoning,  even  the  Cartesian,  however 
proved  or  accurate,  will  yet  be  subject  to  this  doubt,  whatever  may 
finally  be  thought  of  any  powerful  deceptive  genius  or  of  the  dif- 
ference between  sleep  and  wakefulness. 

On  Article  6.  We  have  free  will  not  in  thinking  hut  in  act- 
ing. It  is  not  in  my  will  whether  honey  shall  seem  to  be  sweet  or 
bitter,  but  neither  is  it  in  the  power  of  my  will  whether  a theorem 
proposed  to  me  shall  seem  true  or  false,  but  it  is  a matter  of  con- 
sciousness alone  to  consider  what  seems  so.  Whoever  has  affirmed 
anything  is  conscious  either  of  a present  feeling  or  reason,  or,  at 
least,  of  a present  memory  renewing  a past  feeling  or  a perception 
of  a past  reason ; although  we  are  often  deceived  in  this  by  failure 
of  memory  or  lack  of  attention.  But  consciousness  of  anything 
present  or  past  assuredly  does  not  belong  to  our  will.  We  know 
that  this  one  thing  is  in  the  power  of  our  faculty  of  will ; namely, 
that  it  may  command  attention  and  zeal,  and  thus,  although  it  may 
not  make  an  opinion  in  us,  it  can  nevertheless  indirectly  contribute 
to  it.  So  it  happens  that  often  men  finally  believe  that  what  they 
wish  is  true,  after  they  have  accustomed  the  mind  to  attending 
most  of  all  to  those  things  which  favor  it;  in  which  way  they 
bring  about  that  it  satisfies  not  only  the  will  but  also  conscious- 
ness. Cf.  Art.  31. 

On  Article  7.  I think  therefore  I am  is  well  remarked  by 
Descartes  to  be  among  the  first  truths.  But  it  was  but  just  that  he 
should  not  neglect  others  equal  to  this.  In  general,  therefore,  it 
may  be  said : Truths  are  either  of  fact  or  of  reason.  The  first  of 
the  truths  of  reason  is,  as  Aristotle  rightly  observed,  the  principle 
of  contradiction  or,  what  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  of  identity. 
First  truths  of  fact  are  as  many  as  the  immediate  perceptions,  or 
those  of  consciousness,  so  to  speak.  Moreover  not  only  am  I con- 
scious of  my  thinking  hut  also  of  my  thoughts.  FTor  is  it  more 
certain  that  I think  than  that  this  or  that  is  thought  by  me.  Thus 
first  truths  of  fact  may  not  inconveniently  he  traced  back  to  these 
two,  I think,  and  Various  things  are  thought  by  me.  Whence  it  fol- 
lows not  only  that  I am  but  also  that  I am  affected  in  various  ways. 

On  Article  8.  This  is  not  valid : “I  am  able  to  assume  or 
imagine  that  no  corporeal  things  exist  hut  I am  not  able  to  imagine 
4 


50 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBHITZ. 


that  I do  not  exist  or  that  I do  not  think ; therefore  I am  not  cor- 
poreal, nor  is  thought  a mode  of  body.”  And  I marvel  that  such 
an  able  man  could  attribute  so  much  to  so  light  a sophism  ; certainly 
he  adds  nothing  more  in  this  article.  What  he  brings  forward  in 
his  Meditations  will  be  examined  in  its  proper  place.  He  who 
thinks  that  the  mind  is  corporeal,  will  not  admit  that  you  can  affirm 
that  no  corporeal  things  exist ; but  he  will  admit  this,  that  you  can 
doubt  (as  long  as  you  are  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  the  mind) 
whether  corporeal  things  exist  or  do  not  exist;  and  since,  never- 
theless, you  see  clearly  that  your  mind  does  exist,  he  will  concede 
that  this  one  thing  thence  follows,  namely  that  you  can  doubt 
whether  the  mind  is  corporeal ; nor  will  anything  further  be 
wrested  by  any  tortures  from  this  argument.  But  this  furnished  a 
handle  to  the  paralogism  in  Art.  2 above,  the  liberty  being  assumed 
of  rejecting  what  is  doubted  as  if  it  were  false;  as  if  it  were 
admissible  to  assume  that  there  are  no  corporeal  things  because  it 
can  be  doubted  whether  they  exist,  which  ought  not  to  be  conceded. 
It  would  be  otherwise  if  we  knew  the  nature  of  the  mind  as 
perfectly  as  we  knew  its  existence,  for  thus  whatever  did  not 
appear  in  it,  it  would  be  agreed  was  not  in  it. 

Oh  Article  13.  I have  already  remarked,  on  Art.  5,  that  the 
errors  which  may  arise  from  want  of  memory  or  attention  and 
which  occur  also  in  arithmetical  calculations  (even  after  a perfect 
method  has  been  found  as  in  numbers)  are  recounted  here  to  no 
purpose,  since  no  art  can  be  devised  in  which  they  are  not  to  be 
feared,  especially  when  the  reasoning  must  be  long  drawn  out ; and 
that  therefore  we  must  have  recourse  to  examinations.  As  for  the 
rest,  God  seems  to  be  summoned  hither  for  a sort  of  show  or  pomp  ; 
not  to  mention  that  the  strange  fiction  or  doubt,  whether  we  are  not 
made  to  err  even  in  matters  most  evident,  ought  to  move  no  one, 
since  the  nature  of  evidence  is  against  it  and  the  experiences  and 
successes  of  all  life  are  contrary  to  it.  And  if  ever  this  doubt 
could  justly  be  raised,  it  would  be  absolutely  insuperable ; it  would 
confront  even  Descartes  himself  and  every  one  else  even  when 
presenting  the  most  evident  things ; this  I say,  not  to  mention  that 
it  must  be  known  that  this  doubt  is  not  established  by  denying 
God  nor  removed  by  introducing  him.  For  even  if  there  were  no 


on  Descartes’  “principles.”  51 

God,  provided  it  were  possible  for  us  to  continue  to  exist,  there 
would  be  no  reason  for  our  being  less  capable  of  truth;  and 
although  it  be  conceded  that  there  is  a God,  it  does  not  therefore 
follow  that  a creature  exceedingly  fallible  and  imperfect  does  not 
exist,  especially  when  it  may  be  that  its  imperfection  is  not  native, 
but  perhaps  superinduced  by  a great  sin,  as  Christian  theologians 
teach  concerning  original  sin,  yet  so  that  this  sin  cannot  he  imputed 
to  God.  Moreover  although  God  does  not  seem  to  he  here  aptly 
introduced,  I think,  nevertheless,  but  in  a different  way,  that  true 
knowledge  of  God  is  the  principle  of  higher  wisdom;  for  God  is 
not  less  the  first  cause  than  the  ultimate  reason  of  things ; nor  are 
things  known  better  than  from  their  causes  and  reasons. 

On  Article  14.  The  argument  for  the  existence  of  God 
drawn  from  the  notion  itself  of  him,  Anselm,  Archbishop  of  Can- 
terbury, first,  so  far  as  is  known,  discovered  and  stated  in  his 
extant  Liber  contra  Insipientem.  And  it  was  examined  here  and 
there  by  the  writers  of  the  scholastic  theology  and  by  Aquinas 
himself,  whence  Descartes,  not  without  study  of  it,  seems  to  have- 
borrowed  it.  This  reasoning  possesses  some  beauty  but  is  neverthe- 
less imperfect.  The  argument  amounts  to  this  : Whatever  may  be 
demonstrated  from  the  notion  of  a thing,  that  can  be  attributed  to 
the  thing.  Mow  from  the  notion  of  most  perfect  or  greatest  being, 
existence  can  be  demonstrated.  Therefore  existence  can  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  most  perfect  being  (God),  or  God  exists.  The  assump- 
tion is  proved : Most  perfect  or  greatest  being  includes  all  perfec- 
tions, therefore  existence  also,  which  undoubtedly  is  of  the  number 
of  perfections,  since  to  exist  is  more  or  greater  than  not  to  exist. 
Thus  far  the  argument.  But  if  perfection  or  greatness  had  been 
omitted,  the  argument  might  have  been  constructed  even  more 
strictly  and  more  closely  in  this  way:  Necessary  being  exists  (or 
being  to  whose  essence  existence  belongs,  or  being  of  itself  exists), 
as  is  evident  from  the  terms.  Now  God  is  such  a being  (from  the 
definition  of  God)  ; therefore  God  exists.  These  arguments  are 
valid,  provided  it  be  admitted  that  most  perfect  or  necessary  being 
is  possible,  and  does  not  imply  contradiction,  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing  that  the  essence  from  which  existence  follows  is  possible. 
But  as  long  as  this  has  not  been  demonstrated,  it  certainly  ought 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


52 

not  to  be  thought  that  the  existence  of  God  has  been  perfectly 
demonstrated  by  such  an  argument.  And,  generally,  it  ought  to 
be  known  (as  I formerly  urged),  that  from  a definition  nothing  can 
be  safely  inferred  concerning  the  thing  defined,  so  long  as  it  is  not 
established  that  the  definition  expresses  something  possible.  For 
if,  perchance,  it  implies  some  hidden  contradiction,  it  might 
happen  that  something  absurd  would  be  deduced  from  it.  Mean- 
while from  this  argument  we  become  acquainted  with  this  wonder- 
ful privilege  of  the  divine  nature  that  provided  it  be  possible  it 
exists  of  itself,  which  is  not  sufficient  for  proving  existence  in  other 
things.  There  only  remains  for  the  geometrical  demonstration  of 
the  divine  existence  that  the  possibility  of  God  be  demonstrated 
with  accurate  severity  in  geometrical  rigor.  Meanwhile  the  exis- 
tence of  that  which  only  lacks  possibility  receives  great  faith : as 
for  the  rest,  that  there  is  some  necessary  being  is  evident  from  the 
fact  that  contingent  things  exist. 

Ox  Article  IS.  We  have  an  idea  of  a most  perfect  being,  and 
therefore  the  cause  of  this  idea  (that  is,  the  most  perfect  being) 
exists.  This  which  is  Descartes’  second  argument,  is  even  more 
doubtful  than  the  possibility  of  God.  It  is  denied  also  by  many  of 
those  who  with  great  zeal  acknowledge  that  God  is  not  only  possi- 
ble but  that  he  exists.  FT or  is  it  true,  what  I remember  Descartes 
somewhere  says,  that  when  we  speak  of  something,  understanding 
what  we  say,  we  have  the  idea  of  the  thing.  For  it  often  happens 
that  we  combine  incompatibles,  as  when  we  think  of  quickest 
motion,  which  is  admitted  to  be  impossible  and  therefore  lacks 
idea ; and  nevertheless  we  admit  that  we  speak  of  this  with  under- 
standing. Indeed  it  has  been  explained  by  me  elsewhere  that  we 
often  only  confusedly  think  that  of  which  we  speak,  and  are  not 
conscious  of  an  idea  existing  in  our  mind  unless  we  understand  the 
thing  and  resolve  it  as  far  as  is  sufficient. 

On  Article  20.  The  third  argument  is  burdened  with  this 
same  vice,  as  well  as  others,  since  it  assumes  that  the  idea  of  the 
highest  perfection,  God,  is  in  us,  and  hence  it  concludes  that  God 
exists,  since  we  who  have  this  idea  exist. 

On  Article  21.  From  the  fact  that  we  now  are,  it  follows 
that  we  shall  still  hereafter  be,  unless  a reason  of  change  exists.  So 


ox  descartes’  “principles.” 


53 


unless  it  were  established  otherwise  that  we  could  not  even  exist 
unless  by  favor  of  God,  nothing  would  be  proved  as  to  the  existence 
of  God  from  our  duration ; as  if  indeed  one  part  of  this  duration 
could  be  wholly  independent  of  the  other ; which  is  not  to  be 
admitted. 

Ox  Article  26.  Although  we  are  finite,  we  may  nevertheless 
know  many  things  concerning  the  infinite,  as  concerning  asymp- 
totic lines  or  those  which  produced  ad  infinitum  always  approach 
but  never  meet ; concerning  infinite  spaces  not  greater  than  a finite 
length  as  respects  area ; concerning  the  last  members  of  series 
which  are  infinite.  Otherwise  we  should  know  nothing  certain  con- 
cerning God  either.  Moreover  it  is  one  thing  to  know  something  of 
a thing,  another  to  comprehend  the  thing,  that  is  to  have  in  our 
power  whatever  lies  hidden  in  the  thing. 

Ox  Article  28.  As  to  what  pertains  to  the  ends  which  God 
proposed  to  himself,  I clearly  think  both  that  those  ends  of  God 
are  to  be  known  and  to  be  investigated  with  great  profit  and  that 
contempt  of  this  inquiry  is  not  free  from  peril  or  suspicion.  And, 
in  general,  as  often  as  we  see  that  something  has  remarkable  uses, 
we  may  safely  assert  that  among  others  this  end  also,  namely,  that 
he  might  furnish  these  uses,  was  proposed  to  God  when  producing 
this  thing,  since  he  both  knew  and  procured  this  use  of  the  thing. 
Elsewhere  I have  noted  and  shown  by  examples  that  certain  hidden 
physical  truths  of  great  moment,  which  cannot  be  so  easily  known 
through  efficient  causes,  might  be  disclosed  by  the  consideration  of 
final  cause. 

Ox  Article  30.  Even  if  we  admit  a perfect  substance,  which 
is  undoubtedly  not  the  cause  of  imperfections,  the  true  or  fictitious 
grounds  for  doubting  which  Descartes  introduced  are  not  thus 
removed,  as  I have  already  noticed,  Art.  13. 

Ox  Articles  31,  35.  That  errors  depend  more  upon  the  will 
than  upon  the  intellect,  I do  not  admit.  To  believe  that  true  which 
is  false  or  that  false  which  is  true  when  this  may  be  known  by 
investigating,  this  is  to  err.  So  also  through  consciousness  or 
memory  certain  perceptions  or  reasons  arise,  and  therefore  do  not 
depend  on  the  will  except  in  so  far  as  in  some  indirect  way,  and 
sometimes  even  unknown  to  us,  it  may  happen  that  we  seem  to 


51  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

onrselves  to  see  those  things  which  we  will.  Cf.  Art.  6.  We 
judge  therefore  not  because  we  will  hut  because  it  appears. 
And  as  for  the  saying  that  the  will  is  wider  than  the  intellect, 
this  is  more  sounding  than  true;  in  a word,  I may  say  it  is 
but  trappings  for  the  people.  We  will  nothing  except  it  appear 
to  the  intellect.  The  origin  of  all  errors  is  the  same,  that 
which  is  observed  as  the  reason  of  errors  of  reckoning  among 
arithmeticians.  For  it  often  happens  from  a defect  of  attention  or 
memory  that  we  do  what  we  ought  not  to  do,  or  leave  undone  what 
we  ought  to  do,  or  think  that  we  have  done  what  we  have  not  done 
or  that  we  have  not  done  what  we  have  done.  So  it  happens  that 
in  reckonings  (to  which  reasoning  corresponds  in  the  mind)  the 
right  figures  are  not  set  down,  wrong  ones  are  put  down,  something 
is  passed  over  among  the  things  which  ought  to  be  taken  into 
account,  the  method  is  disturbed.  Our  mind,  indeed,  wearied  or 
distracted,  does  not,  for  its  present  operations,  sufficiently  attend  to 
the  matter;  or,  by  an  error  of  memory,  it  assumes  as  if  formerly 
proved  that  which  only  adheres  to  us  deeply  because  it  has  been 
often  inculcated  or  fixedly  regarded  or  eagerly  desired.  The 
remedy  also  for  our  errors  is  the  same  as  that  for  the  errors  of 
reckoning,  namely,  that  we  attend  to  the  matter  and  to  the  form, 
that  we  proceed  slowly,  that  we  repeat  and  vary  the  operation,  that 
we  institute  examinations  or  proofs,  that  we  divide  longer  reason- 
ings into  parts,  by  which  the  mind  may  breathe,  and  that  we  con- 
firm each  part,  as  may  be,  by  particular  proofs.  And  since  we 
must  in  action  sometimes  be  hurried,  the  great  thing  is  to  have 
acquired  presence  of  mind  for  one’s  self  by  force  of  habit,  just  as 
those  have  done  who  in  the  midst  of  tumult  and.  even  without  writ- 
ing or  calculations  are  none  the  less  able  to  compute  large  numbers, 
so  that  the  mind  is  not  easily  distracted  either  by  the  external 
senses  or  by  its  own  imaginations  or  emotions,  but  always  rises 
above  what  it  is  doing  and  retains  the  power  of  regarding,  or,  as  we 
commonly  say,  of  turning  itself  back  upon  itself,  so  that  presently, 
in  place  of  an  external  admonisher  it  may  say,  “See  what  you  are 
doing,  say  why  you  are  here,  the  hour  passes.”  The  Germans 
admirably  call  this  sich  begreiffen;  the  French  not  less  happily, 
s’aviser,  as  if  it  were  to  warn  one’s  self,  to  suggest  to  one’s  self,  as 


on  Descartes’  “principles.”  55 

the  liomenclators  suggested  to  Roman  candidates  the  names  and 
merits  of  citizens  worthy  to  be  taken,  as  the  prompter  suggests  to 
the  comedian  the  initial  words  of  the  rest  of  the  piece,  as  a certain 
youth  suggested  to  Philip,  king  of  Maced  on,  “Remember  you  are 
mortal.”  But  this  turning  of  the  mind , s’aviser,  is  not  in  our 
power  nor  in  the  election  of  our  will ; on  the  contrary  it  must  first 
occur  to  the  intellect,  and  it  depends  on  the  present  degree  of  our 
perfection.  It  belongs  to  the  will  in  advance  to  strive  zealously 
that  the  mind  be  well  prepared,  which  is  advantageously  done  both 
by  the  consideration  of  the  experiences  and  losses  or  dangers  of 
others,  and  also  by  the  use  of  our  own,  but  (as  is  allowable)  this  is 
at  the  risk  of  the  loss  of  time  or  at  least  of  a light  or  ludicrous 
injury;  but  at  the  same  time  there  is  the  accustoming  of  the  mind 
to  a certain  order  and  method  of  thinking  so  that  afterwards  it  may 
occur,  when  it  is  needed,  as  if  voluntarily.  There  nevertheless  are 
errors  which  without  guilt  escape  or  are  not  avoided.  Where  we 
are  in  trouble  not  by  defect  of  judgment  but  by  want  of  memory 
or  ability  we  are  not  so  much  in  error  as  we  are  ignorant,  for  we 
cannot  bring  it  about  that  we  may  either  know  or  remember  what 
we  will.  That  kind  of  directing  the  mind  suffices  by  which  we 
fight  against  lack  of  attention,  and  as  often  as  memory  repeats  to 
us  past  proofs  which  perchance  were  in  reality  none,  we  have  a 
confused  recollection  which  is  suspicious ; and  either  we  repeat  the 
inquiry  if  it  may  be  done  and  the  matter  is  important,  or  we  do 
not  rely  on  past  care  unless  it  is  sufficiently  tested. 

On  Article  37.  The  highest  perfection  of  man  is  not  more 
that  he  acts  freely  than  that  he  acts  with  reason ; or  rather,  both 
are  the  same,  since  the  freer  one  is  the  less  is  the  use  of  reason  dis- 
turbed by  the  violence  of  the  emotions. 

On  Article  39.  To  ask  whether  there  is  liberty  in  our  will  is 
the  same  as  to  ask  whether  choice  is  in  our  will.  Free  and  volun- 
tary mean  the  same  thing.  For  free  is  the  same  as  spontaneous 
with  reason ; and  to  will  is  to  be  carried  to  action  by  a reason  per- 
ceived by  the  intellect ; moreover  the  more  unconditional  the  reason 
is  and  the  less  the  impulse  has  of  bare  and  confused  qterception 
mixed  with  it,  the  freer  the  action  is.  To  abstain  from  judgments 
does  not  belong  to  our  will  but  to  the  intellect  suggesting  some 
attention  to  itself,  as  has  been  already  said  on  Art.  35. 


56 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


Ox  Article  40.  If  anyone  thinking  that  Gocl  has  preordained 
all  things  and  nevertheless  that  he  himself  is  free,  and  his  argu- 
ments exhibiting  conflict  among  themselves,  makes  this  one  reply, 
as  Descartes  orders ; namely : that  his  mind  is  finite  and  cannot 
comprehend  such  things,  he  seems  to  me  to  reply  to  the  conclusion, 
not  to  the  argument,  and  to  cut,  not  to  untie,  the  knot.  The  ques- 
tion is  not  whether  you  comprehend  the  thing  itself,  hut  rather 
whether  you  do  not  comprehend  your  absurdity  on  my  showing 
it.  There  must  certainly  he  a contradiction  also  in  the  mysteries  of 
faith  not  less  than  in  the  mysteries  of  nature.  Therefore  if  you 
wish  to  excel  as  a philosopher,  it  behooves  that  you  take  up  the 
argument,  which  one  of  your  opponents  infers  with  some  appear- 
ance of  truth  from  your  assertions,  and  point  out  the  defect  in  it, 
which  assuredly  can  always  be  done,  unless  you  have  erred. 

On  Articles  43,  45,  46.  I have  elsewhere  called  attention  to 
the  fact  that  there  is  no  great  use  in  this  rule  which  is  laid  down, 
of  approving  only  what  is  clear  and  distinct , unless  better  marks 
of  clear  and  distinct  are  brought  forward  than  those  which 
Descartes  gave.  The  rules  of  Aristotle  and  the  geometers  are 
better,  namely:  That  we  should  admit  nothing,  principles  (i.  e. 
first  truths  and  hypotheses)  of  course  excepted,  unless  proved  by 
legimate  argument ; legitimate,  I say,  that  is,  burdened  neither 
with  defect  of  form  nor  of  matter.  But  it  is  a defect  of  matter 
if  anything  except  principles,  or  again  things  proved  from  prin- 
ciples by  legitimate  argument,  be  assumed.  But  I understand  the 
right  form  to  be  not  only  the  common  syllogistic  form,  but  also  any 
other  predemonstrated  which  concludes  by  force  of  its  own  dis- 
position; which  also  the  forms  of  the  operations  of  the  aritlnne- 
ticans  and  algebraists,  the  forms  of  the  book-keepers,  indeed  also, 
in  some  degree,  the  forms  of  judiciary  process,  do  : for  occasionally 
we  are  content  to  proceed  with  a certain  degree  of  resemblance. 
Nevertheless  the  art  of  logic,  especially  useful  in  life  for  estimat- 
ing degrees  of  probability,  remains  still  to  be  discussed,  concerning 
which  not  a few  things  have  been  noted  down  by  me.  On  form, 
compare  further  what  is  said  on  Art.  75. 

On  Articles  47,  48.  Some  one,  I know  not  whom  (I  think  it 
was  Comenius),  formerly  rightly  criticized  Descartes  for  promis- 


ox  Descartes’  “prixciples.” 


57 

ing,  Art.  47,  summarily  to  enumerate  all  simple  notions,  and  yet 
directly  in  the  following  Article  48,  lie  deserts  us,  and,  some  being 
named,  he  adds:  and  the  like ; besides  which  the  larger  part  of 
those  which  he  does  name  are  not  simple.  This  is  an  inquiry  of 
greater  moment  than  is  thought. 

Ox  Article  50.  Truths  entirely  simple  but  which  neverthe- 
less are  not  admitted  on  account  of  the  prejudged  opinion  of  men, 
we  must  take  especial  pains  to  demonstrate  by  those  more  simple. 

Ox  Article  51.  I do  not  know  whether  the  definition  of  sub- 
stance as  that  which  needs  the  concurrence  of  God  alone  to  exist  is 
appropriate  for  any  created  substance  known  to  us,  unless  inter- 
preted in  some  less  common  meaning.  Tor  not  only  do  we  need 
other  substances,  but  we  need  also  much  more  accidents.  Since 
therefore  substance  and  accident  mutually  need  each  other,  there  is 
need  of  other  marks  for  discriminating  substance  from  accident ; 
among  which  may  be  this,  that  although  the  substance  may  need 
some  accident  it  often  nevertheless  does  not  need  a determinate 
one  but  when  this  one  is  taken  away  is  content  with  the  substitu- 
tion of  another ; the  accident,  however,  not  only  needs  some  sub- 
stance in  general  but  also  that  one  of  its  own  in  which  it  is  once 
present,  so  that  it  may  not  change  it.  JSTevefitheless  there  remain 
other  things  to  be  said  elsewhere  concerning  the  nature  of  sub- 
stance, of  greater  moment  and  of  more  profound  discussion. 

Ox  Article  52.  I confess  that  there  is  one  principle  of  sub- 
stance and  one  attribute  of  it,  expressing  its  essence ; but  I do  not 
know  whether  it  can  be  explained  in  words,  and  those  few,  so  that 
if  you  understand  an  individual  substance,  other  kinds  of  sub- 
stances may  be  explained  by  definitions.  But  that  extension  con- 
stitutes the  common  nature  of  corporeal  substauce  I see  asserted  by 
many  with  great  confidence,  never  proved.  Certainly  neither 
motion  nor  action  nor  resistance  nor  passivity  is  thence  derived ; 
nor  do  the  laws  of  nature  which  are  observed  in  the  motion  and  con- 
junction of  bodies  come  from  the  mere  notion  of  extension,  as  I 
have  elsewhere  shown.  And  indeed  the  notion  of  extension  is  not 
primitive  but  resolvable.  Tor  it  is  required  in  extension  that  there 
be  a whole  continuum,  in  which  many  things  exist  at  once.  And, 
to  speak  farther,  to  extension  indeed,  the  notion  of  which  is  rela- 


58 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


live,  something  is  required  which  is  extended  or  continued,  as  in 
milk  whiteness,  in  body  that  itself  which  makes  its  essence:  the 
repetition  of  this  (whatever  it  may  be)  is  extension.  And  I cer- 
tainly agree  with  Huygens  (whose  opinion  in  natural  philosophy 
and  mathematics  is  of  great  weight  with  me)  that  the  conception 
of  a vacant  space  and  of  mere  extension  is  the  same;  nor  in  my 
opinion  can  mobility  itself  or  avrirviria  be  understood  of  mere 
extension  but  of  the  subject  of  extension,  by  which  place  is  not  only 
constituted  but  also  filled. 

Ox  Article  54.  I do  not  remember  that  as  yet  it  has  been  per- 
fectly demonstrated  either  by  our  author  or  by  his  partisans  that 
thinking  substance  is  devoid  of  extension  or  extended  substance  of 
thought,  so  that  thence  it  is  evident  that  the  one  attribute  is  not 
required  for  the  other  in  the  same  subject  nor  indeed  can  consist 
with  it.  Nor  is  this  surprising;  for  the  author  of  the  book,  Search 
After  Truth  (in  which  some  excellent  things  are  said),  correctly 
remarks  that  no  distinct  notion  of  thought  is  offered  by  the  Carte- 
sians, and  thus  it  is  not  strange  if  what  is  involved  in  it  is  not  clear 
to  them. 

Ox  Articles  GO,  61.  To  deny  a real  distinction  between  modes 
is  not  a necessary  change  of  the  received  use  of  words.  For  hitherto 
it  has  been  held  that  modes  exist  between  things,  and  they  have 
been  seen  to  really  differ,  as  a spherical  wax  figure  from  a square 
one ; certainly  there  is  a true  change  from  one  figure  to  the  other, 
and  thus  it  has  a real  foundation. 

On  Article  63.  To  conceive  thought  and  extension  as  the 
thinking  substance  itself  or  the  extended  substance  itself  seems  to 
me  neither  right  nor  possible.  This  device  is  suspicious  and  like 
that  by  which  doubtful  things  were  commanded  to  be  considered 
false.  Minds  are  prepared  by  these  distortions  of  things  for  perti- 
nacity and  for  false  reasonings. 

On  Articles  65  to  68.  Descartes  performed  a useful  service 
after  the  ancients  in  eradicating  that  prejudice  by  which  we  regard 
heat,  color  and  other  phenomena  as  something  outside  of  us ; when 
it  is  evident  that  what  seemed  very  hot  is  soon  felt  by  the  same 
hand  to  be  tepid ; and  he  who  observes  a green  color  in  a pulver- 
ized mixture,  his  eye  being  presently  assisted,  no  longer  perceives  a 


ox  Descartes’  “principles.”  59 

green  color  but  a mixture  of  yellow  and  blue,  and,  with  a better 
equipment  or  other  experiences  or  reasons,  the  causes  of  these  two 
may  be  perceived  : from  which  it  appears  that  no  such  thing  exists 
outside  of  us,  the  phantasm  of  which  hovers  before  our  imagination. 
We  are  ordinarily  like  boys  who  are  persuaded  that  a golden  pot  is 
to  be  found  at  the  very  end  of  the  rainbow  where  it  touches  the 
earth,  which  in  vain  they  try  to  find  by  running. 

On  Articles  71  to  74.  On  the  causes  of  errors  we  have  said 
something  above,  on  Arts.  31  and  35.  From  these  also  the  reason 
for  the  present  ones  may  be  given.  For  the  prejudices  of  infancy 
have  to  do  with  unproved  assertions.  Fatigue,  moreover,  lessens 
attention;  and  ambiguity  of  words  belongs  to  the  abuse  of  signs 
and  makes  an  error  in  form;  and  thus  it  is  as  if  (as  the  German 
proverb  says)  X were  put  in  place  of  V in  a calculation,  or  as  if  a 
quack  doctor  in  a prescribed  formula  should  select  sandarach 
instead  of  dragon’s  blood. 

On  Article  75.  It  seems  to  me  fair  that  we  should  give 
to  the  ancients  each  one  his  due;  not  by  a silence,  malignant  and 
injurious  to  ourselves,  conceal  their  merits.  Those  things  which 
Aristotle  prescribed  in  his  Logic,  although  not  sufficient  for  discov- 
ery, are  nevertheless  almost  sufficient  for  judging;  at  least  where 
he  treats  of  necessary  consequences ; and  it  is  important  that  the 
conclusions  of  the  human  mind  be  established  as  if  by  certain 
mathematical  rules.  And  it  has  been  noted  by  me  that  those  who 
admit  false  reasonings  in  serious  things  oftener  sin  in  logical  form 
than  is  commonly  believed.  Thus  in  order  to  avoid  all  errors  there 
is  need  of  nothing  else  than  to  use  the  most  common  rules  of  logic 
with  great  constancy  and  severity.  But  since  the  complication  of 
things  often  does  not  admit  of  this  pedantry,  we  hence  furnish,  in 
the  sciences  and  in  things  to  be  done,  certain  special  logical  forms, 
which  ought  to  be  demonstrated  beforehand  by  those  general  rules ; 
the  nature  of  each  subject  being  taken  into  account ; just  as  Euclid 
had  a certain  logic  of  his  own  concerning  conversions,  compositions, 
divisions  of  reasons,  established  first  in  the  special  book  on  ele- 
ments, and  afterwards  ruling  in  the  whole  geometry.  And  thus 
brevity  and  certainty  are  at  once  regarded ; and  the  more  there  are 
of  these,  the  more  there  is  of  science  and  of  whatever  there  is  that 


PHILOSOPHICAL,  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


60 

is  refined.  Those  things  are  to  be  added  which  we  have  noted  on 
Articles  43  et  seq.,  concerning  reasonings  which  are  said  to  be 
made  in  form  and  which  extend  farther  than  is  commonly  believed. 

On  Part  II. 

On  Article  1.  The  argument  by  which  Descartes  seeks  to 
demonstrate  that  material  things  exist  is  weak ; it  were  better 
therefore  not  to  try.  The  gist  of  the  argument  is  this  : The  reason 
why  we  believe  in'  material  things  is  external  to  us,  and  hence 
either  from  God  or  from  another  or  from  things  themselves ; not 
from  God,  if  no  things  exist,  for  he  would  be  a deceiver;  not  from 
another,  this  he  has  forgotten  to  prove ; therefore  from  themselves, 
therefore  they  themselves  exist.  It  might  be  replied,  that  a sensa- 
tion may  be  from  an  other  than  God,  who  as  he  permits  all  other 
evils  for  certain  weighty  reasons  so  may  permit  this  deceiving  of  us 
without  having  the  character  of  a deceiver,  especially  as  it  is  joined 
with  no  injury,  since  it  would  rather  be  unpleasant  to  us  not  to  be 
deceived.  Besides  the  deception  therein,  which  the  argument  con- 
ceals, is  that  it  may  be  that  the  perceptions  are  from  God  or  from 
another  but  that  the  judgment  (concerning  the  cause  of  the  sen- 
sation, whether  it  be  from  a real  object  outside  of  us),  and  hence 
the  deception,  comes  from  ourselves.  Just  as  happens  also  when 
colors  and  other  things  of  this  sort  are  considered  as  real  objects. 
Besides  souls  might  have  merited  by  previous  sins  that  they  lead 
this  life  full  of  deception  where  they  snatch  at  shadows  for  things ; 
to  which  the  Platonists  do  not  seem  to  be  averse,  to  whom  this  life 
seemed  as  a sleep  in  the  cave  of  Morpheus,  the  mind  being 
demented  by  Lethean  draughts  before  it  came  thither. 

On  Article  4.  That  body  consists  in  extension  alone,  Descartes 
tries  to  demonstrate  by  an  enumeration  of  the  other  attributes 
which  he  removes,  but, it  ought  to  have  been  shown  that  the  enumer- 
ation is  sufficient;  then  not  all  are  well  removed,  certainly  those 
who  admit  atoms,  that  is  bodies  of  greatest  hardness,  denied  that 
hardness  consists  in  this,  namely,  that  the  body  does  not  yield  to  the 
motion  of  the  hands,  but  rather  in  this,  that  it  preserves  its  form. 
And  those  who  place  the  essence  of  body  in  avTiTviria,  or  impene- 
trability, do  not  derive  its  notion  from  our  hands  or  senses  but  from 


ON  DESCARTES 


PRINCIPLES. 


61 


} u 


tlie  fact  that  it  does  not  give  place  to  another  homogeneous  body 
unless  it  itself  can  go  elsewhere.  Just,  as  if  we  imagine  that  against 
a cube  there  run  six  other  cubes  precisely  similar  to  and  resembling 
the  first,  so  that  each  one  of  them  with  one  of  its  sides  accurately 
coincides  with  one  side  of  the  intercepting  cube ; on  this  supposi- 
tion it  would  be  impossible  for  either  the  intercepting  cube  itself 
or  a part  of  it  to  be  moved,  whether  it  be  understood  as  flexible  or 
as  rigid.  But  if  that  middle  cube  he  held  to  be  penetrable  exten- 
sion or  empty  space  then  the  six  concurring  cubes  will  oppose  their 
angles  to  each  other  mutually;  if  however  they  are  flexible,  noth- 
ing will  prevent  the  middle  parts  of  these  from  breaking  into  the 
intercepting  cubical  space.  Whence  also  we  understand  what  is 
the  difference  between  hardness,  which  belongs  to  certain  bodies, 
and  impenetrability,  which  belongs  to  all ; which  latter  Descartes 
ought  to  have  remembered  not  less  than  hardness. 

On  Articles  5,  6,  7.  Descartes  has  excellently  explained  that 
rarefaction  and  condensation  such  as  we  perceive  by  the  senses  may 
take  place  although  neither  interspersed  vacuum  nor  a change  of 
dimensions  of  the  same  part  of  matter  be  admitted. 

On  Articles  8 to  19.  ISTot  a few  of  those  who  defend  a vacuum 
consider  space  as  a substance,  nor  can  they  be  refuted  by  the  Car- 
tesian arguments ; other  principles  are  needed  to  end  this  dispute. 
They  will  admit  that  quantity  and  number  do  not  exist  outside  of 
the  things  to  which  they  are  attributed,  but  they  will  deny  that 
space  or  place  is  quantity  of  body,  and  they  will  rather  believe  that 
it  has  quantity  or  capacity  and  that  body  is  equal  to  it  in  content. 
Descartes  had  to  show  that  internal  space  or  place  does  not  differ 
from  the  substance  of  body.  Those  who  are  contrary  minded  will 
defend  themselves  by  the  common  notion  of  mortals  who  think 
that  body  succeeding  body  passes  over  the  same  space  and  the  same 
place  which  has  been  deserted  by  a previous  body ; but  this  cannot 
be  said  if  space  coincides  with  the  substance  itself  of  body. 
Although  to  have  a certain  situation  or  to  be  in  a given  place 
is  an  accident  of  body  they  will  nevertheless  no  more  admit 
that  place  itself  is  an  accident  of  body  than  that,  as  contact  is 
an  accident,  so  also  what  is  touched  is  an  accident.  And  indeed 
Descartes  seems  to  me  not  so  much  to  bring  forward  good  reasons 


(>2  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 

for  liis  own  opinion  as  to  reply  to  opposing  arguments ; which  in 
this  place  he  does  not  unskillfully.  And  he  often  employs  this 
artifice  in  place  of  demonstration.  But  we  expected  something 
more  and  if  I am  not  mistaken  we  were  commanded  to  expect  more. 
To  nothing,  it  must  he  confessed,  there  is  no  extension,  and  this 
may  be  rightly  hurled  against  those  who  make  space  an  imaginary 
something.  But  those  to  whom  space  is  a substance  are  not  affected 
by  this  argument ; they  would  indeed  be  affected  if  Descartes  had 
shown  above,  what  he  here  assumes,  that  every  extended  substance 
is  body. 

On  Article  20.  The  author  does  not  seem  satisfactorily  to 
oppose  atoms.  Their  defenders  concede  that  they  may  be  divided 
as  well  in  thought  as  by  divine  power.  But  whether  bodies  which 
have  a firmness  inseparable  by  the  forces  of  nature  (which  is  the 
true  notion  of  atom  among  them)  can  exist  naturally,  is  a question 
which  Descartes  (what  I wonder  at)  does  not  even  touch  upon  in 
this  place,  and  nevertheless  he  here  declares  that  atoms  have  been 
overthrown  by  him,  and  he  assumes  it  in  the  whole  course  of  his 
work.  We  shall  have  more  to  say  on  atoms  on  Article  54. 

On  Articles  21,  22,  23.  That  the  world  has  no  limits  of  exten- 
sion and  thus  can  only  be  one,  then  that  all  matter  everywhere  is 
homogeneous  and  is  not  distinguished  except  by  motions  and 
figures,  are  opinions  which  are  here  built  upon  the  proposition, 
which  is  neither  admitted  by  all  nor  demonstrated  by  the  author, 
that  extension  and  body  are  the  same  thing. 

On  Article  25.  If  motion  is  nothing  but  change  of  contact  or 
immediate  vicinity,  it  follows  that  it  can  never  be  determined 
which  thing  is  moved.  For  as  in  astronomy  the  same  phenomena 
are  presented  in  different  hypotheses,  so  it  is  always  permissible  to 
ascribe  real  motion  to  either  one  or  other  of  those  bodies  which 
change  among  themselves  vicinity  or  situation ; so  that  one  of 
these  bodies  being  arbitrarily  chosen  as  if  at  rest  or,  for  a given 
reason  moving  in  a given  line,  it  may  be  geometrically  determined 
what  motion  or  rest  must  be  ascribed  to  the  others  so  that  the 
given  phenomena  may  appear.  Hence  if  there  is  nothing  in 
motion  but  this  respective  change,  it  follows  that  no  reason  is 
given  in  nature  why  motion  must  be  ascribed  to  one  thing  rather 


on  Descartes’  “principles.”  63 

than  to  others.  The  consequence  of  this  will  be  that  there  is  no 
real  motion.  Therefore  in  order  that  a thing  can  he  said  to  be 
moved,  we  require  not  only  that  it  change  its  situation  in  respect 
to  others,  but  also  that  the  cause  of  change,  the  force  or  action,  he 
in  it  itself. 

[The  remarks  on  the  rest  of  the  book,  excepting  those  on  Articles  45  and  64, 
are  omitted  here  as  being  of  little  philosophical  interest.  They  treat  princi- 
pally of  Descartes’  opinions  as  to  the  laws  of  motion.] 

On  Article  45.  Before  I undertake  to  examine  the  special 
laws  of  motion  laid  down  by  our  author,  I will  give  a general  crite- 
rion, or  Lydian  stone  as  it  were,  by  which  they  may  be  examined, 
which  I am  accustomed  to  call  the  law  of  continuity . I have 
recently  explained  it  elsewhere,  but  it  must  be  repeated  here  and 
amplified.  Certainly  when  two  hypotheses  or  two  different  data 
continually  by  turns  approach  until  at  length  one  of  them  ends  in 
the  other,  it  must  be  also  that  the  quaesita  aut  eventa  of  both  by 
turns  continually  approach  one  another,  and  finally,  that  one  van- 
ishes in  the  other,  and  vice  versa.  Thus  it  is  with  ellipses  one 
focus  of  which  remains  unmoved,  if  the  other  focus  recedes 
from  it  more  and  more,  then  the  new  ellipses  which  are  thus 
produced  will  continually  approach  a parabola  and  finally  wholly 
vanish  in  it,  since  indeed  the  distance  of  the  receding  focus  will 
have  become  immeasurable.  Whence  both  the  properties  of  such 
ellipses  will  approach  more  and  more  to  the  properties  of  a para- 
bola so  far  even  that  they  finally  vanish  in  them,  and  also  a 
parabola  may  be  considered  as  an  ellipse  one  focus  of  which  is 
infinitely  distant,  and  hence  all  the  properties  of  ellipses  may  be 
also  verified  of  a parabola  as  if  of  such  an  ellipse.  And  indeed 
geometry  is  full  of  examples  of  this  kind  ; but  nature,  the  most  wise 
Author  of  which  employes  the  most  perfect  geometry,  observes  the 
same,  otherwise  no  ordered  progress  would  he  preserved  in  it. 
Thus  motion  gradually  decreasing  finally  vanishes  into  rest,  and 
inequality  continually  diminished  ends  in  true  equality,  so  that  rest 
may  be  regarded  as  infinitely  slight  motion  or  as  infinite  slowness, 
and  equality  as  infinitely  slight  inequality;  and  for  this  reason 
whatever  may  be  demonstrated  either  of  motion  in  general  or  of 
inequality  in  general  must  also  according  to  this  interpretation  he 


64 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBXITZ. 


verified  of  rest  or  of  equality,  so  that  the  law  of  rest  or  of  equality 
may  in  a certain  way  he  conceived  as  a special  case  of  the  law  of 
motion  or  of  inequality.  But  if  this  does  not  follow,  it  must  be 
considered  as  certain  that  the  rules  are  awkward  and  badly 
conceived. 

Ok  Article  64.  The  author  closes  the  Second  and  General 
Part  concerning  the  principles  of  material  things  with  a certain 
admonition  which  seems  to  me  to  need  restriction.  He  says  truly 
that  in  order  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  nature  there  is  no  need 
of  other  principles  than  those  found  in  abstract  mathematics  or  in 
the  theory  of  magnitude,  figure  and  motion.  H.or  does  he  recog- 
nize any  other  matter  than  that  which  is  the  subject  of  geometry. 
I indeed  fully  assent  that  all  the  special  phenomena  of  nature  can 
be  explained  mechanically  if  they  are  sufficiently  examined  by  us, 
nor  can  the  causes  of  material  things  be  understood  in  any  other 
way.  But  I think  also  that  this  ought  to  be  repeatedly  considered, 
that  the  very  mechanical  principles  and  hence  the  general  laws 
of  nature  are  derived  from  higher  principles,  nor  can  they  be 
explained  by  the  mere  consideration  of  quantity  and  of  that  which 
is  geometrical,  but  that  there  is  rather  in  them  something  metaphys- 
ical, independent  of  the  notions  which  the  imagination  presents 
and  which  must  he  referred  to  a substance  destitute  of  extension. 
For  in  addition  to  extension  and  its  variations  there  is  in  matter 
force  itself  or  power  of  acting  which  forms  a transition  from  meta- 
physics to  nature,  from  material  things  to  immaterial.  This  force 
has  its  own  laws,  derived  from  principles  not  of  mere  absolute,  and, 
so  to  speak,  brute  necessity,  as  in  mathematics,  hut  of  perfect 
reason.  But  these  being  embraced  together  in  a general  discussion, 
afterwards  when  a reason  is  given  for  the  phenomena  of  nature, 
all  can  he  explained  mechanically,  and  as  vainly  as  fundamental 
( archaei ) perceptions  and  desires,  and  operating  ideas,  and  forms 
of  substances,  and  souls  also  are  then  employed,  so  vainly  would  we 
call  in  the  universal  cause  of  all,  as  a Deus  ex  machina,  to  explain 
each  natural  thing  by  his  simple  will,  which  I remember  the  author 
of  Philosophia  Mosaica  does,  the  words  of  Sacred  Scripture  being 
badly  understood.  ITe  who  will  consider  this  properly  will  hold  a 
middle  position  in  philosophy  and  will  satisfy  theology  no  less  than 


ON  descaetes’  “principles.”  65 

physics,  and  he  will  understand  that  it  was  not  so  much  a sin  of 
the  schoolmen  to  hold  the  doctrine  of  intelligible  forms  as  to 
apply  it  as  they  did,  at  the  time  when  the  inquiry  was  rather  of 
the  modifications  and  instruments  of  substance  and  its  manner  of 
acting,  that  is,  its  mechanism.  Nature  has  as  it  were  an  empire 
within  an  empire,  and  so  to  say  a double  kingdom,  of  reason  and  of 
necessity,  or  of  forms  and  of  particles  of  matter;  for  just  as  all 
things  are  full  of  souls,  so  also  they  are  full  of  organized  bodies. 
These  realms,  without  confusion  between  them,  are  governed  each 
by  its  own  law,  nor  is  the  reason  of  perception  and  of  desire  to  be 
sought  in  the  modifications  of  extension,  any  more  than  the  reason 
of  nutrition  and  of  other  organic  functions  is  to  be  sought  in  forms 
or  souls.  But  the  highest  substance,  which  is  the  universal 
cause  of  all,  brings  it  about  by  his  infinite  wisdom  and  power  that 
these  two  very  different  series  are  referred  to  the  same  corporeal 
substance  and  perfectly  harmonize  between  themselves  just  as  if  one 
was  controlled  by  the  influence  of  the  other ; and  if  you  observe 
the  necessity  of  matter  and  the  order  of  efficient  powers,  you 
observe  that  nothing  happens  without  a cause  satisfying  the  imag- 
ination and  except  on  account  of  the  mathematical  laws  of  mechan- 
ism ; or  if  you  regard  the  circle  of  ends  as  a golden  chain  and  of 
forms  as  an  intelligible  world,  the  apexes  of  ethics  and  of  meta- 
physics being  joined  in  one  on  account  of  the  perfection  of  the 
supreme  author,  you  notice  that  nothing  can  be  done  without  the 
highest  reason.  For  God  and  eminent  form  and  first  efficient  are 
the  same,  and  he  is  the  end  or  final  reason  of  things.  Moreover 
it  is  our  part  to  reverence  his  footprints  in  things,  and  not  only 
to  admire  his  instruments  in  operating  and  the  mechanical  cause 
of  material  things,  but  also  the  higher  uses  of  admirable  inge- 
nuity, and  as  we  recognize  God  as  the  architect  of  bodies  so  also 
to  recognize  him  especially  as  the  king  of  minds  and  his  intelli- 
gence as  ruling  all  things  for  the  best,  which  constitutes  the  most 
perfect  Republic  of  the  Universe  under  the  most  powerful  and 
wisest  of  Monarchs.  Thus  in  the  particular  phenomena  of  nature 
and  in  the  connection  of  each  consideration,  we  shall  consult 
equally  utility  of  life  and  perfection  of  mind,  and  wisdom  no  less 
than  piety. 


VIII. 


Oh  the  jSTotioks  of  Eight  ahd  Justice.  1693. 

[From  tlie  Latin.] 

I do  not  know  whether,  even  after  so  many  eminent  writers 
have  discussed  them,  the  notions  of  right  and  of  justice;  have  been 
sufficiently  cleared  up.  Bight  is  a certain  moral  power,  and  obliga- 
tion a moral  necessity.  Moreover,  I understand  by  moral  that 
which  among  good  men  is  equivalent  to  natural : for,  as  a cele- 
brated Eoman  jurisconsult  says,  things  which  are  contrary  to 
good  morals  must  be  regarded  as  things  which  cannot  be  done. 
A good  man  moreover  is  one  who  loves  all  as  much  as  reason  allows. 
Justice,  therefore,  which  virtue  is  the  mistress  of  the  affection 
which  the  Greeks  call  <f>i\av6punria , we  will  define  most  properly, 
unless  I am  mistaken,  as  the  charity  of  the  wise  man  [ caritatem 
sainentis],  that  is,  charity  according  to  the  dictates  of  wisdom. 
Therefore,  what  Cameades  is  reported  to  have  said,  namely,  that 
justice  is  the  highest  folly,  because  it  commands  us,  neglecting  our 
own  interests,  to  care  for  the  interests  of  others,  comes  from  igno- 
rance of  the  definition.  Charity  is  universal  benevolence,  and 
benevolence  is  the  habit  of  loving.  Moreover  to  love  is  to  take 
delight  in  the  happiness  of  another,  or,  what  amounts  to  the  same 
thing,  it  is  to  account  another’s  happiness  one’s  own.  Whence  the 
difficult  knot,  which  is  also  of  great  moment  in  theology,  is  untied, 
how  there  can  be  a disinterested  love,  which  is  free  from  hope  and 
from  fear,  and  from  regard  for  personal  advantage ; it  is  evident 
that  the  joy  of  those  whose  joy  enters  into  our  own  delights  us, 
for  those  things  which  delight  are  sought  after  for  their  own  sake. 
And  just  as  the  contemplation  of  beautiful  objects  is  itself  agree- 
able, and  a painting  by  Eaphael  affects  him  who  understands  it, 
even  if  it  brings  no  riches,  in  such  a way  that  it  is  kept  before 
his  eyes  and  regarded  with  delight,  as  a symbol  of  love;  so  when 
the  beautiful  object  is  at  the  same  time  also  capable  of  happiness, 
his  affection  passes  over  into  true  love.  But  the  divine  love  sur- 
passes other  loves  because  God  can  be  loved  with  the  greatest 


ON  THE  NOTIONS  OF  EIGHT  AND  JUSTICE. 


67 


success,  since  nothing  is  at  once  happier  than  God,  and  nothing- 
more  beautiful  and  more  worthy  of  happiness  can  he  known  than 
he.  And  since  he  also  possesses  the  highest  power  and  wisdom, 
his  happiness  does  not  only  enter  into  ours  (if  we  are  wise,  that 
is  love  him)  but  it  also  constitutes  it.  Since,  moreover,  wisdom 
ought  to  direct  charity,  there  will  he  need  of  defining  it  also.  I 
think,  however,  that  the  notions  of  men  are  best  satisfied  if  we 
say  that  wisdom  is  nothing  else  than  the  science  itself  of  happi- 
ness. Thus  we  are  brought  back  again  to  the  notion  of  happiness , 
to  explain  which  this  is  not  the  place. 

From  this  source  flows  natural  right,  of  which  there  are  three 
grades;  strict  right  in  commutative  justice,  equity  (or  charity  in 
the  narrow  sense  of  the  word)  in  distributive  justice,  finally  piety 
(or  probity)  in  universal  justice:  whence  spring  the  rules,  to 
injure  no  one,  to  concede  to  each  his  own,  to  live  honorably  (or 
rather  piously),  as  well  as  the  most  general  and  commonly  recog- 
nized precepts  of  right,  just  as  I formerly  outlined  it  in  my  youth- 
ful essay,  De  Methodo  Juris. 

The  law  of  bare  or  strict  right  is,  No  one  is  to  he  injured,  so 
that  in  the  state  no  cause  for  action  be  given  him,  out  of  the  state 
no  right  of  war;  whence  comes  the  justice  which  philosophers  call 
commutative  and  the  right  which  Grotius  calls  power  [ facultas ]. 
The  higher  grade  I call  equity,  or,  if  you  prefer,  charity  (namely, 
in  the  narrower  sense),  which  I extend  beyond  the  rigor  of  bare 
right  to  those  obligations  also  to  the  performance  of  which  we  may 
not  be  forced ; such  as  gratitude,  almsgiving,  to  which  we  have, 
according  to  Grotius,  an  aptitude  [aptitudo,  moral  claim],  not  a 
power. 

And  just  as  it  belonged  to  the  lowest  grade  to  injure  no 
one,  so  to  the  middle  grade  it  belongs,  To  do  good  to  all;  but  so  far 
only  as  is  fitting  to  each  or  so  far  as  each  deserves,  so  that  it  is 
not  allowable  to  favor  all  equally.  Thus  this  is  the  sphere  of 
distributive  justice,  and  the  law  of  right  here  is  that  which  com- 
mands us  to  give  to  each  his  due  [suum  cuique  tribui].  And  to 
this  the  iiolitical  laws  in  the  commonwealth  extend  which  secure 
the  happiness  of  the  subjects,  and  along  with  this  bring  it  about 
that  those  who  had  only  aptitude  acquire  power,  that  is,  that  they 


6S 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


are  able  to  demand  wliat  is  fair  that  others  perform.  And  while 
in  the  lowest  grade  of  right  the  differences  among  men  were  not 
regarded,  except  those  which  arise  from  the  particular  affair 
itself,  hut  all  men  are  held  as  equals,  now,  however,  in  this  higher 
grade,  deserts  are  weighed ; whence  privileges,  rewards,  punish- 
ments have  their  place.  This  difference  in  the  grade  of  right 
Xenophon  has  excellently  sketched,  with  the  hoy  Cyrus  as  example, 
who,  chosen  as  judge  between  two  boys,  the  stronger  of  whom  had 
exchanged  coats  with  the  other  by  force, . because  he  had  found 
the  coat  of  the  other  more  fitting  to  his  figure,  and  his  own  coat 
to  the  figure  of  the  other,  had  pronounced  in  favor  of  the  robber : 
but  it  was  pointed  out  by  his  teacher  that  the  question  here  was 
not  as  to  which  the  coat  might  fit,  but  to  which  it  belonged,  and 
that  this  form  of  giving  judgment  could  only  then  be  employed 
rightly,  when  he  himself  had  coats  to  be  distributed.  For  equity 
itself  commends  to  us  strict  right  in  affairs,  that  is,  equality 
among  men,  except  when  a weighty  reason  of  greater  good  com- 
mands us  to  recede  from  it.  Moreover,  what  is  called  respect  of 
persons  has  its  place  not  in  exchanging  goods  with  others,  but  in 
distributing  our  own  or  the  public  goods. 

The  highest  degree  of  right  I have  called  hy  the  name  of  probity 
or  rather  piety.  For  what  has  been  hitherto  said  can  be  so  under- 
stood as  to  be  confined  within  the  consideration  of  mortal  life. 
And,  moreover,  bare  or  strict  right  springs  from  the  principle  of 
preserving  peace ; equity  or  charity  extends  to  something  more ; 
so  that  while  each  one  benefits  the  other  as  much  as  he  can,  he 
increases  his  own  happiness  in  that  of  the  other ; and,  in  a word, 
strict  right  avoids  misery,  the  highest  right  tends  to  happiness,  but 
happiness  such  as  belongs  to  mortality.  But  that  we  ought  to 
place  life  itself  and  whatever  makes  this  life  desirable,  after 
another’s  great  good ; that,  moreover,  the  greatest  griefs  ought  to 
be  endured  for  the  sake  of  others ; this  is  more  beautifully  taught 
by  philosophers  than  solidly  demonstrated.  For  the  honor  and 
glory  and  joyous  feeling  in  the  virtue  of  one’s  own  soul,  to  which, 
under  the  name  of  honor,  they  appeal,  are  goods  of  thought  or  of 
the  mind,  and,  moreover,  have  great  superiority,  but  not  with  all 
men  and  for  all  bitterness  of  evils,  since  all  men  are  not  equally 


ON  THE  NOTIONS  OF  EIGHT  AND  JUSTICE. 


69 


affected  by  the  imagination ; especially  those  whom  neither  a liberal 
education  nor  a free-born  mode  of  living  or  the  discipline  of  life 
or  of  rank  has  surely  accustomed  to  the  estimation  of  honor  and  to 
the  appreciation  of  the  goods  of  the  soul.  But  that  it  may  be  set- 
tled by  a general  demonstration  that  all  that  is  worthy  is  useful, 
and  all  that  is  base  is  injurious,  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and 
the  director  of  all,  God,  must  be  assumed.  Thus  it  is  that  we 
know  that  we  all  live  in  the  most  perfect  state  under  a monarch 
who  on  account  of  his  wisdom  cannot  be  deceived  and  on  account 
of  his  power  cannot  be  eluded ; and  he  too  is  so  lovable  that  to 
serve  such  a master  is  happiness.  Therefore,  he  who  spends  his 
soul  for  this  master,  as  Christ  teaches,  wins  it.  By  his  power  and 
providence  it  comes  to  pass  that  all  right  passes  over  into  fact, 
that  no  one  is  injured  except  by  himself,  that  nothing  done  rightly 
is  without  its  reward,  no  sin  without  punishment.  Since,  as  Christ 
has  divinely  taught,  all  our  hairs  are  numbered,  and  even  a cup 
of  water  is  not  given  in  vain  t'o  one  thirsting,  so  nothing  is 
neglected  in  the  Commonwealth  of  the  Universe.  It  is  on  this 
account  that  justice  is  called  universal  and  includes  all  other 
virtues ; for  that  also  which  otherwise  does  not  concern  the  interest 
of  another,  namely,  that  we  do  not  misuse  our  body  or  our  means, 
this  is  also  forbidden  outside  of  human  laws,  by  natural  right, 
i.  e.,  by  the  eternal  laws  of  the  divine  monarchy,  since  we  are 
indebted  to  God  for  ourselves  and  for  what  we  have.  For  as  it 
is  to  the  interest  of  the  State  so  it  is  much  more  to  that  of  the 
Universe  that  no  one  make  a bad  use  of  his  own.  Here,  therefore, 
that  highest  law  of  right  receives  its  force,  which  commands  us  to 
live  honorably  (i.  e.,  piously).  And  in  this  sense  it  is  rightly 
put  by  learned  men  among  the  things  to  be  demanded,  that  the 
natural  law  and  the  law  of  nations  be  taught  according  to  the 
doctrines  of  Christianity,  that  is  (from  the  example  of  Christ) 
to.  avojTepay  the  sublime  things,  the  divine  things  of  the  wise.  Thus 
we  seem  to  ourselves  to  have  explained  most  fitly  the  three  precepts 
of  right,  or  three  degrees  of  justice,  and  to  have  pointed  out  the 
sources  of  natural  law. 


IX. 


Leibnitz’s  Reply  to  ti-ie  Extract  prom  the  Letter  oe  M. 

Foucher,  Canon  of  Dijon,  published  in  the  “Journal”  of 
March  16.  1693. 

[From  the  French.] 

One  ought  to  be  very  glad,  sir,  that  you  give  a reasonable  mean- 
ing to  the  doubt  of  the  Academics.  It  is  the  best  apology  that 
you  could  make  for  them.  I shall  he  charmed  to  see  sometime 
their  views  digested  and  made  clear  by  your  pains.  But  you  will 
be  obliged  from  time  to  time  to  lend  them  some  ray  of  your  light, 
as  you  have  begun  to  do.  - 

It  is  true  that  I wrote  two  little  discourses,  twenty  years  ago, 
one  on  the  theory  of  abstract  motion , wherein  I considered  it  as 
outside  of  the  system,  as  if  it  were  a thing  purely  mathematical ; 
the  other  on  the  hypothesis  of  concrete  ancl  systematic  motion,  such 
as  really  is  met  with  in  nature.  There  may  be  some  good  in  them 
since  you  with  others  judge  so.  However  there  are  many  points 
on  which  I believe  that  1 am  better  instructed  at  present,  and 
among  others  I explain  to-day  indivisibles  in  an  entirely  different 
way.  That  was  the  attempt  of  a young  man  who  had  not  yet 
fathomed  mathematics.  The  laws  of  abstract  motion  which  I gave 
at  that  time  would  really  hold  good  if  there  was  nothing  else  in 
body  but  what  is  conceived  there  according  to  Descartes  and  even 
according  to  Gassendi.  But  as  I have  found  that  nature  treats 
body  quite  differently  as  regards  motion  it  is  one  of  my  arguments 
against  the  received  notion  of  the  nature  of  body,  as  I have  indi- 
cated in  the  Journal  des  Savants  of  June  2,  1692. 

As  regards  indivisibles , when  by  that  word  is  understood  simple 
extremities  of  time  or  of  line,  new  extremities  could  not  he 
conceived  in  them,  nor  actual  nor  potential  parts.  Thus  points 
are  neither  large  nor  small,  and  there  needs  no  leap  to  pass  them. 
Llowever,  although  there  are  such  indivisibles  everywhere,  the  con- 
tinuum is  not  composed  of  them,  as  the  objections  of  the  sceptics 
appear  to  suppose.  In  my  opinion  these  objections  have  nothing 


KEPLY  TO  FOTTCIIEK. 


71 


insurmountable  about  them,  as  will  be  found  by  reducing  them  to 
form.  Gregory  of  St.  Vincent  has  well  shown  by  the  calculations 
even  of  divisibility  ad  infinitum,  the  place  where  Achilles  ought 
' to  overtake  the  tortoise  which  precedes  him,  according  to  the  pro- 
portion of  velocities.  Thus  geometry  serves  to  dissipate  these 
apparent  difficulties. 

I am  so  much  in  favor  of  the  actual  infinite  that  instead  of 
admitting  that  nature  abhors  it,  as  is  commonly  said,  I hold  that  it 
affects  it  everywhere  in  order  better  to  mark  the  perfections  of  its 
author.  So  I believe  that  there  is  no  part  of  matter  which  is  not, 
I do  not  say  divisible,  but  actually  divided ; and  consequently  the 
least  particle  must  be  regarded  as  a world  full  of  an  infinity  of 
different  creatures. 


X. 


Extract  from  xi  Letter  to  the  Abbe  Xicaise  on  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Descartes.  1793. 

[From  the  French.] 

I honor  exceedingly  tlie  Bishop  d’Avranches,  and  I beg  you, 
sir,  to  give  him  my  respects  when  occasion  offers.  One  of  my 
friends  in  Bremen  having  sent  me  the  book  of  Herr  Swelling,  pro- 
fessor there,  against  the  censure  of  that  illustrious  prelate,  in  order 
to  have  my  opinion  of  it,  I replied  that  the  best  answer  that  the 
Cartesians  could  make  would  be  to  profit  by  the  advice  of 
d’Avranches ; to  emancipate  themselves  from  the  spirit  of  sect, 
always  contrary  to  the  advancement  of  the  sciences ; to  unite  to 
the  reading  of  the  excellent  works  of  Descartes  that  of  some  other 
great  men,  ancient  and  modem ; not  to  despise  antiquity,  whence 
Descartes  has  taken  a good  part  of  his  best  thoughts;  to  give 
themselves  to  experiments  and  to  demonstrations  in  place  of  those 
general  reasonings  which  serve  but  to  support  idleness  and  to  cover 
up  ignorance;  to  try  to  make  some  advance  and  not  to  content 
themselves  with  being  simple  paraphrasers  of  their  master ; and  not 
to  neglect  or  despise  anatomy,  history,  the  languages,  criticism,  for 
want  of  knowing  their  importance  and  value ; not  to  imagine  that 
we  know  all  that  is  necessary  or  all  we  may  hope  to ; finally,  to  be 
modest  and  studious,  in  order  not  to  draw  upon  themselves  this  apt 
saying:  Ignorantia  inflat.  I shall  add  that  I do  not  know  how  or 
by  what  star,  the  influence  of  which  is  the  enemy  of  every  sort  of 
secret,  the  Cartesians  have  done  almost  nothing  that  is  new,  and 
that  almost  all  the  discoveries  have  been  made  by  persons  not  of 
the  sect,.-  I know  but  the  little  pipes  of  M.  Rohault ; which  do  not 
deserve  the  name  of  a Cartesian  discovery.  It  seems  that  those 
who  attach  themselves  to  a single  master  abase  themselves  by  this 
kind  of  slavery  and  conceive  almost  nothing  except  in  imitation  of 
him.  I am  sure  that  if  Descartes  had  lived  longer  he  would  have 
given  us  many  important  things.  This  shows  us  either  that  it  was 
rather  his  genius  than  his  method,  or  else  that  he  has  not  published 


OUST  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  DESCARTES. 


73 


liis  method.  In  fact  I remember  having  read  in  one  of  his  letters 
that  he  intended  simply  to  write  a discourse  on  his  method,  and  to 
give  some  examples  of  it ; but  that  he  had  no  intention  of  publish- 
ing it.  Thus  the  Cartesians  who  think  that  they  have  the  method 
of  their  master  deceive  themselves  very  much.  Nevertheless,  I 
imagine  that  this  method  was  not  so  perfect  as  we  are  made  to 
believe.  I think  so  from  his  geometry.  This  is,  withoht  doubt, 
his  strong  point;  nevertheless  we  know  to-day  that  it  is  very  far 
from  going  as  far  as  it  ought  to  go  and  as  he  said  it  went.  The 
most  important  problems  need  a new  sort  of  analysis  entirely 
different  from  his,  examples  of  which  I myself  have  given.  It 
seems  to  me  that  Descartes  did  not  sufficiently  penetrate  the 
important  truths  of  Kepler  on  astronomy  which  the  course  of  time 
has  verified.  His  “Man”  is  very  different  from  the  true  man,  as 
M.  Stenon  and  others  have  shown  it  to  be.  The  knowledge  he  had 
of  salts  and  chemistry  was  very  meagre;  this  is  the  reason  that 
what  he  says  thereon,  as  well  as  on  minerals,  is  mediocre.  The 
metaphysics  of  this  author,  although  it  has  some  fine  traits,  is 
intermingled  with  great  paralogisms,  and  has  some  very  weak  pas- 
sages. I have  discovered  the  source  of  his  errors  as  to  the  laws  of 
motion,  and  although  I esteem  very  highly  his  physics  it  is  not 
because  I regard  it  as  true,  except  in  some  particular  things,  but 
because  I consider  it  as  an  admirable  model  and  as  an  example  of 
what  could  and  ought  now  to  be  produced  on  principles  more  solid 
than  experiments  have  thus  far  furnished  us  with.  In  a word,  I 
esteem  Descartes  very  highly,  but  very  often  it  is  not  permitted  me 
to  follow  him.  I have  in  the  past  made  remarks  on  the  first  and 
second  parts  of  his  “Principles.”  These  parts  comprise,  in 
epitome,  his  general  philosophy,  in  which  I have  most  often  been 
obliged  to  separate  myself  from  him.  The  following  parts  come  to 
the  detail  of  nature,  which  is  not  yet  so  easily  explained.  This  is 
why  I have  not  yet  touched  them.  But  I do  not  know  how  I have 
been  insensibly  led  to  entertain  you  so  long  on  this  subject. 


XI. 


On  the  Reform  of  Metaphysics  and  on  the  Motion  of 
Substance.  1694. 

[From  the  Latin.] 

I see  that  most  of  those  who  devote  themselves  with  pleasure  to 
the  study  of  mathematics  entertain  a dislike  for  that  of  meta- 
physics because  in  the  former  they  find  clearness  and  in  the  latter 
obscurity.  I think  that  the  principal  reason  of  this  is  that  general 
notions,  which  are  believed  to  he  perfectly  known  by  all,  have 
become  ambiguous  and  obscure  by  the  negligence  of  men  and  by 
the  inconsistency  of  their  thoughts,  and  that  what  are  ordinarily 
given  as  definitions  are  not  even  nominal  definitions,  because  they 
explain  absolutely  nothing.  And  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that 
this  evil  has  spread  into  the  other  sciences,  which  are  subordinate 
to  this  first  and  architectonic  science.  Thus  we  have  subtile  dis- 
tinctions in  place  of  clear  definitions,  and  in  place  of  truly 
universal  axioms  we  have  general  rules  which  are  more  often  bro- 
ken by  exceptions  than  supported  by  examples.  And  yet  men  by 
a sort  of  necessity  frequently  make  use  of  metaphysical  terms,  and 
flatter  themselves  that  they  understand  what  they  have  learned  to 
say.  And  it  is  manifest  that  the  true  and  fruitful  meanings  uot 
only  of  substance  but  also  of  cause,  of  action,  of  relation,  of  simi- 
larity and  most  other  general  terms,  lie  for  the  most  part  hidden. 
AVhence  it  is  not  surprising  that  this  queen  of  the  sciences,  which 
is  called  first  philosophy  and  which  Aristotle  defined  as  the  science 
desired  or  to  be  sought  for  remains  to-day  in  the  num- 

ber of  the  sciences  sought.  Plato,  it  is  true,  often  in  his  Dialogues 
inquires  into  the  value  of  notions ; Aristotle  does  the  same  in  his 
hooks  entitled  Metaphysics ; nevertheless,  without  much  apparent 
profit.  The  later  Platonists  fall  into  monstrosities  of  language,  and 
the  disciples  of  Aristotle,  especially  the  Scholastics,  were  more 
desirous  of  raising  questions  than  of  answering  them.  In  our  day 
some  illustrious  men  have  also  devoted  themselves  to  the  first 
philosophy , but  up  to  the  present  time  without  much  success.  It 


ON  METAPHYSICS  AND  THE  NOTION  OF  SUBSTANCE. 


75 


cannot  bo  denied  that  Descartes  brought  to  it  many  excellent 
things  ; that  he  has  above  all  the  merit  of  having  renewed  Platonic 
study  by  turning  the  mind  away  from  the  things  of  sense  and  of 
having  afterward  employed  usefully  academic  scepticism.  But 
soon,  by  a sort  of  inconsistency  or  of  impatience  to  affirm,  he  was 
led  astray,  no  longer  distinguished  the  certain  from  the  uncertain, 
and  made  the  nature  of  corporeal  substance  incorrectly  consist 
in  extension,  and  held  false  notions  of  the  union  of  the  soul 
and  the  body ; the  cause  of  all  of  which  was  that  the  nature  of 
substance  in  general  was  not  understood.  For  he  had  proceeded  at 
a bound,  as  it  were,  to  the  solution  of  the  gravest  questions,  without 
having  explained  the  notions  which  they  implied.  Hence,  nothing 
shows  more  clearly  how  far  his  metaphysical  meditations  are 
removed  from  certainty  than  the  writing  in  which,  at  the  prayer  of 
Mersenne  and  others,  he  vainly  tried  to  clothe  them  with  a mathe- 
matical garb.  I see  also  that  other  men  gifted  with  rare  penetra- 
tion have  broached  metaphysics  and  treated  some  parts  of  it  with 
profoundness,  but  enveloping  them  with  so  much  obscurity  that 
they  appear  to  surmise  rather  than  to  prove.  But  metaphysics,  it 
seems  to  me,  has  more  need  of  clearness  and  certainty  than  even 
the  mathematics,  because  the  latter  carry  with  them  their  proofs 
and  corroborations,  which  is  the  principal  cause  of  their  success ; 
whereas  in  metaphysics  we  are  deprived  of  this  advantage.  There- 
fore a certain  particular  plan  is  necessary  in  exposition  which,  like 
the  thread  in  the  Labyrinth,  serves  us,  no  'less  than  the  method  of 
Euclid,  for  solving  our  problems  as  it  were  by  reckoning;  pre- 
serving, nevertheless,  always  the  clearness  which  even  in  com- 
mon conversation  should  not  be  sacrificed. 

blow  important  these  things  are  is  apparent,  especially  from  the 
notion  of  substance  which  I give,  because  it  is  so  fruitful  that  from 
it  first  truths,  even  those  which  concern  God  and  souls  and  the 
nature  of  bodies,  follow ; truths  in  part  known  but  not  sufficiently 
proved ; in  part  unknown  up  to  this  time  but  which  would  be  of 
the  greatest  usefulness  in  the  other  sciences.  To  give  a foretaste 
of  them,  it  is  sufficient  for  me  to  say  that  the  idea  of  energy, 
called  by  the  Germans  Tcraft,  and  by  the  French  la  force,  and 
for  the  explanation  of  which  I have  designed  a special  science  of 


76 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


dynamics,  adds  much'  to  the  understanding  of  the  notion  of  sub- 
stance. For  active  force  differs  from  the  bare  power  familiar  to  the 
schools,  in  that  the  active  power  or  faculty  of  the  scholastics  is 
nothing  else  than  the  possibility  ready  to  act,  which  has  neverthe- 
less need,  in  order  to  pass  into  action,  of  an  external  excitation, 
and  as  it  were  of  a stimulus.  But  active  force  includes  a sort  of  act 
or  eWe\e%eia,  which  is  midway  between  the  faculty  of  acting  and 
the  action  itself,  and  involves  an  effort,  and  thus  of  itself  passes 
into  operation ; nor  does  it  need  aid  other  than  the  removal  of 
impediments.  This  may  be  illustrated  by  the  example  of  a heavy 
hanging  body  straining  the  rope  which  sustains  it,  or  of  a tense  bow. 
For  although  gravity  or  elastic  force  may  and  must  be  explained 
mechanically  from  the  motion  of  ether,  nevertheless  the  final 
reason  of  motion  in  matter  is  the  force  impressed  upon  it  at  the 
creation,  a force  inherent  in  every  body,  but  which  is  variously 
limited  and  confined  in  nature  by  the  very  collision  of  bodies.  I 
say,  then,  that  this  property  of  acting  resides  in  every  substance ; 
that  always  some  sort  of  action  is  born  of  it ; and  that,  conse- 
quently, corporeal  substance,  no  less  than  spiritual,  never  ceases 
to  act;  a truth  which  those  who  place  its  essence  in  mere  extension 
or  even  in  impenetrability,  and  who  have  imagined  that  they  con- 
ceived of  body  absolutely  at  rest,  seem  not  to  have  sufficiently 
understood.  It  will  appear,  also  from  our  meditations  that  a 
created  substance  receives  from  another  created  substance,  not  the 
force  itself  of  acting  but  only  the  limits  and  determination  of  an 
already  preexistent  tendency  or  virtue  of  acting.  I omit  here  other 
considerations  useful  for  the  solution  of  the  difficult  problem  con- 
cerning the  mutual  operation  of  substances. 


XII. 


A New  System  of  the  Nature  and  of  the  Interaction  of 

Substances,  as  well  as  of  the  union  which  exists  between 

tile  Soul  and  the  Body.  1695. 

[From  the  French.] 

1.  I. conceived  this  system  many  years  ago  and  communicated  it 
to  some  learned  men,  and  in  particular  to  one  of  the  greatest  theo; 
logians  and  philosophers  of  our  time,  who,  having  been  informed 
of  some  of  my  opinions  hy  a very  distinguished  person,  had  found 
them  highly  paradoxical.  When,  however,  he  had  received  my 
explanations,  he  withdrew  his  condemnation  in  the  most  generous 
and  edifying  manner ; and,  having  approved  a part  of  my  proposi- 
tions, he  ceased  censuring  the  others  with  which  he  was  not  yet  in 
accord.  Since  that  time  I have  continued  my  meditations  as  far  as 
opportunity  has  permitted,  in  order  to  give  to  the  public  only 
thoroughly  examined  views,  and  I have  also  tried  to  answer  the 
objections  made  against  my  essays  in  dynamics,  which  are  related 
to  the  former.  Finally,  as  a number  of  persons  have  desired  to  see 
my  opinions  more  clearly  explained,  I have  ventured  to  publish 
these  meditations  although  they  are  not  at  all  popular  nor  such  as 
to  be  enjoyed  hy  every  sort  of  mind.  I have  been  led  to  do  this 
principally  in  order  that  I might  profit  by  the  judgments  of  those 
who  are  learned  in  these  matters,  inasmuch  as  it  would  he  too 
inconvenient  to  seek  and  challenge  separately  those  who  would  he 
disposed  to  give  the  instructions  which  I shall  always  be  glad  to 
receive,  provided  the  love  of  truth  appears  in  them  rather  than 
passion  for  opinions  already  held. 

2.  Although  I am  one  of  those  who  have  worked  very  hard  at 
mathematics  I have  not  since  my  youth  ceased  to  meditate  on  phi- 
losophy, for  it  always  seemed  to  me  that  there  was  a way  to 
establish  in  it,  by  clear  demonstrations,  something  stable.  I had 
penetrated  well  into  the  territory  of  the  scholastics  when  mathe- 
matics and  modern  authors  induced  me  while  yet  young  to  with- 
draw from  it.  Their  fine  ways  of  explaining  nature  mechanically 


7S 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


charmed  me  ; and,  with,  reason,  I scorned  the  method  of  those  who 
employ  only  forms  or  faculties,  by  which  nothing  is  learned.  But 
afterwards,  when  I tried  to  search  into  the  principles  of  mechanics 
to  find  proof  of  the  laws  of  nature  which  experience  made  known, 
I perceived  that  the  mere  consideration  of  an  extended  mass  did 
not  suffice  and  that'  it"  was  necessary  to  employ  in  addition  the 
notion  of  force,  which  is  very  easily  understood  although  it  belongs 
to  the  province  of  metaphysics.  It  seemed  to  me  also  that  the 
opinion  of  those  who  transform  or  degrade  animals  into  simple 
machines,  notwithstanding  its  seeming  possibility,  is  contrary  to 
appearances  and  even  opposed  to  the  order  of  things. 

3.  In  the  beginning,  when  I had  freed  myself  from  the  yoke  of 
Aristotle,  I occupied  myself  with  the  consideration  of  the  void  and 
atoms,  for  this  is  what  best  fills  the  imagination ; but  after  many 
meditations  I perceived  that  it  is  impossible  to  find  the  principles 
of  true  unity  in  mere  matter,  or  in  that  wbichrikASnly  passive, 
because  there  everything  is  but  a collection  or  mass  of  parts  ad 
infinitum.  How,  multiplicity  cannot  have  its  reality  except  from 
real  unities,  which  orginate  otherwise  and  are  entirely  different 
things  from  the  points  of  Avhich  it  is  certain  the  continuum  could 
not  be  composed.  Therefore,  in  order  to  find  these  real  unities  I 
was  compelled  to  resort  to  a formal  atom,  since  a material  being 
could  not  be  at,  the  same  time  material  and  perfectly  indivisible,  or 
in  other  words,  endowed  with  true  unity.  It  became  necessary, 
therefore,  to  recall  and,  as  it  were,  reinstate  the  substantial  forms, 
so  decried  now-a-days,  but  in  a way  to  render  them  intelligible,  and 
distinguish  the  use  which  ought  to  be~TErade  of  them  from  the 
abuse  which  had  befallen  them.  I found  then  that  their  nature  is 
force  and  that  from  this  something  analogous  to  sensation  and 
desire  results,  and  that  therefore  it  was  necessary  to  conceive  them 
similarly  to  the  idea  which  we  have  of  souls.  But  as  the  soul 
ought  not  to  be  employed  to  explain  the  details  of  the  economy  of 
the  animal  body,  likewise  I judged  that  it  was  not  necessary  to 
employ  these  forms  to  explain  particular  problems  in  nature 
although  they  are  necessary  in  order  to  establish  true  general  prin- 
ciples. Aristotle  calls  them  the  first  entelechies.  I call  them, 
perhaps  more  intelligibly,  primitive  forces  which  contain  in  them- 


IEW  SYSTEM. 


79 


selves  not  only  actuality  [ Vacte ] or  complement  of  possibility,  but 
also  an  original ^ajctivity. 

4.  I saw  that  these  forms  and  these  souls  ought  to  be  indivisible, 
just  as  much  as  our  mind,  as  in  truth  I remembered  was  the 
opinion  of  St.  Thomas  in  regard  to  the  souls  of  brutes.  But  this 
innovation  renewed  the  great  difficulties  in  respect  to  the  origin 
and  duration  of  souls  and  of  forms.  For  as  every  simple  substance 
which  has  true  unity  cannot  begin  or  end  except  by  miracle,  it  fol- 
lows, that  it  cannot  begin  except  by  creation,  nor  end  except 
by  annihilation.  Therefore,  with  the  exception  of  the  souls 
which  God  might  still  be  pleased  to  create  expressly,  I was  obliged 
to  recognize  that  the  constitutive  forms  of  substances  must  have 
been  createdjwith  the  world,  and  that  they  must  exist  always.  Cer- 
tain scholastics,  HEe  Albertus  Magnus  and  John  Bacon,  had  also 
foreseen  a part  of  the  truth  as  to  their  origin.  And  the  matter 
ought  not  to  appear  at  all  extraordinary  for  only  the  same  duration 
which  the  Gassendists  accord  their  atoms  is  given  to  these  forms. 

5.  I was  of  the  opinion,  nevertheless,  that  neithejr^nAAA  nor  the 
rational  soul,  which  belong  to  a superior  order  and  have  incom- 
parably more  perfection  than  these  forms  implanted  in  matter 
which  in  my  opinion  are  found  everywhere,  ought  to  be  mixed 
up  indifferently  or  confounded  with  other  forms  or  souls — being- 
in  comparison  with  them,  like  little  gods  made  in  the  image  of  God 
and  having  within  them  some  rays  of  the  light  of  divinity.  This  is 
why  God  governs  spirits  as  a prince  governs  his  subjects,  and  even 
as  a father  cares  for  his  children;  while  he  disposes  of  the  other 
substances  as  an  engineer  manipulates  his  machines.  Thus  spirits 
have  peculiar  laws  which  place  them  above  the  changes  which 
matter  undergoes,  and  indeed  it  may  be  said  that  all  other  things 
are  made  only  for  them,  these  changes  even  being  arranged  for  the 
felicity  of  the  good  and  the  punishment  of  the  bad. 

6.  However,  to  return  to  ordinary  forms  or  to  animal  souls 
[ames  brutes],  the  duration  which  must  be  attributed  to  them  in 
place  of  that  which  had  been  attributed  to  atoms,  might  raise  the 
question  as  to  whether  they  pass  from  body  to  body,  which  would  be 
metempsychosis — veryJike  the  belief  of  certain  philosophers  in  the 
transmission  of  motion  and  of  species.  But  this  fancy  is  very  far 


so 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


removed  from  the  nature  of  things.  There  is  no  such  passage; 
and  here  it  is  that  the  transformations  of  Swammerdam,  Malpighi 
and  Leewenhoeek,  who  are  the  best  observers  of  our  time,  have 
come  to  my  aid  and  have  made  me  admit  more  easily  that  the 
annual  and  every  other  organized  substance  does  not  at  all  begin 
when  we  think  it  does,  and  that  its  apparent  generation  is  only  a 
development  and  a sort  of  augmentation.  I have  noticed  also  that 
the  author  of  the  Search  after  Truth  [i.  e.,  Malebranche] , Rigis, 
ITartsoeker  and  other  able  men,  have  not  been  far  removed  from 
this  opinion. 

7.  But  the  most  important  question  of  all  still  remained : What 
do  these  souls  or  these  forms  become  after  the  death  of  the  animal 
or  after  the  destruction  of  the  individual  of  the  organized  sub- 
stance? It  is  this  question  which  is  most  embarrassing,  all  the 
more  so  as-  it  seems  unreasonable  that  souls  should  remain  uselessly 
in  a chaos  of  confused  matter.  This  obliged  me  finally  to  believe 
that  there  was  only  one  reasonable  opinion  to  hold,  namely,  that 
not  only  the  soul  but  also  the  animal  itself  and  its  organic  mechan- 
ism^ were  preserved,  although  the  destruction  of  its  gross  parts  had 
rendered  Tt  so  small  as  to  escape  our  senses  now  just  as  much  as  it 
did  before  it  was  born.  Thus  there  is  no  person  who  can  accurately 
note  the  true  time  of  death,  which  can  be  considered  for  a long 
time  solely  asp  a suspension  of  visible  actions,  and  indeed  is  never 
anything  else  in  mere  animals;  witness  the  resuscitation  of 
drowned  flies  after  being  buried  under  pulverized  chalk,  and  other 
similar  examples,  which  make  it  sufficiently  clear  that  there  would 
be  many  more  resuscitations  and  of  far  more  intricacy  if  men  were 
in  condition  to  set  the  mechanism  going  again.  And  apparently  it 
was  of  something  of  this  sort  that  the  great  Democritus,  atomist  as 
he  was,  spoke,  although  Pliny  makes  sport  of  the  idea.  It  is  then 
natural  that  the  animal  having,  as  people  of  great  penetration 
begin  to  recognize,  always  been  living  and  organized,  should 
always  remain  so.  And  since,  therefore,  there  is  no  first  birth  nor 
entirely  new  generation  of  the  animal,  it  follows  that  there  will  be 
no  final  extinction  nor  complete  death  taken  in  its  metaphysical 
rigor,  and  that  in  consequence  instead  of  the  transmigration  of 
souls  there  is  only  transformation  of  one  and  the  same  animal, 


NEW  SYSTEM. 


81 


according  as  its  organs  .are  folded  differently  and  more  or  less 
developed. 

8.  Nevertheless,  rational  souls  follow  very  much  higher  laws 
and  are  exempt  from  all  that  could  make  them  lose  the  quality  of 
heing^citizens  in  the  society  of  spirits,  God  having  planned  for 
them  so  well,  that  all  the  changes  in  matter  cannot  make  them  lose 
the  moral  qualities  of  their  personality.  And  it  can  be  said  that 
everything  tends  to  the  perfection  not  only  of  the  universe  in  gen- 
eral hut  also  of  these  creatures  in  particular  who  are  destined  to 
such  a measure  of  happiness  that  the  universe  finds  itself  inter- 
ested therein,  hy  virtue  of  the  divine  goodness  which  communi- 
cates itseTflo  each  one,  according  as  sovereign  wisdom  permits. 

9.  As  regards  the  ordinary  body  of  animals  and  of  other  cor- 
poreal substances,  the  complete  extinction  of  which  has  up  to  this 
time  been  believed  in,  and  the^changes  of  which  depend  rather 
upon  mechanical  rules  than  upon  moral  laws,  I remarked  with 
pleasure  that  the  author  of  the  book  On  Diet,  which  is  attributed 
to  Hippocrates,  had  foreseen  something  of  the  truth  when  he  said 
in  express  terms  that  animals  are  not  born  and  do  not  die,  and 
that  the  things  which  are  supposed  to  begin  and  to  perish  only 
appear  and  disappear.  This  was  also  the  opinion  of  Parmenides 
and  of  Melissus,  according  to  Aristotle,  for  these  ancients  were 
more  profound  than  is  thought. 

10.  I am  the  best  disposed  in  the  world  to  do  justice  to  the 
moderns ; nevertheless  I think  they  have  carried  reform  too  far, 
for  instance,  in  confounding  natural  things  with  artificial,  for  the 
reason  that  they  have  not  sufficiently  high  ideas  of  the  majesty 
of  nature.  They  conceive  that  the  difference  between  its  machines 
and  ours  is  only  that  of  large  to  small.  This  caused  a very  able 
man,  author  of  Conversations  on  the  Plurality  of  Worlds,  to  say 
recently  that  in  regarding  nature  close  at  hand  it  is  found 
less  admirable  than  had  been  believed,  being  only  like  the  work- 
shop of  an  artisan.  I believe  that  this  does  not  give  a worthy  idea 
of  it  and  that  only  our  system  can  finally  make  men  realize  the  true 
and  immense  distance  which  there  is  between  the  most  trifling 
productions  and  mechanisms  of  the  divine  wisdom  and  the  greatest 
masterpieces  of  the  art  of  a finite  mind,  this  difference  consisting 

6 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


82 


\ 


1 


not-  merely  in  degree  but  also  in  kind.  It  must  then  be  known 
that  the  machines  of  nature  have  a truly  infinite  number  of  organs 
and  that  they  are  so  well  protected  and  so  proof  against  all  acci- 
dents that  it  is  not  possible  to  destroy  them.  A natural  machine 
remains  a machine  even  to  its  least  parts  and,  what  is  more,  it 
remains  always  the  same  machine  it  has  been,  being  only  trans- 
formed by  the  different  folds  it  receives,  and  sometimes  expanded, 
sometimes  compressed  and,  as  it  were,  concentrated,  when  believed 
to  be  lost. 

11.  Farther,  by  means  of  the  soul  or  of  form  there  arises  a true 
unity  which  answers  to  what  wp  call  the  I in  usyFhat'^BTch  could 
take  place  neither  in  the  machines  of  art  nor  in  the  simple  mass 
of  matter  however  well  organized  it  might  be,  which  can  only  be 
considered  as  an  army,  or  as  a herd  of  cattle,  or  as  a pond  full  of 
fish,  or  as  a watch  composed  of  springs  and  wheels.  Nevertheless, 
if  there  were  not  real  substantial  unities  there  would  be  nothing 
substantial  or  real  in  the  mass.  It  was  this  which  forced  Cordemoi 
to  abandon  Descartes,  and  to  embrace  Democritus’  doctrine  of  the 
Atoms,  in  order  to  find  a true  unity.  But  atoms  of  matter  are  con- 
trary to  reason,  leaving  out  of  account  the  proof  that  they  are  made 
up  of  parts,  for  the  invincible  attachment  of  one  part  to  another 
(if  such  a thing  could  be  conceived  or  with  reason  supposed)  would 
not  at  all  destroy  their  diversity.  Only  atoms  of  substance,  i.  e., 
unities  which  are  real  and  absolutely  destitute  of  parts,  are  sources 
of  actions  and  the  absolute  first  principles  of  the  composition  of 
things,  and,  as  it  were,  the  last  elements  of  the  analysis  of  sub- 
stances. They  might  be  called  metaphysical  points ; they  possess 
a certain  vitality  and  a kind  of  perception,  and  mathematical 
points  are  their  points  of  view  to  express  the  universe.  But  when 
corporeal  substances  are  compressed  all  their  organs  together  form 
only  a physical  point  to  our  sight.  Thus  physical  points  are  only 
indivisible  in  appearance ; mathematical  points  are  so  in  reality  but 
they  are  merely  modalities ; only  metaphysical  points  or  those  of 
substance  (constituted  by  forms  or  souls)  are  exact  and  real,  and 
without  them  there  would  be  nothing  real,  for  without  true  unities 
there  could  not  be  multiplicity. 

12.  After  having  established  these  propositions  1 thought  myself 
entering  into  port,  but  when  I came  to  meditate  on  the  union  of 


SEW  SYSTEM. 


83 


the  soul  with  the  body  I was  as  if  cast  hack  into  the  open  sea. 
For  I found  no  way  of  explaining  how  the  body  can  cause  anything 
to  pass  into  the  soul,  or  vice  versa;  nor  how  one  substance  can 
communicate  with  another  created  substance.  Descartes  gave  up 
the  attempt  on  that  point,  as  far  as  can  be  learned  from  his  writ- 
ings, but  his  disciples  seeing  that  the  common  view  was  inconceiv- 
able, were  of  the  opinion  that  we  perceive  the  qualities^of  bodies 
because  God  causes^  thoughts  to  arise  in  the  soul  on  the  occasion  of 
movements  of  matter ; «and  when  the  soul  wished  to  move  the  body 
in  its  turn  they  judged  that  it  was  God  who  moved  it  for  the  soul. 
And  as  the  communication  of  motions  again  seemed  to  them  incon- 
ceivable, they  believed  that  God  gave  motion  to  a body  on  the 
occasion  of  the  motion  of  another  body.  This  is  what  they  call  the 
system  of  Occasional  Causes,  which  has  been  much  in  vogue  on 
account  of  the  excellent  remarks  of  the  author  of  the  Search  after 
Truth. 

13.  It  must  be  confessed  that  the  difficulty  has  been  well  gone 
into  in  telling  us  what  cannot  take  place,  but  it  does  not  appear 
that  it  is  done  away  with  by  their  explanation  of  what  actually 
takes  place.  It  is  indeed  true  that  there  is  no  real  influence  of 
one  created  substance  upon  another,  speaking  in  metaphysical 
strictness,  and  that  all  things  with  all  their  realities  are  continually 
produced  by  the  power  of  God ; but  in  resolving  problems  it  is  not 
enough  to  employ  a general  cause  and  to  call  in  what  is  called  the 
Deus  ex  Macliina.  For  when  this  is  done  and  there  is  no  other 
explanation  which  can  be  drawn  from  secondary  causes,  this  is, 
properly,  having  recourse  to  miracle.  In  philosophy  we  should 
try  to  give  reasons  by  explaining  how  things  occur  by  divine  wis- 
dom in  conformity  with  the  idea  of  the  subject  under  considera- 
tion. 

II.  Being  then  obliged  to  admit  that  it  is  not  possible  for  the 
soul  or  any  true  substance  to  receive  any  influence  from  without,  if 
it  be  not  by  the  divine  omnipotence,  I was  led  insensibly  to  an 
opinion  which  surprised  me  but  which  appears  inevitable  and 
which  has  in  truth  great  advantages  and  many  beauties.  It  is  this  : 
it  must  then  be  said  that  God  created  the  soul,  or  every  other  real 
unity,  in  the  first  place  in  such  a way  that  everything  with  it  comes 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


Si 

into  existence  from  its  own  proper  nature  [ fonds ] through  perfect 
spontaneity  as  regards  itself  and  in  perfect  harmony  with  objects 
outside  itself.  And  that  thus  our  internal-  feelings  (i.  e.,  those 
within  the  soul  itself  and  not  in  the  brain  or  finer  parts  of  the 
body),  being  only  phenomena  consequent  upon  external  objects  or 
true  appearances,  and  like  well-ordered  dreams,  it  is  necessary  that 
these  internal  perceptions  within  the  soul  itself  come  to  it  by  its 
own  proper  original  constitution,  i.  e.,  by  the  representative 
nature  (capable  of  expressing  beings  outside  itself  by  relation  to 
its  organs),  which  has  been  given  it  at  its  creation  and  which 
constitutes  its  individual  character.  This  brings  it  about  that 
each  of  these  substances  in  its  own  way  and  according  to  a certain 
point  of  view,  represents  exactly  the  entire  universe,  and  percep- 
tions or  impressions  of  external  things  reach  the  soul  at  the  proper 
time  ni  virtue  of  its  own  laws,  as  if  it  were  in  a world  apart,  and 
as  if  there  existed  nothing  but  God  and  itself  (to  make  use  of 
the  manner  of  speaking  of  a certain  person  of  great  elevation  of 
mind,  whose  piety  is  well  known)  ; there  is  also  perfect  harmony 
among  all  these  substances,  producing  the  same  effects  as  if  they 
communicated  with  each  other  by  a transmission  of  kinds  or  of 
qualities,  as  philosophers  generally  suppose. 

Farther,  the  organized  mass,  within  which  is  the  point  of  view 
of  the  soul,  being  expressed  more  nearly,  finds  itself  reciprocally 
ready  to  act  of  itself,  following  the  laws  of  the  bodily  mechanism, 
at  the  moment  when  the  soul  wills  it,  without  either  one  troubling 
the  laws  of  the  other,  the  nerves  and  the  blood  having  just  at  that 
time  received  the  impulse  which  is  necessary  in  order  to  make 
them  respond  to  the  passions  and  perceptions  of  the  soul ; it  is  this 
mutual  relationship,  regulated  beforehand  in  every  substance  of 
the  universe,  which  produces  what  we  call  thei imnter-rwmpmiivir.a,- 
tion  and  alone  constitutes  the  union  between  the  soul  and  body. 
And  we  may  understand  from  this  hoW'the  soul  has  its  seat  in  the 
body  by  an  immediate  presence  which  could  not  be  greater,  for  it 
is  there,  as  the  unit  is  in  the.  complex  of  units,  which  is  the 
multitude. 

15.  This  hypothesis  is  very  possible.  For  why  might  not  God 
give  to  a substance  in  the  beginning  a nature  or  internal  force  which 


XEW  SYSTEM. 


85 


could  produce  in  it  in  perfect  order  (as  in  a spiritual  or  formal 
automaton,  but  free  here  since  it  has  reason  to  its  share),  all  that 
which  will  happen  to  it ; that  is  to  say  all  the  appearances  or  expres- 
sions it  will  have,  and  that  without  the  aid  of  any  creature  ? All 
the  more  as  the  nature  of  the  substance  necessarily  demands  and 
essentially  includes  a progress  or  change,  without  which  it  would 
not  have  power  to  act.  And  this  nature  of  the  soul,  being  repre- 
sentative, in  a exact  (although  more  or  less  distinct)  manner, 
of  the  universe,  the  series  of  representations  which  the  soul  will 
produce  for  itself  will  naturally  correspond  to  the  series  of  changes 
in  the  universe  itself ; as,  in  turn,  the  body  has  also  been  accom- 
modated to_the_soul,  for  the  encounters  where  ft  is  conceived  as 
acting  outwardly.  This  is  the  more  reasonable  as  bodies  are  only 
made  Tor  those  spirits  which  are  capable  of  entering  into  com-;  , 
miuiion  with  God  and  of  celebrating  His  glory.  Thus  from  the  1 
moment  the  possibility  of  this  hypothesis  of  harmonies  is  perceived, 
we  perceive  also  that  it  is  the  most  reasonable  and  that  it  gives  a 
marvellous  idea  of  the  harmony  of  the  universe  and  of  the  perfec- 
tion of  the  works  of  God. 

16.  This  great  advantage  is  also  found  in  it,  that  instead  of  say- 
ing that  we  are  ekee  only  in  appearance  and  in  a way  practically 
sufficient,  as  many  persons  of  ability  have  believed,  it  must 
rather  be  said  that  we  are  only  enchained  in  appearance,  and  that 
according  to  the  strictness  of  metajffiysical  expressions  we  are  in  a 


A 


A 


state  of  perfect  independence  as  respects  the  influence  of  all  other 
creatures.  This  again  places  in  a marvellous  light  the  immortality 
of \he-  soul  and  the  always  uniform,  px^servatiou  of  our  individ- 
uality, regulated  perfectly  bv  its-own -nntxire  beyond  the  risk  of  all 
accidents  from  without/ whatever  appearance  there  may  be  to  the/' 
contrary.  AT  ever  has  a system  so  clearly  proved  our  high  standing. 
Every  spirit,  being  like  a separate  world  sufficient  to'Tfself,  inde1- 
pendent  of  every  other  creature,  involving  the  infinite,  expressing 
the  universe,  is  as  durable,  as  stable  and  as  absolute  as  the  universe 
of  creatures  itself.  Therefore  we  ought  always  to  appear  in  it  in 
the  way  best  fitted  to  contribute  to  the  perfection  of  the  society  of 
all  spirits,  which  makes  their  moral  union  in  the  city  %f  God. 
Here  is  found  also  a new  proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  which  is 
one  of  surprising  clearness.  Eor  this  perfect  harmony  of  so.  many 


86  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 

substances  which  have  no  communication  with  each  other,  can  only 
come  from  a common  cause. 

17.  Besides  all  these  advantages  which  render  this  system  com- 

mendable, it  can  also  be  said  that  this  is  more  than  an  hypothesis, 
since  it  hardly  seems  possible  to  explain  the  facts  in  any  other 
intelligible  manner,  and  since  several  great  difficulties  which  have 
exercised  the  mind  up  to  this  time,  seem  to  disappear  of  them- 
selves as  soon  as  this  system  is  well  understood.  The  customary 
•ways  of  speaking  can  still  be  retained.  Tor  we  can  say  that  the 
substance,  the  disposition  of  which  explains  the -changes  in  others 
in  an  intelligible  manner  (in  this  respect,  that  it  may  he  supposed 
that  the  others  have  been  in  this  point  adapted  to  it  since  the 
beginning,  according  to  the  order  of  the  decrees  of  God ) , is  the  one 
which  must  be  conceived  of  as  acting  upon  the  others.  Also  the 
action  of  one  substance  upon  another  is  not  the  emission  or  trans- 
fer of  an  entity  as  is  commonly  believed,  and  cannot  be  understood 
reasonably  except  in  the  way  I have  just  mentioned.  It  is  true 
that  we  can  easily  conceive  in  matter  both  emissions  and  receptions 
of  parts,  by  means  of  which  we  are  right  in  explaining  mechani- 
cally all  the  phenomena  of  physics ; but  as  the  material  mass  is  not 
a substance  it  is  apparent  that  action  as  regards  substance  itself  can 
only  hejwh^  said. 

18.  These  considerations,  however  metaphysical  they  may 
appear,  have  yet  a marvellous  use  in  physics  in  establishing  the 
laws  of  motion,  as  our  Dynamics  can  make  clear.  For  it  can  be  said 
that  in  the  collision  of  bodies,  each  one  suffers  only  by  reason  of  its 
own  elasticity,  because  of  the  motion  which  is  already  in  it.  And 
as  to  absolute  motion,  it  can  in  no  way  be  determined  mathematic- 
ally, since  everything  terminates  in  relations ; therefore  there  is 
always  a perfect  equality  of  hypotheses,  as  in  astronomy,  so  that 
whatever  number  of  bodies  may  be  taken  it  is  arbitrary  to  assign 
repose  or  a certain  degree  of  velocity  to  any  one  that  may  be 
chosen,  without  being  refuted  by  the  phenomena  of  straight,  circu- 
lar and  composite  motion.  [Nevertheless  it  is  reasonable  to  attrib- 
ute to  bodies  real  movements,  according  to  the  supposition  which 
explains  phenomena  in  the  most  intelligible  manner,  since  this 
description  is  in  conformity  to  the  idea  of  action  which  I have 
just  established. 


XIII. 


The  Keply  op  M.  Boucher  to  Leibnitz  concerning  his  Hew 
System  of  the  Interaction  of  Substances.  1695. 

[From  the  French.] 

Although  your  system  is  not  new  to  me,  sir,  and  although  I 
made  known  to  you,  in  part,  my  opinion  in  replying  to  a letter 
which  you  wrote  me  on  this  subject  more  than  ten  years  ago,  still  I 
will  not  fail  to  tell  you  again  what  I think  of  it,  since  you  ask  me 
anew. 

The  first  part  aims  only  to  make  known  in  all  substances  the 
unities  which  constitute  their  reality  and  distinguish  them  from 
others,  and  form,  to  speak  after  the  manner  of  the  school,  their 
individuation ; this  is  what  you  remark  first  on  the  subject  of 
matter^ur~5Ntension.  I agree  with  you  that  it  is  right  to  inquire 
after  the  unities  which  form  the  composition  and  the  reality  of 
extension,  for  without  this,  as  you  very  justly  remark,  an  always 
dimsiBle  extension  is  only  a chimerical  compound,  the  principles  of 
which  do  not  exist  since  without  unities  no  true  multitude  is  possi- 
ble. ISTevertheless,  I wonder  that  people  are  indifferent  on  this 
subject,  for  the  essential  principles  of  extension  cannot  exist  really. 
In  truth,  points  without  parts  cannot  be  in  the  universe,  and  two 
points  joined  together  form  no  extension  ; it  is  impossible  that  any 
length  can  exist  without  breadth,  or  any  surface  without  depth. 
And  it  is  of  no  use  to  bring  forward  physical  points,  for  these 
points  are  extended  and  involve  all  the  difficulties  which  we  should 
like  to  avoid.  But  I will  not  longer  delay  on  this  subject  on 
which  you  and  I have  already  had  a discussion  in  the  Journal 
of  the  sixteenth  of  March,  1693,  and  of  the  third  of  August  of  the 
same  year. 

You  introduce  on  the  other  hand  another  kind  of  unities  which, 
strictly  speaking,  are  unities  of  composition  or  of  relation,  and 
which  respect  the  perfection  or  comjYetnmAxf  a whole  which,  being 
organic,  is  destined  for  certain  functions ; for  example,  a clock  is 
one,  an  animal  is  one;  and  you  believe  that  you  can  give  the  name 


ss 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


of  substantial  forms  to  the  natural  unities  of  animals  and  of  plants, 
so  that  these  unities  shall  form  their  individuation  in  distinguish- 
ing them  from  every  other  compound.  It  seems  to  me  that  you 
are  right  in  giving  animals  a principle  of  individuation  other  than 
that  which  is  usually  given  them,  which  is  only  through  relation  to 
external  accidents.  In  reality  this  principle  must  be  internal,  as 
much  on  the  part  of  their  soul  as  of  their  body ; but  whatever  dis- 
position there  may  be  in  the  organs  of  the  animal,  that  does  not 
suffice  to  render  it  sentient.  For  finally  all  this  concerns  merely 
the  organic  and  mechanical  structure,  and  I do  not  see  that  you 
are  thereby  justified  in  constituting  a sensitive  principle  in  brutes 
differing  substantially  from  that  of  men.  And  after  all  it  is  not 
without  reason  that  the  Cartesians  acknowledge  that  if  we  admit  a 
sensitive  principle  in  animals  capable  of  distinguishing  good  from 
evil,  it  is  consequently  necessary  also  to  admit  in  them  reason, 
discernment  and  judgment.  So  allow  me  to  say  to  you,  sir,  that 
\ this  does  not  solve  the  difficulty,  either. 

We  come  to  your  concomitance,  which  forms  the  principal  and 
second  part  of  your  system.  We  will  admit  that  God,  that  great 
artificer  of  the  universe,  can  adjust  all  the  organic  parts  of  the  body 
of  a man  so  well  that  they  shall  be  capable  of  producing  all  the 
movements  which  the  soul  joined  to  this  body  might  wish  to  pro- 
duce in  the  course  of  his  life,  without  its  having  the  power  to 
change  these  movements  or  to  modify  them  in  any  way.  And, 
reciprocally,  God  can  produce  a contrivance  in  the  soul  (be  it  a 
machine  of  a new  kind  or  not),  by  means  of  which  ail  the  thoughts 
and  modifications  which  correspond  to  these  movements  shall  arise 
successively^  at  the  same  moment  that  the  body  shall  perform  its 
functions.  And  I admit  that  this  is  not  more  impossible  than  to 
make  two  clocks  agree  so  well  and  go  so  uniformly  that  at  the 
moment  when  clock  A shall  strike  twelve  clock  B also  strikes  it,  so 
that  one  would  imagine  that  the  two  clocks  are  regulated  by  the 
same  weight  or  the  same  spring.  But  after  all,  to  what  can  this 
great  artifice  in  substances  serve  if  not  to  make  men  believe  that 
the  one  acts  upon  the  other,  although  this  is  not  true ? In  reality, 
it  seems  to  me  that  this  system  is  hardly  more  advantageous  than 
that  of  the  Cartesians;  and  if  we  are  right  in  rejecting  theirs 


VOUCHEE  ON  NEW  SYSTEM. 


89 


because  it  uselessly  supposes  that  God,  considering  the  movements 
which  he  himself  produces  in  the  body,  produces  also  in  the  soul 
thoughts  which  correspond  to  these  movements — as  if  it  ivere  not 
more  worthy  of  him  to  produce  all  at  once  the  thoughts  and  modi- 
fications of  the  soul  without  needing  bodies  to  serve  as  regulators 
and,  so  to  speak,  inform  him  what  he  ought  to  do — shall  we  not 
have  reason  to  inquire  of  you  why  God  does  not  content  himself 
with  producing  all  the  thoughts  and  modifications  of  the  soul 
(whether  he  do  it  immediately  or  by  contrivance,  as  you  will), 
without  there  being  useless  bodies  which  the  mind  can  neither 
move  nor  know?  Even  to  such  an  extent  that  although  no  move- 
ment should  take  place  in  the  body,  the  soul  would  not  cease  to 
think  always  that  there  was  one;  just  as  those  who  are  asleep  think 
that  they  are  moving  their  members  and  are  walking,  when  never- 
theless those  members  are  at  rest,  and  do  not  move  at  all.  Thus, 
during  the  waking  state,  souls  would  remain  always  persuaded  that 
their  bodies  would  move  according  to  their  desires,  although, 
nevertheless,  these  vain  and  useless  masses  would  be  inactive  and 
would  remain  in  a continuous  lethargy.  Truly,  sir,  do  we  not  see 
that  these  opinions  are  made  expressly,  and  that  these  ex  post  facto 
systems  have  been  invented  only,  to  save  certain  preconceived  prin- 
ciples ? In  fact,  the  Cartesians,  assuming  that  there  is  nothing- 
in  common  between  spiritual  and  corporeal  substances,  cannot 
explain  how  one  acts  on  the  other ; and  consequently  they  are 
compelled  to  say  what  they  do.  But  you,  sir,  who  could  free 
yourself  by  other  ways,  I am  surprised  that  you  embarrass  yourself 
with  their  difficulties.  Eor  who  does  not  see  that  when  a balance 
is  in  equilibrium  and  inactive,  if  a.  new  weight  is  added  to  one  of 
the  sides,  forthwith  movement  appears  and  one  of  the  counter- 
weights makes  the  other  rise  in  spite  of  the  effort  which  the  latter 
makes  to  descend.  You  conceive  that  material  beings  are  capable 
of  efforts  and  of  movement;  and  it  follows  very  naturally  that  the 
strongest  effort  must  surpass  the  weakest.  On  the  other  hand  you 
recognize  also  that  spiritual  beings  may  make  efforts ; and  as  there 
is  no  effort  which  does  not  suppose  some  resistance,  it  is  necessary 
either  that  this  resistance  be  stronger  or  weaker;  if  stronger,  it 
overcomes ; if  weaker,  it  yields.  How  it  is  not  impossible  that  the 


90 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


mind  making  an  effort,  to  move  the  body  finds  it  endowed  with  a 
contrary  effort  which  resists — sometimes  more,  sometimes  less,  and 
this  suffices  to  cause  it  to  suffer  thereby.  It  is  thus  St.  Augustine, 
in  his  books  on  music,  explains  of  set  purpose  the  action  of  spirits 
on  bodies. 

I know  that  there  are  many  other  questions  to  be  raised  before 
resolving  from  first  principles  all  those  which  might  be  discussed ; 
so  true  is  it  that  one  ought  to  observe  the  laws  of  the  academics, 
the  second  of  which  forbids  the  calling  in  question  those  things 
which  one  easily  sees  cannot  be  decided,  such  as  are  almost  all 
those  of  which  we  have  just  spoken;  not  that  these  questions  are 
absolutely  insoluble  but  because  they  can  only  be  solved  in  a 
certain  order,  which  requires  that  philosophers  begin  by  agreeing 
as  to  the  infallible  mark  of  truth,  and  confine  themselves  to  dem- 
onstrating from  first  principles ; and  by  waiting,  one  can  always 
separate  that  which  is  conceived  clearly  and  sufficiently  from  other 
points  or  subjects  which  embrace  some  obscurity. 

This,  sir,  is  what  I can  say  at  present  of  your  system,  without 
speaking  of  the  other  fine  subjects  of  which  you  there  incidentally 
treat,  and  which  would  merit  particular  discussion. 


XIV. 


Explanation  of  the  Xew  System  concerning-  the  Communi- 
cation between  Substances,  to  serve  as  a reply  to  the 

Memoir  of  M.  Foucher  inserted  in  ti-ie  “Journal  des 

Savants”  of  September  12,  1695.  1696. 

[From  the  French.] 

I remember,  sir,  that  I believed  I was  fulfilling  your  wishes  in 
communicating  to  you,  many  years  ago,  my  philosophical  hypothe- 
sis, although  I assured  you  at  the  same  time  that  I had  not  yet 
made  up  my  mind  to  avow  it.  I asked  for  your  opinion  of  it  in 
exchange,  hut  I do  not  remember  to  have  received  any  objections 
from  you ; otherwise,  teachable  as  I am,  I should  not  have  given 
you  occasion  to  make  the  same  objections  to  me  twice.  However, 
after  the  publication,  they  still  come  apropos.  For  I am  not  one  of 
those  in  whom  a prepossession  takes  the  place  of  reason,  as  you 
will  experience  when  you  are  able  to  bring  forward  some  precise 
and  weighty  arguments  against  my  opinions,  a thing  which  appar- 
ently has  not  been  your  design  on  this  occasion.  You  have  wished 
to  speak  as  a skillful  academic  and  thus  give  opportunity  for  a 
thorough  examination  of  these  subjects. 

1.  I have  not  wished  to  explain  here  the  principles  of  extension, 
but  those  of  effective  extension  or  of  corporeal  mass ; and  these 
principles,  in  my  opinion,  are  real  unities ; that  is,  substances* 
endowed  with  true  unity. 

2.  The  unity  of  a clock,  of  which  you  make  mention,  is  entirely 
different,  with  me,  from  that  of  an  animal,  which  latter  is  capable 
of  being  a substance  endowed  with  a true  unity,  like  what  we  call 
the  e^in  us ; whereas  a clock  is  nothing  "but  an  assemblage. 

3.  It  is  not  in  the  disposition  of  the  organs  that  I place  the 
sentient  principle  of  animals,  and  I admit  that  this  disposition 
concerns  only  the  corporeal  mass. 

f.  So  it  seems  that  you  do  not  make  me  out  to  be  wrong  when  I 
demand  true  unities  and  when  for  this  reason  I rehabilitate  sub- 
stantial forms.  But  when  you  seem  to  say  that  the  soul  of  the 


92 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


brutes  must  possess  reason  if  feeling  is  ascribed  to  it,  you  draw  a 
conclusion,  the  force  of  which  I do  not  see. 

5.  You  admit,  with  praiseworthy  sincerity,  that  my  hypothesis 
of  harmony  or  of  concomitance  is  possible.  But  you  do  not  conceal 
a certain  repugnance  to  it ; undoubtedly  because  you  have  believed 
it  purely  arbitrary,  not  having  been  informed  that  it  follows  from 
my  view  of  unities,  for  therein  everything  is  connected. 

6.  You  demand  then,  sir,  what  purpose  all  this  contrivance  may 
serve,  which  I attribute  to  the  author  of  nature?  As  if  one  could 
attribute  too  much  of  it  to  him,  and  as  if  this  exact  correspondence 
which  substances ' have  among  themselves,  by  laws  of  their  own 
which  each  one  has  received  in  the  beginning,  was  not  a thing 
admirably  beautiful  in  itself  and  worthy  of  its  author.  You  ask, 
too,  what  advantage  I find  herein. 

7.  I might  refer  to  what  I have  already  said  of  it ; neverthe- 
less, I reply,  in  the  first  place,  that  when  a thing  cannot  but  be  it 
is  not  necessary  that,  in  order  to  admit  it,  we  should  demand  of 
what  use  it  is.  Of  what  use  is  the  incommensurability  of  the  side 
with  the  diagonal  ? 

8.  I reply,  in  the  second  place,  that  this  correspondence  serves 
to  explain  the  communication  of  substances  and  the  union  of  the 
soul  with  the  body  by  laws  of  nature  established  beforehand,  with- 
out having  recourse  either  to  a transmission  of  species,  which  is 
inconceivable,  or  to  fresh  assistance  from  God,  which  appears 
very  unsuitable.  For  it  must  be  understood  that  as  there  are  laws 
•of  nature  in  matter,  so  there  are  like  laws  in  souls  or  forms,  and 
these  laws  effect  what  I have  just  stated. 

9.  I am  asked,  farther,  whence  it  comes  that  God  does  not  con- 
tent himself  with  producing  all  the  thoughts  and  modifications  of 
the  soul  without  these  useless  bodies  which  the  soul,  they  say,  can 
neither  move  nor  know?  The  reply  is  easy.  It  is  that  God  has 
willed  that  there  should  be  more  rather  than  fewer  substances,  and 
that  he  has  thought  it  good  that  these  modifications  of  the  soul 
should  answer  to  something  external. 

10.  There  is  no  useless  substance ; they  all  cooperate  in  the 
design  of  God. 


FIRST  EXPLANATION  OF  NEW  SYSTEM. 


93 


11.  I am  unwilling,  also,  to  admit  that  the  soul  does  not  know 
bodies  at  all,  although  this  knowledge  is  gained  without  the  influ- 
ence of  the  one  upon  the  other. 

12.  I should  even  have  no  difficulty  in  saying  that  the  soul 
moves  the  body ; and  as  a Copernican  speaks  truly  of  the  rising  of 
the  sun,  a Platonist  of  the  reality  of  matter,  a Cartesian  of  the 
reality  of  sensible  qualities,  provided  that  he  is  rightly  understood, 
so  I believe  that  it  is  quite  true  to  say  that  substances  act,  the  one 
on  the  other,  provided  that  it  be  understood  that  one  is  the  cause 
of  the  changes  in  the  other  in  consequence  of  the  laws  of  harmony. 

13.  As  to  the  objection  concerning  the  lethargy  of  bodies,  that 
they  would  he  inactive  while  the  soul  would  think  them  in  move- 
ment, this  could  not  be,  because  of  this  same  unfailing  corres- 
pondence which  the  divine  wisdom  has  established. 

14.  I do  not  know  these  vain,  useless  and  inactive  masses,  of 
which  you  speak.  There  is  action  everywhere,  and  I establish  that 
fact  better  than  the  received  philosophy  does,  because  I believe  that 
there  is  no  body  without  movement,  nor  substance  without  force 
[effort]. 

15.  I do  not  understand  in  what  the  objection  consists  contained 
in  the  words,  “In  truth,  sir,  do  not  we  see  that  these  opinions  are 
made  expressly,  and  that  these  ex  post  facto  systems  have  been 
invented  only,  in  order  to  save  certain  principles  ?”  All  hypoth- 
eses are  made  expressly,  and  all  systems  follow  after,  to  save 
phenomena  or  appearances ; but  I do  not  see  what  the  principles 
are  of  which  I am  said  to  he  prepossessed,  and  which  I wish  to 
save. 

16.  If  this  means  that  I am  led  to  my  hypothesis  by  a priori 
reasons  or  by  certain  principles,  as  is  in  truth  the  fact,  it  is  rather 
praise  for  the  hypothesis  than  an  objection.  It  is  usually  sufficient 
that  a hypothesis  prove  itself  a posteriori,  because  it  satisfies  the 
phenomena;  but  when  there  are  also  other  and  a priori  reasons, 
it  is  so  much  the  better. 

17.  But  perhaps  this  means  that  having  invented  a new  opinion 
I have  been  glad  to  employ  it,  in  order  to  give  myself  the  airs 
of  an  innovator,  rather  than  because  I recognized  any  usefulness 


94 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


in  it.  I do  not  know,  sir,  whether  you  have  a poor  enough 
opinion  of  me  to  attribute  these  thoughts  to  me.  For  you  know 
that  I love  the  truth  and  that  if  I affected  novelties  so  much  I 
should  he  in  more  haste  to  produce  them,  especially  those  the 
solidity  of  which  is  recognized.  But  in  order  that  those  who  do 
not  know  me  so  well  may  not  give  your  words  a meaning  we  would 
not  like,  it  will  he  sufficient  to  say  that  in  my  opinion  it  is 
•impossible  to  explain  otherwise  transeunt  action  conformable  to 
the  laws  of  nature,  and  that  I believe  that  the  usefulness  of  my 
hypothesis  will  be  recognized  by  the  difficulty  which  the  most 
sharp-sighted  philosophers  of  our  time  have  found  in  the  communi- 
cation between  minds  and  bodies,  and  even  of  corporeal  substances 
among  themselves ; and  I do  not  know  if  you  have  not  found  some 
there  yourself. 

18.  It  is  true  that  there  are,  in  my  opinion  forces  [ efforts ] in 
all  substances,  but  these  forces  are  properly  only  in  the  substance 
itself ; and  what  follows  in  the  others  is  only  in  virtue  of  a pre- 
established  harmony  (if  I may  be  permitted  to  use  this  word), 
and  in  no  wise  by  a real  influence  or  by  a transmission  of  some 
property  or  quality.  As  I have  explained  what  activity  [ action ] 
and  passivity  [ passion ] are,  you  may  infer  also  the  meaning  of 
force  \ effort]  and  resistance. 

19.  You  say,  sir,  that  you  know  there  are  many  other  questions 
to  be  asked  before  those  which  we  have  just  discussed  can  be 
decided.  But  perhaps  you  will  find  that  I have  already  asked 
them ; and  I do  not  know  whether  your  academics  have 
employed  with  greater  rigor  or  with  more  effect  than  I what  there 
is  of  good  in  their  method.  I highly  approve  of  seeking  to  demon- 
strate truths  from  first  principles ; it  is  more  useful  than  is 
thought;  and  I have  often  put  this  precept  into  practice.  So  I 
approve  of  what  you  say  on  that  head,  and  I would  that,  your 
example  would  bring  our  philosophers  to  think  of  it  as  they  should. 

20.  I will  add  another  reflection  which  seems  to  me  important 
in  making  the  reality  and  usefulness  of  my  system  better  under- 
stood. You  know  that  Descartes  believed  that  the  same  quantity 
of  motion  is  preserved  in  bodies.  It  has  been  shown  that  he  was 
mistaken  on  that  point,  but  I have  shown  that  it  is  always  true 


FIRST  EXPLANATION  OF  NEW  SYSTEM. 


95 


that  the,  same  moving  force, _ for  which  he  had  substituted  the 
quantity  of  motion,  is  preserved.  However,  the  changes  which 
Take  place  in  the  body  in  consequence  of  the  modifications  of  the 
soul,  embarrassed  him,  because  they  seemed  to  violate  this  law. 
But  he  believed  that  he  had  found  an  expedient,  which  in  truth  is 
ingenious,  by  saying  that  we  must  distinguish  between  motion 
and  direction,  and  that  the  soul  cannot  increase  or  diminish  the 
moving  force,  but  that  it  changes  the  direction  or  determination 
of  the  course  of  the  animal  spirits,  and  that  it  is  in  this  way  that 
voluntary  movements  take  place.  It  is  true  that  he  was  unwilling 
to  explain  how  the  soul  acts  to  change  the  course  of  bodies,  that 
which  is  as  inconceivable  as  to  say  that  it  gives  them  motion, 
unless  recourse  is  had  with  me  to  the  preestablished  harmony. 
But  it  should  be  known  that  there  is  another  law  of  nature,  which 
I have  discovered  and  demonstrated,  and  which  Descartes  did  not 
know.  It  is  that  not  only  is  the  same  quantity  of  moving  force 
preserved,  but  also  the  same  quantity  of  direction  towards  what- 
ever side  in  the  world  is  taken.  That  is  to  say,  drawing  any 
straight  line  you  please,  and  taking  also  such  and  as  many  bodies 
as  you  please,  you  will  find,  in  considering  all  these  bodies  together, 
without  omitting  any  of  those  which  act  upon  any  one  of  those 
you  have  taken,  that  there  will  always  be  the  same  quantity  of 
progress  in  the  same  direction  [du  meme  cote ] in  all  lines  parallel 
to  the  right  line  which  you  have  taken,  taking  care  to  estimate  the 
sum  of  the  progress  by  subtracting  that  of  the  bodies  which  move 
in  the  direction  opposite  to  that  of  the  bodies  which  move  in  the 
direction  taken.  This  law,  being  just  as  beautiful  and  just  as 
general  as  the  other,  no  more  deserves  to  be  violated  than  the 
other;  and  this  is  avoided  by  my  system,  which  preserves  the 
force  and  the  direction,  and  in  a word  all  the  natural  laws  of 
bodies,  in  spite  of  the  changes  which  take  place  in  them,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  changes  of  the  soul. 


XV. 


Second  Explanation  of  the  System  of  the  Communication 
between  Substances.  1696. 

[From  the  French.] 

By  your  reflections,  sir,  I see  clearly  that  the  thought  which  one 
of  nay  friends  lias  published  in  the  Journal  de  Paris  has  need  of 
explanation. 

You  do  not  understand,  you  say,  how  I could  prove  that  which  I 
advanced  concerning  the  communication  or  harmony  of  two  sub- 
stances so  different  as  the  soul  and  the  body.  It  is  true  that  I 
believe  that  I have  found  the  means  of  doing  so,  and  this  is  how  I 
propose  to  satisfy  you.  Imagine  two  clocks  or  watches  which 
agree  perfectly.  Xow,  this  may  take  place  in  three  ivays.  The 
first  consists  in  a mutual  influence ; the  second  is  to  have  a skillful 
workman  attached  to  them  who  regulates  them  and  keeps  them 
always  in  accord ; the  third  is  to  construct  these  two  clocks  with  so 
much  art  and  accuracy  as  to  assure  their  future  harmony.  Put 
now  the  soul  and  the  body  in  place  of  these  two  clocks ; their 
accordance  may  be  brought  about  by  one  of  these  three  ways. 
The  way  of  influence  is  that  of  common  philosophy,  but  as  we  can- 
not conceive  of  material  particles  which  may  pass  from  one  of  these 
substances  into  the  other,  this  view  must  be  abandoned.  The  way 
of  the  continual  assistance  of  the  creator  is  that  of  the  system  of 
occasional  causes;  hut  I hold  that  this  is  to  make  a Dens  ex 
Machina  intervene  in  a natural  and  ordinary  matter,  in  which, 
according  to  reason,  he  ought  not  to  cooperate  except  in  the  way  in 
which  he  dees  in  all  other  natural  things.  Thus  there  remains 
only  my  hypothesis;  that  is,  the  way  of  harmony.  From  the 
beginning  God  has  made  each  of  these  two  substances  of  such  a 
nature  that  merely  by  following  its  own  peculiar  laws,  received 
with  its  being,  it  nevertheless  accords  with  the  other,  just  as  if 
there  were  a mutual  influence  or  as  if  God  always  put  his  hand 
thereto  in  addition  to  his  general  cooperation.  After  this  I have- 
no  need  of  proving  anything,  unless  you  wish  to  require  me  to 


SECOND  EXPLANATION  OF  NEW  SYSTEM. 


97 


prove  that  God  is  sufficiently  skillful  to  make  use  of  this  prevenient 
contrivance,  semblances  of  which  we  see  even  among  men.  ISTow, 
taking  for  granted  that  he  can  do  it,  you  easily  see  that  this  is  the 
way  most  beautiful  and  most  worthy  of  him.  You  suspected  that 
my  explanation  would  be  opposed  to  the  very  different  idea  which 
we  have  of  the  mind  and  of  the  body ; but  you  will  presently  clearly 
see  that  no  one  has  better  established  their  independence.  For 
while  it  has  been  necessary  to  explain  their  communication  by  a 
kind  of  miracle,  occasion  has  always  been  given  to  many  people  to 
fear  that  the  distinction  between  the  body  and  the  soul  was  not  as 
real  as  was  believed,  since  in  order  to  maintain  it  it  was  necessary 
to  go  so  far.  I shall  not  be  at  all  sorry  to  sound  enlightened  per- 
sons concerning  the  thoughts  which  T have  just  explained  to  you. 


7 


XVI. 


Third  Explanation.  Extract  from  a letter  oe  Leibnitz  on 

his  Philosophical  Hypothesis  and  the  curious  Problem 

PROPOSED  BY  ONE  OF  HIS  FRIENDS  TO  THE  MATHEMATICIANS. 

1696. 

[From  tlie  French.] 

Some  wise  and  penetrating  friends,  having  considered  my  novel 
hypothesis  concerning  the  great  question  of  the  union  of  soul  and 
body,  and  having  found  it  of  importance  have  besought  me  to  give 
some  explanations  of  the  difficulties  which  have  been  raised  and 
which  come  from  the  fact  that  it  has  not  been  well  understood. 

I have  thought  that  the  matter  might  be  rendered  intelligible  to 
every  sort  of  mind  by  the  following  comparison : 

Imagine  two  clocks  or  two  watches  which  agree  perfectly. 
Xow  this  may  happen  in  three  luays.  The  first  consists  in  the 
mutual  influence  of  one  clock  on  the  other ; the  second,  in  the  care 
of  a man  who  attends  thereto ; the  third,  in  their  own  accuracy. 

The  first  way,  which  is  that  of  influence,  has  been  experimented 
on  by  the  late  M.  Huygens,  to  his  great  astonishment.  He  had 
two  large  pendulums  attached  to  the  same  piece  of  wood;  the 
continual  heats  of  these  pendulums  communicated  similar  vibra- 
tions to  the  particles  of  wood ; but  these  different  vibrations  not 
being  able  to  subsist  very  well  in  their  order  and  without  inter- 
fering with  each  other,  unless  the  pendulums  agreed,  it  happened 
by  a kind  of  marvel  that  even  when  their  beats  had  been  pur- 
posely disturbed  they  soon  came  again  to  heat  together,  almost 
like  two  chords  which  are  in  unison. 

The  second  way  of  making  two  clocks,  even  although  poor  ones, 
always  accord,  would  he  to  have  a skillful  workman  who  should  see 
to  it  that  they  are  kept  in  constant  agreement.  This  is  what  I call 
the  way  of  assistance. 

Finally,  the  third  ivay  would  he  to  make  at  the  start  these 
two  clocks  with  such  art  and  accuracy  that  we  could  be  assured 
of  their  future  accordance.  This  is  the  way  of  preestablished 
agreement. 


THIRD  EXPLANATION  OF  NEW  SYSTEM. 


99 


Put  now  the  soul  and  the  body  in  the  place  of  these  two  clocks. 
Their  harmony  or  sympathy  will  arise  in  one  of  these  three  ways. 
The  way  of  influence  is  that  of  the  common  philosophy;  but  as 
we  cannot  conceive  of  material  particles  or  properties,  or  imma- 
terial qualities,  which  can  pass  from  one  of  these  substances  into 
the  other,  we  are  obliged  to  abandon  this  view.  The  way  of 
assistance  is  that  of  the  system  of  occasional  causes ; but  I hold 
that  this  is  making  a Deus  ex  Machina  intervene  in  a natural  and 
ordinary  matter,  when,  according  to  reason,  he  ought  not  to  inter- 
vene except  in  the  manner  in  which  he  cooperates  in  all  the  other 
affairs  of  nature. 

Thus,  there  remains  only  my  hypothesis ; that  is,  the  way  of 
the  harmony  preestablished  bv  a prevenient  divine  contrivance, 
which  from  the  beginning  has  formed  each  of  these  substances  in 
a way  so  perfect,  and  regulated  with  so  much  accuracy,  that  merely 
by  following  laws  of  its  own,  received  with  its  being,  it  never- 
theless agrees  with  the  other,  just  as  if  there  were  mutual  influence, 
or  as  if  God  in  addition  to  his  general  cooperation  constantly  put 
his  hand  thereto. 

After  this  I do  not  think  I need  to  prove  anything,  unless  it  he 
that  you  wish  me  to  prove  that  God  has  everything  necessary  to 
making  use  of  this  prevenient  contrivance,  semblances  of  which  we 
see  even  among  men,  according  to  their  skill.  And  supposing  that 
he  can  do  it  you  see  well  that  this  is  the  most  admirable  way  and 
the  one  most  worthy  of  him. 

It  is  true  that  I have  yet  other  proofs  hut  they  are  more  pro- 
found, and  it  is  not  necessary  to  state  them  here. 


XVII. 


Reflections  on  Locke's  Essay  on  Human  Understanding.  1696. 

[From  the  French.] 

I find  so  many  marks  of  unusual  penetration  in  what  Mr.  Locke 
has  given  us  on  the  Human  Understanding  and  on  Education,  and 
I consider  the  matter  so  important,  that  I have  thought  that  the 
time  would  not  he  badly  employed  which  I should  give  to  such 
profitable  reading ; all  the  more  as  I have  myself  deeply  meditated 
concerning  that  which  has  to  do  with  the  foundations  of  our 
knowledge.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  I have  jotted  down  on  this 
sheet  some  of  the  reflections  which  have  occurred  to  me  in  reading 
his  Essay  on  the  Understanding.  Of  all  researches,  there  is  none 
more  important,  because  it  is  the  key  to  all  others. 

The  first  booh  considers  mainly  the  principles  said  to  be  born 
with  us.  Mr.  Locke  does  not  admit  them,  any  more  than  he  does 
innate  ideas.  ILe  has  undoubtedly  had  good  reasons  for  putting 
himself  in  opposition  on  this  point  to  ordinary  prejudices,  for  the 
name  of  ideas  and  principles  is  extremely  abused.  Common  phi- 
losophers make  for  themselves  principles  at  their  fancy;  and  the 
Cartesians,  who  profess  more  accuracy,  do  not  fail  to  intrench 
themselves  behind  so-called  ideas  of  extension,  of  matter  and  of  the 
soul,  wishing  in  this  way  to  exempt  themselves  from  the  necessity 
of  proving  what  they  advance,  on  the  pretext  that  those  who  will 
meditate  on  these  ideas  will  find  in  them  the  same  thing  that 
they  do ; that  is  to  say,  that  those  who  will  accustom  themselves  to 
their  manner  of  thinking  will  have  the  same  prepossessions,  which 
is  very  true. 

My  opinion  is,  then,  that  nothing  ought  to  be  taken  as  primitive 
principles  except  experiences  and  the  axiom  of  identity,  or,  what  is 
the  same  thing,  contradiction,  which  is  primitive,  since  otherwise 
there  would  be  no  difference  between  truth  and  falsehood ; and 
since  all  researches  would  cease  at  the  start  if  to  say  yes  or  no  were 
indifferent.  We  cannot,  therefore,  prevent  ourselves  from  assum- 
ing this  principle  as  soon  as  we  wish  to  reason.  All  other  truths 


101 


REFLECTIONS  ON  LOCKe’s  “ESSAY.” 

are  capable  of  proof,  and  I highly  esteem  the  method  of  Euclid, 
who  without  stopping  at  what  would  be  thought  to  be  sufficiently 
proved  by  the  so-called  ideas,  has  proved,  for  example,  that  in 
a triangle  one  side  is  always  less  than  the  other  two  together. 
Yet  Euclid  was  right  in  taking  some  axioms  for  granted,  not  as  if 
they  were  truly  primitive  and  undemonstrable,  but  because  he 
would  have  come  to  a standstill  if  he  had  wished  to  draw  conclu- 
sions only  after  an  accurate  discussion  of  principles.  Thus  he 
judged  it  proper  to  content  himself  with  having  pushed  the 
proofs  up  to  this  small  number  of  propositions,  so  that  it  can  be 
said  that  if  they  are  true,  all  that  he  says  is  also  true.  He  has  left 
to  others  the  trouble  of  demonstrating  further  these  principles 
themselves,  which,  besides,  are  already  justified  by  experience;  but 
in  these  matters  this  does  not  satisfy  us.  This  is  why  Appolonius, 
Proclus  and  others  have  taken  the  trouble  to  demonstrate  some 
of  Euclid’s  axioms.  This  manner  of  proceeding  ought  to  be 
imitated  by  philosophers  in  order  to  arrive  finally  at  some  estab- 
lished positions,  even  if  they  be  but  provisional,  after  the  way  of 
which  I have  just  spoken. 

As  for  ideas,  I have  given  some  explanation  of  them  in  a short 
essay  entitled  Meditationes  de  G ognitione,  V eritate  et  Ideis,  and  I 
could  have  wished  that  Mr.  Locke  had  seen  and  examined  it ; for  I 
am  one  of  the  most  docile  of  men,  and  nothing  is  more  fitted  to 
advance  our  thoughts  than  the  considerations  and  remarks  of  per- 
sons of  merit,  •when  they  are  made  with  care  and  sincerity.  Here  I 
shall  only  say  that  true  or  real  ideas  are  those  of  the  possibility  of 
whose  fulfillment  we  are  assured;  the  others  are  doubtful,  or  (in 
case  of  proof  of  their  impossibility)  chimerical.  Mow  the  possi- 
bility of  ideas  is  proved  as  much  a priori  by  demonstrations,  by 
making  use  of  the  possibility  of  other  simpler  ideas,  as  a posteriori 
by  experience ; for  what  is,  cannot  fail  to  be  possible.  But  primi- 
tive ideas  are  those  whose  possibility  is  undemonstrable,  and  which 
indeed  are  nothing  else  than  the  attributes  of  God. 

As  regards  the  question,  whether  there  are  ideas  and  truths 
horn  with  us,  I do  not  consider  it  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
beginning  nor  for  the  practice  of  the  art  of  thinking,  to  decide  it ; 
whether  they  all  come  to  us  from  without,  or  whether  they  come 


102 


philosophical  works  of  leibnitz. 


from  ourselves,  we  will  reason  correctly  if  we  observe  what  I have 
just  said  above  and  if  we  proceed  with  order  and  without  prej- 
udice. The  question  concerning  the  origin  of  our  ideas  and  of 
on r maxims  is  not  preliminary  in  philosophy,  and  we  must  have 
made  great  progress  to  be  able  to  answer  it  well.  I think,  however, 
that  I can  say  that  our  ideas,  even  those  of  sensible  things,  come 
from  within  the  soul  [de  notre  propre  fond]  ; of  which  view  you 
may  the  better  judge  by  what  I have  published  concerning  the 
nature  and  interaction  of  substances  and  what  is  called  the  union 
of  the  sold  with  the  body.  For  I have  found  that  these  things  had 
not  been  well  understood.  I am  in  no  wise  in  favor  of  the 
tabula  rasa  of  Aristotle;  and  there  is  something  sound  in  what 
Plato  called  reminiscence.  There  is  even  something  more;  for 
we  have  not  only  a reminiscence  of  all  our  past  thoughts  but  also 
a presentiment  of  all  our  future  thoughts.  It  is  true  that  it  is 
confusedly  and  without  distinguishing  them,  very  much  as  when 
I hear  the  sound  of  the  ocean,  I hear  that  of  all  the  waves  in 
particular  which  make  up  the  total  sound,  although  it  is  without 
discerning  one  wave  front  another.  And  thus  it  is  true  in  a cer- 
tain sense,  which  I have  explained,  that  not  only  our  ideas  but 
also  our  sensations,  spring  from  within  our  own  soul,  and  that  the 
soul  is  more  independent  than  is  thought,  although  it  is  always 
true  that  nothing  takes  place  in  it  which  is  not  determined  and 
that  nothing  is  found  in  creatures  which  God  does  not  continually 
create. 

In  the  second  booh,  which  goes  into  the  details  of  ideas,  I confess 
that  Mr.  Locke’s  reasons  for  proving  that  the  soul  is  sometimes 
without  thought  do  not  seem  to  me  convincing,  unless  he  gives  the 
name  of  thoughts  to  only  those  perceptions  sufficiently  noticeable 
to  be  distinguished  and  retained.  I hold  that  the  soul,  and  even 
the  body,  is  never  without  action,  and  that  the  soul  is  never  without 
some  perception.  Even  in  dreamless  sleep  we  have  some  confused 
and  dim  feeling  of  the  place  where  we  are  and  of  other  things.  But 
even  if  experience  should  not  confirm  this  view,  I believe  that  it 
may  be  demonstrated.  It  is  very  much  as  when  we  cannot  prove 
absolutely  by  experience  whether  there  is  a vacuum  in  space,  and 
whether  there  is  rest  in  matter.  And  yet  questions  of  this  kind 
seem  to  me,  as  well  as  to  Mr.  Locke,  to  be  decided  demonstratively. 


103 


REFLECTION'S  ONT  LOCKe’s  “ESSAY.” 

I assent  to  the  difference  which  he  makes,  with  good  reason, 
between  matter  and  space.  But  as  concerns  the  vacuum,  many 
learned  people  have  believed  in  it.  Mr.  Locke  is  of  this  number. 
I was  almost  persuaded  of  it  myself,  but  I gave  it  up  long  ago. 
And  the  incomparable  Mr.  Huygens,  who  was  also  for  the  vacuum 
and  for  the  atoms,  began  at  last  to  reflect  upon  my  reasons,  as  his 
letters  can  hear  witness.  The  proof  of  a vacuum,  taken  from 
motion,  of  which  Mr.  Locke  makes  use,  supposes  that  body  is 
originally  hard,  and  that  it  is  composed  of  a certain  number  of 
inflexible  parts.  For  in  this  case  it  would  be  true,  whatever  finite 
number  of  atoms  might  be  taken,  that  motion  could  not  take  place 
without  a vacuum.  But  all  the  parts  of  matter  are  divisible  and 
even  pliable. 

There  are  some  other  things  in  this  second  book  which  arrest 
my  attention;  for  example,  when  it  is  said,  chapter  XVII,  that 
infinity  is  to  he  attributed  only  to  Space,  Time  and  Number.  I 
believe,  in  truth,  with  Mr.  Locke,  that,  strictly  speaking,  it  may 
be  said  that  there  is  no  space,  no  time  and  no  number  which  is 
infinite,  but  that  it  is  only  true  that  however  great  may  be  a space, 
a time  or  a number,  there  is  always  another  larger  than  it,  ad 
infinitum ; and  that  thus  the  true  infinite  is  not  found  in  a whole 
made  up  of  parts.  It  is  none  the  less,  however,  found  elsewhere; 
namely,  in  the  Absolute,  which  is  without  parts  and  which  has 
influence  upon  compound  things  because  they  result  from  the  limi- 
tation of  the  absolute.  Hence  the  positive  infinite  being  nothing 
else  than  the  absolute,  it  may  be  said  that  there  is  in  this  sense  a 
positive  idea  of  the  infinite,  and  that  it  is  anterior  to  that  of  the 
finite.  For  the  rest,  by  rejecting  a composite  infinite,  we  do  not 
deny  what  the  geometricians,  and  especially  the  excellent  Mr. 
Mewton,  prove  de  Seriebus  infinitis,  not  to  mention  what  I myself 
have  contributed  to  the  subject. 

As  for  what  is  said,  chapter  XXX,  de  ideis  adaequatis , it  is  per- 
missible to  give  to  the  terms  the  signification  one  finds  a propos. 
nevertheless,  without  finding  fault  with  Locke’s  meaning,  I put 
degrees  in  ideas,  according  to  which  I call  those  adequate  in  which 
there  is  nothing  more  to  explain,  very  much  as  in  numbers.  How 
all  ideas  of  sensible  qualities,  as  of  light,  color,  heat,  not  being  of 


101 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


this  nature,  I do  not  count  them  among  the  adequate ; also  it  is 
not  through  themselves,  nor  a 'priori,  but  by  experience,  that  we 
know  their  reality  or  possibility. 

There  are  again  many  good  things  in  the  third  book,  where  he 
treats  of  words  or  terms.  It  is  very  true  that  everything  cannot 
he  defined,  and  that  sensible  qualities  have  no  nominal  definition 
and  may  be  called  primitive  in  this  sense;  but  they  can  none  the 
less  receive  a real  definition,  I have  shown  the  difference  between 
these  two  kinds  of  definition  in  the  meditation  quoted  above.  The 
nominal  definition  explains  the  name  by  the  marks  of  the  thing; 
but  the  real  definition  makes  known  a priori  the  possibility  of  the 
thing  defined.  For  the  rest,  I heartily  approve  of  Mr.  Locke’s  doc- 
trine concerning  the  demonstrability  of  moral  truths. 

The  fourth  or  last  book,  which  treats  of  the  knowledge  of  truth, 
shows  the  use  of  what  has  just  been  said.  I find  in  it,  as  well  as  in 
the  preceding  books,  numberless  beautiful  reflections.  To  make 
fitting  remarks  upon  them  would  be  to  make  a book  as  large  as  the 
work  itself.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  axioms  are  a little  less  con- 
sidered in  it  than  they  deserve  to  be.  It  is  apparently  because, 
with  the  exception  of  those  of  the  mathematicians,  there  are  not 
ordinarily  found  any  which  are  important  and  solid.  I have  tried 
to  remedy  this  defect.  I do  not  despise  identical  propositions,  and 
I have  found  that  they  are  of  great  sendee  even  in  analysis.  It  is 
very  true  that  we  know  our  own  existence  by  an  immediate  intui- 
tion, and  that  of  God,  by  demonstration ; and  that  a mass  of 
matter,  the  parts  of  which  are  without  perception,  cannot  make  a 
whole  which  thinks.  I do  not  despise  the  argument,  invented  some 
centuries  ago  by  Anselm,  which  proves  that  the  perfect  being  must 
exist ; although  I find  something  lacking  in  this  argument,  because 
it  takes  for  granted  that  the  perfect  being  is  possible.  For  if  this 
one  point  were  proved  in  addition  the  whole  demonstration  would 
be  complete. 

As  for  the  knowledge  of  other  things,  it  is  very  well  said  that 
experience  alone  does  not  suffice  for  advancing  sufficiently  in 
physics.  A penetrating  mind  will  draw  more  conclusions  from 
some  very  ordinary  experiences  than  another  could  draw  from  the 
most  choice;  besides  there  is  an  art  of  experimenting  and  of  inter- 


KEEEECTIONS  Olf  LOCKe’s  “ESSAY.” 


105 


rogating,  so  to  speak,  nature.  Yet  it  is  always  true  that  progress 
cannot  be  made  in  the  details  of  physics  except  in  proportion  as 
one  has  experience. 

Mr.  Locke  is  of  the  opinion,  held  by  many  able  men,  that  the 
forms  of  logic  are  of  little  use.  I should  be  almost  of  the  opposite 
opinion ; and  I have  often  found  that  paralogisms,  even  in  mathe- 
matics, are  faults  of  form.  Mr.  Huygens  has  made  the  same 
observation.  Much  might  be  said  on  this  point,  and  many  excel- 
lent things  are  despised  because  the  use  is  not  made  of  them  of 
which  they  are  capable.  We  are  prompted  to  despise  what  we  have 
learned  in  the  schools.  It  is  true  that  we  there  learn  many  use- 
less things,  but  it  is  good  to  exercise  the  function  della  Crusca, 
that  is,  to  separate  the  good  from  the  bad.  Mr.  Locke  can  do 
it  as  well  as  anyone  whatsoever ; and  in  addition  he  gives  us 
important  thoughts  of  his  own  invention.  ILe  is  not  only  an 
assaver,  but  he  is  also  a transmuter,  by  the  augmentation  which 
he  makes  of  good  metal.  If  he  continued  to  make  a present  of  it 
to  the  public  we  should  be  greatly  indebted  to  him. 


XVIII. 


On  the  Ultimate  Origin  of  Things.  1697. 

[From  the  Latin.] 

In  addition  to  the  world  or  aggregate  of  finite  things,  there  is 
some  uniqiieBeing  ^dio^gormris-,  not  only  like  the  soul  in  me,  or 
rather  like  the  Ego  itself  in  my  body,  but  in  a much  higher  sense. 
For  one  Being,  dominating  the  universe,  not  only  rules  the  world 
but  he  creates  and  fashions  it,  is  superior  to  the  world,  and,  so 
to  speak,  extramundane,  and  by  this  very  fact  is  the  ultimate 
reason  of  things.  For  the  sufficient  reason  of  existence  can  not  he 
found  either  in  any  particular  thing  or  in  the  whole  aggregate 
or  series.  Suppose  a book  on  the  elements  of  geometry  to  have 
been  eternal  and  that  others  had  been  successively  copied  after  it, 
it  is  evident  that,  although  we  might  account  for  the  present  book 
by  the  book  which  was  its  model,  we  could  nevertheless  never,  by 
assuming  any  number  of  books  whatever,  reach  a perfect  reason 
for  them ; for  we  may  always  wonder  why  such  books  have 
existed  from  all  time ; that  is,  why  books  are  at  all  and  why  they 
are  thus  written.  What  is  true  of  books  is  also  true  of  the  different 
states  of  the  world,  for  in  spite  of  certain  laws  of  transformation  a 
succeeding  state  is  in  a certain  way  only  a copy  of  the  preceding, 
and  to  whatever  anterior  state  you  may  go  back  you  will  never 
find  there  a perfect  reason  why,  forsooth,  there  is  any  world  at  all, 
and  such  a world  as  exists.  And  even  if  you  imagine  the  world 
eternal,  nevertheless  since  you  posit  nothing  but  a succession  of 
states,  and  as  you  find  a sufficient  reason  for  them  in  none  of  them 
whatsoever,  and  as  any  number  of  them  whatever  does  not  aid  you 
in  giving  a reason  for  them,  it  is  evident  that  the  reason  must  be 
sought  elsewhere.  For  in  eternal  things  even  where  there  is  no 
cause  there  must  be  a reason  which,  in  perduring  things,  is 
necessity  itself  or  essence,  but  in  the  series  of  changing  things, 
if  it  were  supposed  that  they  succeed  each  other  eternally,  this 
reason  would  be,  as  will  soon  be  seen,  the  prevailing  of  inclinations 
where  the  reasons  are  not  necessitating  ( i . e.,  of  an  absolute  or 


ON  THE  ULTIMATE  ORIGIN  OF  THINGS. 


107 


metaphysical  necessity  the  opposite  of  which  would  imply  contra- 
diction), but  inclining.  From  which  it  follows  that  by  supposing 
the  eternity  of  the  world,  an  ultimate  extramundane  reason  of 
things,  or  God,  cannot  be  escaped. 

The  reasons  of  the  world,  therefore,  lie  hidden  in  something 
extramundane  different  from  the  chain  of  states  or  series  of  things, 
the  aggregate  of  which  constitutes  the  world.  We  must  therefore 
pass  from  physical  or  hypothetical  necessity,  which  determines  the 
posterior  states  of  the  world  by  the  prior,  to  something  which  is  of 
absolute  or  metaphysical  necessity,  the  reason  for  which  cannot 
be  given.  For  the  present  world  is  necessary,  physically  or  hypo- 
thetically, but  not  absolutely  or  metaphysically.  It  being  granted, 
indeed,  that  the  world  such  as  it  is,  is  to  he,  it  follows  that  things 
must  happen  in  it  just  as  they  do.  But  as  the  ultimate  origin  must 
he  in  something  which  is  metaphysically  necessary,  and  as  the 
reason  of  the  existing  can  only  he  from  the  existing,  there  must 
exist  some  one  being  metaphysically  necessary,  or  whose  essence 
is  existence ; and  thus  there  exists  something  which  differs  from 
the  plurality  of  beings  or  from  the  world,  which,  as  we  have  recog- 
nized and  shown,  is  not  metaphysically  necessary. 

But  in  order  to  explain  a little  more  clearly  how,  from  eternal 
or  essential  or  metaphysical  truths,  temporary,  contingent  or  phys- 
ical truths  arise,  we  ought  first  to  recognize  that  from  the  very  fact 
that  something  exists  rather  than  nothing,  there  is  in  possible 
things,  that  is,  in  rhe  very  possibility  or  essence,  a certain  need  of 
existence,  and,  so  to  speak,  some  claim  to  existence ; in  a word, 
that  essence  tends  of  itself  towards  existence.  Whence  it  further 
follows  that  all  possible  things,  whether  expressing  essence  or 
possible  reality,  tend  by  equal  right  toward  existence,  according  to 
their  quantity  of  essence  or  reality,  or  according  to  the  degree  of 
perfection  which  they  contain,  for  perfection  is  nothing  else  than 
quantity  of  essence. 

Hence  it  is  most  clearly  understood  that  among  the  infinite  com- 
binations of  possibles  and  possible  series,  that  one  actually  exists 
by  which  the  most  of  essence  or  of  possibility  is  brought  into  exist- 
ence. And  indeed  there  is  always  in  things  a principle  of  deter- 
mination which  is  to  be  taken  from  the  greatest  and  the  smallest, 


108 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


or  in  suck  a way  that  tke  greatest  effect  is  obtained  with  the  least, 
so  to  speak,  expenditure.  And  here  the  time,  place,  or  in  a word, 
tke  receptivity  or  capacity  of  tke  world  may  be  considered  as  the 
expenditure  or  tke  ground  upon  which  the  world  can  be  most 
easily  built,  whereas  tke  varieties  of  forms  correspond  to  the  com- 
modiousness  of  tke  edifice  and  the  multiplicity  and  elegance  of 
its  chambers.  And  the  matter  itself  may  be  compared  to  certain 
games  where  all  the  spaces  on  a table  are  to  be  filled  according 
to  determined  laws,  and  where,  unless  a certain  skill  be  employed, 
you  will  be  finally  excluded  by  unfavorable  spaces  and  forced  to 
leave  many  more  places  empty  than  you  intended  or  wished.  But 
there  is  a certain  way  of  filling  most  easily  the  most  space.  Just 
as,  therefore,  if  we  have  "to  make  a triangle,  there  being  no  other 
determining  reason,  it  follows  that  an  equilateral  results ; and 
if  we  have  to  go  from  one  point  to  another,  without  any  further 
determination  as  to  the  way,  the  easiest  and  shortest  path  will  be 
chosen ; so  it  being  once  posited  that  being  is  better  than  not 
being,  or  that  there  is  a reason  why  something  should  be  rather 
than  nothing,  or  that  we  must  pass  from  the  possible  to  the  actual, 
it  follows,  that,  even  if  nothing  further  is  determined,  the  quantity 
of  existence,  must  be  as  great  as  possible,  regard  being  had  to  the 
capacity  of  the  time  and  of  the  place  (or  to  the  possible  order 
of  existence),  exactly  as  tiles  are  disposed  in  a given  area  in  such 
a way  that  it  shall  contain  the  greatest  number  of  them  possible. 
From  this  it  is  now  marvelously  understood  how  in  the  very  origin 
of  things  a sort  of  divine  mathematics  or  metaphysical  mechanics 
was  employed,  and  how  the  determination  of  the  greatest  quantity 
of  existence  takes  place.  It  is  thus  that  from  all  angles  the  deter- 
mined angle  in  geometry  is  the  right  angle,  and  that  liquids  placed 
in  heterogeneous  positions  take  that  form  which  has  the  most 
capacity,  or  the  spherical ; but  especially  it  is  thus  that  in  ordi- 
nary mechanics  itself,  when  several  heavy  bodies  act  against  each 
other  the  motion  which  results  constitutes,  on  the  whole,  the  great- 
est descent.  For  just  as  all  possibles  tend  by  equal  right  to  exist 
in  proportion  to  their  reality,  so  all  weights  tend  by  an  equal  right 
to  descend  in  proportion  to  their  gravity ; and  as  here  a motion 
is  produced  which  contains  the  greatest  possible  descent  of  heavy 


ON  THE  ULTIMATE  ORIGIN  OF  THINGS. 


109 


bodies,  so  there  a world  is  produced  in  which  is  found  realized 
the  greatest  number  of  possibles. 

And  thus  we  now  have  physical  necessity  from  metaphysical ; 
for  although  the  world  be  not  metaphysically  necessary,  in  the 
sense  that  its  contrary  implies  a contradiction  or  a logical  absurd- 
ity, it  is  nevertheless  physically  necessary,  or  determined  in  such 
a way  that  its  contrary  implies  imperfection  or  moral  absurdity. 
And  as  possibility  is  the  principle  of  essence,  so  perfection  or  the 
degree  of  essence  (through  which  the  greatest  possible  number  is 
at  the  same  time  possible),  is  the  principle  of  existence.  Whence 
at  the  same  time  it  is  evident  that  the  author  of  the  world  is  free, 
although  he  makes  all  things  determinately ; for  he  acts  according 
to  a principle  of  wisdom  or  of  perfection.  Indeed  indifference 
arises  from  ignorance,  and  the  wiser  one  is,  the  more  determined 
one  is  to  the  highest  degree  of  perfection. 

But,  you  will  say,  however  ingenious  this  comparison  of  a cer- 
tain determining  metaphysical  mechanism  with  the  physical 
mechanism  of  heavy  bodies  may  appear,  nevertheless  it  fails  in 
this,  that  heavy  bodies  truly  exist,  whereas  possibilities  and 
essences  prior  to  existence  or  outside  of  it  are  only  fancies  or 
fictions  in  which  the  reason  of  existence  cannot  be  sought.  I 
answer,  that  neither  these  essences  nor  the  so-called  eternal  truths 
regarding  them  are  fictions,  but  that  they  exist  in  a certain  region 
of  ideas,  if  I may  thus  speak,  that  is  in  God  himself^  the  source 
of  all  essences  and  of  the  existence  of  all  else.  And  the  existence 
of  the  actual  series  of  things  shows  sufficiently  of  itself  that  my 
assertion  is  not  gratuitous.  For  since  the  reason  of  the  series  is 
not  found  in  itself,  as  we  have  shown  above,  but  must  be  sought 
in  metaphysical  necessities  or  eternal  truths,  and  since  that  which 
exists  can  only  come  from  that  which  exists,  as  we  have  remarked 
above,  eternal  truths  must  have  their  existence  in  a certain  subject, 
absolutely  and  metaphysically  necessary,  that  is  in  God,  through 
whom  those  things  which  otherwise  would  be  imaginary,  are,  to 
speak  barbarously  but  significantly,  realized. 

And  in  truth  we  discover  that  everything  takes  place  in 
the  world  according  to  the  laws,  not  only  geometrical  - but 
also  metaphysical,  of  eternal  truths ; that  is,  not  only  accord- 


110 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


ing  to  material  necessities  but  also  according  to  formal  necessi- 
ties; and  this  is  true  not  only  generally  in  that  which  con- 
cerns the  reason,  which  we  have  just  explained,  of  a world  existing 
rather  than  non-existing,  and  existing  thus  rather  than  otherwise 
(a  reason  which  can  only  be  found  in  the  tendency  of  the  possible 
to  existence)  ; hut  if  we  descend  to  the  special  we  see  the  meta- 
physical laws  of  cause,  of  power,  of  action  holding  good  in  admir- 
able manner  in  all  nature,  and  prevailing  over  the  purely  geo- 
metrical laws  themselves  of  matter,  as  I found  in  accounting  for 
the  laws  of  motion:  a thing  which  struck  me  with  such  astonish- 
ment that,  as  I have  explained  more  at  length  elsewhere,  I was 
forced  to  abandon  the  law  of  the  geometrical  composition  of  forces 
which  I had  defended  in  my  youth  when  I was  more  materialistic. 

Thus,  therefore,  we  have  the  ultimate  reason  of  the  reality,  as 
well  of  essences  as  of  existences,  in  one  Being  who  is  necessarily 
much  superior  and  anterior  to  the  world  itself,  since  it  is  from  him 
that  not  only  the  existences  which  this  world  contains,  hut  also  the 
possibles  themselves  derive  their  reality.  And  this  reason  of  things 
can  he  sought  only  in  a single  source,  because  of  the  connection 
which  they  all  have  with  one  another.  But  it  is  evident  that  it  is 
from  this  source  that  existing  things  continually  emanate,  that  they 
are  and  have  been  its  products,  for  it  does  not  appear  why  one  state 
of  the  world  rather  than  another,  the  state  of  yesterday  rather 
than  that  of  to-day,  should  come  from  the  world  itself.  We  see, 
also,  with  the  same  clearness,  how  God  acts,  not  only  physically 
hut  freely ; how  both  the  efficient  and  final  cause  of  things  is  in 
him,  and  how  he  manifests  not  only  his  greatness  and  his  power 
in  the  mechanism  of  the  world  as  constructed,  hut  also  his  goodness 
and  his  wisdom  in  constructing  it. 

And  in  order  that  no  one  should  think  that  we  confound  here 
moral  perfection  or  goodness  with  metaphysical  perfection  or  great- 
ness, and  that  the  former  is  denied,  while  the  latter  is  granted,  it 
must  he  known  that  it  follows  from  what  has  been  said  that  the  world 
is  most  perfect,  not  only  physically,  or,  if  you  prefer,  metaphysically, 
because  that  series  of  things  is  produced  in  which  there  is  actually 
the  most  of  reality,  hut  also  that  it  is  most  perfect  morally,  because 
real  moral  perfection  is  physical  perfection  for  souls  themselves. 


ON  THE  ULTIMATE  ORIGIN  OF  THINGS. 


Ill 


Thus  the  world  is  not  only  the  most  admirable  mechanism,  but  in 
so  far  as  it  is  composed  of  souls,  it  is  also  the  best  republic,  through 
which  as  much  happiness  or  joy  is  brought  to  souls  as  is  possible,  in 
which  their  physical  perfection  consists. 

But,  you  will  say,  we  experience  the  contrary  in  this  world,  for 
often  good  people  are  very  unhappy,  and  not  only  innocent  brutes 
but  also  innocent  men  are  afflicted  and  even  put  to  death  with  tor- 
ture ; finally,  the  world,  if  you  regard  especially  the  government  of 
the  human  race,  resembles  a sort  of  confused  chaos  rather  than  the 
well  ordered  work  of  a supreme  wisdom.  This  may  appear  so  at 
the  first  glance,  I confess,  but  if  you  examine  the  thing  more 
closely,  it  evidently  appears  from  the  things  which  have  been 
adduced,  that  the  contrary  should  be  affirmed ; that  is,  that  all 
things,  and  consequently  souls,  attain  to  the  highest  degree  of  per- 
fection possible. 

And,  in  truth,  as  the  jurisconsults  say,  it  is  not  proper  to  judge 
before  having  examined  the  whole  law.  We  know  only  a very 
small  part  of  eternity  which  extends  into  immensity;  for  the 
memory  of  the  few  thousands  of  years  which  history  transmits 
to  us  is  indeed  a very  little  thing.  And  yet  from  an  experience 
so  short  we  dare  to  judge  of  the  immense  and  of  the  eternal,  like 
men  who,  bom  and  brought  up  in  a prison,  or,  if  you  prefer  in 
the  subterranean  salt  mines  of  the  Sarmatians,  think  that  there 
is  no  other  light  in  the  world  than  the  lamp  whose  feeble  gleam 
hardly  suffices  to  direct  their  steps.  Let  us  look  at  a very  beauti- 
ful picture,  and  let  us  cover  it  in  such  a way  as  to  see  only  a 
very  small  part  of  it,  what  else  will  appear  in  it,  however  closely  we 
may  examine  it  and  however  near  we  may  approach  to  it,  except  a 
certain  confused  mass  of  colors  without  choice  and  without  art  ? 
And  yet  when  we  remove  the  covering  and  regard  it  from  the 
proper  point  of  view  we  will  see  that  what  appeared  thrown  on  the 
canvas  at  haphazard  has  been  executed  with  the  greatest  art  by  the 
author  of  the  work.  What  the  eyes  discover  in  the  picture,  the 
ears  discover  in  music.  The  most  illustrious  composers  often 
mingle  discords  with  their  harmonies  in  order  to  excite  and  pique, 
so  to  speak,  the  listener,  who,  anxious  as  to  the  outcome,  is  all  the 
more  pleased  when  soon  all  things  are  restored  to  order.  Just  as  we 


112 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


rejoice  to  have  passed  through  slight  dangers  and  experienced  small 
ills,  whether  because  of  a feeling  of  egotism,  or  because  we  find 
pleasure  in  the  frightful  images  which  tight-rope  dances  or  leap- 
ing^ between  swords  ( sends  perilleux ) present ; so  we  partly  loose 
laughing  children,  pretending  to  throw  them  far  away  from  us, 
like  the  ape  which,  having  taken  Christian,  king  of  the  Danes, 
while  still  an  infant  wrapped  in  swaddling  clothes,  carried  him  to 
the  top  of  the  roof,  and  when  everybody  was  frightened  brought 
him  hack  laughing,  safe  and  sound  to  his  cradle.  According  to  the 
same  principle,  it  is  insipid  always  to  eat  sweetmeats;  we  must 
mingle  with  them  sharp,  acid  and  even  bitter  things,  which  excite 
the  taste.  He  who  has  not  tasted  bitter  things  has  not  merited 
sweet  things  and,  indeed,  will  not  appreciate  them.  It  is  the  law 
even  of  joy,  that  pleasure  he  not  uniform,  for  this  engenders 
disgust  and  renders  us  stupid  and  not  joyous. 

As  to  what  we  said,  that  a part  may  be  disturbed  without  preju- 
dice to  the  general  harmony,  it  must  not  be  understood  as  mean- 
ing that  no  account  is  made  of  the  parts,  or  that  it  suffices  that 
the  entire  world  he  perfect  in  measure,  although  it  might  happen 
that  the  human  race  should  be  unhappy,  and  that  there  should  be 
in  the  universe  no  regard  for  justice,  no  heed  taken  of  our  lot,  as 
some  think  who  do  not  judge  rightly  enough  of  the  whole  of  things. 
For  it  ought  be  known  that  as  in  a well-constituted  republic  as 
much  care  as  possible  is  taken  of  the  good  of  the  individual,  so  the 
universe  cannot  he  perfect  if  individual  interests  are  not  protected 
as  much  as  the  universal  harmony  will  permit.  And  for  this  a 
better  law  could  not  be  established  than  the  very  law  of  justice 
which  declares  that  each  one  participate  in  the  perfection  of  the 
universe  and  in  a happiness  of  his  own  in  proportion  to  his  own 
virtue  and  to  the  good  will  he  entertains  toward  the  common  good ; 
by  which  that  which  we  call  charity  and  love  of  God  is  fulfilled, 
in  which  alone,  according  to  the  judgment  of  the  wisest  theologians, 
the  force  and  power  of  the  Christian  religion  itself  consists.  And 
it  ought  not  appear  astonishing  that  so  large  a part  should  be  given 
to  souls  in  the  universe  since  they  reflect  the  most  faithful  image  of 
the  supreme  Author,  and  hold  to  him  not  only  the  relation  of 
machine  to  artificer,  but  also  that  of  citizen  to  prince;  and  they  are 


ON  THE  ULTIMATE  ORIGIN  OF  THINGS. 


113 


to  continue  as  long  as  the  universe  itself ; and  in  a manner  they 
express  and  concentrate  the  whole  in  themselves  so  that  it  can  be 
said  that  souls  are  whole  parts. 

As  regards  especially  the  afflictions  of  good  people,  we  must  hold 
for  certain  that  there  results  for  them  a greater  good,  and  this  is 
not  only  theologically  but  physically  true.  So  grain  cast  into  the 
ground  suffers  before  producing  its  fruit.  And  we  may  affirm, 
generally,  that  afflictions,  temporarily  evil,  are  in  effect  good,  since 
they  are  short  cuts  to  greater  perfections.  So  in  physics,  liquors 
which  ferment  slowly  take  more  time  also  to  improve ; whereas 
those  the  agitation  of  which  is  greater,  reject  certain  parts  with 
more  force  and  are  more  promptly  improved.  And  we  might  say 
of  this  that  it  is  retreating  in  order  the  better  to  leap  forward 
( quon  recede,  pour  mieux  sauter ).  We  should  therefore  regard 
these  considerations  not  merely  as  agreeable  and  consoling,  hut  also 
as  most  true.  And,  in  general,  I feel  that  there  is  nothing  truer 
than  happiness,  and  nothing  happier  or  sweeter  than  truth. 

And  in  addition  to  the  general  beauty  and  perfection  of  the 
works  of  God,  we  must  recognize  a certain  perpetual  and  very 
free  progress  of  the  whole  universe,  such  that  it  advances  always 
to  still  greater,  refinement  [ cultus ].  It  is  thus  that  even  now  a 
great  part  of  our  earth  has  received  cultivation  and  will  receive 
more  and  more.  And  although  it  is  true  that  sometimes  certain 
parts  of  it  grow  up  wild  again  or  again  suffer  destruction  and 
deterioration,  this  nevertheless  must  he  understood  as  we  inter- 
preted affliction  above,  that  is  to  say,  this  very  destruction  and 
deterioration  leads  to  some  greater  result,  so  that  we  profit  in  some 
way  by  the  loss  itself. 

And  as  to  the  possible  objection,  that  if  it  were  so  the  world 
ought  long  ago  to  have  become  a paradise,  the  reply  is  ready : Even 
if  many  substances  have  already  reached  great  perfection,  neverthe- 
less on  account  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  the  continuum,  there 
always  remain  in  the  depths  of  things  slumbering  parts  which 
must  yet  be  awakened  and  become  greater  and  better,  and,  in  a 
word,  attain  a better  culture.  And  hence  progress  never  comes  to 
an  end. 


XIX. 


Reply  to  Reflections,  found  in  the  “J ournal  des  Savants’7 

OF  THIS  YEAR,  RELATING  TO  THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  CERTAIN 

PASSAGES  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  DESCARTES.  1697. 

[From  the  French.] 

I am  accused  of  wishing  to  establish  my  reputation  on  the  ruins 
of  that  of  Descartes.  I have  a right  to  complain  of  this.  Very 
far  from  wishing  to  ruin  the  reputation  of  this  great  man,  I find 
that  his  real  merit  is  not  sufficiently  known,  because  what  is  most 
excellent  in  him  is  not  enough  considered  and  imitated.  Men 
fasten  on  the  weakest  passages  because  these  are  most  easily  under- 
stood by  those  who  are  not  willing  to  give  themselves  the  trouble 
of  thinking  profoundly  and  who  yet  would  like  to  understand  the 
foundation  of  things.  This  is  why,  to  my  great  regret,  his  par- 
tisans add  almost  nothing  to  his  discoveries,  and  this  is  the  usual 
effect  of  the  sectarian  spirit  in  philosophy.  As  all  my  views  are 
intent  only  upon  the  public  good,  I have  said  something  from  time 
to  time  to  arouse  them,  well  knowing  that  their  penetration  would 
lead  them  very  far,  if  they  did  not  believe  that  their  master  had 
done  enough.  I have  always  declared  that  I esteem  Descartes 
exceedingly ; there  are  few  who  approach  him  in  genius.  I know 
but  Archimides,  Copernicus,  Galileo,  Kepler,  Jung,  Huygens, 
Xewton,  and  a few  others  of  such  force;  to  whom  Pythagoras, 
Democritus,  Plato,  Aristotle,  Suisset,  Cardan,  Gilbert,  Verulam, 
Campanella,  Harvey,  Pascal,  and  some  others  might  be  added.  It 
is  nevertheless  true  that  Descartes  has  made  use  of  artifices  in 
order  to  profit  by  the  discoveries  of  others  without  wishing  to 
appear  indebted  to  them.  He  treated  some  excellent  men  in  an 
unjust  and  unworthy  way  when  they  offended  him,  and  he  had  an 
unbridled  ambition  to  set  himself  up  as  a party  chief.  But  this 
does  not  diminish  the  beauty  of  his  thoughts.  F ar  from  approving 
those  who  despise  him  and  who  repay  true  merit  with  ingratitude, 
it  is  this  that  I blame  principally  in  Descartes,  and  still  more  in 
several  of  his  partisans,  whose  misunderstood  attachment  for  a 


OH  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  DESCARTES. 


115 


single  author  nourishes  prejudice  and  hinders  them  from  profiting 
by  the  light  of  so  many  others.  I am  accustomed  to  say  that  the 
Cartesian  philosophy  is  as  it  were  the  ante-chamber  of  the  truth, 
and  that  it  is  difficult  to  penetrate  well  beyond  without  having 
passed  through  there ; but  one  deprives  himself  of  the  true  knowl- 
edge of  the  heart  of  things  if  he  stops  there. 

As  for  the  little  of  reputation  which  I am  honored  by  having 
accorded  me,  I have  not  acquired  it  in  refuting  Descartes ; I have 
no  need  of  that  means ; law,  history  and  letters  contributed  to  it 
before  I had  thought  of  mathematics.  And  if  our  new  analysis, 
the  calculus  of  which  I have  propounded,  surpasses  that  of  Des- 
cartes as  much  as  and  more  than  his  surpassed  preceding  methods, 
his  remains  none  the  less  worthy  of  esteem,  although  it  has  been 
necessary  for  the  progress  of  science  to  disabuse  those  who  think  it 
suffices  for  everything;  which  cannot  better  be  done  than  by  pro- 
posing to  them  problems,  beautiful  and  attractive,  and,  for  those 
who  know  their  method,  even  simple,  but  which  not  one  of  the 
Cartesian  analysts  has  been  able  to  solve 

Let  us  come  now  to  the  heart  of  our  dispute.  I am  not  the  first 
who  has  blamed  Descartes  for  having  rejected  the  search  for  final 
causes.  Besides  the  Rev.  F ather  Malebranche,  the  late  Mr.  Boyle 
did  so  with  much  zeal  and  solidity;  not  to  speak  of  numerous 
other  grave,  moderate  and  well-disposed  authors,  men  who  other- 
wise make  much  of  Descartes.  The  reply  is  here  made  that  he 
banished  final  causes  from  physics,  and  that  he  was  right  in  so 
doing ; but  that  he  would  have  been  wrong  if  he  had  banished  them 
from  ethics:  For  the  whole  good  and  the  whole  evil  of 

our  free  actions  depends  upon  their  end.  This  reply  is 
surprising.  The  question  is  not  concerning  our  free  actions, 
of  which  it  is  very  true  that  ethics  treats,  but  concerning 
God  and  his  wisdom,  which  appears  among  the  things  which 
Descartes  ought,  not  to  have  neglected.  And  the  reply,  far  from 
excusing  him,  would  charge,  if  it  were  true,  that  according  to  him 
final  causes  belong  only  to  our  free  actions.  But  I suppose  that 
this  is  not  the  view  of  the  author  of  the  Reflections,  nor  that  of 
Descartes.  Nevertheless,  his  silence  might  do  harm  contrary  to  his 
intention.  He  did  not  wish  to  avail  himself  of  this  means  of  prov- 


H6  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 

ing  the  existence  of  God ; he  may  be  excused  on  this  point, 
although  many  have  blamed  him  for  it ; hut  he  has  not  done  well  in 
everywhere  else  passing  by  so  important  a point,  which  ought  to 
have  been  employed  in  some  passages  of  his  Principles  of  Philos- 
ophy. If  God  is  the  author  of  things  and  if  he  is  sovereignly 
wise,  one  could  not  very  well  reason  as  to  the  structure  of  the  uni- 
verse without  making  considerations  of  his  wisdom  enter  therein, 
just  as  one  could  not  well  reason  concerning  a building  without 
entering  into  the  designs  of  the  architect.  I have  adduced  else- 
where an  excellent  passage  from  the  Phaedo  of  Plato  (which  is  the 
dialogue  on  the  death  of  Socrates),  where  the  philosopher  Anaxi- 
mander [Anaxagoras],  who  had  posited  two  principles,  an  intelli- 
gent mind  and  matter,  is  blamed  for  not  having  employed  this 
intelligence  or  this  wisdom  in  the  progress  of  his  work,  having' 
contented  himself  with  the  figures  and  motions  of  matter;  and 
this  is  exactly  the  case  with  our  too  materialistic  modern 
philosophers. 

But,  it  is  said,  in  physics  we  do  not  ash  why  things  are  hut  hoiv 
they  are.  1 reply  that  both  questions  a re  there  asked.  Often 
the  end  and  aim  makes  clear  the  means,  because  in  knowing  the 
end  we  can  better  judge  of  the  means.  Besides  to  explain  a 
machine  we  could  not  do  better  than  to  state  its  design  and  to 
show  how  all  its  parts  conduce  thereto.  This  may  even  he  useful 
in  finding  the  origin  of  the  intention.  I wish  that  this  method 
were  employed  also  in  medicine.  The  animal  body  is  a machine, 
at  once  hydraulic,  pneumatic  and  pyrobolic,  the  design  of  which  is 
to  maintain  a certain  motion ; and  by  showing  what  conduces  to 
this  design  and  what  is  injurious  to  it,  physiology  as  well  as  thera- 
peutics, would  he  understood.  Thus  it  is  seen  that  final  causes  are 
of  service  in  physics,  not  only  to  make  us  admire  the  wisdom  of 
God,  which  is  the  principal  reason,  but  also  for  knowing  things  and 
for  managing  them.  I have  elsewhere  shown  that  whereas  we  may 
still  dispute  as  to  the  efficient  cause  of  light,  which  Descartes,  as 
the  most  intelligent  now  acknowledge,  has  not  sufficiently  well 
explained,  yet  the  final  cause  suffices  for  divining  the  laws  which  it 
follows,  for  provided  we  imagine  that  nature  had  as  its  design  the 
conducting  of  rays  from  a given  point  to  another  given  point  by 
the  easiest  path,  we  find  all  these  laws  admirably,  by  simply 


OX  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  DESCAKTES. 


117 


employing,  as  I have  clone  in  the  Acta  E ruditorum  of  Leipsic, 
some  lines  of  analysis,  Alolineux  thanked  me  for  this  in  his 
Dioptrics,  and  he  highly  approved  of  the  remark,  which  I made  on 
the  occasion,  on  the  important  use  of  final  causes,  which  lead  us  to 
the  consideration  of  Sovereign  Wisdom,  in  showing  us  at  the  same 
time  the  laws  of  nature  which  are  its  consequence. 

The  author  of  the  Deflections  asks  me  to  give  the  passage  where 
Descartes  says  that  matter  receives  successively  all  the  forms  of 
which  it  is  capable.  He  has  searched  Articles  203  and  201  of  the 
fourth  part  of  his  Principles  for  it.  But  it  is  found  in  Article  47 
of  the  third  part.  I shall  quote  it  in  the  words  of  the  original 
Latin.  The  author  remarks  in  the  summary  that  the  falsity  of  his 
suppositions  regarding  the  origin  of  the  world  could  not  be  inju- 
rious, and  to  prove  it  the  better  he  adds : “Atque  omnino  parum 
refert  quid  hoc  pacto  supponatur,  quia  postea  juxta  leges  naturae 
est  mutandum.  Et  vix  aliquid  supponi  potest,  ex  quo  non  idem 
effectus  (quanquam  fortasse  operosius)  per  easclem  naturae  leges 
clecluci  possit.  Cum  earum  ope  materia  formas  omnes,  quorum  est 
capax,  successive  cissumat,  si  formas  istas  ordine  consideremus,  tan- 
dem ad  illam  quae  est  hujus  mundi  poterimus  devenire.”  From 
this  it  may  be  judged  whether  I have  imposed  upon  this  author, 
and  whether  he  does  not  say  positively  not  only  that  matter  can 
take,  but  also  that  it  does  take  effectively,  as  well  as  successively, 
all  the  forms  of  which  it  is  susceptible,  and  that  it  is  thus  of  little 
importance  what  suppositions  are  made.  There  is  much  to  he 
said  against  this  reasoning.  In  order  to  sustain  it,  it  would  he 
necessary  to  suppose  that  the  same  state  of  the  universe  returns 
always  precisely  after  a certain  period ; since  otherwise,  a state 
of  the  world  being  taken  which  is  posterior  in  fact  to  another, 
this  latter  state  could  never  be  deduced  from  the  former,  even  if 
matter  should  receive  all  the  forms  of  which  it  is  capable.  But 
these  periods  involve  other  difficulties,  so  much  so  that  thus  all 
the  infinite  possibilities  would  have  to  occur  in  this  finite,  periodic 
interval;  and  all  eternity  could  produce  nothing  new.  To  say, 
also,  with  Descartes,  that  he  is  at  liberty  to  suppose  almost  any- 
thing he  wishes,  it  would  not  suffice  that  each  supposition  or 
hypothesis  should  finally  lead  to  our  world ; for  it  might  be  so 
distant  and  the  passage  from  one  to  the  other  might  be  so  long 


118 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


and  so  difficult  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  mind  of  man 
to  follow  it  and  to  comprehend  it.  But  the  only  proposition  here 
in  question  is  the  one  I have  adduced,  and  whose  strange  conse- 
quences I have  noted : for  if  everything  possible,  and  everything 
imaginable,  however  unworthy  it  he,  some  day  comes  to  pass ; if 
every  fable  or  fiction  has  been  or  will  become  true  history,  there 
is  naught  but  necessity,  and  no  choice,  no  providence.  And  this 
consequence  it  is  that  the  author  of  the  Reflections  does  not  disown, 
he  having  simply  undertaken  to  disprove  the  proposition  itself, 
which  he  did  not  find  in  the  Principles  of  its  author. 

Nevertheless  I am  unwilling  to  attack  the  religion  and  piety  of 
Descartes,  as  is  unjustly  imputed  to  me.  I protested  the  contrary 
in  express  terms,  for  a doctrine  may  he  dangerous,  without  the  one 
circulating  it,  or  the  one  following  it,  remarking  the  fact  or  approv- 
ing its  consequences.  Nevertheless  it  is  well  to  make  them  known, 
to  the  end  that  we  may  he  on  our  guard  against  them,  forasmuch 
as  it  clearly  appears  that  Spinoza  and  some  others  have  drawn 
them.  For  there  are  minds  disposed  to  seize  upon  the  worst  pas- 
sages, and  ingenious  in  deducing  the  most  dangerous  conclusions. 
I would  not  have  spoken  of  Spinoza  if  I had  thought  that  what  I 
wrote  would  he  published,  from  the  fear  that  it  would  be  believed 
that  I wished  to  cast  odium  upon  the  Cartesians,  knowing  well  that 
they  have  sometimes  been  wronged  by  mistaken  zeal.  Neverthe- 
less, since  there  is  a desire  to  criticize  my  words,  it  has  been 
necessary  to  show  that  I have  advanced  nothing  groundlessly.  As 
one  of  the  best  uses  of  true  philosophy,  and  particularly  of  physics, 
is  to  nourish  piety  and  to  lead  us  to  God,  I am  not  ill-pleased 
with  those  who  have  given  me  this  occasion  for  explaining  myself 
in  a way  which  may  make  good  impressions  on  some  one ; although 
I could  wish  that  it  had  been  done  without  attributing  to  me  a pas- 
sion and  partiality,  from  which,  perhaps,  few  people  are  more 
removed  than  I.  To  express  in  few  words  the  feeling  which  I 
have  toward  an  author  whose  reputation  I am  wrongly  accused  of 
wishing  to  ruin  (an  enterprise  which  would  he  as  unjust  as  it.  is 
impossible),  I will  say  that  he  who  does  not  acknowledge  the  emi- 
nent merit  of  Descartes  is  not  very  penetrating ; but  that  he  who 
acknowledges  and  esteems  none  but  him  and  those  who  follow  him, 
will  never  amount  to  much. 


XX. 


Ox  Nature  ix  Itself  ; or  Ox  the  F orce  residixg  ix  Created 
Thixgs,  axd  their  Actioxs.  1698. 

[From  the  Latin.] 

1.  I have  recently  received  from  the  very  illustrious  John 
Christopher  Sturm,  a man  especially  meritorious  for  his  work  in 
mathematics  and  physics,  the  Apology  which  he  published  at 
Altorf  in  defence  of  his  Dissertation,  De  Idolo  Naturae,  which 
Gunther  Christopher  Schel hammer,  the  eminent  and  beloved  phy- 
sician of  Kiel,  attacked  in  his  book  on  nature.  As  I have  formerly 
examined  the  same  question,  and  as  I have  had  by  letters  some  dis- 
cussions on  this  subject  with  the  eminent  author  of  the  Disserta- 
tion, mention  of  which  he  made  in  a way  very  gratifying  to  me  in 
recalling  publicly  some  details  of  our  correspondence  in  the  first 
volume  of  his  Select  Physics  (Vol.  I,  Sec.  1,  Chap.  3,  epilog.  § v, 
pp.  119,  120),  I have  been  thereby  but  the  more  disposed  to  give 
serious  attention  to  such  an  important  subject,  judging  it  necessary 
that  my  view  and  the  whole  question  should  be  a little  more 
distinctly  set  forth  from  those  principles  which  I have  already 
often  indicated.  This  apologetic  dissertation  seemed  to  me  to  offer 
an  ojiportunity  favorable  to  my  design,  because  it  was  easy  to  see 
that  the  author  had  there  treated  in  a few  words  the  essential 
points  of  the  question.  For  the  rest  I do  not  take  sides  between 
these  illustrious  men. 

2.  Two  points  especially,  it  seems  to  me,  are  in  question : first, 
in  what  consists  the  nature  which  we  are  accustomed  to  attribute 
to  things,  the  commonly  received  attributes  of  which,  according  to 
the  judgment  of  the  celebrated  Sturm,  savor  a little  of  paganism; 
next,  whether  there  is  in  creatures  any  eVepyeia,  a thing  which  he 
apj)ears  to  deny.  As  for  the  first  point,  concerning  nature  in  itself, 
if  we  examine  what  it  is  and  what  it  is  not,  I admit  indeed  that 
there  is  no  soul  of  the  universe;  I even  admit  that  these  marvels, 
which  happen  every  day  and  of  which  we  are  wont  to  say  with 
reason  that  the  work  of  nature  is  the  work  of  an  intelligence,  are 


120 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


not  to  be  attributed  to  certain  created  intelligences  endowed  with  a 
wisdom  and  virtue  porportioned  to  so  great  a matter;  but  that 
universal  nature  is,  so  to  speak,  the  handiwork  of  God,  and  one  so 
great  that  every  natural  machine  (and  this  is  the  true  but  little 
observed  difference  between  nature  and  art)  is  composed  of  really 
infinite  organs,  and  consequently  requires  in  the  author  and 
director  infinite  wisdom  and  power.  This  is  why  I hold  the  omnis- 
cient heat  of  Hippocrates  and  the  soul-giving  Cholco-goddess  of 
Avicenna  and  the  very  wise  plastic  virtue  of  Scaliger  and  others 
and  the  hylarchic  principle  of  Henry  More,  some  of  them  impossi- 
ble, others  superfluous ; and  it  is  enough  for  me  that  the  mechan- 
ism of  things  is  constructed  with  so  much  wisdom  that  all  these 
marvels  come  to  pass  through  its  very  development,  organized 
beings  being  evolved,  I think,  according  to  a preconceived  plan. 
I am  therefore  of  the  opinion  of  the  illustrious  author  when  he 
rejects  the  figment  of  a certain  created  nature,  whose  wisdom  forms 
and  governs  the  mechanisms  of  bodies ; but  it  does  not  hence  follow, 
I believe,  and  reason  does  not  admit,  that  all  created,  indwelling, 
active  force  must  be  rejected. 

3.  We  have  just  spoken  of  what  it  is  not;  let  us  now  examine 
more  closely  what  this  nature  is  which  Aristotle  was  not  wrong  in 
calling  the  principle  of  motion  and.of  rest , although  this  philoso- 
pher seems  to  me  to  take  the  word  in  too  broad  a meaning,  and 
understand  by  it  not  only  local  motion  or  rest  in  a place,  but  in 
general  change  and  t deror?  or  persistence.  Whence,  also,  as  I may 
say  in  passing,  the  definition  which  he  gives  of  motion  is  truly 
obscure ; it  is,  however,  not  so  absurd  as  it  seems  to  those  who  sup- 
pose that  he  meant  to  define  only  local  motion.  But  let  us  return 
to  the  matter  in  hand.  Hubert  Boyle,  a man  eminent  and  skilled 
in  the  accurate  observation  of  nature,  has  written  on  nature  in 
itself  a little  book,  the  thought  of  which,  if  I remember  correctly, 
is  summed  up  in  this,  that  we  ought  to  regard  nature  as  being  the 
very  mechanism  of  bodies ; which  indeed  may  be  proved  iv 
TrXarei ; but  if  he  had  examined  the  thing  with  more  aicpifiei'a  he 
would  have  distinguished  in  the  mechanism  itself  the  principles 
from  their  derivatives.  So  it  does  not  suffice,  in  order  to  explain  a 
clock,  to  say  that  it  is  moved  in  a mechanical  manner,  without  dis- 


ON  NATURE  IN  ITSELF. 


121 


tinguishing  whether  it  receives  this  impulse  from  a weight  or  from 
a spring.  I have  already  declared  more  than  once  (what  I think 
will  be  of  profit  in  hindering  the  abusing  of  mechanical  explana- 
tions of  material  things,  to  the  prejudice  of  piety,  as  if  matter 
could  exist  of  itself  and  as  if  the  mechanism  had  no  need  of  any 
intelligence  or  of  any  spiritual  substance)  that  the  origin  of  the 
mechanism  itself  does  not  come  merely  from  a material  principle 
alone  nor  from  mathematical  reasons  hut  from  a certain  higher 
principle,  and,  so  to  speak,  metaphysical  source. 

4.  One  remarkable  proof,  among  others,  of  this  truth  is  that 
the  foundation  of  the  laws  of  nature  must  he  made  to  consist  not 
in  this,  that  the  same  quantity  of  motion  is  preserved,  as  was  com- 
monly believed,  but  rather  in  this,  that  the  same  quantity  of  active 
j power , still  more  (and  I have  discovered  that  this  happens  for  an 
admirable  reason),  the  same  quantity  of  moving  force  [actio] 
must  he  preserved,  the  estimation  of  which  must  he  very  different 
from  that  which  the  Cartesians  conceive  under  quantity  of  motion. 

I have  conferred  on  this  subject,  partly  by  letters,  in  part 
publicly,  with  two  mathematicians  of  superior  talent,  and  one  of 
them  embraced  my  opinion  altogether;  the  other,  after  long  and 
thorough  examination,  ended  by  renouncing  all  his  objections  and 
avowing  frankly  that  he  had  not  yet  been  able  to  find  an  answer  to 
my  demonstration.  And  I am  all  the  more  astonished  to  see  that 
the  illustrious  man,  in  the  edited  portion  of  his  Select  Physics,  in 
explaining  the  laws  of  motion,  has  admitted  the  common  doctrine 
as  if  it  did  not  permit  of  doubt  (he  has,  however,  recognized  that 
it  rests  upon  no  demonstration  but  on  a certain  probability,  and  he 
has  rejieated  it  in  this  last  dissertation,  Chap.  3,  § 2)  ; hut  perhaps 
he  wrote  before  my  writings  appeared  and  had  not  the  time  or  the 
thought  for  revising  his  own,  especially  as  he  was  persuaded  that 
the  laws  of  motion  are  arbitrary,  which  appears  to  me  not  at  all 
according  to  reason.  For  I think  that  it  is  because  of  reasons 
determined  by  wisdom  and  order  that  God  has  been  led  to  make  the 
laws  which  we  observe  in  nature ; and  hence  it  is  evident,  accord- 
ing to  the  remark  which  I formerly  made  on  the  occasion  of  an 
optical  law  and  which  the  celebrated  Molineux  later  highly 
approved  in  his  Dioptrics,  that  final  cause  is  not  only  useful  to  vir- 


122 


PHILOSOPHICAL,  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


tue  and  to  piety  in  ethics  and  in  natural  theology,  but  that  even  in 
physics  it  serves  to  find  and  to  discover  hidden  truths.  So  when 
the  renowned  Sturm,  where  he  treats  of  final  cause  in  his  Select 
Physics ; presented  my  doctrine  among  the  hypotheses,  I could  have 
wished  that  he  had  sufficiently  examined  it  in  his  criticism ; for  he 
would  have  found  opportunity  for  saying  in  favor  of  the  impor- 
tance and  fruitfulness  of  the  argument  many  excellent  things  and 
such  as  are  useful  for  piety. 

5.  But  we  must  now  examine  what  he  says  of  the  notion  of 
nature  in  his  apologetic  dissertation,  and  what  seems  to  us  insuffi- 
cient in  it.  He  grants,  Chap.  IV,  §§  2,  3,  and  often  elsewhere, 
that  the  movements  which  take  place  now  are  the  result  of  the 
eternal  law  once  decreed  by  God,  which  law  he  calls  soon  after 
volition  and  command ; and  that  there  is  no  need  of  a new  com- 
mand from  God,  of  a new  volition,  and  still  less  of  a new  effort 
or  of  a sort  of  laborious  operation  (§  3)  ; and  he  repels  as  an 
unjust  imputation  on  the  part  of  his  opponent  the  thought  that  God 
moves  things  as  a wood-cutter  does  his  two-edged  ax,  or  as  a 
miller  governs  his  mill  by  retaining  the  waters  or  by  turning  them 
loose  on  the  wheel.  But  in  truth,  as  indeed  it  seems  to  me,  this 
explanation  does  not  suffice.  For  I ask  if  this  volition  or  this 
command,  or,  if  you  prefer,  this  divine  law,  decreed  originally, 
attributed  to  things  only  an  extrinsic  denomination;  or  if,  in 
forming  them,  it  created  in  them  some  permanent  impression,  or 
as  Schelhammer,  remarkable  as  well  for  his  judgment  as  for  his 
experience,  well  calls  it,  an  indwelling  law  (although  it  is  most 
often  unknown  to  the  creatures  in  whom  it  resides),  whence  pro- 
ceed all  actions  and  all  passions.  The  first  appears  to  be  the 
doctrine  of  the  authors  of  the  system  of  Occasional  Causes,  and 
especially  of  the  very  ingenious  Malebranche ; the  latter  is 
received  (and  as  I believe  rightly)  as  the  most  true. 

6.  And  in  truth  since  this  past  decree  does  not  exist  at  present, 
it  can  produce  nothing  now  unless  it  then  left  after  it  some  perdur- 
ing  effect,  which  now  still  continues  and  operates.  And  he 
who  thinks  otherwise  renounces,  if  I judge  rightly,  all  distinct 
explanation  of. things;  and  it  can  he  said  that  anything  is,  by  an 
equal  title,  the  result  of  anything,  if  that  which  is  absent  in  space 


ON  NATURE  IN  ITSELF. 


123 


and  time  can  without  intermedium  operate  here  and  now.  Thus 
it  is  not  sufficient  to  saj  that  in  creating  things  in  the  beginning 
God  willed  that  they  should  observe  a certain  law  in  their  progress, 
if  his  will  is  conceived  to  have  been  so  inefficacious  that  things 
were  not  affected  by  it  and  no  lasting  effect  was  produced  in  them. 
And  assuredly  it  is  contrary  to  the  notion  of  the  divine  power  and 
will,  which  is  pure  and  absolute,  that  God  should  will  and  never- 
theless in  willing  produce  or  change  nothing;  that  he  is  always 
acting  and  never  effecting;  that  in  a word  he  leaves  no  toorh  or 
airoTeXea  i±a . Without  doubt,  if  nothing  was  impressed  on 

creatures  by  this  divine  word,  “Let  the  earth  bring  forth,  let  the 
animals  multiply” ; if  after  it  things  were  not  affected  otherwise 
than  if  no  command  intervened,  it  follows  (since  there  must  he 
between  the  cause  and  the  effect  a certain  connection,  either 
immediate  or  mediate),  either  that  nothing  takes  place  now  con- 
formably to  this  mandate  or  that  this  mandate  effecting  so  much 
in  the  present  must  be  always  renewed  in  the  future,  a consequence 
which  the  learned  author,  with  reason,  repels.  But  if,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  law  decreed  by  God  left  some  trace  of  itself  impressed 
on  things ; if  things  were  so  formed  by  the  mandate  as  to  render 
them  fit  to  accomplish  the  will  of  the  legislator,  then  it  must 
be  admitted  that  a certain  efficacy,  form  or  force,  such  as  we  are 
accustomed  to  call  by  the  name  of  nature,  is  impressed  on  things, 
whence  proceeds  the  series  of  phenomena  according  to  the  pre- 
scription of  the  first  command. 

7.  But  this  indwelling  force  may  indeed  be  conceived  dis- 
tinctly but  not  explained  by  images ; nor,  certainly,  ought  it  to  be 
so  explained  any  more  than  the  nature  of  the  soul,  for  force  is  one 
of  those  things  which  are  not  to  be  grasped  by  the  imagination  but 
by  the  understanding.  Thus,  when  the  author  of  the  apologetic* 
dissertation  (Chap.  4,  § 6)  asks  that  the  manner  in  which  indwell- 
ing law  operates  in  bodies  ignorant  of  this  law  be  explained  to  him 
by  the  imagination,  I understand  him  to  desire  to  have  an 
explanation  of  it  through  the  understanding;  for  otherwise,  it 
might  be  believed  that  he  demanded  that  sounds  be  painted  and 
colors  heard.  Furthermore,  if  the  difficulty  of  explaining  things 
is  sufficient  for  rejecting  them,  he  therefore  merits  the  imputation 


124 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


which  he  himself  (Chap.  1,  § 2)  repels  as  unjust,  of  preferring  to 
decide  that  everything  is  moved  merely  hv  a divine  virtue  rather 
than  to  admit,  under  the  name  of  nature,  something  the  nature  of 
which  is  unknown  to  him.  And  certainly  even  Ilohbes  and  others 
could  claim  with  equal  right  that  all  things  are  corporeal,  because 
they  are  persuaded  that  only  bodies  can  be  explained  distinctly  and 
by  the  imagination.  But  they  themselves  are  justly  refuted  by  the 
very  fact  that  there  is  in  things  a power  of  acting  which  is  not 
derived  from  imageable  things,  but  merely  to  trace  this  to  a man- 
date of  God,  which  once  given,  in  no  wise  affects  things  nor  leaves 
any  effect  after  it,  so  far  from  clearing  up  the  difficulty,  is  rather 
to  renounce  the  role  of  the  philosopher  and  to  cut  the  Gordian 
knot  with  the  sword.  For  the  rest,  a more  distinct  and  correct 
explanation  of  active  force  than  has  up  to  this  time  been  given, 
may  be  drawn  from  our  Dynamics,  in  which  we  give  an  interpre- 
tation of  the  laws  of  nature  and  of  motion,  which  is  true  and  in 
accordance  with  things. 

8.  But  if  some  defender  of  the  new  philosophy  which  intro- 
duces the  inertia  and  torpor  of  things,  goes  so  far  as  to  take  away 
from  the  commands  of  God  all  durable  effect  and  all  efficacy  for 
the  future,  and  has  no  scruples  in  requiring  of  God  incessantly 
renewed  efforts  (that  which  Sturm  prudently  declares  he  is  averse 
to),  he  himself  may  see  liow  worthy  he  thinks  this  of  God;  more- 
over, lie  could  not  be  excused  unless  he  offered  an  explanation  of 
why  things  themselves  can  last  some  time  but  the  attributes  of 
things  which  we  understand  under  the  name  of  nature  cannot  be 
lasting;  why  it  may  not  be,  furthermore, . according  to  reason  that 
just  as  the  word  fiat  left  something  after  it,  namely,  the  persisting 
thing  itself,  so  the  not  less  admirable  word  of  blessing  has  left  also 
after  it  in  things  a certain  fecundity  or  virtue  of  producing  their 
acts  and  of  operating,  whence,  if  there  is  no  obstacle,  the  operation 
results.  That  which  I have  explained  elsewhere  might  be  added  to 
this  if  perchance  it  is  not  yet  perfectly  clear  to  all,  that  the  very 
substance  of  things  consists  in  their  power  of  acting  and  suffering, 
whence  it  follows  that  not  even  durable  things  can  be  produced  if 
a force  of  some  permanence  cannot  be  imprinted  upon  them  by  the 
divine  power.  Thus  it  would  follow  that  no  created  substance,  no 


OX  STATURE  1ST  ITSELF. 


125 


soul,  would  remain  numerically  the  same;  that  nothing  would  be 
preserved  by  God,  and  consequently  that  all  things  would  be  only 
certain  passing  or  evanescent  modifications,  and,  so  to  speak, 
apparitions,  of  one  permanent  divine  substance ; and,  what 
amounts  to  the  same  thing,  that  nature  itself  or  the  substance  of  all 
things,  would  be  God ; a pernicious  doctrine,  recently  introduced 
into  the  world  or  renewed  by  a subtle  but  profane  author.  In 
truth,  if  corporeal  things  contained  nothing  but  matter 
it  would  be  quite  true  to  say  that  they  are  in  a flux  and  have 
nothing  substantial,  as  the  Platonists  formerly  very  well 
recognized. 

9.  Another  question  is  whether  we  must  say  that  creatures 
properly  and  truly  act.  This  question  is  included  in  the  first  if  we 
once  understand  that  the  indwelling  nature  does  not  differ  from 
the  power  of  acting  and  suffering.  For  there  cannot  he  action  with- 
out the  power  of  acting,  and  on  the  other  hand  that  potency  is 
worthless  which  can  never  be  exercised.  Since,  however,  action 
and  potency  are  none  the  less  different  things,  the  first  successive, 
the  second  lasting,  let  us  consider  the  action.  Here,  I confess,  I 
find  no  little  difficulty  in  explaining  the  thought  of  the  learned 
Sturm.  For  he  denies  that  created  things  act  properly  and  of 
themselves,  and,  nevertheless  soon  after,  while  admitting  that  they 
act,  he  does  not  wish  that  the  comparison  of  creatures  to  an  ax 
moved  by  a wood-cutter  be  attributed  to  him.  I cannot  draw  from 
this  anything  certain  nor  do  I find  explained  with  sufficient  clear- 
ness to  what  extent  he  recedes  from  the  received  opinions,  or  what 
distinct  notion  he  has  conceived  in  his  mind  of  action,  which,  as 
the  debates  of  the  metaphysicians  attest,  is  far  from  being  obvious 
and  simple.  As  for  me,  as  far  as  I seem  to  have  grasped  the  notion 
of  action,  the  doctrine  generally  received  in  philosophy,  that 
actions  belong  to  subjects,  follows  from  it  and  is  established  by  it; 
and  I think  that  this  principle  is  so  true  that  it  may  be  inverted ; 
so  that  not  only  is  everything  which  acts  a particular  substance, 
but  also  every  particular  substance  acts  without  cessation,  not  even 
excepting  body  itself,  in  which  no  absolute  rest  is  ever  found. 

10.  But  let  us  now  examine  a little  more  attentively  the  opin- 
ion of  those  who  take  away  from  created  things  true  and  individual 


126 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


action;  a thing  which  Robert  Fludd,  author  of  the  Philosophia 
Mosaica,  formerly  did,  and  also  now  some  Cartesians  do  who  think 
that  it  is  not  at  all  the  things  which  act,  hut  indeed  God,  on  occa- 
sion of  things  and  according  to  the  aptitude  of  things;  and  thus 
things  are  occasions  not  causes ; they  receive,  but  do  not  effect  or 
produce.  After  Cordemoi,  de  La  Forge  and  other  Cartesians  had 
proposed  this  doctrine,  Malebranclie,  with  his  superior  mind,  lent 
it  the  lustre  of  his  style ; hut  no  one,  in  my  opinion,  has  presented 
solid  ji roofs.  Certainly  if  this  doctrine  is  pushed  to  the  point  of 
suppressing  even  the  immanent  actions  of  substances  (a  view  which 
the  illustrious  Sturm  in  his  Select  Physics,  Bk.  I,  cli.  iv,  Epilo., 
§ 11,  p.  176,  rightly  rejects,  and  in  this  he  gives  proof  of  much 
circumspection),  then  nothing  in  the  world  appears  to  he  more 
contrary  to  reason.  In  truth,  who  will  question  that  the  mind 
thinks  and  wills,  and  that  many  thoughts  and  volitions  in  us  are 
elicited  from  ourselves,  and  that  we  are  endowed  with  spontaneity  ? 
This  would  be  not  only  to  deny  human  liberty  and  to  make  God 
the  cause  of  evil,  but  also  to  contradict  the  testimony  of  our 
inmost  experience  and  of  our  conscience ; through  which  we  feel 
that  those  things  are  ours,  which,  without  any  kind  of  reason,  our 
adversaries  would  transfer  to  God.  But  if  we  attribute  to  our 
soul  the  indwelling  power  of  producing  immanent  actions,  or, 
what  is  the  same  thing,  of  acting  immanently,  then  nothing 
hinders,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  conformable  to  reason,  that  this  same 
power  should  reside  in  other  animated  beings  or  forms,  or,  if  you 
prefer,  in  the  nature  of  substances ; but  if  some  one  should  think 
that  in  the  nature  of  things  as  known  to  us  only  our  souls  are 
active,  or  that  all  power  of  acting  immanently,  and  so  to  speak 
vitally,  is  joined  with  intellect,  such  assertions  certainly  rest  on  no 
ground,  and  can  be  defended  only  in  opposition  to  the  truth.  As 
to  what  is  to  be  believed  concerning  the  transient  actions  of 
creatures,  that  will  be  explained  better  in  another  place,  and  has, 
in  part,  already  been  explained  by  us  elsewhere:  that  is  to  say, 
the  communication  of  substances  or  of  monads  has  its  source  not  in 
influx  but  in  a concord  proceeding  from  divine  preformation : each 
substance,  at  the  same  time,  that  it  follows  the  indwelling  power 
and  laws  of  its  own  nature,  being  accommodated  to  the  others ; and 
it  is  in  this  that  the  union  of  the  soul  and  body  consists. 


ON  NATURE  IN  ITSELF. 


127 


11.  Moreover,  that  bodies  are  of  themselves  inert  is  true  if  it 
is  rightly  understood,  to  this  extent,  namely,  that  what  is,  for  any 
reason,  once  assumed  to  be  at  rest  cannot  set  itself  in  motion  or 
allow  itself  without  resistance  to  be  set  in  motion  by  another  body; 
any  more  than  it  can  of  itself  change  the  rate  of  velocity  or  the 
direction  which  it  once  has,  or  allow  it  easily  and  without  resis- 
tance to  be  changed  by  another  body.  And  also  it  must  be  con- 
fessed that  extension,  or  what  is  geometrical  in  body  if  taken  sim- 
ply, has  nothing  in  it  which  can  give  rise  to  action  and  to  motion ; 
on  the  contrary,  matter  rather  resists  motion  by  a certain  natural 
inertia,  as  Kepler  has  well  called  it,  so  that  it  is  not  indifferent 
to  motion  and  rest,  as  is  generally  thought,  but  it  needs  in  order  to 
move  an  active  force  proportionate  to  its  size.  Wherefore  I make 
the  very  notion  of  materia  prima,  or  of  mass,  which  is  always  the 
same  in  body  and  proportioned  to  its  size,  consist  in  this  very 
passive  force  of  resistance  (involving  impenetrability  and  some- 
thing more)  ; and  hence,  I show  that  entirely  different  laws  of 
motion  follow  than  if  there  were  in  body  and  in  matter  itself 
only  impenetrability  together  with  extension;  and  that,  as  there 
is  in  matter  a natural  inertia  opposed  to  motion,  so  in  body  itself, 
and  what  is  more,  in  every  substance,  there  is  a natural  constancy 
opposed  to  change.  But  this  doctrine  does  not  defend,  but  rather 
opposes,  those  who  deny  action  to  things ; for  just  as  certain 
as  it  is  that  matter  of  itself  does  not  begin  motion,  so  certain 
is  it  (as  very  fine  experiments  on  the  motion  communicated 
by  a moving  body  show)  that  body  retains  of  itself  the 
impetus  which  it  has  once  acquired,  and  that  it  is  constant 
in  its  mobility  or  makes  an  effort  to  persevere  in  that  very  series 
of  changes  which  it  has  entered  on.  As  these  activities  and 
entelechies  cannot  be  modifications  of  primary  matter  or  of  mass, 
a thing  essentially  passive,  as  was  recognized  by  the  very  judicious 
Sturm  himself  (as  we  shall  see  in  the  following  paragraph),  it  may 
be  inferred  that  there  must  be  found  in  corporeal  substance  a first 
entelechy  or  TrpwTov  he/cTi^ov  for  activity;  that  is,  a primitive 
moving  force  which  being  joined  to  extension  (or  what  is  purely 
geometrical)  and  to  mass  (or  what  is  purely  material)  always 
indeed  acts  but  nevertheless,  in  consequence  of  the  meeting  of 
bodies,  is  variously  modified  through  efforts  and  impetus.  And  it 


12S 


PHILOSOPHICAL,  WORKS  OF  LEIBHITZ. 


is  this  same  substantial  principle  which  is  called  soul  in  living 
beings,  and  substantial  form  in  others;  and  so  far  as  by  its  union 
with  matter  it  constitutes  a substance  truly  one,  or  one  per  se,  it 
forms  what  I call  a monad:  since  if  these  true  and  real  unities  are 
taken  away  only  beings  by  aggregation  will  remain;  nay,  rather, 
it  follows  from  this,  that  there  will  be  no  real  entities  in  bodies. 
For  although  there  are  atoms  of  substance  given,  that  is,  our 
monads  without  parts,  there  are  no  atoms  of  mass,  i.  e.,  of  the  small- 
est extension,  or  ultimate  elements,  since  the  continuous  cannot  be 
formed  of  points.  In  short,  no  being  is  given  which  is  the  greatest 
in  mass  or  infinite  in  extension,  although  there  may  always  be 
some  larger  than  others : but  a being  is  given  which  is  the  greatest 
by  intension  of  perfections  or  infinite  in  power. 

12.  I see,  however,  that  in  this  same  apologetic  dissertation, 
ch.  IV,  § 7 et  seq.,  the  celebrated  Sturm  has  undertaken  to  attack 
by  certain  arguments  the  moving  force  residing  in  bodies.  “I 
shall  abundantly  here  prove,”  he  says,  “that  corporeal  substance 
is  not  even  capable  of  any  actively  moving  potency.”  But  I do  not 
understand  what  a power  not  actively  moving  can  be.  Moreover, 
he  says  that  he  will  employ  two  arguments,  one  drawn  from  the 
nature  of  matter  and  of  body,  the  other  from  the  nature  of  motion. 
The  first  amounts  to  this,  that  matter,  in  its  nature  and  essentially, 
is  a passive  substance ; and  that  thus  it  is  no  more  possible  to  give 
it  active  force  than  it  is  for  God  to  will  that  a stone,  as  long  as  it 
remains  a stone,  shall  be  living  and  rational,  that  is,  not  a stone; 
further,  whatever  qualities  are  posited  in  bodies  are  but  modifica- 
tions of  matter,  moreover  (what  I acknowledge  is  well  said),  a 
modification  of  a thing  essentially  passive  cannot  render  this  thing 
active.  But  it  is  easy  to  reply  with  the  received  and  true  philoso- 
phy that  matter  is  to  be  understood  as  secondary  or  as  primary; 
the  secondary  is  a certain  complete  but  not  purely  passive  sub- 
stance; the  primary  is  purely  passive  but  not  complete,  and  conse- 
quently there  mast  be  added  to  it  a soul,  or  form  analogous  to  the 
soul,  a primary  eWeV/yeia,  that  is,  a certain  effort  or  primitive 
power  of  acting,  which  is  itself  the  indwelling  law  imprinted  by 
divine  decree.  I do  not  think  that  such  a view  is  repugnant  to  the 
illustrious  and  ingenious  man  who  lately  maintained  that  body  is 


ON  NATURE  IN  ITSEEE. 


129 


composed  of  matter  and  of  spirit ; provided  that  spirit  is  taken  not 
for  an  intelligent  thing  (as  in  other  cases  is  done)  hut  for  a soul 
or  form  analogous  to  the  soul ; not  for  a simple  modification,  .but 
for  something  constituent,  substantial  and  perduring,  which  I am 
accustomed  to  call  monad,  and  which  possesses  a sort  of  perception 
and  desire.  Therefore  this  received  doctrine,  agreeing  with  the 
favorably  explained  dogma  of  the  schoolmen,  must  be  first  refuted, 
in  order  that  the  argument  of  this  illustrious  man  may  have  any 
weight.  Whence  also  it  is  evident  that  we  cannot  admit,  what  he 
assumes,  that  whatever  is  in  corporeal  substance  is  but  a modifica- 
tion of  matter.  Tor  it  is  well  known  that  according  to  received 
philosophy  there  are  in  the  bodies  of  living  beings  souls  which 
assuredly  are  not  modifications.  Tor  although  the  illustrious  man 
appears  to  maintain  the  contrary  and  to  take  away  from  the  brutes 
all  feeling,  in  the  true  meaning  of  the  word,  and  soul,  properly 
speaking,  nevertheless,  he  cannot  assume  this  opinion  as  the 
foundation  of  his  demonstration  until  it  itself  has  been  proved. 
And  I believe,  on  the  contrary,  that  it  is  consistent  neither  with  the 
order  nor  the  beauty  nor  the  reason  of  things,  that  this  vital  or 
immanently  active  principle  should  be  only  in  a small  part  of 
matter,  when  greater  perfection  demands  that  it  be  in  all.  Wor 
does  aught  hinder  souls,  or  at  least  forms  analogous  to  souls,  from 
being  everywhere,  although  the  dominant,  and  hence  intelligent, 
souls,  like  the  human,  cannot  be  everywhere. 

13.  The  second  argument,  which  the  illustrious  Sturm  draws 
from  the  nature  of  motion,  does  not  appear  to  me  to  be  necessarily 
conclusive.  He  says  that  motion  is  only  the  successive  existence  of 
the  thing  in  different  places.  Let  us  grant  this  provisionally, 
although  we  are  not  at  all  satisfied  with  it,  and  although  it 
expresses  rather  the  result  of  motion  than  its  so-called  formal 
reason;  nevertheless  moving  force  is  not  thus  excluded.  Tor  a 
body  is  not  only  at  the  actual  moment  of  its  motion  in  a place 
commensurate  to  it,  but  it  has  also  a tendency  or  effort  to  change 
its  place  so  that  the  succeeding  state  follows  of  itself  from  the 
present  by  the  force  of  nature;  otherwise  at  the  actual  moment, 
and  hence  at  any  moment,  a body  A,  which  is  in  motion,  would  in 
no  wise  differ  from  a body  B,  which  is  at  rest;  and  from  the 
9 


130 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


opinion  of  the  illustrious  man,  were  it  contrary  to  ours  on 
this  point,  it  would  follow  that  there  would  be  no  difference 
whatever  in  bodies,  because  in  the  fullness  of  a mass  in 
itself  uniform  no  other  difference  can  be  assumed  than  that 
which  respects  the  motion.  Finally,  it  would  further  follow 
that  there  would  be  absolutely  no  variation  in  bodies,  and 
that  they  would  remain  always  in  the  same  state.  For  if 

any  portion  of  matter  does  not  differ  from  another  equal  to  and 
like  it  (which  the  illustrious  Sturm  must  admit,  since  he  does  awa.y 
with  active  forces,  impulses,  and  all  other  qualities  and  modifica- 
tions, except  existence  in  this  place,  which  would  be  successively 
another  and  another)  ; if  moreover  the  state  at  one  instant  does 
not  differ  from  the  state  at  another  instant  except  by  the  transposi- 
tion of  portions  of  matter,  equal  and  similar,  and  at  every  point 
fitting  to  each  other,  it  evidently  follows  that,  on  account  of  the 
perpetual  substitution  of  indiscernible  things,  it  will  be  absolutely 
impossible  to  distinguish  the  states  in  the  world  of  bodies  at  differ- 
ent moments.  In  truth,  it  would  only  be  an  extrinsic  denomina- 
tion by  which  one  part  of  matter  would  be  distinguished  from 
another,  that  is,  by  the  future,  namely,  that  it  would  be  later 
in  another  and  still  another  place ; but  for  the  present  state,  there 
is  no  difference;  and  not  even  from  the  future  could  a well 
founded  difference  be  drawn,  because  we  could  even  later  never 
arrive  at  any  true  present  difference,  since  by  no  mark  can  one 
place  be  distinguished  from  another  place,  nor  (on  the  hypothesis 
of  the  perfect  uniformity  in  matter  itself)  matter  from  other 
matter  of  the  same  place.  In  vain  also  would  we  after  motion 
have  resort  to  figure.  In  a mass  perfectly  similar,  indistinguish- 
able and  full,  there  arises  no  figure,  nor  limit  and  distinction  of 
various  parts,  except  from  the  motion  itself.  If  then  motion  does 
not  contain  any  mark  of  distinction  it  will  impart  none  to  figure  ; 
and  as  everything  which  is  substituted  for  that  which  was,  is 
perfectly  equivalent,  no  one,  even  were  he  omniscient,  could  grasp 
the  least  indication  of  change,  and  consequently  everything  will  be 
just  as  if  no  change  and  no  distinction  occurred  in  bodies:  and 
we  could  never  in  this  way  account  for  the  diverse  appearances 
which  we  perceive.  And  it  would  be  as  if  we  should  imagine  two 
perfect  concentric  spheres,  perfectly  similar  in  themselves  aud 


ON"  NATURE  IN  ITSELF. 


131 


in  all  their  parts,  one  of  which  should  he  enclosed  in  the  other 
so  that  not  the  least  aperture  should  he  left : then,  if  we  suppose 
that  the  inner  sphere  is  either  in  motion  or  at  rest,  not  even  an 
angel,  to  say  nothing  more,  will  be  able  to  perceive  any  difference 
between  the  states  at  different  times,  and  will  have  no  sign  by 
which  to  distinguish  whether  the  inner  sphere  is  at  rest  or  in 
motion  and  according  to  what  law  the  motion  is.  Moreover,  not 
even  the  boundary  of  the  spheres  can  be  defined,  because  of  the 
want  both  of  a/pevture  and  of  difference ; just  as  in  this  case  motion 
cannot  be  noticed  because  of  the  lack  of  difference.  Whence 
it  must  he  considered  as  certain  (although  those  who  have  not  suffi- 
ciently penetrated  into  these  things  have  little  noticed  it)  that  such 
things  are  foreign  to  the  nature  and  order  of  things,  and  that  (what 
is  among  the  number  of  my  new  and  greater  axioms)  there  is 
nowhere  any  perfect  similarity ; whence  it  follows  also  that  we 
find  in  nature  neither  corpuscles  of  an  extreme  hardness,  nor  a 
fluid  of  an  extreme  tenuity,  nor  subtile  matter  universally  diffused, 
nor  ultimate  elements,  called  by  some  by  the  name  of  primary  or 
secondary.  It  is,  I believe,  because  he  had  understood  something 
of  this,  that  Aristotle,  more  profound  in  my  opinion  than  many 
think,  judged  that  in  addition  to  local  change  there  was  need  of 
alteration,  and  that  matter  would  remain  invariable.  Moreover, 
this  dissimilarity  or  diversity  of  qualities,  and  hence  this  aXXotWt? 
or  alteration,  which  Aristotle  did  not  sufficiently  explain,  comes 
from  the  diverse  degrees  and  directions  of  efforts,  and  so  from  the 
modifications  of  indwelling  monads.  We  can  understand  by  this 
that  there  must  necessarily  be  posited  in  bodies  something 
besides  a uniform  mass.  Certainly,  those  who  hold  to  atoms  and 
a vacuum  diversify  matter  at  least  in  some  degree  by  making  it 
here  divisible,  there  indivisible,  full  in  one  place,  porous  in 
another.  But  for  a long  time  now  I have  understood  (by  laying 
aside  the  prejudices  of  youth)  that  atoms  together  with  vacuum 
must  he  rejected.  The  celebrated  author  adds  that  the  existence  of 
matter  through  diverse  moments  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  divine 
will ; why  not  then,  he  says,  attribute  to  the  same  its  existence  here 
and  now  ? I reply,  that  this,  like  all  other  things  in  so  far  as  they 
involve  some  perfection,  must  undoubtedly  be  attributed  to  God ; 


132 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


but  just  as  this  universal  first  cause  which  preserves  all  things 
does  not  destroy,  hut  rather  produces,  the  natural  permanence, 
or  once  granted  perseverance  in  existence,  of  the  thing  which 
begins  to  exist ; so  it  will  not  destroy  but  rather  strengthen  the 
natural  efficacy,  or  perseverance  in  action  once  communicated,  of 
the  thing  set  in  motion. 

If.  Many  other  things  are  met  with  in  this  apologetic  disser- 
tation which  present  difficulties,  as  what  is  said  in  chapter  IV,  § 11, 
concerning  motion  transmitted  from  one  ball  to  another  through 
several  intermediaries,  that  the  last  ball  is  moved  by  the  same  force 
by  which  the  first  is  moved,  whereas,  it  seems  to  me,  it  is  moved  by 
an  equivalent  but  not  the  same  force ; for  (what  may  appear  sur- 
prising), each  ball  repelled  by  the  next  impinging  it  is  set  in 
motion  by  its  own  force,  viz.,  its  elasticity.  (I  do  not  here  discuss 
at  all  the  cause  of  this  elasticity,  nor  do  I deny  that  it  ought  to  be 
explained  mechanically  by  the  movement  of  an  indwelling  and 
unstable  fluid.)  So  also  it  will  rightly,  seem  surprising  when  he 
says,  § 12,  that  a thing  which  cannot  set  itself  in  motion  cannot 
of  itself  continue  the  motion.  For  it  is  evident  rather  that,  as  there 
is  need  of  force  to  communicate  motion,  so,  when  the  impulse  is 
once  given,  so  far  from  there  being  need  of  a new  force  to  continue 
it  there  is  rather  need  of  a new  force  to  stop  it.  For  the  question 
here  is  not  of  that  preservation  of  motion  by  means  of  a universal 
cause  necessary  to  things,  which,  as  we  have  remarked,  could  not 
destroy  the  efficiency  of  things  without  taking  away  their  existence. 

15.  By  this  it  will  be  again  perceived*  that  the  doctrine  of 
occasional  causes  defended  by  some  (unless  it  be  explained  in  such 
a way  as  to  admit  of  modifications  which  the  illustrious  Sturm  has 
in  part  admitted  and  in  part  seems  disposed  to  admit),  is  subject 
to  dangerous  consequences  which  are  certainly  not  agreeable  to  its 
very  learned  defenders.  For  so  far  is  it  from  augmenting  the 
glory  of  God  by  doing  away  with  the  idola  of  nature,  that  on  the 
contrary,  by  resolving  all  created  things  into  simple  modifications 
of  a single  divine  substance,  it  seems,  with . Spinoza,  to  make  of 
God  the  very  nature  of  things ; since  that  which  does  not  act,  that 
which  lacks  active  force,  that  which  is  deprived  of  distinctive 
mark,  and  finally,  of  all  reason  and  ground  of  permanence,  can  in 


OiST  NATURE  1ST  ITSELF. 


133 


no  wise  be  a substance.  I am  thoroughly  persuaded  that  the  illus- 
trious Sturm,  a man  remarkable  for  his  piety  and  learning,  is  very 
far  removed  from  these  monstrosities.  Thus  there  is  no  doubt 
but  that  he  will  either  have  to  show  clearly  that  there  remains  in 
things  some  substance,  or  even  some  variation,  without  prejudice 
to  his  doctrine,  or  he  will  have  to  accept  the  truth. 

16.  I have  many  reasons  for  suspecting  that  I have  not  suffi- 
ciently grasped  his  meaning,  nor  he  mine.  He  has  somewhere 
admitted  to  me  that  a certain  'portion  of  divine  power  (that  is,  I 
think,  an  expression,  imitation,  proximate  effect ; for  the  cliviue 
force  itself  can  certainly  not  be  divided  into  parts)  can  and  even  in 
a way  must  be  regarded  as  possessed  by  and  attributed  to  things. 
What  he  has  transmitted  to  me  and  what  he  has  repeated  in  his 
Select  Physics,  may  be  seen  in  the  passage  which  I quoted  at  the 
beginning  of  this  essay.  If  this  be  interpreted  (as  the  terms  seem 
to  imply)  in  the  sense  in  which  we  speak  of  the  soul  as  a portion  of 
the  divine  breath,  then  there  is  no  longer  any  controversy  between 
us.  But  what  prevents  me  from  affirming  that  such  is  his  meaning, 
is  that  nowhere  else  do  I see  him  propounding  anything  like  it,  nor 
advancing  any  deductions  from  it.  I notice  on  the  contrary,  that 
his  general  views  are  little  in  harmony  with  this  opinion,  and  that 
his  apologetic  dissertation  goes  into  everything  else.  When  indeed 
my  views  concerning  indwelling  force  were  first  published  in  the 
month  of  March,  1694,  in  the  Acta  Eruditorum  of  Leipzig  (views 
which  my  Essay  on  Dynamics  published  in  the  same  in  April, 
1695,  farther  developed),  he  addressed  to  me  by  letter  certain 
objections;  but  after  having  received  my  reply,  he  decided  in  a 
very  friendly  way  that  the  only  difference  between  us  was  in  the 
maimer  of  expressing  ourselves.  When  I,  remarking  this,  had 
brought  some  other  things  to  his  attention,  he  turning  about 
declared  there  were  many  differences  between  us,  which  I recog- 
nized : and  finally,  these  having  been  removed,  he  wrote  me  anew 
that  there  was  no  difference  between  us  except  in  terms,  a thing 
very  agreeable  to  me.  I have,  therefore,  wished,  on  the  occasion 
of  the  recent  apologetic  dissertation,  to  so  explain  the  matter  that 
finally  the  opinion  of  each  one  of  us  and  the  truth  of  the  same  may 
the  more  easily  be  established.  For  the  illustrious  author  possesses, 


134 


PHILOSOPHICAL  AVOKKiB  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


moreover,  such,  rare  penetration  and  clearness  of  exposition,  that  I 
hope  that  no  little  light  will  he  thrown  by  his  zeal  on  this  great  sub- 
ject. And  consequently  this  work  of  mine  will  not  he  useless 
because  it  furnishes  him  the  opportunity,  with  his  wonted  talent 
and  force  of  judgment,  to  examine  and  to  explain  some  things  of 
importance  in  the  present  subject,  which  have  up  to  this  time  been 
omitted  by  authors  and  by  me.  But  these  things  will  be  supple- 
mented, if  I am  not  mistaken,  by  new,  more  profound,  and  more 
comprehensive  principles,  whence  perhaps  may  come,  some  day, 
a reconstructed  and  amended  system  of  philosophy  midway 
between  the  formal  and  the  material  (and  properly  uniting  and 
preserving  both). 


XXI. 


\ 

Ethical  Definitions.  1697-1698. 

[From  the  French.] 

As  to -charity  or  disinterested  love,  on  which  I see  embarrassing 
disputes  have  arisen,  I think  that  one  could  not  extricate  one's  self 
better  than  by  giving  a true  definition  of  love.  I believe  that 
in  the  preface  to  the  work  [ Codex  Diplom&ticus  Juris  Gentium ] 
which  is  known  to  you,  sir,  I have  formerly  so  done  in  noting  the 
source  of  justice.  For  Justice  is  fundamentally  nothing  else  than 
charity  conformed  to  wisdom.  Charity  is  universal  benevolence. 
Benevolence  is  a disposition  or  inclination  to  love  and  it  has  the 
same  relation  to  love  that  habit  has  to  act.  And  Love  is  this  act  or 
active  state  of  the  soul  which  makes  us  find  our  pleasure  in  the 
happiness  or  satisfaction  of  others.  This  definition,  as  I have  since 
noted,  is  capable  of  solving  the  enigma  of  disinterested  love,  and  of 
distinguishing  it  from  the  bonds  of  interest  or  debauchery.  I 
remember  that  in  a conversation,  which  I had  several  years  ago  with 

the  Count and  other  friends,  in  which  human  love  alone  was 

spoken  of,  this  difficulty  was  considered,  and  my  solution  was 
found  satisfactory.  When  one  loves  a person  sincerely  one  does 
not  seek  one's  own  advantage  or  a pleasure  severed  from  that  of 
the  beloved  person,  but  one  seeks  one’s  pleasure  in  the  contentment 
and  in  the  felicity  of  this  person.  And  if  tins  felicity  did  not 
please  in  itself,  but  merely  because  of  an  advantage  resulting  there- 
from to  us,  this  would  no  longer  be  pure  and  sincere  love.  It  must 
be  then  that  pleasure  is  immediately  found  in  this  felicity,  and 
that  grief  is  found  in  the  unhappiness  of  the  beloved  person.  For 
whatever  produces  pleasure  immediately  through  itself  is  also 
desired  for  itself,  as  constituting  (at  least  in  part)  the  end  of  our 
wishes,  and  as  something  which  enters  into  our  own  felicity  and 
gives  us  satisfaction. 

This  serves  to  reconcile  two  truths  which  appear  incompatible ; 
for  we  do  all  for  our  own  good,  and  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  have 
other  feelings  whatever  we  may  say.  Xevertheless  we  do  not  yet 


136 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


love  altogether  purely,' when  we  seek  the  good  of  the  beloved  object 
not  for  itself  and  because  it  itself  pleases  us,  but  because  of  an 
advantage  which  we  foresee  from  it.  But  it  is  apparent  from  the 
notion  of  love  which  we  have  just  given  that  we  seek  at  the  same 
time  our  good  for  ourselves  and  the  good  of  the  beloved  object  for  - 
it  itself,  when  the  good  of  this  object  is  immediately,  finally 
( ultimato ) and  through  itself  our  end,  our  pleasure  and  our  good; 
as  happens  in  regard  to  all  the  things  wished  for  because  they  are 
pleasing  in  themselves,  and  are  consequently  good  of  themselves, 
even  if  one  should  have  no  regard  to  consequences;  these  are  ends 
and  not  means. 

blow  divine  love  is  infinitely  above  the  loves  of  creatures,  for 
other  objects  worthy  of  being  loved  constitute  in  fact  part  of  our 
contentment  or  our  happiness,  in  so  far  as  their  perfection  touches 
us,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  felicity  of  God  does  not  compose  a 
part  of  our  happiness,  but  the  whole.  He  is  its  source  and  not  its 
accessory,  and  since  the  pleasures  of  lovable  earthly  objects  can 
injure  by  their  consequences,  only  the  pleasure  taken  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  the  divine  perfections  is  surely  and  absolutely  good,  with- 
out danger  or  excess  being  possible. 

These  considerations  show  in  what  the  true  disinterestedness  of 
pure  love  consists,  which  cannot  be  severed  from  our  own  content- 
ment and  felicity,  as  M.  de  la  Trappe  has  well  remarked,  because 
our  true  felicity  embraces  essentially  the  knowledge  of  the  felicity 
of  God  and  of  the  divine  perfections,  that  is  to  say,  the  love  of 
God.  And  consequently  it  is  impossible  to  prefer  one  to  the  other 
by  a thought  founded  in  distinct  notions.  And  to  wish  to  sever 
one’s  self  from  one’s  self  and  from  one’s  own  good  is  to  play  with 
words ; or  if  you  wish  to  go  to  the  effects,  it  is  to  fall  into  an 
extravagant  quietism,  it  is  to  desire  a stupid,  or  rather  affected  and 
simulated  inaction  in  which  under  pretext  of  resignation  and  of  the 
annihilation  of  the  soul  swallowed  up  in  God,  one  may  go  to  liber- 
tinism in  practice,  or  at  least  to  a hidden  speculative  atheism,  such 
as  that  of  Averroes  and  of  others  more  ancient,  who  taught  that  our 
soul  finally  lost  itself  in  the  universal  spirit,  and  that  this  is  perfect 
union  with  God. — Extract  from,  a letter  to  Nicaise,  1697. 


ETHICAL  DEFINITIONS. 


137 


The  error  concerning  pure  love  appears  to  be  a misunderstand- 
ing, which  as  I have  already  said  to  you,  sir,  comes  perhaps  from 
not  paying  sufficient  attention  to  forming  definitions  of  terms. 

To  love  truly  and  disinterestedly  is  nothing  else  than  to  be  led 
to  find  pleasure  in  the  perfections  or  in  the  felicity  of  the  object, 
and  consequently  to  experience  grief  in  what  may  be  contrary  to 
these  perfections.  This  love  has  properly  for  its  object  subjects 
susceptible  of  felicity;  but  some  resemblance  of  this  is  found  as 
regards  objects  which  have  perfections  without  being  aware  of  it, 
as  for  example,  a beautiful  picture.  He  who  finds  pleasure  in  con- 
templating it  and  would  find  pain  in  seeing  it  ruined  even  if  it 
should  belong  to  another,  would  love  it,  so  to  speak,  with  a disin- 
terested love.  This  could  not  be  said  of  another  who  should 
merely  have  in  view  gain  in  selling  it  or  the  winning  of  applause 
by  showing  it,  without  further  caring  whether  or  not  it  were 
ruined  when  it  should  no  longer  belong  to  him.  This  shows  that 
pleasure  and  action  cannot  be  taken  away  from  love  without 
destroying  it,  and  that  AL  des  Preaux  in  the  beautiful  verses  which 
you  sent  me,  was  right  both  in  recommending  the  importance  of 
the  divine  love  and  in  opposing  a love  which  is  chimerical  and 
without  effect.  I have  explained  my  definition  in  the  preface  of 
my  Codex  Diplomaticus  Juris  Gentium  (published  before  these 
new  disputes  arose),  because  I had  need  of  it  in  order  to  give  the 
definition  of  Justice,  which  in  my  opinion  is  nothing  but  charity 
regulated  according  to  wisdom.  ISTow  Chabity  being  a universal 
benevolence,  and  Benevolence  being  (a  habit  of  loving,  it  was 
necessary  to  define  what  it  is  to  love.  And  since  to  love  is  to  have 
a feeling  which  makes  us  find  pleasure  in  what  conduces  to  the 
happiness  of  the  beloved  object,  and  since  wisdom  (which  makes 
the  rule  of  justice)  is  nothing  but  the  science  of  happiness,  I 
showed  by  this  analysis  that  happiness  is  the  basis  of  justice,  and 
that  those  who  would  give  the  true  elements  of  jurisprudence, 
which  I do  not  find  laid  down  as  they  should  be,  ought  to  begin  by 
establishing  the  science  of  happiness,  which  does  not  yet  appear 
well  determined,  although  books  on  Ethics  are  full  of  discourses  on 
blessedness  or  the  sovereign  good. 

As  pleasube,  which  is  nothing  but  the  feeling  of  rare  perfec- 
tion, is  one  of  the  principal  points  of  happiness,  which  in  turn 


13S 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


consists  in  a lasting  condition  of  possession  of  wliat  is  necessary  in 
order  to  taste  pleasure,  it  were  to  be  desired  that  the  science  of 
pleasures  which  the  late  M.  Lautin  meditated  had  been  com- 
pleted.— Extract  from  a letter  to  Nicaise , 1698. 

[The  following  Ethical  Definitions,  translated  from  the  Latin,  are  undated.] 

Justice  is  the  charity  of  the  wise. 

Charity  is  general  benevolence. 

Benevolence  is  the  habit  of  love. 

To  love  anyone  is  to  delight  in  his  happiness. 

Wisdom  is  the  science  of  happiness. 

Happiness  is  durable  joy. 

Joy  is  a state  of  pleasure. 

Pleasure  or  delight  is  a sense  of  perfection,  that  is,  a sense  of 
something  which  helps  or  which  sustains  some  power. 

Tie  is  perfected  whose  power  is  augmented  or  helped. 

Demonstrate  this  Hypothesis  elsewhere: 

The  world  is  governed  by  the  wisest  and  most  powerful  of  mon- 
archs,  whom  we  call  God. 

Propositions. 

The  end  or  aim  of  God  is  his  own  joy  or  love  of  himself. 

God  created  creatures,  and  especially  those  endowed  with  mind, 
for  his  own  glory  or  from  love  of  himself. 

God  created  all  things  in  accordance  with  the  greatest  harmony 
or  beauty  possible. 

God  loves  all. 

God  bestows  on  all  as  much  as  is  possible. 

Neither  hatred,  nor  wrath,  nor  sadness,  nor  envy,  belong  to  God. 

God  loves  to  be  loved  or  those  loving  him. 

God  loves  souls  in  proportion  to  the  perfection  which  he  has 
given  to  each  of  them. 

The  perfection  of  the  universe,  or  harmony  of  things,  does  not 
allow  all  minds  to  be  equally  perfect. 

The  question  why  God  has  given  to  one  mind  more  perfection 
than  to  another,  is  among  senseless  questions,  as  if  you  should  ask 
whether  the  foot  is  too  large  or  the  shoe  pinching  the  foot  is  too 
small.  And  this  is  a mystery,  ignorance  of  which  has  obscured  the 
whole  doctrine  of  the  predestination  and  justice  of  God. 


ETHICAL  DEFIXITIOXS. 


139 


He  who  does  not  obey  God  is  not  the  friend  of  God. 

He  who  obeys  God  from  fear  is  not  yet  the  friend  of  God. 

He  who  loves  God  above  all  things  is  at  length  the  friend  of 
God. 

He  who  does  not  seek  the  common  good  does  not  obey  God. 

He  who  does  not  seek  the  glory  of  God  does  not  obey  God. 

He  who  at  the  same  time  seeks  the  glory  of  God  and  the 
common  good  obeys  God. 

He  who  does  not  in  his  acts  recognize  God  does  not  sufficiently 
love  God. 

He  who  is  displeased  by  some  things  in  the  acts  of  God  does  not 
think  God  perfect. 

He  who  thinks  God  does  some  things  from  absolute  good 
pleasure,  having  no  reason,  or  from  irrational  or  indifferent 
liberty,  does  not  think  God  perfect. 

He  who  thinks  God  acts  in  the  best  possible  way  acknowledges 
that  God  is  perfect. 

Whoever  does  not  delight  in  the  contemplation  of  the  divine  per- 
fection does  not  love  God. 

All  creatures  serve  the  felicity  or  glory  of  God  in  the  degree  of 
their  perfection. 

Whoever  against  his  will  serves  the  felicity  of  God  does  not  love 
God. 

Whoever  places  his  own  felicity  in  relation  with  the  divine 
felicity,  loves  himself  and  loves  finally  God. 

He  who  loves  God  endeavors  to  learn  his  will. 

He  who  loves  God  obeys  God’s  will. 

He  who  loves  God  loves  all. 

Every  wise  man  endeavors  to  do  good  to  all. 

Every  wise  man  does  good  to  many. 

Every  wise  man  is  a friend  of  God. 

The  wiser  one  is  the  happier  he  is. 

Every  wise  man  is  just. 

Every  just  man  is  happy. 


XXII. 


On  the  Cartesian  Demonstration  of  the  Existence  of  God. 

1700-1. 

[From  the  French.] 

In  truth  metaphysics  is  natural  theology,  and  the  same  God  who 
is  the  source  of  all  good  is  also  the  principle  of  all  knowledge. 
This  is  because  the  idea  of  God  embraces  that  of  absolute  being, 
that  is  to  say,  what  is  simple  in  our  thoughts,  from  which  all  that 
we  think  takes  its  origin.  Descartes  had  not  considered  the  matter 
from  this  side;  he  gives  two  ways  of  proving  the  existence  of 
God : the  first  is,  that  there  is  in  us  an  idea  of  God,  since  we 
undoubtedly  think  of  God  and  since  we  cannot  think  of  anything 
without  having  the  idea  of  it.  How  if  we  have  an  idea  of  God 
and  if  it  is  a true  one,  that  is,  if  it  is  of  an  infinite  being  and  if  it 
represents  it  faithfully,  it  cannot  be  caused  by  anything  less,  and 
consequently  God  himself  must  be  its  cause.  He  must  therefore 
exist.  The  other  argument  is  still  shorter.  It  is  that  God  is  a 
being  which  possesses  all  perfections  and  consequently  possesses 
existence  which  is  in  the  number  of  perfections ; hence  he  exists. 
It  must  he  confessed  that  these  arguments  are  a little  suspicious 
because  they  advance  too  quickly  and  do  violence  to  us  without 
enlightening  us ; whereas  true  demonstrations  are  wont  to  fill  the 
mind  with  some  solid  nourishment.  However  it  is  difficult  to  find 
the  knot  of  the  matter,  and  I see  that  a number  of  able  men  who 
have  made  objection  to  Descartes  have  passed  this  by. 

Some  have  believed  that  there  is  no  idea  of  God  because  he  is 
not  subject  to  the  imagination,  supposing  that  idea  and  image  are 
the  same  thing.  I am  not  of  their  opinion,  and  I well  know  that 
there  is  an  idea  of  thought  and  of  existence  and  of  similar  things 
of  which  there  is  no  image.  For  we  think  of  something  and  when 
we  remark  what  made  us  recognize  it,  this,  so  far  as  it  is  in  our 
soul,  is  the  idea  of  the  thing.  This  is  why  there  is  also  an  idea  of 
what  is  not  material  or  imaginable. 

Others  admit  that  there  is  an  idea  of  God,  and  that  this  idea 
embraces  all  perfections,  but  they  cannot  understand  how  existence 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. 


Ill 


follows  from  it : be  it  because  tbey  do  not  admit  that  existence  is 
of  the  number  of  perfections,  or  because  they  do  not  see  how  a 
simple  idea  or  thought  can  imply  existence  outside  of  us.  For 
myself  I well  believe  that  he  who  has  acknowledged  this  idea  of 
God  and  who  fully  sees  that  existence  is  a perfection,  ought  to 
avow  that  this  perfection  belongs  to  God.  In  fact  I do  not  doubt 
the  idea  of  God  any  more  than  his  existence,  on  the  contrary,  I 
claim  that  I have  a demonstration  of  it ; hut  I would  not  that  we 
flatter  ourselves  and  pursuade  ourselves  that  we  could  succeed  in 
so  great  a matter  at  so  little  cost.  Paralogisms  are  dangerous  in 
this  matter ; when  they  are  not  successful  they  rebound  upon 
ourselves  and  strengthen  the  opposite  party.  I say  then  that  we 
must  prove  with  all  imaginable  accuracy  that  there  is  an  idea  of 
an  all-perfect  being,  that  is  to  say  of  God.  It  is  true  that  the 
objections  of  those  who  think  that  they  can  prove  the  contrary 
because  there  is  no  image  of  God  are  as  I have  just  shown  worth- 
less ; but  it  must  also  be  confessed  that  the  proof  which  Descartes 
offers  for  establishing  the  idea  of  God  is  imperfect.  How,  he  will 
say,  can  we  speak  of  God  without  thinking  of  him.  And  could  we 
think  of  God  without  having  the  idea  of  him  ? Yes,  undoubtedly, 
we  sometimes  think  of  impossible  things,  and  this  has  even  been 
demonstrated ; for  example,  Descartes  held  that  the  quadrature 
of  the  circle  is  impossible,  and  yet  we  do  not  cease  to  think  of  it  and 
to  draw  consequences  as  to  what  would  happen  if  it  were  possible. 
Motion  of  ultimate  swiftness  is  impossible  in  any  body  whatever 
for  if  it  were  supposed  in  a circle,  for  example,  another  concentric 
circle,  surrounding  the  first  and  attached  firmly  to  it,  would  be 
moved  with  a velocity  still  greater  than  the  first,  which  conse- 
quently is  not  of  the  ultimate  degree,  contrary  to  what  we  have 
supposed.  All  this  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  we  think  of 
this  ultimate  swiftness  which  has  no  idea  since  it  is  impossible.  So 
the  greatest  of  all  circles  is  an  impossible  thing,  and  a number 
made  up  of  all  possible  units  is  no  less  so:  there  is  proof  of  it. 
And  nevertheless  we  think  of  all  this.  This  is  why  there  is  cer- 
tainly room  to  doubt  whether  the  idea  of  the  greatest  of  all  stars 
is  to  be  trusted  and  whether  it  does  not  involve  some  contradiction ; 
for  I well  understand,  for  example,  the  nature  of  motion  and  of 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


142 

swiftness,  and  what  greatest  is.  But  for  all  that  I do  not  under- 
stand whether  all  this  is  compatible  and  whether  there  is  a way 
of  joining  all  this  and  making  therefrom  an  idea  of  the  greatest 
swiftness  of  which  motion  is  capable.  So  although  I know  what 
star  is,  and  what  largest  and  most  perfect  are,  nevertheless,  I do 
not  yet  know  whether  there  is  not  a hidden  contradiction  in  join- 
ing all  these  together,  as  there  is  in  fact  in  the  other  examples 
mentioned.  That  is  to  say,  in  a word,  I do  not  know  for  all  this 
whether  such  a star  is  possible;  for  if  it  were  not  there  would 
be  no  idea  of  it.  However,  I confess,  that  God  in  this  respect  has 
a great  advantage  over  all  other  things.  F or  it  is  sufficient  to  prove 
that  he  is  possible,  to  prove  that  he  exists,  a thing  not  encountered 
anywhere  else  that  I know  of.  Furthermore  I infer  from  this 
that  there  is  a presumption  that  God  exists,  for  there  is  always  a 
presumption  on  the  side  of  possibility;  that  is  to  say,  everything 
is  held  to  be  possible  until  its  impossibility  is  proved.  There  is 
therefore  also  a presumption  that  God  is  possible,  that  is,  that  he 
exists,  since  in  him  existence  is  a consequence  of  the  possibility. 
This  may  suffice  for  practical  life  but  it  is  not  sufficient  for  a 
demonstration.  I have  disputed  much  on  this  point  with  several 
Cartesians,  but,  finally,  I have  gotten  some  of  the  more  able  to 
frankly  confess,  after  having  understood  the  force  of  my  argu- 
ments, that  this  possibility  was  still  to  be  demonstrated.  There 
are  even  some  who  after  being  challenged  by  me  have  undertaken 
to  demonstrate  this  but  they  have  not  yet  accomplished  it. — 
Extract  from  an  undated  letter  to  ( probably ) the  Grand  Duchess 
Sophia. 


I have  not  yet  seen  the  work  published  at  Basle  in  the  year  1699, 
entitled  Judicium  de  argumento  Cartesii  pro  existentia  Dei  petito 
ab  ejus  idea;  but  having  formerly  casually  examined  the  same 
argument  in  an  essay  On  Knowledge,  Truth  and  Ideas,  inserted  in 
the  Acta  of  Lepzig,  in  the  year  1684,  I am  curious  to  read  what 
an  able  man  says  in  the  Ilistoire  des  Oav rages  cles  Savants,  May, 
1700,  in  favor  of  the  arguments  of  Descartes  and  against  the  Latin 
work  published,  at  Basle.  And  I will  say  to  you,  sir,  that  I hold  a 
position  midway  between  the  work  and  the  reply.  The  author  of 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. 


143 

tlie  work  believes  tbat  the  argument  is  a sophism,  the  author  of  the 
reply  considers  it  a demonstration,  and  I myself  believe  that  it  is 
an  imperfect  argument  which  tacitly  takes  for  granted  a proposi- 
tion the  proof  of  which,  if  added,  would  complete  the  demonstra- 
tion. Thus  the  argument  is  not  to  be  despised : it  is  at  least  a good 
beginning.  Est  aliquid  prodire  tenus,  si  non  datur  ultra. 

Geometricians,  who  are  the  true  masters  of  the  art  of  reasoning, 
have  seen  that  in  order  that  demonstrations  drawn  from  definitions 
may  be  good,  it  is  necessary  to  prove,  or-  at  last  postulate,  that  the 
notion  embraced  in  the  definition  is  possible.  This  is  why  Euclid 
placed  among  his  postulata , that  the  circle  is  something  possible,  in 
asking  that  a circle,  the  center  and  radius  of  which  are  given,  be 
described.  The  same  precaution  holds  good  in  every  sort  of  rea- 
soning, and  particularly  in  the  argument  of  Anselm,  archbishop  of 
Canterbury  (in  Liber  contra  insipientem) , quoted  and  examined 
by  St.  Thomas  and  other  scholastics,  and  renewed  by  Descartes, 
which  proves  that  God,  being  the  greatest  or  most  perfect  being, 
embraces  that  perfection  called  existence,  and  that  consequently  he 
exists.  To  this  it  may  be  said  that  the  reasoning  is  sound,  suppos- 
ing that  the  being  sovereignly  perfect  or  which  embraces  all  per- 
fections, is  possible;  and  that  it  is  the  privilege  of  the  divine 
nature  (ens  a se ) that  its  essence  comprises  existence,  that  is,  that, 
it  exists  provided  it  is  possible.  And  even  omitting  all  mention 
of  perfection  it  may  be  said  that  if  necessary  being  is  possible  it 
exists.  This  is  undoubtedly  the  most  beautiful  and  the  most 
important  of  modal  propositions,  because  it  furnishes  a passage 
from  possibility  to  actuality,  and  it  is  solely  here  that  a posse  ad 
esse  valet  consequentia.  Also  herein  is  found  the  principle  of 
existences. 

The  author  of  the  work  opposes  an  example  to  Descartes,  in 
reasoning  as  he  does  and  reaching  a false  conclusion,  for  he  says 
that  existence  is  contained  in  the  idea  of  a very  perfect  body  (or 
one  which  comprises  all  perfection),  hence  such  a body  exists.  To 
this,  in  my  opinion,  reply  must  be  made  that  the  idea  of  a very 
perfect  body  in  tbis  sense  is  impossible,  for  a body  beina  limited  by 
its  essence  cannot  include  all  perfections.  The  work  and  the  reply 
give  themselves  up  a little  too  much  to  the  terms  and  distinctions  of 
essence  and  existence,  real  (or  formal)  and  objective,  whither  I do 


144  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBXITZ. 

not  think  it  necessary  to  follow  them.  It  is  sufficient  to  remark 
that  the  author  of  the  work,  having  proposed  to  himself  the  reason- 
ing of  those  who  say  that  God  must  necessarily  exist  because  it  is 
not  impossible  that  God  be,  has  touched  the  essential  point  and  has 
replied  hy  no  means  badly  that  it  does  not  follow  that  a thing  is 
possible  because  we  do  not  see  its  impossibility,  our  knowledge 
being  limited.  But  this  might  have  led  him  to  think  that  the 
argument  is  not  a sophism,  and  that  those  who  have  proposed  it 
have  erred  only  in  concealing  what  they  presuppose,  instead  of 
following  the  example  of  the  geometricians,  who  have  penetration 
and  sincerity  enough  to  see  and  expressly  indicate  the  axioms  and 
postulates  of  which  they  have  need  and  which  they  presuppose. 

The  author  of  the  reply,  as  far  as  I can  understand  him,  does 
not  enter  sufficiently  into  this ; he  has  good  reason,  p.  211,  for 
rejecting  this  limitation:  that  wholly  perfect  being  includes  exist- 
ence if  it  be  supposed  that  there  is  a wholly  perfect  being , that  is  to 
say  an  actual  being.  But  if  we  understand  it  thus : if  it  be  sup- 
posed that  there  is  a wholly  perfect  being  possible  or  among 
essences,  the  limitation  is  good.  He  is  right  in  saying  that  it  is  not 
permissible  to  doubt  things  which  are  known  to  us,  under  the  pre- 
text that  our  knowledge  is  limited.  But  this  does  not  appear  to 
be  the  meaning  of  the  author  of  the  work.  I have  already 
remarked  in  my  essay,  before  mentioned,  that  the  true  mark  of 
perfectly  distinct  knowledge  is  that  the  possibility  of  the  notion 
in  question  can  be  proved  a priori.  Thus  he  is  fundamentally 
wrong  here  in  attributing  to  himself  a clear  and  distinct  notion 
when  he  cannot  verify  it  hy  the  mark  which  is  essential  to  it.  The 
example  of  the  proposition  that  two  and  tivo  are  four  is  not 
applicable  here  because  it  can  be  demonstrated  by  definitions  the 

possibility  of  which  is  recognized. — -Extract  from  a letter  to , 

1700. 


I have  already  elsewhere  given  mv  opinion  concerning  St. 
Anselm’s  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God,  renewed  hy 
Descartes ; the  substance  of  which  is  that  that  which  embraces  in 
its  idea  all  perfections,  or  the  greatest  of  all  possible  beings,  com- 
prehends also  in  its  essence  existence,  since  existence  is  one  of  the 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  AEGUMEKT. 


145 


number  of  perfections,  and  otherwise  something  could  be  added  to 
that  which  is  perfect.  I hold  the  position  midway  between  those 
who  take  this  reasoning  for  a sophism  and  the  opinion  of  Reverend 
Father  Lami,  explained  here,  who  considers  it  a complete  demon- 
stration. I admit  then  that  it  is  a demonstration,  but  imperfect, 
which  demands  or  supposes  a truth  which  deserves  to  be  further 
demonstrated.  For  it  is  tacitly  supposed  that  God,  or  the  Perfect 
Being,  is  possible.  If  this  point  were  again  demonstrated,  as  it 
should  be,  it  could  be  said  that  the  existence  of  God  was  demon- 
strated geometrically  a 'priori.  And  this  shows  what  I have 
already  said,  that  we  cannot  reason  perfectly  on  ideas  except  by 
knowing  their  possibility ; to  which  geometricians  haVe  paid  atten- 
tion, but  the  Cartesians  not  sufficiently.  However  it  can  be  said 
that  this  demonstration  is  none  the  less  of  importance,  and  so  to 
speak,  presumptive.  For  every  being  must  be  held  possible  until 
its  impossibility  is  proved.  I doubt  however  whether  Reverend 
Father  Lami  was  right  in  saying  that  it  was  adopted  by  the  School. 
For  the  author  of  the  marginal  note  remarks  here  very  justly  that 
St.  Thomas  had  rejected  it. 

However  this  may  be,  a demonstration  still  more  simple  might 
be  formed,  not  mentioning  the  perfections  at  all,  so  as  not  to  be 
stopped  by  those  who  should  venture  to  deny  that  all  perfections 
are  compatible,  and  consequently  that  the  idea  in  question  is  pos- 
sible. For  by  simply  saying  that  God  is  a being  of  itself  or 
primative,  ens  a se,  that  is,  that  which  exists  by  its  essence,  it  is 
easy  to  conclude  from  this  definition  that  such  a being,  if  it  is 
possible,  exists ; or  rather,  this  conclusion  is  a corollary  which  is 
derived  immediately  from  the  definition,  and  hardly  differs  from 
it.  For  the  essence  of  the  thing  being  only  that  which  makes  its 
possibility  in  particular,  it  is  very  clear  that  to  exist  by  its  essence, 
is  to  exist  by  its  possibility.  And  if  being  of  itself  were  defined  in 
terms  still  nearer,  by  saying  that  it  is  the  being  which  must  exist 
because  it  is  possible,  it  is  manifest  that  all  which  could  be  said 
against  the  existence  of  such  a being  would  be  to  deny  its 
possibility. 

On  this  subject  we  might  again  make  a modal  proposition,  which 
would  he  one  of  the  best  fruits  of  all  logic;  namely,  that  if 
10 


146 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBHITZ. 


necessary  being  is  possible,  it  exists.  For  necessary  being  and 
being  by  its  essence  are  only  one  and  tlie  same  thing.  Thus  the 
reasoning  taken  in  this  way  appears  to  have  solidity;  and  those 
Avho  will  have  it  that  from  mere  notions,  ideas,  definitions  or 
possible  essences,  actual  existence  can  never  be  inferred,  in  truth 
fall  into  what  I have  just  said,  namely,  they  deny  the  possibility  of 
being  of  itself.  But  it  is  well  to  notice  that  this  way  of  taking  it 
itself  serves  to  show  that  they  are  wrong,  and  fills  up  finally  the 
gap  in  the  demonstration.  For  if  being  of  itself  is  impossible, 
all  beings  by  others  are  so  also;  since  they  exist  ultimately  only 
through  being  of  itself ; thus  nothing  could  exist.  This  reasoning 
leads  us  to  another  important  modal  proposition,  equal  to  the  pre- 
ceding, and  which  joined  with  it,  completes  the  demonstration.  It 
might  be  expressed  thus:  If  necessary  being  is  not , there  is 
no  being  possible.  It  seems  that  this  demonstration  has  not  been 
carried  so  far,  up  to  this  time.  However  I have  also  labored  else- 
where to  prove  that  the  perfect  being  is  possible. 

I designed,  sir,  merely  to  write  you  in  few  words  some  trifling 
reflections  on  the  Memoirs  which  you  sent  me;  but  the  variety  of 
matters,  the  heat  of  meditation  and  the  pleasure  which  I have 
taken  in  the  generous  design  of  the  Prince  who  is  the  protector 
of  this  work,  have  carried  me  on.  I beg  pardon  for  having  been 
so  lengthy,  and  I am,  etc. — Extract  from  a letter  to  the  editor  of 
the  Journal  de  Trevoux.  1701. 


XXIII. 


Considerations  on  the  Doctrine  of  a Universal  Spirit. 

1702. 

Many  ingenious  persons  have  believed,  and  believe  now,  that 
there  is  but  one  spirit,  which  is  universal  and  which  animates  all 
the  universe  and  all  its  parts,  each  one  in  accordance  with  its 
structure  and  organs,  just  as  the  same  breath  of  wind  makes  the 
various  pipes  of  an  organ  give  forth  different  sounds.  And  that 
thus  when  an  animal  has  its  organs  in  good  order,  it  produces  there 
the  effect  of  an  individual  soul,  but  when  the  organs  are  spoiled, 
this  individual  soul  again  becomes  nothingness,  or  returns,  so  to 
speak,  into  the  ocean  of  the  universal  spirit. 

Aristotle  has  seemed  to  many  to  hold  a like  opinion,  which  Aver- 
roes,  a celebrated  Arabian  philosopher,  has  renewed.  He  believed 
that  there  was  in.  us  an  intellectus  agens  or  active  understanding, 
and  also  an  intellectus  patiens  or  passive  understanding : that  the 
former,  coming  from  without,  was  eternal  and  universal  for  all,  but 
that  the  passive  understanding  was  peculiar  to  each,  and  took  its 
departure  at  the  death  of  the  man.  In  the  last  two  or  three 
centuries,  this  has  been  the  doctrine  of  some  Peripatetics,  as  of 
Pomponatius,  Contarenus  and  others ; and  traces  of  it  are  to  be 
recognized  in  the  late  M.  Uaude,  as  his  letters  and  the  Naudoeana, 
which  have  been  lately  published,  show.  They  taught  this  in  secret 
to  their  most  intimate  and  best  qualified  disciples,  while  in  public 
they  had  the  cleverness  to  say  that  this  doctrine  was  in  reality  true 
according  to  philosophy,  by  which  they  understood  that  of  Aris- 
totle par  excellence,  hut  that  it  was  false  according  to  faith.  Hence 
have  finally  arisen  the  disputes  over  double  truth  which  the  last 
Later  an  Council  condemned. 

I have  been  told  that  Queen  Christina  had  a decided  leaning 
toward  this  opinion,  and  as  M.  Uaude,  who  was  her  librarian,  was 
imbued  with  it,  he  probably  communicated  to  her  what  he  knew  of 
the  secret  views  of  the  celebrated  philosophers  with  whom  he  had 
had  intercourse  in  Italy.  Spinoza,  who  admits  only  one  sub- 


148 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


stance,  is  not  far  removed  from  the  doctrine  of  a single,  universal 
spirit,  and  even  the  New  Cartesians,  who  claim  that  God  alone  acts, 
establish  it  as  it  were  without  being  aware  of  doing  so.  Apparently 
Molinos  and  some  other  New  Quietists,  among  others,  a certain 
Joannes  Angelas  Silesius,  who  wrote  before  Molinos  and  some  of 
whose  works  have  recently  been  reprinted,  and  even  Weigel  ius 
before  them  both,  embraced  this  opinion  of  a sabbath  or  rest  of 
souls  in  God.  This  is  why  the}'  believed  that,  the  cessation  of  par- 
ticular functions  was  the  highest  state  of  perfection. 

It  is  true  that  the  Peripatetic  philosophers  did  not  make  this 
spirit  quite  universal,  for  besides  the  intelligences,  which  according 
to  them,  animated  the  stars,  they  had  an  intelligence  for  this  world 
here  below ; and  this  intelligence  performed  the  part  of  the  active 
understanding  in  the  souls  of  men.  They  were  led  to  this  doctrine 
of  an  immortal  soul  common  to  all  men,  by  false  reasoning.  For 
they  took  for  granted  that  actual  infinite  multiplicity  is  impossible 
and  that  thus  it  was  not  possible  that,  there  should  be  an  infinite 
number  of  souls,  but  that  it  must  be  nevertheless,  if  particular 
souls  existed.  For  the  world  being,  according  to  them,  eternal,  and 
the  human  race  also,  and  new  souls  always  being  born,  if  these  all 
continued  to  exist,  there  would  now  be  an  actual  infinity.  This 
reasoning  passed  among  them  for  a proof.  But  it  was  full  of  false 
suppositions.  For  neither  the  impossibility  of  actual  infinitude, 
nor  that  the  human  race  has  existed  eternally,  nor  the  generation  of 
new  souls,  is  admitted,  since  the  Platonists  teach  the  preexistence 
of  souls,  and  the  Pythagoreans  teach  metempsychosis,  and  claim 
that,  a certain  determined  number  of  souls  remains  ever  and  under- 
goes changes. 

The  doctrine  of  a universal  spirit  is  good  in  itself,  for  all  those 
who  teach  it  admit  in  effect  the  existence  of  the  divinity,  whether 
they  believe  that  this  universal  spirit  is  supreme — for  in  this  case 
they  hold  that  it  is  God  himself, — or  whether  they  believe  with 
the  Cabalists  that  God  created  it.  This  latter  was  also  the  opinion 
of  Henry  More,  an  Englishman,  and  of  certain  other  modern 
philosophers,  and  especially  of  certain  chemists  who  believed  in  a 
universal  Archsens  or  world-soul ; and  some  have  maintained  that 
it  was  this  spirit  of  the  Lord  which,  as  the  beginning  of  Genesis 
says,  “moved  upon  the  waters.” 


OX  THE  DOCTKESfE  OF  A UXIVERSAT,  SPIRIT. 


149 


But  when  they  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  this  universal  spirit  is  the 
only  spirit  ancl  that  there  are  no  particular  souls  or  spirits,  or  at 
least  that  these  particular  souls  cease  to  exist,  I believe  that  they 
pass  the  limits  of  reason,  and  advance,  without  grounds,  a doctrine 
of  which  they  have  not  even  a distinct  notion.  Let  us  examine  a 
little  the  apparent  reasons  upon  which  they  rest  this  doctrine  which 
destroys  the  immortality  of  souls  and  degrades  the  human  race,  or 
rather,  all  living  creatures,  from  that  rank  which  belongs  to  them 
and  which  has  commonly  been  attributed  to  them.  Bor  it  seems 
to  me  that  an  opinion  of  so  much  importance  ought  to  be  proved, 
and  that  it  is  not  sufficient  to  have  imagined  a supposition  of  this 
kind,  which  really  is  only  founded  on  a very  lame  comparison 
with  the  wind  which  animates  musical  organs. 

I have  shown  above  that  the  pretended  demonstration  of  the 
Peripatetics,  who  maintained  that  there  was  but  one  spirit  common 
to  all  men,  is  of  no  force,  and  rests  only  on  false  suppositions. 
Spinoza  has  pretended  to  prove  that  there  is  only  one  substance  in 
the  world,  but  his  proofs  are  pitiable  or  unintelligible.  And  the 
X ew  Cartesians,  who  believed  that  God  alone  acts,  have  given 
very  little  proof  of  it ; not  to  mention  that  F ather  M alebranche 
seems  to  admit  at  least  the  internal  action  of  particular  spirits. 

One  of  the  most  apparent  reasons  which  have  been  urged  against 
particular  souls,  is  the  embarrassment  as  to  their  origin.  The 
scholastic  philosophers  have  disputed  greatly  over  the  origin  of 
forms,  among  which  they  include  souls.  Opinions  differed  greatly 
as  to  whether  there  was  an  eduction  of  power  from  matter,  as  a 
statue  is  extracted  from  marble ; or  whether  there  was  a traduction 
of  souls  such  that  a new  soul  was  born  of  a preceding  soul  as 
one  fire  is  lighted  from  another ; or  whether  souls  already  existed 
and  only  made  themselves  known  after  the  generation  of  the  ani- 
mal ; or  finally  whether  souls  were  created  by  God  every  time  there 
was  a new  generation. 

Those  who  denied  particular  souls,  believed  that  they  were 
thereby  freeing  themselves  from  all  difficulties,  but  this  is  cutting 
the  knot  instead  of  untying  it ; and  there  is  no  force  in  an  argument 
which  would  run  thus:  the  explanations  of  a doctrine  have  been 
various,  hence  the  'whole  doctrine  is  false.  This  is  the  manner  in 


150 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBHITZ. 


which  sceptics  reason,  and  if  it  were  to  he  accepted,  there  would  be 
nothing  which  could  not  he  rejected.  The  experiments  of  our  time 
lead  us  to  believe  that  souls  and  even  animals  have  always  existed, 
although  in  small  volume,  and  that  generation  is  only  a kind  of 
growth ; and  in  this  way  all  the  difficulties  concerning  the  genera- 
tion of  souls  and  of  forms  disappear.  However  we  do  not  deny 
God  the  right  to  create  new  souls  or  to  give  a higher  degree  of 
perfection  to  those  which  are  already  in  nature,  but  we  speak  of 
what  is  ordinary  in  nature,  without  entering  into  the  particular 
economy  of  God  in  respect  to  human  souls,  which  may  he  privi- 
leged, since  they  are  infinitely  above  those  of  animals. 

In  my  opinion,  what  has  greatly  contributed  to  incline  ingenious 
persons  toward  the  doctrine  of  a single  universal  spirit,  is  the  fact 
that  common  philosophers  gave  currency  to  a theory  concerning 
separate  souls,  and  the  functions  of  the  soul  independent  of  the 
body  and  of  its  organs,  which  they  could  not  sufficiently  justify. 
They  had  good  reason  for  wishing  to  maintain  the  immortality  of 
the  soul  as  in  accordance  with  divine  jperfecMons  and  true  moral- 
ity ; but  seeing  that  in  death  the  organs  visible  in  animals  became 
disordered  and  are  finally  spoiled,  they  believed  themselves  obliged 
to  have  recourse  to  separate  souls  ; that  is  to  say,  to  believe  that  the 
soul  existed  without  any  body,  and  did  not  even  then  cease  to  have 
its  thoughts  and  activities.  And  in  order  to  better  prove  this  they 
tried  to  show  that  the  soul  even  in  this  life  has  abstract  thoughts, 
independent  of  material  notions.  How  those  who  rejected  this 
separate  state  and  this  independence  as  contrary  to  experience  and 
reason,  were  all  the  more  compelled  to  believe  in  the  extinction  of 
the  particular  soul  and  the  preservation  of  the  single  universal 
spirit. 

I have  examined  this  matter  carefully  and  I have  proved  that 
really  there  are  in  the  soul  some  materials  of  thought  or  objects  of 
the  understanding  which  the  external  senses  do  not  furnish, 
namely,  the  soul  itself  and  its  activities  ( nihil  est  in  intellectu  quod 
non  fuerit  in  sensu,  nisi  ipse  intellectus ) ; and  those  who  believe 
in  a universal  spirit  will  readily  grant  this,  since  they  distinguish 
it  from  matter.  I find,  nevertheless,  that  there  is  never  an  abstract 
thought  which  is  not  accompanied  by  some  images  or  material 


cm  THE  DOCTRINE  OE  A UNIVERSAL  SPIRIT. 


151 


traces,  and.  I have  established,  a perfect  parallelism  between  what 
takes  place  in  the  soul  and  what  takes  place  in  matter,  having 
shown  that  the  soul  with  its  activities  is  something  distinct  from 
matter,  hut  that  nevertheless  it  is  always  accompanied  by  organs 
which  must  correspond  to  it ; and  that  this  is  reciprocal  and  always 
will  he. 

-And  as  to  the  complete  separation  between  soul  and  body, 
although  I can  say  nothing  beyond  what  is  said  in  the  Holy  Scrip- 
tures of  the  laws  of  grace  and  of  what  God  has  ordained  in  respect 
to  human  souls  in  particular,  since  these  are  things  which  cannot 
he  known  through  the  reason  and  which  depend  upon  revelation 
and  upon  God  himself,  nevertheless,  I see  no  reason  either  in 
religion  or  in  philosophy,  which  obliges  me  to  give  up  the  doctrine 
of  the  parallelism  of  the  soul  and  the  body,  and  to  admit  a perfect 
separation.  For  why  might  not  the  soul  always  retain  a subtile 
body,  organized  in  its  fashion,  and  even  resume  some  day,  in  the 
resurrection,  as  much  as  is  necessary  of  its  visible  body,  since  we 
accord  to  the  blessed  a glorious  body  and  since  the  ancient  F athers 
accorded  a subtile  body  to  the  angels  ? 

Moreover  this  doctrine  is  conformable  to  the  order  of  nature, 
established  through  experience ; for  the  observations  of  very  skillful 
observers  make  us  believe  that  animals  do  not  begin  when  the 
ordinary  person  thinks  they  do,  and  that  the  seminal  animals,  or 
animated  seeds,  have  existed  ever  since  the  beginning  of  things. 
Order  and  reason  demand  also  that  what  has  existed  since  the 
beginning  should  not  end ; and  thus  as  generation  is  only  a 
growtM  of  a transformed  and  developed  animal,  so  death  will  only 
be  the  diminution  of  a transformed  and  developed  animal, 
while  the  animal  itself  will  always  remain,  during  the 
transformations,  as  the  silkworm  and  the  butterfly  are  the  same 
animal.  And  it  is  well  to  remark  here  that  nature  has  the  skill 
and  the  goodness  to  reveal  her  secrets  to  us  in  some  small  samples, 
to  make  us  judge  of  the  rest,  since  everything  is  correspondent  and 
harmonious.  It  is  this  that  she  shows  in  the  transformation  of 
caterpillars  and  of  other  insects — for  flies  also  come  from  worms — 
to  make  us  divine  that  there  are  transformations  everywhere. 
Experiments  with  insects  have  destroyed  the  common  belief  that 


152 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


these  animals  are  engendered  by  their  nourishment,  without  propa- 
gation. It  is  thus  that  nature  has  also  shown  us  in  the  birds  a 
specimen  of  the  generation  of  all  animals  by  means  of  eggs,  a fact 
which  new  discoveries  have  now  established. 

Experiments  also  with  the  microscope  have  shown  that  the 
butterfly  is  only  a development  of  the  caterpillar 3 but,  above  all, 
that  seeds  contain  the  plant  or  animal  already  formed,  although 
afterward  it  needs  transformation  and  nutrition  or  growth  in  order 
to  become  an  animal  perceptible  to  our  ordinary  senses.  And  as 
the  smallest  insects  are  also  engendered  by  the  propagation  of  the 
species,  we  must  judge  the  same  to  be  true  of  these  little  seminal 
animals,  namely,  that  they  themselves  come  from  other  seminal 
animals,  even  smaller,  and  so  began  to  exist  when  the  world  did. 
This  is  in  harmony  with  the  Sacred  Scriptures,  which  imply  that 
seeds  have  existed  from  the  beginning. 

Nature  has  given  us  an  example  in  sleep*  and  swoons,  which 
ought  to  make  us  believe  that  death  is  not  a cessation  of  all  the 
functions,  but  only  a suspension  of  certain  of  the  more  noticeable 
functions.  And  I have  explained!  elsewhere  an  important  point, 
which  not  having  been  sufficiently  considered  has  the  more  easily 
inclined  men  to  the  opinion  of  the  mortality  of  souls  : namely,  that 
a large  number  of  minute  perceptions,  equal  and  interbalanced, 
having  no  background  and  no  distinguishing  marks,  are  not  noticed 
and  cannot  be  remembered.  But  to  wish  to  conclude  from  this 
that  the  soul  is  then  altogether  without  functions  is  the  same  thing 
as  when  the  common  pieopde  believe  that  there  is  a vacuum  or 
nothing  where  there  is  no  visible  matter,  and  that  the  earth  is 
without  motion,  because  its  motion  is  not  noticeable,  being  uniform 
and  without  shocks.  We  have  innumerable  minute  perceptions 
which  we  cannot  distinguish : for  example,  a great  deafening 
noise,  as  the  murmur  of  a whole  assembled  people,  is  compiosed  of 
all  the  little  murmurs  of  p* articular  persons  which  we  would  not 
notice  separately,  but  of  which  we  have  nevertheless  a sensation, 
otherwise  we  would  not  be  sensible  of  the  whole.  So  when  an 
animal  is  depmvecl  of  the  organs  capable  of  giving  it,  sufficiently 
distinct  perceptions,  it  does  not  at  all  follow  that  there  do  not 
remain  to  it  smaller  and  more  uniform  perceptions,  nor  that  it  is 


ON  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  A UNIVERSAL  SPIRIT. 


153 


deprived  of  all  organs  and  all  perceptions.  The  organs  are  only 
folded  up  and  reduced  to  small  volume;  but  the  order  of  nature 
demands  that  everything  redevelop,  and,  some  day,  return  to  a per- 
ceptible state,  and  that  there  be  in  these  changes  a certain 
well-regulated  progress,  which  serves  to  make  things  ripen  and 
become  perfect.  It  appears  that  Democritus  himself  has  seen  this 
resuscitation  of  animals,  for  Plotinus  says  that  he  taught  a 
resurrection. 

All  these  considerations  show,  how  not  only  particular  souls,  but 
also  animals,  subsist,  and  that  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  in  an 
utter  extinction  of  souls  or  a complete  destruction  of  the  animal ; 
and  consequently  that  there  is  no  need  to  have  recourse  to  a single 
universal  spirit  and  to  deprive  nature  of  its  particular  and  subsist- 
ing perfections — which  would  be  in  reality  also  not  to  sufficiently 
consider  order  and  harmony.  There  are  besides  many  things  in 
the  doctrine  of  a single  universal  spirit  which  cannot  be  main- 
tained, and  involve  difficulties  much  greater  than  those  of  the 
common  doctrine. 

Here  are  some  of  them : you  see,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  com- 
liarison  with  the  wind  which  makes  various  pipes  sound  differently, 
flatters  the  imagination,  but  explains  nothing,  or  rather  implies 
exactly  the  contrary.  For  this  universal  breath  of  the  pipes  is  only 
a collection  of  a quantity  of  separate  breaths ; moreover  each  pipe 
is  filled  with  its  own  air  which  can  even  pass  from  one  pipe  to 
another,  so  that  this  comparison  would  establish  rather  individual 
souls,  and  would  even  favor  the  transmigration  of  souls  from  one 
body  to  another,  as  the  air  can  change  pipes. 

And  if  we  imagine  that  the  universal  spirit  is  like  an  ocean,  com- 
posed of  innumerable  drops,  which  are  detached  from  it  when  they 
animate  some  particular  organic  body,  but  reunite  themselves  to. 
the  ocean  after  the  destruction  of  the  organs,  you  again  form  a 
material  and  gross  idea  which  does  not  suit  the  subject  and  becomes 
entangled  in  the  same  difficulties  as  the  breath.  For  as  the  ocean 
is  a collection  of  drops,  God  would  likewise  he  an  assembly  of  all 
the  souls,  just  as  a swarm  of  bees  is  an  assembly  of  these  little  ani- 
mals ; hut  as  this  swarm  is  not  itself  a real  substance,  it  is  clear 
that  in  this  way  the  universal  spirit  would  not  be  a true  being  itself, 


154 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


and  instead  of  saving  that  it  is  the  only  spirit,  we  should  have  to 
say  that  it  is  nothing  at  all  in  itself,  and  that  there  are  in  nature 
only  individual  souls,  of  which  it  would  be  the  mass.  Besides,  the 
drops,  reunited  to  the  ocean  of  the  universal  spirit  after  the 
destruction  of  the  organs,  would  be  in  reality  souls  which  would 
exist  separated  from  matter,  and  we  should  thus  fall  hack  again 
into  what  we  wished  to  avoid ; especially  if  these  drops  retain 
something  of  their  preceding  state,  or  have  still  some  functions 
and  could  even  acquire  more  sublime  ones  in  this  ocean  of  the 
divinity  or  of  the  universal  spirit.  For  if  you  wish  that  these  souls, 
reunited  to  God,  be  without  any  function  of  their  own,  you  fall 
into  an  opinion  contrary  to  reason  and  all  sound  philosophy;  as 
if  any  subsisting  being  could  ever  reach  a state  where  it  would  be 
without  any  function  or  impression.  For  one  thing  because  it 
is  joined  to  another  does  not  therefore  cease  to  have  its  own  par- 
ticular functions,  which  joined  with  those  of  the  others,  produce 
the  functions  of  the  whole.  Otherwise  the  whole  would  have  none 
if  the  parts  had  none.  Besides,  I have  elsewhere  proved  that  every 
being  retains  perfectly  all  the  impressions  it  has  received,  although 
these  impressions  he  no  longer  perceptible  separately,  because 
they  are  joined  with  so  many  others.  So  the  soul  reunited  to  the 
ocean  of  souls,  would  always  remain  the  particular  soul  it  had 
been  while  separated. 

This  shows  that  it  is  more  reasonable  and  more  in  conformity 
with  the  custom  of  nature  to  allow  particular  souls  to  subsist  in 
the  animals  themselves,  and  not  outside  in  God,  and  so  to  preserve 
not  only  the  soul  but  also  the  animal,  as  I have  explained  above 
and  elsewhere ; and  thus  to  allow  particular  souls  to  remain  always 
in  activity,  that  is,  in  the  particular  functions  which  are  peculiar 
to  them  and  which  contribute  to  the  beauty  and  order  of  the  uni- 
verse, instead  of  reducing  them  to  the  sabbath  in  God  of  the 
Quietists,  that  is  to  say,  to  a state  of  idleness  and  uselessness.  For 
as  far  as  the  beatific  vision  of  blessed  souls  is  concerned,  it  is 
compatible  with  the  functions  of  their  glorified  bodies,  which  will 
not  cease  to  be,  in  their  way,  organic. 

But  if  some  one  wished  to  maintain  that  there  are  no  particular 
souls,  not  even  when  the  function  of  feeling  and  of  thought  takes 


ON  the  doctrine  of  a universal  spirit. 


155 


place  with  the  aid  of  the  organs,  he  would  be  refuted  by  our  experi- 
ence which  teaches  us,  as  it  seems  to  me,  that  we  are  a something 
in  particular,  which  thinks,  which  apperceives,  which  wills ; and 
that  we  are  distinct  from  another  something  which  thinks  and 
which  wills  other  things.  Otherwise  we  fall  into  the  opinion  of 
Spinoza,  or  of  some  other  similar  authors,  who  will  have  it  that 
there  is  but  one  substance,  namely  God,  which  thinks,  believes,  and 
wills  one  thing  in  me,  but  which  thinks,  believes  and  wills  exactly 
the  contrary  in  another;  an  opinion  of  which  M.  Bavle,  in  certain 
portions  of  his  Dictionary,  has  well  shown  the  absurdity. 

Or  even,  if  there  is  nothing  in  nature  but  the  universal  spirit  and 
matter,  we  would  have  to  say  that  if  it  is  not  the  universal  spirit 
itself  which  believes  and  wills  opposite  things  in  different  persons, 
it  is  matter  which  is  different  and  acts  differently;  but  if  matter 
acts,  of  what  use  is  the  universal  spirit?  If  matter  is  nothing 
but  an  original  passive  substance,  or  a passive  substance  only,  how 
can  these  actions  he  attributed  to  it?  It  is  therefore  much  more 
reasonable  to  believe  that  besides  God,  who  is  the  supreme  Active 
Being,  there  are  a number  of  particular  active  beings,  since  there 
are  a number  of  particular  and  opposite  actions  and  passions, 
which  can  not  be  attributed  to  the  same  subject ; and  these  active 
beings  are  none  other  than  the  particular  souls. 

We  know  also  that  there  are  degrees  in  all  things.  There  is  an 
infinity  of  degrees  between  any  assumed  movement  and  perfect 
repose,  between  hardness  and  a perfect  fluidity  which  is  without 
any  resistance,  between  God  and  nothingness.  There  is  likewise 
an  infinity  of  degrees  between  any  active  being  whatsoever  and 
a purely  passive  being.  Consequently  it  is  not  reasonable  to  admit 
but  one  active  being,  namely  the  universal  spirit,  with  a single 
passive  being,  namely  matter. 

It  must  also  be  considered  that  matter  is  not  a thing  opposed  to 
God,  but  that  it  is  rather  opposed  to  the  limited  active  being,  that 
is,  to  the  soul  or  to  form.  For  God  is  the  supreme  being  opposed 
to  nothingness,  from  whom  matter  as  well  as  form  comes ; and  the 
purely  passive  is  something  more  than  nothingness,  being  capable 
of  something,  while  nothing  can  be  attributed  to  nothingness. 
Thus  with  each  particular  portion  of  matter  must  be  connected  in 


156 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


thought  the  particular  forms, — that  is,  souls  and  spirits, — which 
belong  to  it. 

I do  not  wish  here  to  recur  to  a demonstrative  argument  which 
I have  employed  elsewhere,  and  which  is  drawn  from  the  unities 
or  simple  things,  among  which  particular  souls  are  included.  For 
this  unavoidably  obliges  us  not  only  to  admit  particular  souls,  but 
also  to  avow  that  they  are  immortal  by  their  nature,  and  as  inde- 
structible as  the  universe;  and,  what  is  more,  that  each  soul  is  in 
its  way  a mirror  of  the  universe,  without  any  interruption,  and 
that  it  contains  in  its  depths  an  order  corresponding  to  that  of  the 
universe  itself.  The  souls  diversify  and  represent  the  universe  in 
an  infinity  of  wavs,  all  different  and  all  true,  and  multiply  it,  so 
to  speak,  as  many  times  as  is  possible,  so  that  in  this  way  they 
approach  divinity  as  much  as  is  possible,  according  to  their  differ- 
ent degrees,  and  give  to  the  universe  all  the  perfection  of  which  it 
is  capable. 

After  this,  I do  not  see  on  what  reason  or  probability  the  doc- 
trine of  particular  souls  can  be  combated.  Those  who  do  so1,  admit 
that  what  is  in  us  is  an  effect  of  the  universal  spirit.  But.  the 
effects  of  God  are  subsisting,  not  to  say  that  even  the  modifications 
and  effects  of  creatures  are  in  a way  durable,  and  that  their 
impressions  only  unite  without  being  destroyed.  Therefore,  if  in 
accordance  with  reason  and  experience,  as  we  have  shown,  the 
animal,  with  its  more  or  less  distinct  perceptions  and  with  certain 
organs,  always  subsists,  and  if  consequently  this  effect  of  God 
subsists  always  in  these  organs,  why  would  it  not  be  permissible 
to  call  it  the  soul,  and  to  say  that  this  effect  of  God  is  a soul, 
immaterial  and  immortal,  which  imitates  in  a way  the  universal 
spirit?  since  this  doctrine,  moreover,  removes  all  difficulties,  as 
appears  by  what  I have  just  said  here,  and  in  other  writings  which 
I have  produced  on  these  subjects. 


XXIV. 


On  the  Supersensible  Element  in  Knowledge,  and  on  the 

Immaterial  in  Xature  : A Letter  to  Queen  Charlotte  of 

Prussia,  1702. 

[From  the  French.] 

Madame: 

The  letter  written  not  long  since  from  Paris  to  Osnahruek  and 
which  I recently  read,  by  your  order,  at  Hanover,  seemed  to  me 
truly  ingenious  and  beautiful.  And  as  it  treats  of  the  two  impor- 
tant questions,  Whether  there  is  something  in  our  thoughts  which 
does  not  come  froyi  the  senses , and  Whether  there  is  something  in 
nature  which  is  not  material,  concerning  which  I acknowledge  that 
I am  not  altogether  of  the  opinion  of  the  author  of  the  letter,  I 
should  like  to  be  able  to  explain  myself  with  the  same  grace  as  he, 
in  order  to  obey  the  commands  and  to  satisfy  the  curiosity  of  your 
Majesty. 

We  use  the  external  senses  as,  to  use  the  comparison  of  one  of 
the  ancients,  a blind  man  does  a stick,  and  they  make  us  know 
their  particular  objects,  which  are  colors,  sounds,  odors,  flavors, 
and  the  qualities  of  touch.  But  they  do  not  make  us  know 
what  these  sensible  qualities  are  or  in  what  they  consist.  Eor 
example,  whether  red  is  the  revolving  of  certain  small  globules 
which  it  is  claimed  cause  light ; whether  heat  is  the  whirling  of  a 
very  fine  dust ; whether  sound  is  made  in  the  air  as  circles  in  the 
water  when  a stone  is  thrown  into  it,  as  certain  philosophers  claim ; 
this  is  what  we  do  not  see.  And  we  could  not  even  understand  how 
this  revolving,  these  whirlings  and  these  circles,  if  they  should  he 
real,  should  cause  exactly  these  perceptions  which  we  have  of  red, 
of  heat,  of  noise.  Thus  it  may  be  said  that  sensible  qualities  are  in 
fact  occult  qualities,  and  that  there  must  be  others  more  manifest 
which  can  render  the  former  more  explicable.  And  far  from 
understanding  only  sensible  things,  it  is  exactly  these  which  we 
understand  the  least.  And  although  they  are  familiar  to  us  we  do 
not  understand  them  the  better  for  that ; as  a pilot  understands  no 
better  than  another  person  the  nature  of  the  magnetic  needle 


158 


PHILOSOPHIC AIi  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


which  turns  toward  the  north,  although  he  has  it  always  before  his 
eyes  in  the  compass,  and  although  he  does  not  admire  it  any  the 
more  for  that  reason. 

I do  not  deny  that  many  discoveries  have  been  made  concerning 
the  nature  of  these  occult  qualities,  as,  for  example,  we  know  by 
what  kind  of  refraction  blue  and  yellow  are  formed,  and  that  these 
two  colors  mixed  form  green ; but  for  all  this  we  cannot  yet  under- 
stand how  the  perception  which  we  have  of  these  three  colors 
results  from  these  causes.  Also  we  have  not  even  nominal  defini- 
tions of  such  qualities  by  which  to  explain  the  terms.  The  purpose 
of  nominal  definitions  is  to  give  sufficient  marks  by  which  the  thing 
may  be  recognized ; for  example,  assayers  have  marks  by  which 
they  distinguish  gold  from  every  other  metal,  and  even  if  a man 
had  never  seen  gold  these  signs  might  be  taught  him  so  that  he 
would  infallibly  recognize  it  if  he  should  some  day  meet  with  it. 
But  it  is  not  the  same  wytn  these  sensible  qualities ; and  marks  to 
recognize  blue,  for  example,  could  not  be  given  if  we  had  never 
seen  it.  So  that  blue  is  its  own  mark,  and  in  order  that  a man 
may  know  what  blue  is  it  must  necessarily  be  shown  to  him. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  are  accustomed  to  say  that  the 
notions  of  these  qualities  are  clear,  for  they  serve  to  recognize 
them ; but  that  these  same  notions  are  not  distinct,  because  we 
cannot  distinguish  or  develope  that  which  they  include.  It  is  an  I 
know  not  what  of  which  we  are  conscious,  but  for  which  we  cannot 
account.  Whereas  we  can  make  another  understand  what  a thing 
is  of  which  we  have  some  description  or  nominal  definition,  even 
although  we  should  not  have  the  thing  itself  at  hand  to  show  him. 
However  we  must  do  the  senses  the  justice  to  say  that,  in  addition 
to  these  occult  qualities,  they  make  us  know  other  qualities  which 
are  more  manifest  and  which  furnish  more  distinct  notions.  And 
these  are  those  which  we  ascribe  to  the  common  sense,  because  there 
is  no  external  sense  to  which  they  are  particularly  attached  and 
belong.  And  here  definitions  of  the  terms  or  words  employed  may 
be  given.  Such  is  the  idea  of  numbers , which  is  found  equally  in 
sounds,  colors,  and  touches.  It  is  thus  that  we  perceive  also 
figures,  which  are  common  to  colors  and  to  touches,  but  which  we 
do  not  notice  in  sounds.  Although  it  is  true  that  in  order  to  con- 


ON  THE  SUPERSENSIBLE  IN  KNOWLEDGE. 


159 


ceive  distinctly  numbers  and  even  figures,  and  to  form  sciences  of 
them,  we  must  come  to  something  which  the  senses  cannot  furnish, 
and  which  the  understanding  adds  to  the  senses. 

As  therefore  our  soul  compares  (for  example)  the  numbers  and 
figures  which  are  in  colors  with  the  numbers  and  figures  which  are 
found  by  touch,  there  must  be  an  internal  sense,  in  which  the 
perceptions  of  these  different  external  senses  are  found  united. 
This  is  what  is  called  the  imagination,  which  comprises  at  once  the 
notions  of  the  'particular  senses,  which  are  clear  but  confused,  and 
the  notions  of  the common  sense,  which  are  clear  and  distinct. 
And  these  clear  and  distinct  ideas  which  are  subject  to  the  imag- 
ination are  the  objects  of  the  mathematical  sciences,  namely  of 
arithmetic  and  geometry,  which,  are  pure  mathematical  sciences, 
and  of  the  application  of  these  sciences  to  nature,  forming  mixed 
mathematics.  It  is  evident  also  that  particular  sensible  qualities 
' are  susceptible  of  explanations  and  of  reasonings  only  in  so  far  as 
they  involve  what  is  common  to  the  objects  of  several  external 
senses,  and  belong  to  the  internal  sense.  For  those  who  try  to 
explain  sensible  qualities  distinctly  always  have  recourse  to  the 
ideas  of  mathematics,  and  these  ideas  always  involve  size  or  mul- 
titude of  parts.  It  is  true  that  the  mathematical  sciences  would 
not  be  demonstrative,  and  would  consist  in  a simple  induction  or 
[ observation,  which  would  never  assure  us  of  the  perfect  generality 
of  the  truths  there  found,  if  something  higher  and  which  intelli- 
gence alone  can  furnish  did  not  come  to  the  aid  of  the  imagination 
and  the  senses. 

There  are,  therefore,  objects  of  still  other  nature,  which  are  not 
included  at  all  in  what  is  observed  in  the  objects  of  the  senses  in 
particular  or  in  common,  and  which  consequently  are  not  objects  of 
the  imagination  either.  Thus  besides  the  sensible  and  imageahle, 
there  is  that  which  is  purely  intelligible,  as  being  the  object  of  the 
understanding  alone,  and  such  is  tlie  object  of  my  thought  when  I 
think  of  myself. 

This  thought  of  the  Ego,  which  informs  me  of  sensible  objects, 
and  of  my  own  action  resulting  therefrom,  adds  something  to  tlie 
objects  of  the  senses.  To  think  a color  and  to  observe  that  one 
thinks  it,  are  two  very  different  thoughts,  as  different  as  the  color 


160 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


is  from  the  Ego  which  thinks  it.  And  as  I conceive  that  other 
beings  may  also  have  the  right  to  say  I,  or  that  it  could  be  said 
for  them,  it  is  through  this  that  I conceive  what  is  called  substance 
in  general,  and  it  is  also  the  consideration  of  the  Ego  itself  which 
furnishes  other  metaphysical  notions,  such  as  cause,  effect,  action, 
similarity,  etc.,  and  even  those  of  logic  and  of  ethics.  Thus  it  can 
be  said  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  understanding  which  does  not 
come  from  the  senses,  except  the  understanding  itself,  or  that 
which  understands. 

There  are  then  three  grades  of  notions  : the  sensible  only,  which 
are  the  objects  appropriate  to  each  sense  in  particular;  the  sensi- 
ble and  at  the  same  time  intelligible,  which  pertain  to  the  com- 
mon sense;  and  the  intelligible  only,  which  belong  to  the  under- 
standing. The  first  and  the  second  are  both  imageable,  but  the 
third  are  above  the  imagination.  The  second  and  third  are  intelli- 
gible and  distinct;  hut  the  first  are  confused,  although  they  are 
clear  or  recognizable. 

Being  itself  and  truth  are  not  known  wholly  through  the  senses  ; 
for  it  would  not  be  impossible  for  a creature  to  have  long  and 
orderly  dreams,  resembling  our  life,  of  such  a sort  that  everything 
which  it  thought  it  perceived  through  the  senses  would  he  but 
mere  appearances.  There  must  therefore  be  something  beyond  the 
senses,  which  distinguishes  the  true  from  the  apparent.  But  the 
truth  of  the  demonstrative  sciences  is  exempt  from  these  doubts, 
and  must  even  serve  for  judging  of  the  truth  of  sensible  things. 
Eor  as  able  philosophers,  ancient  and  modern,  have  already  well 
remarked : — if  all  that  I should  think  that  I see  should  be  but  a 
dream,  it  would  always  be  true  that  I who  think  while  dreaming, 
would  he  something,  and  would  actually  think  in  many  ways,  for 
which  there  must  always  be  some  reason. 

Thus  what  the  ancient  Platonists  have  observed  is  very  true, 
and  is  very  worthy  of  being  considered,  that  the  existence  of  sensi- 
ble things  and  particularly  of  the  Ego  which  thinks  and  which  is 
called  spirit  or  soul,  is  incomparably  more  sure  than  the  existence 
of  sensible  things  ; and  that  thus  it  would  not  be  impossible,  speak- 
ing with  metaphysical  rigor,  that  there  should  be  at  bottom  only 
these  intelligible  substances,  and  that  sensible  things  should  be  but 


ON  THE  SUPERSENSIBLE  IN  KNOWLEDGE. 


161 


appearances.  While  on  the  other  hand  our  lack  of  attention  makes 
us  take  sensible  things  for  the  only  true  things.  It  is  well  also  to 
observe  that  if  I should  discover  any  demonstrative  truth,  mathe- 
matical or  other,  while  dreaming  (as  might  in  fact  be),  it  would 
be  just  as  certain  as  if  I had  been  awake.  This  shows  us  how 
intelligible  truth  is  independent  of  the  truth  or  of  the  existence 
outside  of  us  of  sensible  and  material  things.  . 

This  conception  of  being  and  of  truth  is  found  therefore  in  the 
Ego  and  in  the  understanding,  rather  than  in  the  external  senses 
and  in  the  perception  of  exterior  objects. 

There  we  find  also  what  it  is  to  affirm,  to  deny,  to  doubt,  to  will, 
to  act.  But  above  all  we  find  there  the  force  of  the  consequences 
of  reasoning,  which  are  a part  of  what  is  called  the  natural  light. 
For  example,  from  this  premise,  that  no  wise  man  is  widced,  we 
may,  by  reversing  the  terms,  draw  this  conclusion,  that  no  wicked 
man  is  wise.  Whereas  from  this  sentence,  that  every  wise  man  is 
'praiseworthy , we  cannot  conclude  by  converting  it,  that  every  one 
praiseworthy  is  wise  but  only  that  some  praiseworthy  ones  are  wise. 
Although  we  may  always  convert  particular  affirmative  proposi- 
tions, for  example,  if  some  wise  man  is  rich  it  must  also  be  that 
some  rich  men  are  xvise,  this  cannot  be  done  in  particular  negatives. 
For  example,  we  may  say  that  there  are  charitable  persons  who  are 
not  just,  which  happens  when  charity  is  not  sufficiently  regulated ; 
but  we  cannot  infer  from  this  that  there  are  just  persons  who  are 
not  charitable ; for  in  justice  are  included  at  the  same  time  charity 
and  the  rule  of  reason. 

It  is  also  by  this  natural  light  that  the  axioms  of  mathematics 
are  recognized;  for  example,  that  if  from  two  equal  things  the 
same  quantity  be  taken  away  the  things  which  remain  are  equal ; 
likewise  that  if  in  a balance  everything  is  equal  on  the  one  side 
and  on  the  other,  neither  will  incline,  a thing  which  we  forsee 
without  ever  having  experienced  it.  It  is  upon  such  foundations 
that  we  construct  arithmetic,  geometry,  mechanics  and  the  other 
demonstrative  sciences ; in  which,  in  truth,  the  senses  are  very  nec- 
essary, in  order  to  have  certain  ideas  of  sensible  things,  and  experi- 
ments are  necessary  to  establish  certain 'facts,  and  even  useful  to 
verify  reasonings  as  by  a kind  of  proof.  But  the  force  of  the 
11 


102 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


demonstrations  depends  upon  intelligible  notions  and  truths,  which 
alone  are  capable  of  making  us  discern  what  is  necessary,  and 
which,  in  the  conjectural  sciences,  are  even  capable  of  determining 
demonstratively  the  degree  of  probability  upon  certain  given 
suppositions,  in  order  that  we  may  choose  rationally  among  oppo- 
site appearances,  the  one  which  is  greatest.  Nevertheless  this  part 
of  the  art  of  reasoning  has  not  yet  been  cultivated  as  much  as  it 
ought  to  be. 

But  to  return  to  necessary  truths,  it  is  generally  true  that  we 
know  them  only  by  this  natural  light,  and  not  at  all  by  the  experi- 
ences of  the  senses.  For  the  senses  can  very  well  make  known,  in 
some  sort,  what  is,  but  they  cannot  make  known  what  ought  to-  he 
or  could  not  be  otherwise. 

For  example,  although  we  may  have  experienced  numberless 
times  that  every  massive  body  tends  toward  the  centre  of  the 
earth  and  is  not  sustained  in  the  air,  we  are  not  sure  that  this  is 
necessary  as  long  as  we  do  not  understand  the  -reason  of  it.  Thus 
we  could  not  be  sure  that  the  same  thing  would  occur  in  air  at  a 
higher  altitude,  at  a hundred  or  more  leagues  above  us ; and  there 
are  philosophers  who  imagine  that  the  earth  is  a magnet,  and  as 
the  ordinary  magnet  does  not  attract,  the  needle  when  a little 
removed  from  it,  they  think  that  the  attractive  force  of  the  earth 
does  not  extend  very  far  either.  I do  not  say  that  they  are  right, 
but  I do  say  that  one  cannot  go  very  certainly  beyond  the  experi- 
ences one  has  had,  when  one  is  not  aided  by  reason. 

This  is  why  the  geometricians  have  always  considered  that  what 

is  only  proved  by  induction  or  by  examples,  in  geometry  or  in 

arithmetic,  is  never  perfectly  proved.  For 

! example,  experience  teaches  us  that  odd 

3 numbers  continuously  added  together  pro- 

7 duce  the  square  numbers,  that  is  to  say,  those 

9 which  come  from  multiplying  a number  by 

25  itself.  Thus  1 and  3 make  4,  that  is  to  say 

5 2 times  2.  And  1 and  3 and  5 make  9,  that 

* is  to  say  3 times  3.  And  1 and  3 and  5 and  7 

— make  16,  that  is  4 times  4.  And  1 and  3 

25 

and  5 and  7 and  9 make  25,  that  is  5 
times  5.  And  so  on. 


ON  THE  SUPERSENSIBLE  IN  KNOWLEDGE. 


163 


However,  if  one  should  experience  it  a hundred  thousand  times, 
continuing  the  calculation  very  far,  he  may  reasonably  think  that 
this  will  always  follow;  but  he  does  not  therefore  have  absolute 
certainty  of  it,  unless  he  learns  the  demonstrative  reason  which  the 
mathematicians  found  out  long  ago.  And  it  is  on  this  foundation 
of  the  uncertainty  of  inductions,  hut  carried  a little  too  far,  that 
an  Englishman  has  lately  wished  to  maintain  that  we  can  avoid 
death.  For  (said  he)  the  inference  is  not  good:  my  father,  my 
grandfather,  my  great-grandfather  are  dead  and  all  the  others  who 
have  lived  before  us;  therefore  we  shall  also  die.  For  their  death 
has  no  influence  on  us.  The  trouble  is  that  we  resemble  them  a 
little  too  much  in  this  respect  that  the  causes  of  their  death  subsist 
also  in  us.  For  the  resemblance  would  not  suffice  to  draw  sure 
consequences  without  the  consideration  of  the  same  reasons. 

In  truth  there  are  experiments  which  succeed  numberless  times 
and  ordinarily,  and  yet  it  is  found  in  some  extraordinary  cases 
that  there  are  instances  where  the  experiment  does  not  succeed. 
For  example,  if  we  should  have  found  a hundred  thousand  times 
that  iron  put  all  alone  on  the  surface  of  water  goes  to  the  bottom 
we  are  not  sure  that  this  must  always  happen.  And  without 
recurring  to  the  miracle  of  the  prophet  Elisha,  who  made  iron 
float,  we  know  that  an  iron  pot  may  be  made  so  hollow  that  it 
floats,  and  that  it  can  even  carry  besides  a considerable  weight,  as 
do  boats  of  copper  or  of  tin.  And  even  the  abstract  sciences  like 
geometry  furnish  cases  in  which  what  ordinarily  occurs  occurs  no 
longer.  For  example,  we  ordinarily  find  that  two  lines  which 
continually  approach  each  other  finally  meet,  and  many  people  will 
almost  swear  that  this  could  never  be  otherwise.  And  nevertheless 
geometry  furnishes  us  with  extraordinary  lines,  which  are  for 
this  reason  called  asymptotes,  which  prolonged  ad  infinitum  con- 
tinually approach  each  other,  and  nevertheless  never  meet. 

This  consideration  shows  also  that  there  is  a light  horn  with  us. 
For  since  the  senses  and  inductions  could  never  teach  us  truths 
which  are  thoroughly  universal,  nor  that  which  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary, but  only  that  which  is,  and  that  which  is  found  in  particular 
examples ; and  since  we  nevertheless  know  necessary  and  universal 
truths  of  the  sciences,  a privilege  which  we  have  above  the  brutes ; 


164  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

it  follows  that  we  have  derived  these  truths  in  part  from  what  is 
within  us.  Thus  we  may  lead  a child  to  these  by  simple  interroga- 
tions, after  the  manner  of  Socrates,  without  telling  him  anything, 
and  without  making  him  experiment  at  all  upon  the  truth  of  what 
is  asked  him.  And  this  could  very  easily  be  practiced  in  numbers 
and  other  similar  matters. 

I agree,  nevertheless,  that  in  the  present  state  the  external  senses 
are  necessary  to  us  for  thinking,  and  that,  if  we  had  none,  we 
could  not  think.  But  that  which  is -necessary  for  something  does 
not  for  all  that  constitute  its  essence.  Air  is  necessary  for  life, 
hut  our  life  is  something  else  than  air.  The  senses  furnish  us  the 
matter  for  reasoning,  and  we  never  have  thoughts  so  abstract  that, 
something  from  the  senses  is  not  mingled  therewith ; but  reasoning 
requires  something  else  in  addition  to  what  is  from  the  senses. 

As  to  the  second  question,  whether  there  are  immaterial  sub- 
stances, in  order  to  solve  it,  it  is  first  necessary  to  explain  one’s 
self.  Hitherto  by  matter  has  been  understood  that  which  includes 
only  notions  purely  passive  and  indifferent,  namely,  extension  and 
impenetrability,  which  need  to  be  determined  by  something  else  to 
some  form  or  action.  Thus  when  it  is  said  that  there  are  imma- 
terial substances,  it  is  thereby  meant  that  there  are  substances 
which  include  other  notions,  namely,  perception  and  the  principle 
of  action  or  of  change,  which  could  not  be  explained  either  by 
extension  or  by  impenetrability.  These  beings,  when  they  have 
feeling,  are  called  souls,  and  when  they  are  capable  of  reason,  they 
are  called  spirits.  Thus  if  one  says  that  force  and  perception  are 
essential  to  matter,  he  takes  matter  for  corporeal  substance  which 
is  complete,  which  includes  form  and  matter,  or  the  soul  with  the 
organs.  It  is  as  if  it  were  said  that  there  were  souls  everywhere. 
This  might  be  true,  and  would  not  be  contrary  to  the  doctrine  of 
immaterial  substances.  For  it  is  not  intended  that  these  souls  be 
separate  from  matter,  but  simply  that  they  are  something  more 
than  matter,  and  are  not  produced  nor  destroyed  by  the  changes 
which  matter  undergoes,  nor  subject  to  dissolution,  since  they  are 
not  composed  of  parts. 

Nevertheless  it  must  be  avowed  also  that  there  is  substance 
separated  from  matter.  And  to  see  this,  one  has  only  to  consider 


OK  THE  IMMATERIAL  IK  KATL'RE. 


165 


that  there  are  numberless  forms  which  matter  might  have  received 
in  place  of  the  series  of  variations  which  it  has  actually  received. 
For  it  is  clear,  for  example,  that  the  stars  could  move  quite  other- 
wise, space  and  matter  being  indifferent  to  every  kind  of  motion 
and  figure. 

Hence  the  reason  or  universal  determining  cause  whereby  things 
are,  and  are  as  they  are  rather  than  otherwise,  must  be  outside  of 
matter.  And  even  the  existence  of  matter  depends  thereon,  since 
we  do  not  find  in  its  notion  that  it  carries  with  it  the  reason  of  its 
existence. 

How  this  ultimate  reason  of  things,  which  is  common  to  them 
all  and  universal  by  reason  of  the  connection  existing  between  all 
parts  of  nature,  is  what  we  call  God,  who  must  necessarily  be  an 
infinite  and  absolutely  perfect  substance.  I am  inclined  to  think 
that  all  immaterial  finite  substances  (even  the  genii  or  angels 
according  to  the  opinion  of  the  ancient  Church  Fathers)  are  united 
to  organs,  and  accompany  matter,  and  even  that  souls  or  active 
forms  are  everywhere  found  in  it.  And  matter,  in  order  to  con- 
stitute a substance  which  is  complete,  cannot  do  without  them, 
since  force  and  action  are  found  everywhere  in  it,  and  since  the 
laws  of  force  depend  on  certain  remarkable  metaphysical  reasons 
or  intelligible  notions,  without  being  explicable  by  notions  merely 
material  or  mathematical,  or  which  belong  to  the  sphere  of  the 
imagination. 

Perception  also  could  not  be  explained  by  any  mechanism  what- 
soever. We  may  therefore  conclude  that  there  is  in  addition  some- 
thing immaterial  everywhere  in  these  creatures,  and  particularly 
in  us,  in  whom  this  force  is  accompanied  by  a sufficiently  distinct 
perception,  and  even  by  that  light,  of  which  I have  spoken  above, 
which  makes  us  resemble  in  miniature  the  Divinity,  as  well  by 
knowledge  of  the  order,  as  by  the  ordering  which  we  ourselves 
know  how  to  give  to  the  things  which  are  within  our  reach,  in 
imitation  of  that  which  God  gives  to  the  universe.  It  is  in  this 
also  that  our  virtue  and  perfection  consist,  as  our  felicity  consists 
in  the  pleasure  which  we  take  therein. 

And  since  every  time  we  penetrate  into  the  depths  of  things,  we 
find  there  the  most  beautiful  order  we  could  wish,  even  surpassing 


166  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

what  we  have  therein  imagined,  as  all  those  know  who  have 
fathomed  the  sciences ; we  may  conclude  that  it  is  the  same  in  all 
the  rest,  and  that  not  only  immaterial  substances  subsist  always, 
but  also  that  their  lives,  progress  and  changes  are  regulated  for 
advance  toward  a certain  end,  or  rather  to  approach  more  and  more 
thereto,  as  do  the  asymptotes.  And  although  we  sometimes 
recoil,  like  lines  which  retrograde,  advancement  none  the  less 
finally  prevails  and  wins. 

The  natural  light  of  reason  does  not  suffice  for  knowing  the 
detail  thereof,  and  our  experiences  are  still  too  limited  to  catch  a 
glimpse  of  the  laws  of  this  order.  The  revealed  light  guides  us 
meanwhile  through  faith,  but  there  is  room  to  believe  that  in  the 
course  of  time  we  shall  know  them  even  more  by  experience,  and 
that  there  are  spirits  which  know  them  already  more  than  we  do. 

Meanwhile  the  philosophers  and  the  poets,  for  want  of  this,  have 
betaken  themselves  to  the  fictions  of  metempsychosis  or  of  the 
Elvsian  Fields,  in  order  to  give  some  ideas  which  might  strike  the 
populace.  But  the  consideration  of  the  perfection  of  things  or 
(what  is  the  same  thing)  of  the  sovereign  power,  wisdom  and  good- 
ness of  God,  who  does  all  for  the  best,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  greatest 
order,  suffices  to  render  content  those  who  are  reasonable,  and  to 
make  us  believe  that  the  contentment  ought  to  be  greater,  according 
as  we  are  more  disposed  to  follow  order  or  reason. 


XXV. 


Aw  Explanation  of  Certain  Points  in  iiis  Philosophy  : An 
Extract  from  a letter  to  Lady  Masham.  1704. 

[From  the  French.] 

As  I am  altogether  in  favor  of  the  principle  of  uniformity, 
which  I think  nature  observes  in  the  heart  of  things,  while  it  varies 
in  ways,  degrees  and  perfections,  my  whole  hypothesis  amounts  to 
recognizing  in  substances  which  are  removed  from  our  view  and 
observation,  something  parallel  to  what  appears  in  those  which  are 
within  our  reach.  Thus,  taking  now  for  granted  that  there  is  in 
us  a simple  being  endowed  with  action  and  perception,  I think  that 
nature  would  he  little  connected,  if  this  particle  of  matter 
which  forms  human  bodies  were  alone  endowed  with  that  which 
would  make  it  infinitely  different  from  the  rest  (even  in  physics) 
and  altogether  heterogeneous  in  relation  to  all  other  known  bodies. 
This  makes  me  think  that  there  are  everywhere  present  such  active 
beings  in  matter,  and  that  there  is  no  difference  between  them 
except  in  the  matter  of  perception.  And  as  our  own  perceptions 
are  sometimes  accompanied  by  reflection  and  sometimes  not,  and  as 
from  reflection  come  abstractions  and  universal  and  necessary 
truths,  no  traces  of  which  are  to  be  seen  in  brutes  and  still  less  in 
the  other  bodies  which  surround  us,  there  is  reason  for  believing 
that  this  simple  being  which  is  in  us  and  which  is  called  soul  is 
distinguished  by  this  from  those  of  other  known  bodies. 

Whether  now  these  principles  of  action  and  of  perception  be 
called  Forms,  Entelechies,  Souls,  Spirits,  or  whether  these 
terms  be  distinguished  according  to  the  notions  one  would  like  to 
attribute  to  them,  the  things  will  not  thereby  be  changed.  You 
will  ask  what  these  simple  beings  or  these  souls  which  I place  in 
brutes  and  in  the  other  creatures  as  far  as  they  are  organic,  will 
become ; I reply,  that  they  must  not  be  less  inextinguishable  than 
our  souls,  and  that  they  cannot  be  produced  or  destroyed  by  the 
forces  of  nature. 

But  further,  to  preserve  the  analogy  of  the  future  or  past  as  well 
as  of  other  bodies,  with  what  we  experience  at  present  in  our 


108 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


bodies,  I bold  that  not  only  these  souls  or  enteleckies  all  have  a 
sort  of  organic  body  with  them  proportioned  to  their  perceptions 
but  also  that  they  will  always  have  one,  and  have  always  had  one, 
as  long  as  they  have  existed ; so  that  not  only  the  soul  but  also  the 
animal  itself  (or  that  which  is  analogous  to  soul  and  animal,  not  to 
dispute  about  names)  remains.  And  that  thus  generation  and 
death  can  only  be  developments  and  envelopments,  some  examples 
of  which,  nature,  according  to  its  custom,  shows  us  visibly  to  aid  us 
in  divining  that  which  is  hidden.  And  consequently  neither  iron 
nor  fire  nor  any  other  violences  of  nature,  whatever  ravages  they 
may  make  in  the  body  of  an  animal,  can  prevent  the  soul  from 
preserving  a certain  organic  body ; inasmuch  as  the  Organism, 
that  is  to  say,  order  and  artifice,  is  something  essential  to  matter, 
produced  and  arranged  by  sovereign  wisdom,  and  the  production 
must  always  retain  the  traces  of  its  author.  This  leads  me  to  think 
also  that  there  are  no  spirits  entirely  separated  from  matter,  except 
the  first  and  sovereign  being,  and  that  the  genii,  however  marvel- 
lou's  they  may  be,  are  always  accompanied  by  bodies  worthy  of 
them.  This  must  also  be  said  of  souls  which  nevertheless  may  be 
called  separate  by  relation  to  this  gross  body.  You  see  therefore, 
Madame,  that  all  this  is  only  to  suppose  that  it  is  everyiuhere  and 
always  just  as  with  us  and  at  present  (the  supernatural  excepted), 
except  degrees  of  perfections  which  vary;  and  I leave  you  to 
judge  if  an  hypothesis  at  least  simpler  and  more  intelligible  can 
be  thought  of. 

This  very  maxim,  not  to  suppose  unnecessarily  anything  in 
creatures  except  what  corresponds  to  our  experiences,  has  led  me  to 
my  System  of  the  P reestablished  Harmony.  For  we  experience 
that  bodies  act  among  themselves  according  to  mechanical  laws, 
and  that  souls  produce  in  themselves  some  internal  actions.  And 
we  see  no  way  of  conceiving  the  action  of  the  soul  upon  matter,  or 
of  matter  upon  the  soul,  or  anything  corresponding  to  it ; it  not 
being  explicable  by  any  mechanism  whatever  how  material  varia- 
tions, that  is  to  say,  mechanical  iaws,  cause  perception  to  arise ; or 
how  perception  can  produce  change  of  velocity  or  of  direction  in 
animal  spirits  and  other  bodies,  however  subtile  or  gross  they  may 
be.  Thus  the  inconceivability  of  any  other  hypothesis,  as  much  as 


CERTAIN  POINTS  IN  HIS  PHILOSOPHY. 


169 


the  good  order  of  nature  which  is  always  uniform  (without  speak- 
ing here  of  other  considerations),  have  made  me  believe  that  the 
soul  and  the  body  follow  perfectly  their  laws,  each  one  its  own  sep- 
arately, without  the  laws  of  the  body  being  troubled  by  the  actions 
of  the  soul  and  without  bodies  finding  windows  through  which  to 
influence  souls.  It  will  be  asked  then  whence  comes  this  accord 
of  the  soul  with  the  body.  The  defenders  of  occasional  causes 
teach  that  God  accommodates  at  each  moment  the  soul  to  the  body 
and  the  body  to  the  soul.  But  it  being  impossible  that  this  be 
other  than  miraculous,  it  is  unsuited  to  a philosophy  which  must 
explain  the  ordinary  course  of  nature,  for  it  would  be  necessary 
that  God  should  continually  disturb  the  natural  laws  of  bodies. 
This  is  why  I believed  that  it  was  infinitely  more  worthy  of  the 
economy  of  God,  and  of  the  uniformity  and  harmony  of  his  work, 
to  conclude  that  he  has  at  the  beginning  created  souls  and  bodies 
such  that  each  following  its  own  laws  accords  with  the  other.  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  this  is  possible  to  him  whose  wisdom  and 
power  are  infinite.  In  this  I still  only  attribute  to  souls  and  to 
bodies  for  all  time  and  everywhere  what  we  experience  in  them 
every  time  that  the  experience  is  distinct,  that  is  to  say,  mechanical 
laws  in  bodies  and  internal  actions  in  the  soul : the  whole  consisting 
only  in  the  present  state  joined  with  the  tendency  to  changes, 
which  take  place  in  the  body  according  to  moving  forces  and 
in  the  soul  according  to  the  perceptions  of  good  and  evil. 

The  only  surprising  thing  which  follows  from  this  is  that  the 
works  of  God  are  infinitely  more  beautiful  and  more  harmonious 
than  had  been  believed.  And  it  may  be  said  that  the  subterfuge 
of  the  Epicureans  against  the  argument  drawn  from  the  beauty  of 
visible  things  (when  they  say  that  among  numberless  produc- 
tions of  chance  it  is  not  to  be  marvelled  at  if  some  world  like  our 
own  has  succeeded  passably)  is  destroyed,  in  that  the  perpetual 
correspondence  of  beings  which  have  no  influence  one  upon  the 
other  can  only  come  from  a common  cause  of  this  harmony.  M. 
Bayle  (who  is  profound),  having  meditated  on  the  consequences 
of  this  hypothesis,  acknowledges  that  one  never  exalted  more  what 
we  call  the  divine  perfections,  and  that  the  infinite  wisdom  of  God, 
great  as  it  is,  is  none  too  great  to  produce  such  a preestablished 


170 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


harmony,  the  possibility  of  which  he  seemed  to  doubt.  But  I made 
him  consider  that  even  men  produce  automata  which  act  as  if  they 
were  rational,  and  that  God  (who  is  an  infinitely  greater  artist  or, 
rather,  with  whom  everthing  is  art  as  much  as  is  possible) , in  order 
to  make  matter  act  as  minds  require,  has  traced  out  for  it  its  path. 
So  that  after  this  we  ought  not  to  be  more  surprised  at  the  fact 
that  it  acts  with  so  much  reason,  than  at  the  course  of  certain  ser- 
pents in  fireworks  along  an  unseen  cord,  which  shows  that  it  is  a 
man  who  manages  them.  The  designs  of  God  can  only  be  grasped 
in  proportion  to  the  perfections  found  in  them,  and  bodies  being- 
subjected  to  souls  in  advance  in  order  to  be  accommodated  to  their 
voluntary  actions,  the  soul  in  its  turn  is  expressive  of  bodies  in 
virtue  of  its  primordial  nature,  being  obliged  to  represent  them  by 
its  involuntary  and  confused  perceptions.  Thus  each  one  is  the 
original  or  the  copy  of  the  other  in  proportion  to  the  perfections  or 
imperfections  which  it  involves. 


XXVI. 


Extracts  prom  ttie  Hew  Essays  ox  the  Understanding. 

1704. 

[From  the  French.] 

Preface. 

The  Essay  on  the  Understanding , by  an  illustrious  Englishman, 
being  one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  esteemed  works  of  the  time,  I 
have  resolved  to  make  Remarks  on  it,  because,  having  sufficiently 
meditated  for  a long  time  on  the  same  subject  and  upon  most  of  the 
matters  which  are  therein  touched  upon,  I have  thought  that  it 
would  be  a good  opportunity  to  put  forth  something  under  the 
title  of  New  Essays  on  the  Understanding,  and  to  obtain  a favor- 
able reception  for  my  thoughts  by  putting  them  in  such  good 
company.  I have  thought  also  that  I should  be  able  to  profit  by  the 
work  of  another,  not  only  to  lessen  my  own  (since  in  fact  it  is  less 
difficult  to  follow  the  thread  of  a good  author  than  to  labor  entirely 
de  novo),  but  also  to  add  something  to  what  he  has  given  us,  which 
is  always  easier  than  to  start  from  the  beginning ; for  I think  I 
have  cleared  up  some  difficulties  which  he  had  left  in  their  entire- 
ity.  Thus  his  reputation  is  advantageous  to  me;  besides,  being 
inclined  to  do  justice,  and  far  from  wishing  to  lessen  the  esteem 
in  which  that  work  is  held,  I would  increase  it,  if  my  approval 
was  of  any  weight.  It  is  true  that  I often  differ  from  him;  but 
far  from  denying  the  merit  of  celebrated  writers,  we  bear  witness 
to  it,  by  making  known  in  what  and  why  we  separate  ourselves 
from  their  opinion,  when  we  think  it  necessary  to  prevent  their 
authority  from  prevailing  over  reason  on  certain  points  of  impor- 
tance; besides  by  satisfying  such  excellent  men,  we  make  truth 
more  acceptable,  and  it  must  be  supposed  that  it  is  principally  for 
truth  that  they  labor. 

In  fact,  although  the  author  of  the  Essay  says  a thousand  fine 
things  of  which  I approve,  our  systems  differ  very  much.  His  has 
more  relation  to  Aristotle,  and  mine  to  Plato,  although  we  both 
diverge  in  many  things  from  the  doctrines  of  these  two  ancients. 


172 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


He  is  more  popular,  and  I am  forced  at  times  to  be  a little  more 
acromatic  and  more  abstract,  which  is  not  an  advantage  to  me, 
especially  when  I write  in  a living  language.  I think  nevertheless 
that  by  making  two  persons  speak,  one  of  whom  expounds  the 
views  taken  from  the  Essay  of  the  author  and  the  other  joins  thereto 
my  observations,  the  parallel  will  be  more  to  the  liking  of  the 
reader  than  wholly  dry  remarks,  the  reading  of  which  would  be 
constantly  interrupted  by  the  necessity  of  referring  to  his  book 
to  understand  mine.  It  will  nevertheless  be  well  to  compare  now 
and  then  our  writings  and  not  to  judge  of  his  views  except  by  his 
own  work,  although  I have  ordinarily  preserved  its  expression. 
It  is  true  that  the  constraint  which  the  discourse  of  another,  the 
thread  of  which  must  be  followed,  gives  in  making  Remarks,  has 
prevented  me  from  thinking  to  secure  the  embellishments  of  which 
the  dialogue  is  susceptible:  but  I hope  that  the  matter  will  make 
up  for  the  defect  of  style. 

Our  differences  are  on  subjects  of  some  importance.  The 
question  is  to  know  whether  the  soul  in  itself  is  entirely  empty, 
like  the  tablet  on  which  nothing  has  yet  been  written  ( tabula  rasa ) 
according  to  Aristotle  and  the  author  of  the  Essay,  and  whether 
all  that  is  traced  thereon  comes  solely  from  the  senses  and  from 
experience ; or  whether  the  soul  contains  originally  the  principles 
of  several  notions  and  doctrines  which  external  objects  merely 
awaken  on  occasions,  as  I believe,  with  Plato,  and  even  with  the 
schoolmen,  and  with  all  those  who  take  with  this  meaning  the 
passage  of  St.  Paul  (Romans,  2,  15)  where  he  remarks  that  the 
law  of  God  is  written  in  the  heart.  The  Stoics  called  these  prin- 
ciples prolepses,  that  is  to  say,  fundamental  assumptions,  or  what 
is  taken  for  granted  in  advance.  The  mathematicians  call  them 
common  notions  ( KOLval  evvotat ).  Modern  philosophers  give  them 
other  beautiful  names,  and  Julius  Scaliger  in  particular  named 
them  semina  aeternitatis,  also  zopyra,  as  meaning  living  fires, 
luminous  rays,  concealed  within  us,  but  which  the  encounter  of 
the  senses  makes  appear  like  the  sparks  which  the  blow  makes 
spring  from  the  steel.  And  it  is  not  without  reason  that  these 
flashes  are  believed  to  indicate  something  divine  and  eternal,  which 
appears  especially  in  necessary  truths.  Whence  there  arises 


SEW  ESSAYS  : PREFACE. 


173 


another  question,  whether  all  truths  depend  on  experience,  that 
is  to  say,  on  induction  and  examples,  or  whether  there  are  some 
which  have  still  another  basis.  For  if  some  events  can  be  foreseen 
before  any  proof  has  been  made  of  them,  it  is  manifest  that  we 
contribute  something  on  our  part  thereto.  The  senses,  although 
necessary  for  all  our  actual  knowledge,  are  not  sufficient  to  give 
to  us  the  whole  of  it,  since  the  senses  never  give  anything  except 
examples,  that  is  to  say,  particular  or  individual  truths.  Row  all 
the  examples  which  confirm  a general  truth,  however  numerous 
they  be,  do  not  suffice  to  establish  the  universal  necessity  of  this 
same  truth;  for  it  does  not  follow  that  what  has  happened  will 
happen  in  the  same  way.  For  example,  the  Greeks  and  Romans, 
and  all  other  peoples  of  the  earth  known  t'o  the  ancients,  have 
always  noticed  that  before  the  expiration  of  twenty-four  hours 
day  changes  into  night  and  the  night  into  day.  But  we  would 
be  deceived  if  we  believed  that  the  same  rule  holds  good  every- 
where else ; for  since  then,  the  contrary  has  been  experienced  in 
the  region  of  fSTova  Zembla.  And  he  would  still  deceive  himself 
who  believed  that,  in  our  climates  at  least,  it  is  a necessary  and 
eternal  truth  which  will  last  always ; since  we  must  think  that 
the  earth  and  the  sun  even  do  not  exist  necessarily,  and  that  there 
will  perhaps  he  a time  when  this  beautiful  star  will  no  longer  be, 
at  least  in  its  present  form,  nor  all  its  system.  AVhence  it  would 
seem  that  necessary  truths,  such  as  are  found  in  pure  mathematics 
and  especially  in  arithmetic  and  in  geometry,  must  have  princi- 
ples the  proof  of  which  does  not  depend  on  examples,  nor,  conse- 
quently, on  the  testimony  of  the  senses,  although  without  the  senses 
we  would  never  take  it  into  our  heads  to  think  of  them.  This 
ought  to  be  well  recognized,  and  this  is  what  Euclid  has  so  well 
understood  that  he  often  demonstrates  by  reason  that  which  is 
sufficiently  seen  through  experience  and  by  sensible  images. 
Logic  also,  together  with  metaphysics  and  ethics,  one  of  which 
forms  theology  and  the  other  jurisprudence,  both  natural,  are  full 
of  such  truths ; and  consequently  their  proof  can  only  come  from 
internal  principles  which  are  called  innate.  It  is  true  that  we  must 
not  imagine  that  these  eternal  laws  of  the  reason  can  be  read  in 
the  soul  as  in  an  open  book,  as  the  edict  of  the  pretor  is  read  upon 


174 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBXITZ. 


bis  album  without  difficulty  and  without  research;  but  it  is 
enough  that  they  can  be  discovered  in  us  by  force  of  attention,  for 
which  occasions  are  furnished  by  the  senses ; and  the  success  of 
experiments  serves  also  as  confirmation  to  the  reason,  very  much  as 
proofs  serve  in  arithmetic  for  better  avoiding  error  of  reckoning 
when  the  reasoning  is  long.  It  is  also  in  this  that  human  knowl- 
edge and  that  of  tlie  brutes  differ : the  brutes  are  purely  empirics 
and  only  guide  themselves  by  examples,  for  they  never,  as  far  as 
we  can  judge,  come  to  form  necessary  propositions;  whereas  men 
are  capable  of  demonstrative  sciences.  It  is  also  for  this  reason 
that  the  faculty  which  brutes  have  of  making  consecutions  is  some- 
thing inferior  to  the  reason  which  is  in  man.  The  consecutions  of 
the  brutes  are  merely  like  those  of  simple  empirics,  who  claim 
that  what  has  happened  sometimes  will  happen  also  in  a case  where 
that  which  strikes  them  is  similar,  without  being  able  to  judge 
whether  the  same  reasons  bold  good.  This  is  why  it  is  so  easy 
for  men  to  entrap  brutes  and  sd  easy  for  simple  empirics  to  make 
mistakes.  This  is  why  persons  who  have  become  skilled  by  age 
or  by  experience  are  not  exempt  from  error  when  they  rely  too 
much  upon  their  past  experience,  as  has  happened  to  many  in 
civil  and  military  affairs ; because  they  do  not  sufficiently  con- 
sider that  the  world  changes  and  that  men  become  more  skilled  by 
finding  a thousand  new  dexterities,  whereas  deer  and  bares  of  the 
present  day  do  not  become  more  cunning  than  those  of  past  time. 
The  consecutions  of  the  brutes  are  only  a shadow  of  reasoning, 
that  is  to  say,  they  are  but  connections  of  the  imagination  and 
passages  from  one  image  to  another,  because  in  a new  juncture 
which  appears  similar  to  the  preceding  they  expect  anew  what  they 
found  conjoined  with  it  before,  as  if  things  were  linked  together  in 
fact  because  their  images  are  connected  in  the  memory.  It  is  true 
that  even  reason  counsels  us  to  expect  ordinarily  to  see  that  happen 
in  the  future  which  is  conformed  to  a long  past  experience,  but 
this  is  not  for  this  reason  a necessary  and  infallible  truth,  and 
success  may  cease  when  we  expect  it  least,  if  the  reasons  which 
have  sustained  it  change.  This  is  why  the  wisest  do  not  so  rely 
upon  it  as  not  to  try  to  discover  something  of  the  reason  (if  it 
is  possible)  of  this  fact,  in  order  to  judge  when  it  will  be  necessary 


JfEW  ESSAYS  : PREFACE. 


175 


to  make  exceptions.  For  reason  is  alone  capable  of  establishing 
sure  rules,  and  of  supplying  what  is  lacking  to  those  which  were 
not  such  by  inserting  their  exceptions  ; and  of  finding,  finally, 
certain  connections  in  the  force  of  necessary  consequences,  which 
often  gives  the  means  of  foreseeing  the  event  without  having  need 
of  experiencing  the  sensible  connections  of  images,  to  which  the 
brutes  are  reduced;  so  that  that  which  justifies  the  internal  prin- 
ciples of  necessary  truths,  distinguishes  also  man  from  the  brutes. 

Perhaps  our  able  author  will  not  differ  entirely  from  my  opinion. 
For  after  having  employed  the  whole  of  his  first  book  in  rejecting 
innate  knowledge  [lumieres],  taken  in  a certain  sense,  he  never- 
theless avows  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  and  in  what  follows, 
that  the  ideas  which  do  not  orginate  in  sensation  come  from 
reflection.  Flow  reflection  is  nothing  else  than  attention  to  what  is 
in  us,  and  the  senses  do  not  give  us  that  which  we  already  carry 
with  us.  This  being  so,  can  it  be  denied  that  there  is  much  that 
is  innate  in  our  mind,  since  we  are  innate,  so  to  say,  in  ourselves  ? 
and  that  there  is  in  us  ourselves,  being,  unity,  substance,  duration, 
change,  action,  perception,  pleasure,  and  a thousand  other  objects 
of  our  intellectual  ideas?  And  these  objects  being  immediate 
to  our  understanding  and  always  present  (although  they  cannot 
be  always  perceived  on  account  of  our  distractions  and  wants),  why 
be  astonished  that  we  say  that  these  ideas,  with  all  which  depends 
on  them,  are  innate  in  us  ? I have  made  use  also  of  the  comparison 
of  a block  of  marble  which  has  veins,  rather  than  of  a block  of 
marble  wholly  even,  or  of  blank  tablets,  that  is  to  say,  of 
what  is  called  among  philosophers  tabula  rasa.  For  if  the  soul 
resembled  these  blank  tablets,  truths  would  be  in  us  as  the  figure 
of  Hercules  is  in  marble  when  the  marble  is  entirely  indifferent 
toward  receiving  this  figure  or  some  other.  Bpit  if  there  were  veins 
in  the  block  which  should  mark  out  the  figure  of  Hercules  rather 
than  other  figures,  the  block  would  be  more  determined  thereto, 
and  Hercules  would  be  in  it  as  in  some  sort  innate,  although  it 
would  be  necessary  to  labor  in  order  to  discover  these  veins  and  to 
cleanse  them  by  polishing  and  by  cutting  away  that  which  prevents 
them  from  appearing.  It  is  thus  that  ideas  and  truths  are  innate 
in  us,  as  inclinations,  dispositions,  habits,  or  natural  capacities, 


170 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBXITZ. 


and  not  as  actions ; although  these  capacities  are  always  accom- 
panied by  some  actions,  often  insensible,  which  correspond  to  them. 

It  seems  that  our  able  author  claims  that  there  is  nothing  virtual 
in  us,  and  nothing  even  of  which  we  are  not  always  actually  con- 
scious ; but  this  cannot  be  taken  strictly,  otherwise  his  opinion 
would  be  too  paradoxical ; since,  moreover,  acquired  habits  and 
the  stores  of  our  memory  are  not  always  consciously  perceived  and 
do  not  even  come  always  to  our  aid  at  need,  although  we  often 
easily  bring  them  hack  to  the  mind  on  some  slight  occasion  which 
makes  us  remember  them,  just  as  we  need  but  the  beginning  of  a 
song  to  remember  it.  He  modifies  also  his  assertion  in  other 
places,  by  saying  that  there  is  nothing  in  us  of  which  we  have  not 
been  at  least  formerly  conscious.  But  in  addition  to  the  fact  that 
no  one  can  be  sure,  by  reason  alone,  how  far  our  past  apperceptions, 
which  we  may  have  forgotten,  may  have  gone,  especially  according 
to  the  doctrine  of  reminiscence  of  the  Platonists,  which,  fabulous 
as  it  is,  has  nothing  in  it  incompatible,  at  least  in  part,  with  the 
bare  reason : in  addition  to  this,  I say,  why  is  it  necessary  that  all 
be  acquired  by  us  through  the  perceptions  of  external  things,  and 
that  nothing  can  be  unearthed  in  ourselves  ? Is  our  soul  then  such 
a blank  that,  besides  the  images  imprinted  from  without,  it  is 
nothing?  This  is  not  an  opinion  (I  am  sure)  which  our  judicious 
author  can  approve.  And  where  are  there  found  tablets  which  are 
not  something  varied  in  themselves?  For  we  never  see  a surface 
perfectly  even  and  uniform.  Why,  then,  could  we  not  furnish 
also  to  ourselves  something  of  thought  from  our  own  depths,  if 
we  should  dig  therein  ? Thus  I am  led  to  believe  that  at  bottom 
his  opinion  on  this  point  is  not  different  from  mine,  or  rather 
from  the  common  opinion,  inasmuch  as  he  recognized  two  sources 
of  our  knowledge,  the  Senses  and  Reflection. 

I do  not  know  whether  it  will  be  as  easy  to  bring  him  in  accord 
with  us  and  with  the  Cartesians,  when  he  maintains  that  the  mind 
does  not  always  think,  and  particularly  that  it  is  without  percep- 
tion when  we  sleep  without  dreaming.  And  he  objects  that,  since 
bodies  may  be  without  motion,  souls  may  also  well  be  without 
thought.  But  here  I reply  a little  differently  than  is  wont  to  be 
done,  for  I maintain  that  naturally  a substance  cannot  be  without 


NEW  ESSAYS  : PREFACE. 


177 


activity,  and  even  that  there  never  is  a body  without  motion. 
Experience  already  favors  me,  and  one  has  only  to  consult  the  book 
of  the  illustrious  Mr.  Boyle  against  absolute  repose,  to  be  persuaded 
of  it ; but  I believe  that  reason  also  favors  it,  and  this  is  one  of 
the  proofs  which  I have  for  discarding  atoms. 

Furthermore,  there  are  a thousand  indications  which  lead  us  to 
think  that  there  are  at  every  moment  numberless  perceptions  in 
us,  but  without  apperception  and  without  reflection ; that  is  to  say, 
changes  in  the  soul  itself  of  which  we  are  not  conscious,  because  the 
impressions  are  either  too  slight  or  in  too  great  a number  or  too 
even,  so  that  they  have  nothing  sufficient  to  distinguish  them  one 
from  the  other;  hut  joined  to  others,  they  do  not  fail  to  produce 
their  effect  and  to  make  themselves  felt  at  least  confusedly  in  the 
mass.  Thus  it  is  that  custom  causes  us  not  to  take  notice  of 
the  motion  of  a mill  or  of  a waterfall  when  we  have  lived  near  it 
for  some  time.  It  is  not  that  the  motion  does  not  always  strike 
our  organs,  and  that  something  does  not  enter  the  soul  which 
answers  thereto,  on  account  of  the  harmony  of  the  soul  and  the 
body;  hut  these  impressions  which  are  in  the  soul  and  in  body, 
being  destitute  of  the  charms  of  novelty,  are  not  strong  enough  to 
attract  our  attention  and  our  memory,  attached  as  they  are  to 
objects  more  engrossing.  For  all  attention  requires  memory,  and 
often  when  we  are  not  admonished,  so  to  speak,  and  advised  to 
attend  to  some  of  our  own  present  perceptions,  we  let  them  pass 
without  reflection  and  even  without  being  noticed ; but  if  some  one 
calls  our  attention  to  them  immediately  afterwards  and  makes  us 
notice,  for  example,  some  noise  which  was  just  heard,  we  remember 
it  and  are  conscious  of  having  had  at  the  time  some  feeling  of  it. 
Thus  there  were  perceptions  of  which  we  were  not  immediately 
conscious,  consciousness  only  coming  in  this  case  from  the  warning 
received  after  some  interval,  small  though  it  may  be.  And  to 
judge  still  better  of  the  minute  perceptions  which  we  are  unable  to 
distinguish  in  the  crowd,  I am  accustomed  to  make  use  of  the 
example  of  the  roar  or  noise  of  the  sea  which  strikes  one  when  on 
the  shore.  To  hear  this  noise  as  one  does  it  would  be  necessary 
to  hear  the  parts  which  compose  the  whole,  that  is  to  say, 
the  noise  of  each  wave,  although  each  of  these  little  noises  only 
12 


ITS 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


makes  itself  known  in  tlie  confused  collection  of  all  tke  others 
together,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  roar  itself,  and  would  not  be 
noticed  if  the  wave  which  makes  it  was  alone.  For  it  must  he  that 
we  are  affected  a little  by  the  motion  of  this  wave  and  that  we 
have  some  perception  of  each  of  these  noises  however  small ; other- 
wise we  would  not  have  that  of  a hundred  thousand  waves,  since  a 
hundred  thousand  nothings  cannot  make  something.  One  never 
sleeps  so  profoundly  but  that  he  has  some  feeble  and  confused  feel- 
ing, and  he  would  never  be  awakened  by  the  greatest  noise  in  the 
world  if  he  did  not  have  some  perception  of  its  small  beginning, 
just  as  one  would  never  break  a rope  by  the  greatest  effort  in  the 
world  if  it  was  not  stretched  and  lengthened  a little  by  smaller 
efforts,  although  the  little  extension  which  they  produce  is  not 
apparent. 

These  minute  perceptions  are  then  of  greater  efficacy  by  their 
consequences  than  is  thought.  It  is  they  which  form  1 know  not 
what,  these  tastes,  these  images  of  the  sensible  qualities,  clear  in 
the  mass  but  confused  in  the  parts,  these  impressions  which  sur- 
rounding bodies  make  upon  us,  which  embrace  the  infinite,  this 
connection  which  each  being  has  with  all  the  rest  of  the  universe. 
It  may  even  be  said  that  in  consequence  of  these  minute  per- 
ceptions the  present  is  big  with  the  future  and  laden  with  the 
past,  that  all  things  conspire  ( a-v^irvoia  Travra,  as  Hippocrates 
said)  ; and  that  in  the  least  of  substances  eyes  as  piercing  as  those 
of  God  could  read  the  whole  course  of  the  things  in  the  universe, 
Quae  sint,  quae  fuerint,  quae  mox  futura  traliantur.  These  insen- 
sible perceptions  indicate  also  and  constitute  the  same  indi- 
vidual, who  is  characterized  by  the  traces  or  expressions  which 
they  preserve  of  the  preceding  states  of  this  individual,  in  making 
the  connection  with  his  present  state ; and  these  can  be  known  by  a 
superior  mind,  even  if  this  individual  himself  should  not  be  aware 
of  them,  that  is  to  say,  when  the  express  recollection  of  them  will 
no  longer  be  in  him.  But  they  (these  perceptions,  I say)  furnish 
the  means  of  finding  again  this  recollection  at  need,  by  the  periodic 
developments  which  may  some  day  happen.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  death  can  be  but  a sleep,  and  cannot  indeed  continue,  the 
perceptions  merely  ceasing  to  be  sufficiently  distinguished  and 


NEW  ESSAYS  : PREFACE. 


179 


being,  in  animals,  reduced  to  a state  of  confusion  which  suspends 
consciousness,  but  which  could  not  last  always ; not  to  speak  here 
of  man  who  must  have  in  this  respect  great  privileges  in  order  to 
preserve  his  personality. 

It  is  also  through  the  insensible  perceptions  that  the  admirable 
preestablished  harmony  of  the  soul  and  the  body,  and  indeed  of 
all  monads  or  simple  substances,  is  to  be  explained ; which  supplies 
the  place  of  the  unmaintainable  influence  of  the  one  upon  the 
others,  and  which,  in  the  judgment  of  the  author  of  the  finest  of 
Dictionaries  [Bayle],  exalts  the  greatness  of  the  divine  perfections 
above  what  has  ever  been  conceived.  After  this  I should  add  little, 
if  I were  to  say  that  it  is  these  minute  perceptions  which  determine 
us  in  many  a juncture  without  it  being  thought  of,  and  which 
deceive  the  vulgar  by  the  appearance  of  an  indifference  of  equili- 
brium, as  if  we  were  entirely  indifferent  to  turning  (for  example) 
to  the  right  or  to  the  left.  It  is  not  necessary  also  that  I notice 
here,  as  I have  done  in  the  book  itself,  that  they  cause  that  uneasi- 
ness which  I show  consists  in  something  which  does  not  differ  from 
pain  except  as  the  small  from  the  great,  and  which  nevertheless 
often  constitutes  our  desire  and  even  our  pleasure,  in  giving  to  it 
a stimulating  flalvor.  It  is  also  the  inconceivable  parts  of  our 
sensible  perceptions  which  produce  a relation  between  the  percep- 
tions of  colors,  of  heat  and  of  other  sensible  qualities  and  between 
the  motions  in  bodies  which  correspond  to  them ; whereas  the 
Cartesians  with  our  author,  thoroughly  penetrating  as  he  is,  con- 
ceive the  perceptions  which  we  have  of  these  qualities  as  arbitrary, 
that  is  to  say,  as  if  God  had  given  them  to  the  soul  according  to 
his  good  pleasure  without  having  regard  to  any  essential  relation 
between  these  perceptions  and  their  objects:  an  opinion  which 
surprises  me,  and  which  appears  to  me  little  worthy  of  the  Author 
of  things,  who  does  nothing  without  harmony  and  without  reason. 

In  a word,  insensible  perceptions  are  of  as  great  use  in  pneu- 
matics as  insensible  corpuscles  are  in  physics,  and  it  is  equally 
as  unreasonable  to  reject  the  one  as  the  other  under  the  pretext 
that  they  are  beyond  the  reach  of  our  senses.  Nothing  takes  place 
all  at  once,  and  it  is  one  of  my  great  maxims,  and  one  of  the  most 
verified,  that  nature  never  makes  leaps:  this  is  what  I called  the 


ISO 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


Law  of  Continuity,  when  I spoke  of  it  in  the  first  Nouvelles  de  la 
Republique  des  Lcttres;  and  the  use  of  this  law  is  very  consider- 
able in  physics.  It  teaches  that  we  pass  always  from  the  small  to 
the  great,  and  vice  versa,  through  the  medium,  in  degrees  as  in 
parts ; and  that  motion  never  rises  immediately  from  repose  nor  is 
reduced  to  it  except  by  a smaller  motion,  just  as  one  never  com- 
pletes running  any  line  or  length  before  having  completed  a shorter 
line ; although  hitherto  those  who  have  laid  down  the  laws  of 
motion  have  not  observed  this  law,  believing  that  a body  can 
receive  in  an  instant  a motion  contrary  to  the  preceding.  And  all 
this  leads  us  to  conclude  rightly  that  noticeable  perceptions  also 
come  by  degrees  from  these  which  are  too  minute  to  be  noticed. 
To  think  otherwise  is  to  little  understand  the  immense  subtilty 
of  things,  which  always  and  everywhere  embraces  an  actual 
infinite. 

I have  also  noticed  that  in  virtue  of  insensible  variations,  two 
individual  things  cannot  be  perfectly  alike,  and  that  they  must 
always  differ  more  than  numero ; which  destroys  the  blank  tablets 
of  the  soul,  a soul  without  thought,  a substance  without  action,  a 
void  in  space,  atoms  and  even  particles  not  actually  divided  in  mat- 
ter, absolute  rest,  entire  uniformity  in  one  part  of  time,  of  space  or 
of  matter,  perfect  globes  of  the  second  element,  born  of  perfect 
and  original  cubes,  and  a thousand  other  fictions  of  the  philoso- 
phers which  come  from  their  incomplete  notions,  and  which  the 
nature  of  things  does  not  permit,  and  which  our  ignorance  and  the 
little  attention  we  give  to  the  insensible,  let  pass,  but  which  can  not 
be  tolerated,  unless  they  are  limited  to  abstractions  of  the  mind 
which  protests  that  it  does  not  deny  what  it  puts  aside  and  what 
it  thinks  ought  not  enter  into  any  present  consideration.  Other- 
wise if  it  is  rightly  understood,  namely,  that  things  of  which  we 
are  not  conscious,  are  not  in  the  soul  nor  in  the  body,  we  should  be 
lacking  in  philosophy  as  in  politics,  in  neglecting  to  /m xp'°v,  insen- 
sible progressions  ; whereas  an  abstraction  is  not  an  error,  provided 
we  know  that  what  we  feign  is  there.  Just  as  mathematicians 
employ  abstraction  when  they  speak  of  perfect  lines  which  they 
propose  to  us,  of  uniform  motions  and  of  other  regulated  effects, 
although  matter  (that  is  to  say,  the  medley  of  the  effects  of  the 


NEW  ESSAYS  : PREFACE. 


181 


surrounding  infinite,  always  makes  some  exception.  It  is  in  order 
to  distinguish  the  considerations,  and  to  reduce,  as  far  as  is 
possible,  the  effects  to  reasons,  and  to  foresee  some  of  their  con- 
sequences, that  we  proceed  thus : for  the  more  careful  we  are  to 
neglect  no  consideration  which  we  are  able  to  control,  the  more 
practice  corresponds  to  theory.  But  it  pertains  only  to  the 
Supreme  Reason,  which  nothing  escapes,  to  comprehend  distinctly 
all  the  infinite  and  to  see  all  the  reasons  and  all  the  consequences. 
All  that  we  can  do  as  regards  infinites  is  to  recognize  them  con- 
fusedly, and  to  know  at  least  distinctly  that  they  are  there ; other- 
wise we  judge  very  wrongly  of  the  beauty  and  grandeur  of  the 
universe ; so  also  we  could  not  have  a sound  physics  which  should 
explain  the  nature  of  bodies  in  general,  and  still  less  a sound 
pneumatics  which  should  comprise  the  knowledge  of  God,  of  souls 
and  of  simple  substances  in  general. 

This  knowledge  of  insensible  perceptions  serves  also  to  explain 
why  and  how  two  souls,  human  or  otherwise,  of  the  same  kind, 
never  come  from  the  hands  of  the  Creator  perfectly  alike,  and  each 
always  has  its  original  relation  to  the  points  of  view  which  it  will 
have  in  the  universe.  But  this  it  is  which  already  follows  from 
what  I have  remarked  of  two  individuals,  namely,  that  their  differ- 
ence is  always  more  than  numerical.  There  is  still  another  point 
of  importance,  on  which  I am  obliged  to  differ  not  only  from  the 
opinions  of  our  author  but  also  from  those  of  the  greater  part  of 
modern  philosophers ; this  is,  that  I believe,  with  most  of  the 
ancients,  that  all  genii,  all  souls,  all  simple  created  substances  are 
always  joined  to  a body,  and  that  there  never  are  souls  entirely 
separated.  I have  a 'priori  reasons  for  this  ; but  this  advantage  is 
also  found  in  the  doctrine,  that  it  resolves  all  the  philosophical  diffi- 
culties as  to  the  condition  of  souls,  as  to  their  perpetual  conserva- 
tion, as  to  their  immortality  and  as  to  their  action.  The  difference 
of  one  of  their  states  from  another  never  being  and  never  having 
been  anything  but  that  of  more  sensible  to  less  sensible,  of  more 
perfect  to  less  perfect,  or  vice  versa , this  doctrine  renders  their 
past  or  future  state  as  explicable  as  that  of  the  present.  One  feels 
sufficiently,  however  little  reflection  one  makes,  that  this  is  rational, 
and  that  a leap  from  one  state  to  another  infinitely  different  state 


182 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


could  not  be  so  natural.  I am  astonished  that  by  quitting  the 
natural  without  reason,  the  schoolmen  have  been  willing  to  plunge 
themselves  purposely  into  very  great  difficulties,  and  to  furnish 
matter  for  apparent  triumphs  of  freethinkers,  all  of  whose  reasons 
fall  at  a single  blow  by  this  explanation  of  things ; according  to 
which  there  is  no  more  difficulty  in  conceiving  the  conservation  of 
souls  (or  rather,  according  to  me,  of  the  animal)  than  there  is  in 
conceiving  the  change  of  the  caterpillar  into  the  butterfly,  and  the 
conservation  of  thought  in  sleep,  to  which  Jesus  Christ  has  divinely 
well  compared  death.  I have  already  said,  also,  that  sleep  could 
not  last  always,  and  it  will  last  least  or  almost  not  at  all  to  rational 
souls,  who  are  destined  always  to  preserve  the  personality  which 
has  been  given  them  in  the  City  of  God,  and  consequently  remem- 
brance: and  this  in  order  to  be  more  susceptible  to  chastisements 
and  recompenses.  And  I add  further  that  in  general  no  derange- 
ment of  the  visible  organs  is  able  to  throw  things  into  entire  con- 
fusion in  the  animal  or  to  destroy  all  the  organs  and  to  deprive  the 
soul  of  the  whole  of  its  organic  body  and  of  the  ineffaceable 
remains  of  all  preceding  impressions.  But  the  ease  with  which 
the  ancient  doctrine  has  been  abandoned  of  subtile  bodies  united 
to  the  angels  (which  wag  confounded  with  the  corporeality  of  the 
angels  themselves),  and  the  introduction  of  pretended  separate 
intelligences  in  creatures  (to  which  those  [unembodied  intelli- 
gences] which  make  the  heavens  of  Aristotle  revolve  have  con- 
tributed much),  and  finally  the  poorly  understood  opinion  into 
which  we  have  fallen  that  the  souls  of  brutes  could  not  be  preserved 
without  falling  into  metempsychosis  and  without  conducting  them 
from  body  to  body,  and  the  embarrassment  in  which  men  have 
been  placed  by  not  knowing  what  to  do  with  them,  have  caused  us, 
in  my  opinion,  to  neglect  the  natural  way  of  explaining  the  con- 
servation of  the  soul.  This  has  done  great  injury  to  natural  relig- 
ion and  has  made  many  believe  that  our  immortality  was  only 
a miraculous  grace  of  God,  of  which  also  our  celebrated  author 
speaks  with  some  doubt,  as  I shall  presently  remark.  But  it  were 
to  be  desired  that  all  who  are  of  this  opinion  had  spoken  as  wisely 
and  Avith  as  good  faith  as  be ; for  it  is  to  be  feared  that  many  who 
speak  of  immortality  through  grace  do  it  but  to  save  appearances, 


NEW  ESSAYS  : PREFACE. 


183 


and  approximate  at  heart  those  Averroists  and  some  bad  Quietists 
who  picture  to  themselves  an  absorption  and  the  reunion  of  the 
soul  with  the  ocean  of  divinity;  a notion  the  impossibility  of 
which  perhaps  my  system  alone  makes  evident. 

It  seems  also  that  we  differ  further  as  regards  matter,  in  that  the 
author  thinks  a vacuum  is  here  necessary  for  motion,  because  he 
thinks  that  the  minute  parts  of  matter  are  rigid.  And  I acknowl- 
edge that  if  matter  were  composed  of  such  parts  motion  in  the 
plenum  would  he  impossible,  just  as  if  a room  were  full  of  a quan- 
tity of  small  pebbles  without  there  being  the  least  vacant  space. 
But  this  supposition,  for  which  there  appears  also  no  reason,  is 
not  admissible,  although  this  able  author  goes  to  the  point  of 
believing  that  rigidity  or  cohesion  of  minute  parts  constitutes  the 
essence  of  body.  It  is  necessary  rather  to  conceive  space  as  full 
of  an  orginally  fluid  matter,  susceptible  of  all  divisions,  and  even 
actually  subjected  to  divisions  and  subdivisions  ad  infinitum j 
hut  nevertheless  with  this  difference  that  it  is  divisible  and  divided 
unequally  in  different  places,  on  account  of  the  motions  more  or 
less  concurring,  which  are  already  there.  This  it  is  which  causes 
it  to  have  everywhere  a degree  of  rigidity  as  well  as  of  fluidity, 
and  which  causes  no  body  to  be  hard  or  fluid  to  the  highest  degree, 
that  is  to  say,  no  atom  to  he  found  of  an  insurmountable  hardness 
nor  any  mass  entirely  indifferent  to  division.  The  order  also  of 
nature  and  particularly  the  law  of  continuity  destroy  both  equally. 

I have  shown  also  that  cohesion,  which  would  not  itself  be  the 
effect  of  impulse  or  of  motion,  would  cause  a traction  taken 
strictly.  For  if  there  were  a body  originally  inflexible,  for 
example,  an  Epicurean  atom,  which  should  have  a part  projecting 
in  the  form  of  a hook  (since  we  can  conceive  atoms  of  all  sorts  of 
shapes),  this  hook  pushed  would  carry  with  it  the  rest  of  the  atom ; 
that  is  to  say,  the  part  which  is  not  pushed  and  which  does  not 
fall  in  the  line  of  impulsion.  Nevertheless  our  able  author  is  him- 
self opposed  to  these  philosophical  tractions,  such  as  were  attrib- 
uted formerly  to  the  abhorrence  of  a vacuum ; and  he  reduces 
them  to  impulses,  maintaining,  with  the  moderns,  that  one  part  of 
matter  operates  immediately  upon  another  only  by  pushing  it  by 
contact.  In  which  I think  they  are  right,  since  otherwise  there  is 
nothing  intelligible  in  the  operation. 


184 


PIIILOSOri-IICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


It  is  however  necessary  not  to  conceal  the  fact  that  I have 
noticed  a sort  of  retraction  by  our  excellent  author  on  this  subject; 
whose  modest  sincerity  in  this  respect  I cannot  refrain  from  prais- 
ing as  much  as  I have  admired  his  penetrating  genius  on  other 
occasions.  It  is  in  the  reply  to  the  second  letter  of  the  late  Bishop 
of  Worcester,  printed  in  1699,  p.  408,  where  to  justify  the  opinion 
which  he  had  maintained  in  opposition  to  that  learned  prelate, 
namely,  that  matter  might  think,  he  says  among  other  things : 1 
admit  that  I have  said  (book  2 of  the  Essay  on  the  Understand- 
ing, chap.  8,  § 11)  that  body  acts  by  impulse  and  not  otherwise. 
This  also  luas  my  opinion  when  I wrote  it,  and  still  at  present  I 
cannot  conceive  in  it  another  manner  of  acting.  But  since  then 
I have  been  convinced  by  the  incomparable  booh  of  the  judicious 
Mr.  Neiuton,  that  there  is  too  much  presumption  in  ivishing  to 
limit  the  power  of  God  by  our  limited  conceptions.  The  gravita- 
tion of  matter  towards  matter,  by  ivays  which  are  inconceivable  to 
me,  is  not  only  a demonstration  that  God  can,  when  it  seems  good 
to  him,  put  in  bodies  powers  and  ivays  of  acting  which  transcend 
that  which  can  be  derived  from  our  idea  of  body  or  explained  by 
what  we  hnoio  of  matter ; but  it  is  further  an  incontestable 
instance  that  he  has  really  done  so.  I shall  therefore  take  care 
that  in  the  next  edition  of  my  booh  this  passage  be  corrected.  I 
find  that  in  the  French  version  of  this  book,  made  undoubtedly 
according  to  the  latest  editions,  it  has  been  put  thus  in  this  §11: 
It  is  evident,  at  least  so  far  as  we  are  able  to  conceive  it,  that  it  is 
by  impulse  and  not  otherwise  that  bodies  act  on  each  other,  for  it 
is  impossible  for  us  to  understand  that  body  can  act  upon  what  it 
does  not  touch,  which  is  as  much  as  to  imagine  that  it  can  act 
where  it  is  not. 

I cannot  hut  praise  that  modest  piety  of  our  celebrated  author, 
which  recognizes  that  God  can  do  above  what  we  are  able  to  under- 
stand, and  that  thus  there  may  be  inconceivable  mysteries  in  the 
articles  of  faith ; hut  I should  not  like  to  be  obliged  to  resort  to 
miracle  in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature,  and  to  admit  powers  and 
operations  absolutely  inexplicable.  Otherwise  too  much  license 
will  be  given  to  bad  philosophers,  under  cover  of  what  God  can 
do;  and  by  admitting  these  centripetal  forces  [ vertus ] or  these 


NEW  ESSAYS  : PREFACE. 


185 


immediate  attractions  from  a distance,  without  its  being  possible 
to  render  them  intelligible,  I see  nothing  to  binder  our  scholastics 
from  saying  that  everything  is  done  simply  by  their  ‘faculties/ 
and  from  maintaining  their  ‘intentional  species’  which  go  from 
objects  to  us  and  find  means  of  entering  even  into  our  souls.  If 
this  is  so,  omnia  jam  fient,  fieri  quae  posse  negabam.  So  that  it 
seems  to  me  that  our  author,  quite  judicious  as  he  is,  goes  here*  a 
little  too  much  from  one  extreme  to  the  other.  He  is  squeamish 
concerning  the  operations  of  souls,  when  the  question  merely  is  to 
admit  that  which  is  not  sensible;  and  now,  behold,  he  gives  to 
bodies  that  which  is  not  even  intelligible;  granting  them  powers 
and  actions  which  surpass  all  that  in  my  opinion  a created  spirit 
could  do  and  understand,  for  he  grants  them  attraction,  and  that 
even  at  great  distances,  without  limiting  them  to  any  sphere  of 
activity,  and  this  to  maintain  an  opinion  which  does  not  appear  less 
inexplicable;  namely,  the  possibility  that  in  the  order  of  nature 
matter  may  think. 

The  question  which  he  discusses  with  the  celebrated  prelate  who 
attacked  him,  is  whether  matter  can  think;  and  as  this  is  an 
important  point,  even  for  the  present  work,  I cannot  exempt 
myself  from  entering  upon  it  a little  and  from  taking  notice  of 
their  controversy.  I will  present  the  substance  of  it  on  this  sub- 
ject and  will  take  the  liberty  of  saying  what  I think  of  it.  The 
late  Bishop  of  Worcester,  fearing  (hut  in  my  opinion  without 
good  reason)  that  our  author’s  doctrine  of  ideas  was  liable  to  some 
abuses  prejudicial  to  the  Christain  faith,  undertook  to  examine 
some  passages  of  it  in  his  Vindication  of  the  Doctrine  of  the 
Trinity ; and  having  done  justice  to  this  excellent  writer  by  recog- 
nizing that  he  regards  the  existence  of  the  mind  as  certain  as  that 
of  body,  although  the  one  of  these  substances  is  as  little  known 
as  the  other,  he  asks  (pp.  241  seqq.)  how  reflection  can  assure 
us  of  the  existence  of  the  mind,  if  God  can  give  to  matter  the 
faculty  of  thinking,  according  to  the  opinion  of  our  author,  bk. 
4,  chap.  3,  since  thus  the  way  of  ideas  which  ought  to  enable  us  to 
discern  what  may  be  proper  to  the  soul  or  to  the  body,  would 
become  useless ; whereas  he  had  said,  bk.  2 of  the  Essay  on  the 
Understanding,  ch.  23,  §§  15,  27,  28,  that  the  operations  of  the 


ISO  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

soul  furnisli  us  the  idea  of  the  mind,  and  the  understanding  with 
the  will  renders  this  idea  as  intelligible  to  us  as  the  nature  of 
body  is  rendered  by  solidity  and  impulse.  This  is  how  our  author 
replies  in  the  first  letter  (pp.  65  seqq.)  : I believe  that  I have 
proved  that  there  is  a spiritual  substance  in  us,  for  we  experience 
in  ourselves  thought;  now  this  action  or  this  mode  could  not  be 
the  object  of  the  idea  of  a thing  subsisting  of  itself,  and  conse- 
quently this  mode  needs  a support  or  subject  of  inhesion,  and  the 
idea  of  this  support  farms  what  ive  call  substance.  . . For  since 
the  general  idea  of  substance  is  everywhere  the  same,  it  follows 
that  the  modification,  which  is  called  thought  or  power  of  thinking, 
being  joined  to  it,  there  results  a mind  without  there  being  need 
of  considering  what  other  modification  it  has  in  addition;  that 
is  whether  it  has  solidity  or  not.  And  on  the  other  hand,  the 
substance  which  has  the  modification  called  solidity  will  be  matter, 
whether  thought  be  joined  to  it  or  not.  But  if  by  a spiritual 
substance  you  understand  an  immaterial  substance,  I confess  that 
I have  not  proved  that  there  is  one  in  us,  and  that  it  cannot  be 
proved  demonstratively  on  my  principles.  Although  what  I have 
said  on  the  systems  of  matter  (bk.  4,  cli.  10,  § 16),  in  demon- 
strating that  God  is  immaterial,  renders  it  extremely  probable  that 

the  substance  which  thinks  in  us  is  immaterial However 

I have  shown  (adds  the  author,  p.  68)  that  the  great  ends  of 
religion  and  of  morals  are  assured  by  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
without  its  being  necessary  to  suppose  its  immateriality. 

The  learned  Bishop  in  his  reply  to  this  letter,  in  order  to  show 
that  our  author  was  of  another  opinion  when  he  wrote  his  second 
book  of  the  Essay,  quotes,  p.  51,  the  passage  (taken  from  the  same 
book,  ch.  23,  § 15)  where  it  is  said,  that  by  the  simple  ideas  ivhich 
we  have  deduced  from  the  operations  of  our  mind,  ive  can  form 
the  complex  idea  of  a mind.  And  that  putting  together  the  ideas 
of  thought,  of  perception,  of  liberty  and  of  power  of  moving  our 
body,  we  have  as  clear  a notion  of  immaterial  substances  as  of 
material.  ITe  quotes  still  other  passages  to  show  that  the  author 
opposed  mind  to  body.  And  he  says  (p.  54)  that  the  ends  of  relig- 
ion and  of  morals  are  the  better  assured  by  proving  that  the  soul  is 
immortal  by  its  nature,  that  is,  immaterial.  ITe  quotes  also 


NEW  ESSAYS  : PREFACE. 


187 


(p.  70)  this  passage,  that  all  the  ideas  which  we  have  of  particular 
and  distinct  hinds  of  substances  are  nothing  bid  different  combina- 
tions of  simple  ideas ; and  that  thus  the  author  believed  that  the 
idea  of  thinking  and  of  willing  gives  another  substance  different 
from  that  which  the  idea  of  solidity  and  of  impulse  gives  ; and  that 
(§17)  he  observes  that  these  ideas  constitute  the  body  as  opposed 
to  mind. 

The  Bishop  of  Worcester  might  have  added  that  from  the  fact 
that  the  general  idea  of  substance  is  in  the  body  and  in  the  mind, 
it  does  not  follow  that  their  differences  are  modifications  of  one 
and  the  same  thing,  as  our  author  has  just  said  in  the  passage 
which  I have  adduced  from  his  first  letter.  It  is  necessary  to 
distinguish  carefully  between  modifications  and  attributes.  The 
faculties  of  having  perception  and  of  acting,  extension,  solidity, 
are  attributes  or  perpetual  and  principle  predicates ; hut  thought, 
impetuosity,  figures,  motions  are  modifications  of  these  attributes. 
Furthermore,  we  must  distinguish  between  physical  (or  rather 
real)  genus,  and  logical  or  ideal  genus.  Things  which  are  of  the 
same  physical  genus,  or  which  are  homogeneous,  are  of  the  same 
matter,  so  to  speak;  and  may  often  be  changed  the  one  into  the 
other  by  the  change  of  the  modification,  as  circles  and  squares. 
But  two  heterogeneous  things  may  have  a common  logical  genus, 
and  then  their  differences  are  not  simply  accidental  modifications 
of  the  same  subject,  or  of  the  same  metaphysical  or  physical 
matter.  Thus  time  and  space  are  very  heterogeneous  things,  and 
we  shoidd  do  wrong  to  imagine  I know  not  what  real  common 
subject,  which  had  but  continuous  quantity  in  general,  and  the 
modifications  of  which  should  make  time  or  space  to  arise. 

Perhaps  some  one  will  mock  at  these  distinctions  of  philosophers 
of  two  genera,  the  one  merely  logical,  the  other  real ; and  of  two 
matters,  the  one  physical  which  is  that  of  bodies,  the  other  only 
metaphysical  or  general ; as  if  some  one  said  that  two  parts  of 
space  are  of  the  same  matter,  or  that  two  hours  also  are  of  the 
same  matter  among  themselves.  Nevertheless  these  distinctions 
are  not  merely  of  terms,  hut  of  things  themselves,  and  seem  to 
come  in  here  very  appropriately,  where  their  confusion  has  given 
rise  to  a false  conclusion.  These  two  genera  have  a common  notion, 


188 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


and  the  notion  of  the  real  genus  is  common  to  the  two  matters,  so 
that  their  genealogy  will  he  as  follows : 


Genus : 'j 


j Logical  merely,  varied  by  simple  differences. 

Metaphysical  only, 

Beal,  the  differences  of  which 
are  modifications,  that  is  to  "j 
say,  matter. 


is 


l 


where  there 
homogeneity. 
Physical,  where 
there  is  a solid  ho- 


I have  not  seen  the  second  letter  from  the  author  to  the  Bishop ; 
and  the  reply  which  the  prelate  makes  to  it  hardly  touches  on  the 
point  regarding  the  thinking  of  matter.  But  the  reply  of  our 
author  to  this  second  answer,  returns  to  it.  God  (he  says,  very 
nearly  in  these  words,  p.  397)  adds  to  the  essence  of  matter  the 
qualities  and  perfections  which  he  pleases , simple  motion  in  some 
parts,  hut  in  plants  vegetation,  and  in  animals  feeling.  Those 
who  agree  up  to  this  point,  cry  out  as  soon  as  one  more  step  is  talcen, 
and  it  is  said  that  God  can  give  to  matter  thought,  reason,  will, 
as  if  this  destroyed  the  essence  of  matter.  But  to  prove  it,  they 
allege  that  thought  or  reason  is  not  included  in  the  essence  of  mat- 
ter, a point  of  no  consequence,  since  motion  and  life  are  not 
included  in  it  either.  They  assert  also  that  we  cannot  conceive 
that  matter  thinks ; hut  our  conception  is  not  the  measure  of  the 
power  of  God.  After  this  he  cites  the  example  of  the  attraction  of 
matter,  p.  99,  but  especially  p.  408,  where  he  speaks  of  the  gravita- 
tion of  matter  toward  matter,  attributed  to  Mr.  Hewton  (in  the 
terms  which  I have  quoted  above),  confessing  that  we  can  never 
conceive  the  manner  of  it.  This  is  in  reality  to  return  to  occult, 
or,  what  is  more,  inexplicable,  qualities.  He  adds,  p.  401,  that 
nothing  is  more  fit  to  favor  the  sceptics  than  to  deny  what  we  do 
not  understand ; and,  p.  402,  that  we  do  not  conceive  even  how  the 
soul  thinks.  He  thinks,  p.  403,  that  since  the  two  substances, 
material  and  immaterial,  are  capable  of  being  conceived  in  their 
bare  essence  without  any  activity,  it  depends  on  God  to  give  to  the 
one  or  to  the  other  the  power  of  thinking.  And  he  wishes  to  take 
advantage  of  the  admission  of  his  opponent,  who  granted  feeling 


NEW  ESSAYS  ! PREFACE. 


189 


to  brutes,  but  who  would  not  grant  them  any  immaterial  substance. 
It  is  claimed  that  liberty  and  consciousness  (p.  408),  and  the 
power  of  making  abstractions  (p.  409),  can  be  given  to  matter, 
not  as  matter,  but  as  enriched  by  a divine  power.  Finally  he 
adduces  the  remark  (p.  434)  of  a traveller  as  important  and  as 
judicious  as  M.  de  la  Loubere,  that  the  pagans  of  the  east  recognize 
the  immortality  of  the  soul  without  being  able  to  comprehend  its 
immateriality. 

On  all  this  I will  remark,  before  coming  to  the  explanation  of 
my  opinion,  that  it  is  certain  that  matter  is  as  little  capable  of 
mechanically  producing  feeling  as  of  producing  reason,  as  our 
author  agrees ; that  in  truth  I acknowledge  that  it  is  not  right  to 
deny  what  we  do  not  understand,  but  I add  that  we  are  right  in 
denying  (at  least  in  the  natural  order)  what  is  absolutely  neither 
intelligible  nor  explicable.  I maintain  also  that  substances  (mate- 
rial or  immaterial)  cannot  be  conceived  in  their  bare  essence  with- 
out any  activity ; that  activity  belongs  to  the  essence  of  substance 
in  general ; that,  finally,  the  conception  of  creatures  is  not  the 
measure  of  the  power  of  God,  but  that  their  conceptivity  or  force 
of  conceiving  is  the  measure  of  the  power  of  nature : all  this,  which 
is  conformed  to  the  natural  order,  is  capable  of  being  conceived  or 
understood  by  some  creature. 

Those  who  understand  my  system  will  think  that  I cannot 
agree  entirely  with  the  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  excellent 
authors,  whose  controversy,  however,  is  highly  instructive.  But, 
to  explain  myself  distinctly,  before  all  else  it  is  necessary  to  con- 
sider that  the  modifications  which  may  belong  naturally  or  with- 
out miracle  to  a subject,  must  come  to  it  from  the  limitations 
or  variations  of  a real  genus,  or  of  a constant  and  absolute  original 
nature.  For  it  is  thus  that  philosophers  distinguish  the  modes  of 
an  absolute  being  from  that  being  itself ; as  it  is  known  that  size, 
figure  and  motion  are  manifestly  limitations  and  variations  of 
corporeal  nature.  For  it  is  clear  in  what  way  a limited  extension 
gives  figures,  and  that  the  change  which  takes  place  in  it  is  nothing 
but  motion.  And  every  time  that  we  find  some  quality  in  a sub- 
ject, we  must  believe  that  if  we  understood  the  nature  of  this 
subject  and  of  this  quality,  we  should  conceive  how  this  quality 


190  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

can  result  therefrom.  Thus,  in  the  order  of  nature  (miracles  set 
aside),  it  is  not  optional  with  God  to  give  to  substances  indiffer- 
ently such  or  such  qualities,  and  he  will  never  give  them  any  hut 
those  which  shall  he  natural  to  them ; that  is,  which  can  be 
derived  from  their  nature  as  explicable  modifications.  Thus  it 
may  he  asserted  that  matter  will  not  naturally  have  the  above  men- 
tioned attraction,  and  will  not  move  of  itself  in  a curved  line, 
because  it  is  not  possible  to  conceive  how  this  takes  place  there; 
that  is,  to  explain  it  mechanically ; whereas  that  which  is  natural, 
must  be  able  to  become  distinctly  conceivable  if  we  were  admitted 
into  the  secrets  of  things.  This  distinction  between  what  is 
natural  and  explicable  and  what  is  inexplicable  and  miraculous, 
removes  all  the  difficulties;  and  by  rejecting  it,  we  should  main- 
tain something  worse  than  occult  qualities ; and  in  this  we 
would  renounce  philosophy  and  reason,  by  opening  retreats  for 
ignorance  and  idleness,  through  a dead  system  which  admits  not 
only  that  there  are  qualities  which  we  do  not  understand,  of  which 
there  are  only  too  many,  but  also  that  there  are  some  which  the 
greatest  mind,  if  God  gave  it  all  the  compass  possible,  could  not 
comprehend  ; that  is,  which  would  be  either  miraculous  or  without 
rhyme  and  reason ; and  also  that  God  should  make  miracles  ordi- 
narily, would  be  without  rhyme  and  reason,  so  that  this  useless 
hypothesis  would  destroy  equally  our  philosophy  which  seeks  rea- 
sons, and  divine  wisdom  which  furnishes  them. 

]STow  as  to  thought,  it  is  certain,  and  the  author  recognizes  it 
more  than  once,  that  it  could  not  be  an  intelligible  modification 
of  matter  or  one  which  could  be  comprised  therein  and  explained ; 
that  is  to  say,  that  the  feeling  or  thinking  being  is  not  a mechan- 
ical thing  like  a clock  or  a mill,  such  that  we  might  conceive 
sizes,  figures  and  motions,  the  mechanical  conjunction  of  which 
might  produce  something  thinking  and  even  feeling  in  a mass 
in  which  there  was  nothing  of  the  sort,  which  should  cease  also  in 
the  same  way  by  the  derangement  of  this  mechanism.  It  is  not 
then  natural  for  matter  to  feel  and  to  think ; and  this  can  only 
take  place  within  it  in  two  ways,  one  of  which  will  be  that  God 
should  join  to  it  a substance,  to  which  it  is  natural  to  think,  and  the 
other  that  God  should  put  thought  in  it  by  miracle.  In  this,  then, 


5TEW  ESSAYS  : PREFACE. 


191 


I am  entirely  of  tire  opinion  of  the  Cartesians,  except  that  I extend 
it  even  to  brutes,  and  that  I believe  that  they  have  feeling  and 
immaterial  souls  (properly  speaking),  and  are  also  as  imperishable 
as  the  atoms  of  Democritus  or  Gassendi ; whereas  the  Cartesians, 
groundlessly  embarrassed  by  the  souls  of  brutes  and  not  knowing 
what  to  do  with  them  if  they  are  preserved  (for  want  of  having 
bethought  themselves  of  the  preservation  of  the  same  animal 
reduced  to  miniature),  have  been  forced,  contrary  to  all  appear- 
ances and  to  the  judgment  of  the  human  race,  to  deny  even  feeling 
to  brutes.  But  if  some  one  should  say  that  God  at  least  may  add  the 
faculty  of  thinking  to  the  prepared  mechanism,  I would  reply 
that  if  this  were  done  and  if  God  added  this  faculty  to  matter, 
without  depositing  in  it  at  the  same  time  a substance  which  was  the 
subject  of  inhesion,  of  this  same  faculty  (as  I conceive  it),  that  is 
to  say,  without  adding  to  it  an  immaterial  soul,  it  would  be 
necessary  that  matter  should  he  miraculously  exalted  in  order  to 
receive  a power  of  which  it  is  not  naturally  capable;  as  some 
.scholastics  claim  that  God  exalts  fire  even  to  the  point  of  giving 
it  the  power  to  burn  immediately  spirits  separated  from  matter,  a 
thing  which  would  be  a miracle,  pure  and  simple.  And  it  is 
enough  that  it  cannot  be  maintained  that  matter  thinks  without 
putting  in  it  an  imperishable  soul,  or  rather  a miracle,  and  that 
thus  the  immortality  of  our  souls  follows  from  that  which  is 
natural ; since  their  extinction  could  be  effected  only  by  a miracle, 
either  by  exalting  matter  or  by  annihilating  the  soul.  For  we  well 
know  that  the  power  of  God  could  render  our  souls  mortal,  how- 
ever immaterial  (or  immortal  by  nature  alone)  they  may  be,  for 
he  can  annihilate  them. 

FTow  this  truth  of  the  immateriality  of  the  soul  is  undoubtedly 
of  importance.  For  it  is  infinitely  more  advantageous  to  religion 
and  to  morals,  especially  in  the  times  in  which  we  live  (when 
many  people  hardly  respect  revelation  alone  and  miracles),  to  show 
that  souls  are  naturally  immortal,  and  that  it  would  be  a miracle  if 
they  were  not,  than  to  maintain  that  our  souls  ought  naturally  to 
die,  but  that  it  is  by  virtue  of  a miraculous  grace,  founded  in  the 
promise  alone  of  God,  that  they  do  not  die.  Also  for  a long  time 
it  has  been  known  that  those  who  have  wished  to  destroy  natural 


192 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


religion  and  reduce  all  to  revealed  religion,  as  if  reason  taught  us 
nothing  concerning  it,  have  been  regarded  with  suspicion ; and  not 
always  without  reason.  But  our  author  is  not  of  this  number ; he 
maintains  the  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God,  and  he  attrib- 
utes to  the  immateriality  of  the  soul  a probability  in  the  highest 
degree,  which  could  pass  consequently  for  a moral  certainty ; so 
that  I imagine  that,  having  as  much  sincerity  as  penetration,  he 
could  accommodate  himself  easily  to  the  doctrine  which  I have  just 
stated  and  which  is  fundamental  in  every  rational  philosophy ; for 
otherwise  I do  not  see  how  one  can  prevent  himself  from  falling 
back  into  th e fanatical  philosophy , such  as  the  Philosophia  Mosaica 
of  Fludd,  which  saves  all  phenomena  by  attributing  them  to 
God  immediately  and  by  miracle,  or  into  the  barbaric  philosophy, 
like  that  of  certain  philosophers  and  physicians  of  the  past,  which 
still  bore  the  marks  of  the  barbarity  of  their  century  and  which  is 
to-day  with  reason  despised,  who  saved  appearances  by  forging 
expressly  occult  qualities  or  faculties  which  they  imagined  to  be 
like  little  demons  or  goblins  capable  of  producing  unceremoniously 
that  which  is  demanded,  just  as  if  watches  marked  the  hours  by  a 
certain  horodeictic  faculty  without  having  need  of  wheels,  or  as  if 
mills  crushed  grains  by  a fractive  faculty  without  needing  any 
thing  resembling  mill-stones.  As  to  the  difficulty  which  many 
people  have  had  in  conceiving  an  immaterial  substance,  it  will 
easily  cease  (at  least  in  good  part)  when  they  do  not  demand  sub- 
stances separated  from  matter ; as  indeed  I do  not  believe  there 
ever  are  any  naturally  among  creatures. 


Book  I. — Of  Innate  Ideas. 

CHAPTER  I.  [il  IN  LOCKE.] 

Are  there  Innate  Principles  in  the  Mind  of  Man ? 

It  is  necessary  that  I tell  you,  as  news,  that  I am  no  longer  a 
Cartesian,  and  that,  nevertheless,  I am  farther  removed  than  ever 
from  your  Gassendi,  whose  knowledge  and  merit  I otherwise 
recognize.  I have  been  impressed  by  a new  system,  of  which  I have 


NEW  ESSAYS  : BOOK  I. 


193 


read  something  in  the  philosophical  journals  of  Paris,  of  Leipsic, 
and  of  Holland,  and  in  the  marvellous  Dictionary  of  M.  Bayle, 
article  Rorarius ; and  since  then  I believe  I see  a new  aspect  of  the 
interior  of  things.  This  system  appears  to  unite  Plato  with 
Democritus,  Aristotle  with  Descartes,  the  scholastics  with  the 
moderns,  theology  and  ethics  with  reason.  It  seems  to  take  the 
best  from  every  side,  and  then  afterwards  to  go  farther  than  any 
one  has  yet  gone.  I find  in  it  an  intelligible  explanation  of  the 
union  of  the  soul  and  body,  a thing  of  which  I had  before 
despaired.  I find  the  true  principles  of  things  in  the  Unities  of 
Substance  which  this  system  introduces,  and  in  their  harmony 
preestablished  by  the  Primitive  Substance.  I find  in  it  a sur- 
prising simplicity  and  uniformity,  so  that  it  may  he  said  that  this 
substance  is  everywhere  and  always  the  same  thing,  differing  only 
in  degrees  of  perfection.  I see  now  what  Plato  meant  when  he 
took  matter  for  an  imperfect  and  transitory  entity;  what  Aris- 
totle meant  by  his  entelechy ; what  the  promise  which  Democritus 
himself  made  of  another  life  is,  as  recorded  in  Pliny ; just  how  far 
the  Sceptics  were  right  in  inveighing  against  the  senses;  how  the 
animals  ai-e  in  reality  automata  according  to  Descartes,  and  how 
they  have,  nevertheless,  souls  and  feeling,  according  to  the  opinion 
of  the  human  race;  how  it  is  necessary  to  explain  rationally  those 
who  have  lodged  life  and  perception  in  all  things,  like  Cardan, 
Campanella,  and  better  than  they,  the  late  Countess  of  Connaway, 
a Platonist,  and  our  friend,  the  late  M.  Francois  Mercure  van 
Helmont  (although  elsewhere  bristling  with  unintelligible  para- 
doxes), with  his  friend,  the  late  Mr.  Henry  More.  How  the  laws 
of  nature  (a  large  part  of  which  were  unknown  before  this  system) 
have  their  origin  in  principles  superior  to  matter,  and  how,  never- 
theless, everything  takes  place  mechanically  in  matter;  in  which 
respect  the  spiritualistic  authors,  whom  I have  just  mentioned,  had 
failed  with  their  Archsei,  and  even  the  Cartesians,  in  believing 
that  immaterial  substances  changed  if  not  the  force,  at  least  the 
direction  or  determination,  of  the  motions  of  bodies ; whereas  the 
soul  and  body  perfectly  retain  their  laws,  each  its  own,  according 
to  the  new  system,  and  yet  one  obeys  the  other  as  far  as  is  neces- 
sary. Finally,  it  is  since  I have  meditated  on  this  system  that  I 
13 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


104 


have  found  out  how  the  souls  of  brutes  and  their  sensations  are 
not  at  all  prejudicial  to  the  immortality  of  human  souls,  or,  rather 
how  nothing  is  more  adapted  to  establish  our  natural  immortality 
than  to  conceive  that  all  souls  are  imperishable  ( morte  carent  ani- 
mae ),  without,  however,  there  being  metempsychoses  to  be  feared, 
since  not  only  souls  but  also  animals  remain  and  will  remain  liv- 
ing, feeling,  acting.  It  is  everywhere  as  here,  and  always  and 
everywhere  as  with  us,  according  to  what  I have  already  said  to 
you;  unless  it  be  that  the  states  of  animals  are  more  or  less  per- 
fect and  developed  without  there  ever  beins;  need  of  souls  alto- 
gether  separate,  while,  nevertheless,  we  always  have  minds  as  pure 
as  possible,  notwithstanding  our  organs,  which  cannot  disturb  by 
any  influence,  the  laws  of  our  spontaneity.  I find  the  vacuum  and 
atoms  excluded  very  differently  than  by  the  sophism  of  the  Car- 
tesians, founded  on  the  pretended  coincidence  between  the  idea 
of  body  and  of  extension.  I see  all  things  regulated  and 
adorned,  beyond  anything  conceived  of  up  to  this  time ; organic 
matter  everywhere  ; no  sterile,  neglected  vacuum  ; nothing  too  uni- 
form, everything  varied  but  with  order;  and,  what  surpasses  the 
imagination,  the  whole  universe  in  epitome,  but  with  a different 
aspect  in  each  of  its  parts  and  even  in  each  of  its  unities  of  sub- 
stance. In  addition  to  this  new  analysis  of  things,  I have  better 
understood  that  of  notions  or  ideas  and  of  truths.  I understand 
what  is  a true,  clear,  distinct,  adequate  idea,  if  I dare  adopt  this 
word.  I understand  what  are  primitive  truths,  and  true  axioms, 
the  distinction  between  necessary  truths  and  those  of  fact,  between 
the  reasoning  of  men  and  the  consecutions  of  brutes  which  are 
a shadow  of  it.  Finally,  you  will  be  surprised,  sir,  to  hear  all 
that  I have  to  say  to  you,  and  especially  to  understand  how  knowl- 
edge of  the  greatness  and  perfection  of  God  is  thereby  exalted. 
For  I cannot  conceal  from  you,  from  whom  I have  had  nothing- 
secret,  how  much  I am  imbued  now  with  admiration  and  (if  we 
may  venture  to  make  use  of  this  term)  with  love  for  this  sovereign 
source  of  things  and  of  beauties,  having  found  that  those  which 
this  system  reveals,  surpass  everything  hitherto  conceived.  You 
know  that  I had  gone  a little  too  far  formerly,  and  that  I began 
to  incline  to  the  side  of  the  Spinozists,  who  leave  only  infinite 


NEW  ESSAYS  : BOOK  I. 


195 


power  to  God,  without  recognizing  either  perfection  or  wisdom  as 
respects  him,  and,  scorning  the  search  after  final  causes,  derive 
everything  from  brute  necessity.  But  these  new  lights  have  cured 
me  of  this. 

§ 1.  I have  always  favored,  as  I do  still,  the  innate  idea  of 
God,  which  M.  Descartes  maintained,  and  consequently  other 
innate  ideas  which  cannot  come  to  us  from  the  senses.  Now,  I go 
still  farther  in  conformity  with  the  new  system,  and  I even  believe 
that  all  the  thoughts  and  actions  of  our  soul  come  from  its  own 
depths  and  cannot  be  given  to  it  by  the  senses,  as  you  shall  see  in 
the  sequel.  But  at  present  I shall  set  aside  this  investigation,  and 
accommodating  myself  to  the  received  expressions,  since  in  truth 
they  are  good  and  maintainable,  and  since  in  a sense  it  may  be  said 
that  the  external  senses  are  in  part  causes  of  our  thoughts,  I shall 
examine  how  in  my  opinion  it  must  be  said,  even  in  the  common 
system  (speaking  of  the  action  of  bodies  on  the  soul,  as  the  Coper- 
nicaus  speak  with  other  men  of  the  motion  of  the  sun,  and  with 
reason),  that  there  are  ideas  and  principles  which  do  not  come  to  us 
from  the  senses,  and  which  we  find  in  us  without  forming  them, 
although  the  senses  give  us  occasion  to  become  conscious  of  them. 
I imagine  that  your  able  author  has  remarked  that  under  the  name 
of  innate  principles  one  often  maintains  his  prejudices,  and  wishes 
to  exempt  himself  from  the  trouble  of  discussions,  and  that  this 
abuse  has  animated  his  zeal  against  this  supposition.  He  has 
wished  to  combat  the  indolence  and  the  superficial  manner  of  think- 
ing of  those  who,  under  the  specious  pretext  of  innate  ideas  and 
truths  engraved  naturally  on  the  mind,  to  which  we  easily  give 
assent,  do  not  concern  themselves  with  seeking  and  examining  the 
sources,  connections  and  certainty  of  this  knowledge.  In  this  I 
am  altogether  of  his  opinion,  and  I even  go  farther.  I would  that 
our  analysis  should  not  be  limited,  that  definitions  of  all  terms 
capable  thereof  should  be  given,  and  that  all  the  axioms  which  are 
not  primitive,  should  be  demonstrated  or  the  means  of  demon- 
strating them  be  given ; without  distinguishing  the  opinion  which 
men  have  thereof,  and  without  caring  whether  they  give  their  con- 
sent thereto  or  not.  This  would  be  more  useful  than  is  thought. 
But  it  seems  that  the  author  has  been  carried  too  far  on  the  other 


J96 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


side  by  bis  zeal,  otherwise  highly  praiseworthy.  He  has  not 
sufficiently  distinguished,  in  my  opinion,  the  origin  ot‘  necessary 
truths  whose  source  is  in  the  understanding,  from  that  of  the  truths 
of  fact,  drawn  from  the  experiences  of  the  senses,  and  even  from 
the  confused  perceptions  which  are  in  us.  You  see  therefore,  sir, 
that  I do  not  admit  what  you  lay  down  as  fact,  that  we  can  acquire 
all  our  knowledge  without  having  need  of  innate  impressions. 
And  the  sequel  will  show  which  of  us  is  right. 

§§  2,  3,  4.  I do  not  base  the  certainty  of  innate  principles  on 
universal  consent,  for  I have  already  told  you  that  my  opinion  is 
that  we  ought  to  labor  to  be  able  to  prove  all  the  axioms  which  are 
not  primitive.  1 grant  also  that  a consent  very  general,  but  which 
is  not  universal,  may  come  from  a tradition  diffused  throughout 
the  human  race,  as  the  practice  of  smoking  tobacco  has  been 
received  by  almost  all  nations  in  less  than  a century,  although  some 
islanders  have  been  found  who,  not  knowing  even  fire  were  unable  to 
smoke.  Thus  some  able  people,  even  among  theologians,  but  of  the 
party  of  Arminius,  have  believed  that  the  knowledge  of  the  Divin- 
ity came  from  a very  ancient  and  general  tradition ; and  I believe 
indeed,  that  instruction  has  confirmed  and  rectified  this  knowledge. 
It  appears,  however,  that  nature  has  aided  in  reaching  it  without 
instruction;  the  marvels  of  the  universe  have  made  us  think  of  a 
superior  power.  A child  born  deaf  and  dumb  has  been  seen  to 
show  veneration  for  the  full  moon,  and  nations  have  been  found, 
who  seemed  not  to  have  learned  anything  else  of  other  people,  fear- 
ing invisible  powers.  I grant  that,  this  is  not  yet  the  idea  of  God, 
such  as  we  have  it  and  as  we  demand ; but  this  idea  itself  does  not 
cease  to  be  in  the  depths  of  our  souls,  without  being  placed  there, 
as  we  shall  see,  and  the  eternal  laws  of  God  are  in  part  engraved 
thereon  in  a way  still  more  legible,  and  by  a sort  of  instinct.  But 
they  are  practical  principles  of  which  we  shall  also  have  occasion  to 
speak.  It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  the  inclination  which 
we  have  to  recognize  the  idea  of  God,  lies  in  human  nature.  And 
even  if  the  first  instruction  therein  should  be  attributed  to  Revela- 
tion, the  readiness  which  men  have  always  shown  to  receive  this 
doctrine  comes  from  the  nature  of  their  souls.  I conclude  that  a 
sufficient! v general  consent  among  men  is  an  indication  and  not  a 


new  essays  : book  i. 


197 


demonstration  of  an  innate  principle ; but  that  the  exact  and  deci- 
sive proof  of  these  principles  consists  in  showing  that  their 
certainty  comes  only  from  what  is  in  us.  To  reply  again  to  what 
you  say  against  the  general  approbation  given  to  the  two  great 
speculative  principles!  which  are  nevertheless  the  best  established, 
I may  say  to  you  that  even  if  they  were  not  known,  they  would 
none  the  less  be  innate,  because  they  are  recognized  as  soon  as 
heard ; but  I will  add  further,  that  at  bottom  everyone  knows 
them  and  makes  use  at  every  moment  of  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction (for  example)  without  examining  it  distinctly,  and  there 
is  no  barbarian,  who,  in  a matter  which  he  considers  serious,  would 
not  be  shocked  at  the  conduct  of  a liar  who  contradicts  himself. 
Thus  these  maxims  are  employed  without  being  expressly  con- 
sidered. And  it  is  very  much  so  that  we  have  virtually  in  the  mind 
the  propositions  suppressed  in  enthymemes,  which  are  set  aside 
not  only  externally,  but  also  in  our  thought. 

>;  5.  \_Not  on  the  mind  naturally  imprinted,  because  not  known 
to  children,  idiots,  &c.~\  If  you  are  so  prejudiced  as  to  say  that 
there  are  truths  imprinted  on  the  sold  which  it  does  not  perceive,  I 
am  not  surprised  that  you  reject  innate  knowledge.  But  I am 
astonished  that  it  has  not  occurred  to  you  that  we  have  an  infinity 
of  knowledge  of  which  we  are  not  always  conscious,  not  even  when 
we  have  need  of  it.  It  is  for  memory  to  retain  it  and  for  reminis- 
cence to  represent  it  to  us,  as  it  often  does,  but  not  always  when 
needed.  This  is  very  well  called  remembrance  (sub  venire) , for 
reminiscence  requires  some  help.  And  it  must  be  that  in  this  mul- 
tiplicity of  our  knowledge  we  are  determined  by  something  to 
renew  one  portion  rather  than  another,  since  it  is  impossible  to 
think  distinctly  and  at  once  of  all  that  we  know. 

In  a sense  it  must  be  said  that  all  arithmetic  and  all  geometry 
are  innate  and  are  in  us  virtually,  so  that  they  may  be  found 
there  if  we  consider  attentively  and  arrange  what  is  already  in  the 
mind,  without  making  use  of  any  truth  learned  by  experience  or 
by  the  tradition  of  others,  as  Plato  has  shown  in  a dialogue,  where 
he  introduces  Socrates  leading  a child  to  abstract  truths  by  mere 
questions,  without  telling  him  anything.  IVe  may  therefore  invent 
these  sciences  in  our  libraries  and  even  with  closed  eyes,  without 


198  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

learning  b}^  sight  or  even  by  touch,  thb  truths  which  we  need ; 
although  it  is  true  that  we  would  not  consider  the  ideas  in  question 

if  we  had  never  seen  or  touched  anything 

Since  an  acquired  knowledge  may  be  concealed  in  the  soul  by  the 
memory,  as  you  admit,  why  could  not  nature  have  also  hidden  there 
some  original  knowledge  ? Must  everything  which  is  natural  to  a 
substance  which  knows  itself,  be  known  there  actually  in  the  begin- 
ning? Can  not  and  must  not  this  substance  (such  as  our  soul) 
have  many  properties  and  modifications,  all  of  which  it  is  impos- 
sible to  consider  at  first  and  altogether  ? It  was  the  opinion  of  the 
Platonists  that  all  our  knowledge  was  reminiscence,  and  that  thus 
the  truths  which  the  soul  has  brought  along  at  the  birth  of  the 
man,  and  which  are  called  innate,  must  be  the  remains  of  an 
express  anterior  knowledge.  But  this  opinion  has  no  foundation. 
And  it  is  easy  to  judge  that  the  soul  must  already  have  innate 
knowledge  in  the  preceding  state  (if  preexistence  were  a fact), 
however  distant  it  might  be,  just  as  here ; it,  therefore,  would  have 
to  come  also  from  another  preceding  state,  or  it  would  he  finally 
innate,  or  at  least  concreate;  or  it  would  be  necessary  to  go  to 
infinity  and  make  souls  eternal,  in  which  case  this  knowledge  would 
be  innate  in  truth,  from  the  fact  that  it,  would  never  have  a begin- 
ning in  the  soul ; and  if  someone  claimed  that  each  anterior  state 
has  had  something  from  another  more  anterior,  which  it  has  not 
left  to  the  succeeding,  the  reply  will  be  made,  that  it  is  manifest 
that  certain  evident  truths  must  have  been  in  all  these  states.  And 
in  whatever  way  it  may  be  taken,  it  is  always  clear  in  all  the 'states 
of  the  soul  that  necessary  truths  are  innate,  and  are  proved  by  what 
is  internal,  it  not  being  possible  to  establish  them  by  experiences  as 
we  establish  truths  of  fact.  Why  should  it  be  necessary  also  that 
we  could  possess  nothing  in  the  soul  of  which  we  had  never  made 
use?  And  is  to  have  a thing  without  making  use  of  it  the  same 
thing  as  to  have  merely  the  faculty  of  acquiring  it  ? If  it  were  so, 
we  should  never  possess  anything  except  the  things  which  we 
enjoy;  whereas  we  know  that  in  addition  to  the  faculty  and  the 
object,  there  must  often  be  some  disposition  in  the  faculty  or  in 
the  object  or  in  both,  in  order  that  the  faculty  be  exercised  upon 
the  object. 


NEW  ESSAYS  : BOOK  I. 


199 


If  the  mind  had  only  the  simple  capacity  of  receiving  knowledge 
or  passive  power  for  it,  as  indeterminate  as  that  which  the  wax 
has  for  receiving  figures,  and  the  blank  tablet  for  receiving  letters, 
it  would  not  be  the  source  of  necessary  truths,  as  I have  just  shown 
it  to  he ; for  it  is  incontestable  that  the  senses  do  not  suffice  to  show 
their  necessity,  and  that  thus  the  mind  has  a disposition  (as  much 
active  as  passive)  to  draw  them  itself  from  its  depths ; although 
the  senses  are  necessary  in  order  to  give  it  the  occasion  and  atten- 
tion for  this,  and  to  cany  it  to  some  rather  than  to  others.  You  see 
therefore,  sir,  that  these  people,  otherwise  very  able,  who  are  of  a 
different  opinion,  seem  not  to  have  sufficiently  meditated  on  the 
consequences  of  the  difference  which  there  is  between  necessary  or 
eternal  truths  and  the  truths  of  experience,  as  I have  already 
remarked,  and  as  all  our  discussion  shows.  The  original  proof 
of  necessary  truths  comes  from  the  understanding  alone,  and  the 
other  truths  come  from  experiences  or  from  the  observations  of  the 
senses.  Our  mind  is  capable  of  knowing  both,  but  it  is  the  source 
of  the  former ; and  whatever  number  of  particular  experiences  we 
may  have  of  a universal  truth,  we  could  not  be  assured  of  it  forever 
by  induction,  without  knowing  its  necessity  through  the  reason. 

§ 11.  It  is  the  particular  relation  of  the  human  mind  to  these 
truths  which  renders  the  exercise  of  the  faculty  easy  and  natural  as 
respects  them,  and  which  causes  them  to  be  called  innate.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  a naked  faculty  which  consists  in  the  mere  possi- 
bility of  understanding  them ; it  is  a disposition,  an  aptitude,  a 
preformation,  which  determines  our  soul  and  which  brings  it  about 
that  they  may  be  derived  from  it.  Just  as  there  is  a difference 
between  the  figures  which  are  given  to  the  stone  or  marble  indiffer- 
ently, and  those  which  its  veins  already  mark  out,  or  are  disposed 
to  mark  out,  if  the  workman  profits  by  them. 

The  intellectual  ideas,  which  are  the  source  of  necessary  truths, 
do  not  come  from  the  senses ; and  you  recognize  that  there  are 
ideas  which  are  due  to  the  reflection  of  the  mind  when  it  reflects 
upon  itself.  For  the  rest,  it  is  true  that  the  express  knowledge  of 
truths  is  posterior  ( tempore  vel  natura ) to  the  express  knowledge 
of  ideas ; as  the  nature  of  truths  depends  on  the  nature  of  ideas, 
t before  we  expressly  form  one  or  the  other ; and  the  truths,  into 


200 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


which,  the  ideas  which  come  from  the  senses  enter,  depend  on  the 
senses,  at  least  in  part.  But  the  ideas  which  come  from  the  senses 
are  confused,  and  the  truths  which  depend  upon  them  are  confused 
also,  at  least  in  part;  whereas  the  intellectual  ideas  and  the  truths 
which  depend  on  them,  are  distinct,  and  neither  the  one  class  nor 
the  other  has  its  origin  in  the  senses,  although  it  may  he  true  that 
we  would  never  think  of  them  without  the  senses. 

§ 18.  [If  such  an  assent  he  a marie  of  innate,  then,  that  one  and 
two  are  equal  to  three,  that  sioeetness  is  not  bitterness,  and  a thou- 
sand the  like,  must  he  innate .]  I do  not  see  how  this  : what  is  the 
same  thing  is  not  different,  can  be  the  origin  of  the  principle  of 
contradiction,  and  easier ; for  it  seems  to  me  that  you  give  yourself 
more  liberty  by  advancing  that  A is  not  B,  than  by  saying  that  A 
is  not  non-A.  And  the  reason  which  prevents  A from  being  B,  is 
that  B includes  non-A.  For  the  rest,  the  proposition : the  sweet  is 
not  the  hitter,  is  not  innate,  according  to  the  meaning  which  we 
have  given  to  the  term  innate  truth.  For  the  sensations  of  sweet 
and  of  bitter  come  from  the  external  senses.  Thus  it  is  a mixed 
conclusion  ( hybrida  conclusio),  where  the  axiom  is  applied  to  a 
sensible  truth.  But  as  for  this  proposition : the  square  is  not  a 
circle,  it  may  be  said  to  be  innate,  for,  in  considering  it,  you  make 
a subsumption  or  application  of  the  principle  of  contradiction  to 
what  the  understanding  itself  furnishes  as  soon  as  you  are  con- 
scious of  innate  thoughts. 

§ 19.  [Such  less  general  propositions  known  before  these  uni- 
versal maxims.]  We  build  on  these  general  maxims,  as  we  build 
on  majors  which  are  suppressed  when  we  reason  bv  enthymemes ; 
for  although  very  often  we  do  not  think  distinctly  of  what  we  do 
in  reasoning,  any  more  than  of  what  we  do  in  walking  and  jump- 
ing, it  is  always  true  that  the  force  of  the  conclusion  consists  partly 
in  what  is  suppressed  and  could  not  come  from  elsewhere,  as  will 
be  found  if  you  should  wish  to  prove  it. 

§ 20.  [One  and  one  equal  to  two,  &c.,  not  general  nor  useful, 
answered.]  It  is  true  that  we  begin  sooner  to  perceive  particular 
truths,  when  we  begin  with  more  composite  and  gross  ideas;  but 
this  does  not  prevent  the  order  of  nature  from  beginning  with  the 
most  simple,  and  the  reason  of  more  particular  truths  from  depend- 


NEW  ESSAYS  : BOOK  I. 


201 


ing  on  the  more  general,  of  which  they  are  only  examples.  And 
when  we  wish  to  consider  what  is  in  11s  virtually,  and  before  all 
apperception,  we  are  right  in  beginning  with  the  most  simple. 
For  the  general  principles  enter  into  our  thoughts,  of  which  they 
form  the  soul  and  the  connection.  They  are  as  necessary  thereto 
as  the  muscles  and  sinews  are  for  walking,  although  we  do  not 
think  of  them.  The  mind  leans  upon  these  principles  at  all  times, 
but  it  does  not  so  easily  come  to  distinguish  them  and  to  represent 
them  to  itself  distinctly  and  separately,  because  that  requires  great 
attention  to  what  it  does,  and  most  people,  little  accustomed  to 
meditate,  have  hardly  any.  Have  not  the  Chinese,  like  ourselves, 
articulate  sounds  ? and  yet  being  attached  to  another  way  of  writ- 
ing, they  have  not  yet  thought  of  making  an  alphabet  of  these 
sounds.  It  is  thus  that  one  possesses  many  things  without 
knowing  it. 

§ 21.  [These  maxims  not  being  known  sometimes  till  proposed, 
proves  them  not  innate .]  The  nature  of  things  and  the  nature  of 
the  mind  agree.  And  since  you  oppose  the  consideration  of  the 
thing  to  the  apperception  of  that  which  is  engraved  on  the  mind, 
this  objection  itself  shows,  sir,  that  those  whose  side  you  take, 
understand  by  innate  truths  only  those  which  would  be  approved 
naturally  as  by  instinct,  and  even  without  knowing  it,  unless  con- 
fusedly. There  are  some  of  this  nature,  and  we  shall  have  occasion 
to  speak  of  them.  But  that  which  is  called  natural  light  supposes 
a distinct  knowledge,  and  very  often  the  consideration  of  the 
nature  of  things  is  nothing  else  than  the  knowledge  of  the  nature 
of  our  mind  and  of  these  innate  ideas  which  we  do  not  need  to 
seek  outside.  Thus  I call  innate,  those  truths  which  need  only 
this  consideration  in  order  to  be  verified.  I have  already  replied, 
§ 5,  to  the  objection,  § 22,  which  claimed  that  when  it  is  said 
that  innate  ideas  are  implicitly  in  the  mind,  this  must  mean 
simply  that  it  has  the  faculty  of  knowing  them ; for  I have  shown 
that  in  addition  to  this,  it  has  the  faculty  of  finding  them  in  itself, 
and  the  disposition  to  approve  them  when  it  thinks  of  them  as  it 
should. 

§ 23.  [The  argument  of  assenting  on  first  hearing,  is  upon  a 
false  supposition  of  no  precedent  teaching .]  I would  name  as 


202 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


propositions  whose  ideas  are  innate,  the  propositions  of  arithmetic 
and  geometry,  which  are  all  of  this  nature;  and,  as  regards 
necessary  truths,  no  others  could  he  found. 

§ 25.  [ These  maxims  not  the  first  Tcnov/n .]  The  apperception 
of  that  which  is  in  us,  depends  upon  attention  and  order.  iSTow,  it 
is  not  only  possible,  hut  it  is  also  proper,  that  children  pay  more 
attention  to  the  ideas  of  the  senses,  because  the  attention  is  regu- 
lated by  the  need.  The  result,  however,  shows  in  the  sequel,  that 
nature  has  not  uselessly  given  herself  the  trouble  of  impressing 
upon  us  innate  knowledge,  since  without  it  there  would  be  no 
means  of  arriving  at  actual  knowledge  of  the  truths  necessary  in 
the  demonstrative  sciences,  and  at  the  reasons  of  facts;  and  we 
should  possess  nothing  above  the  brutes. 

§ 26.  [ And  so  not  innate.]  dST ot  at  all,  for  thoughts  are 

activities ; and  knowledge  or  truths,  in  so  far  as  they  are  in  us, 
even  when  we  do  not  think  of  them,  are  habits  or  dispositions ; and 
we  know  very  many  things  of  which  we  hardly  think. 

[It  is  very  difficult  to  conceive  that  a truth  he  in  the  mind,  if  the 
mind  has  never  thought  of  this  truth.] 

It  is  as  if  someone  said  that  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  that  there 
are  veins  in  marble  before  they  are  discovered.  This  objection 
also  seems  to  approach  a little  too  much  the  petitio  principii.  All 
those  who  admit  innate  truths  without  basing  them  upon  the  Pla- 
tonic reminiscence,  admit  those  of  which  they  have  not  yet  thought. 
Moreover,  this  reasoning  proves  too  much;  for  if  truths  are 
thoughts,  we  should  be  deprived  not  only  of  the  truths  of  which  we 
have  never  thought,  but  also  of  those  of  which  we  have  thought 
and  of  which  we  no  longer  actually  think ; and  if  truths  are  not 
thoughts  but  habits,  and  aptitudes,  natural  or  acquired,  nothing 
prevents  there  being  some  in  us  of  which  we  have  never  thought, 
nor  will  ever  think. 

§ 37.  [Not  innate,  because  they  appear  least  where  what  is 
innate  shows  itself  clearest.]  I believe  that  we  must  reason  here 
very  differently.  Innate  maxims  appear  only  through  the  atten- 
tion which  is  given  them ; but  these  persons  [children,  idiots,  sav- 
ages] , have  very  little  of  it,  or  have  it  for  entirely  different  things. 
They  think  of  hardly  anything  except  the  needs  of  the  body; 


NEW  ESSAYS  : BOOK  II. 


203 


and  it  is  reasonable  that  pure  and  detached  thoughts  should 
be  the  prize  of  nobler  pains.  It  is  true  that  children  and  savages 
have  the  mind  less  altered  by  customs,  but  they  also  have  it  less 
exalted  by  the  teaching  which  gives  attention.  It  would  not  be 
very  just  that  the  brightest  lights  should  burn  better  in  minds 
which  deserve  them  less,  and  which  are  enveloped  in  thicker  clouds. 
I would  not,  then,  that  one  give  too  much  honor  to  ignorance  and 
savagery,  when  one  is  as  learned  and  as  clever  as  you  are ; that 
would  be  to  depreciate  the  gifts  of  God.  Some  one  will  say,  that 
the  more  ignorant  one  is,  the  nearer  he  approaches  to  the  advantage 
of  a block  of  marble  or  of  a piece  of  wood,  which  are  infallible 
and  sinless.  But  unfortunately,  it  is  not  in  this  way  that  one 
approaches  thereto;  and  as  far  as  we  are  capable  of  knowledge, 
we  sin  in  neglecting  to  acquire  it,  and  we  shall  fail  so  much  the 
more  easily  as  we  are  less  instructed. 

Book  II. — Of  Ideas, 
chapter  i. 

Of  Ideas  in  general  and  ivhether  the  soul  always  thinks. 

§ 1.  [Idea  is  the  object  of  thinking.']  I admit  it,  provided  that 
you  add  that  it  is  an  immediate  internal  object,  and  that  this  object 
is  an  expression  of  the  nature  or  of  the  qualities  of  things.  If  the 
idea  were  the  form  of  thought,  it  would  come  into  existence  and 
would  cease  with  the  actual  thoughts  which  correspond  to  it ; but 
being  its  object  it  might  be  anterior  and  posterior  to  the  thoughts. 
External  sensible  objects  are  but  mediate , because  they  cannot 
act  immediately  upon  the  soul.  God  alone  is  the  immediate  exter- 
nal object.  It  might  be  said  that  the  soul  itself  is  its  own  immedi- 
ate internal  object ; but  it  is  so  in  so  far  as  it  contains  ideas  or 
what  corresponds  to  things ; for  the  soul  is  a microcosm  in  which 
distinct  ideas  are  a representation  of  God,  and  in  which  confused 
ideas  are  a representation  of  the  universe. 

§ 2.  [All  ideas  come  from  sensation  or  reflection.]  This  tabula 
rasa,  of  which  so  much  is  said,  is,  in  my  opinion,  only  a fiction, 
which  nature  does  not  admit  of,  and  which  has  its  foundation  in 


204 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


the  incomplete  notions  of  philosophers,  like  the  vacuum,  atoms,  and 
vest,  absolute  or  relative,  of  two  parts  of  a whole,  or  like  the 
materia  prima  which  is  conceived  as  without  form.  Uniform 
things  and  those  which  contain  no  variety,  are  never  anything  but 
abstractions,  like  time,  space,  and  the  other  entities  of  pure  mathe- 
matics. There  is  no  body,  the  parts  of  which  are  at  rest,  and  there 
is  no  substance  which  has  nothing  bv  which  to  distinguish  it  from 
every  other.  Human  souls  differ  not  only  from  other  souls,  but 
also  among  themselves,  although  the  difference  is  not  of  the  nature 
which  is  called  specific.  And  according  to  the  demonstrations, 
which  I think  I have,  everything  substantial,  whether  soul  or  body, 
has  its  relation,  which  is  peculiar  to  itself,  to  each  of  the  others; 
and  the  one  must  always  differ  from  the  other  by  intrinsic  charac- 
teristics; not  to  mention  that  those  who  speak  so  much  of  this 
tabula  rasa,  after  having  taken  away  from  it  ideas  are  not  able 
to  say  what  is  left  to  it,  like  the  scholastic  philosophers  who  leave 
nothing  to  their  materia  prima.  It  may,  perhaps,  be  answered 
that  this  tabula  rasa  of  the  philosophers  means  that  the  soul  has 
naturally  and  originally  only  bare  faculties.  But  faculties  without 
some  act,  in  a word,  the  pure  powers  of  the  school,  are  also  but 
fictions  unknown  to  nature,  and  which  are  obtained  only  by 
abstraction.  For  where  in  the-  world  will  there  ever  be  found  a 
faculty  which  confines  itself  to  the  mere  power,  without  exercising 
any  act?  There  is  always  a particular  disposition  to  action,  and 
to  one  action  rather  than  to  another.  And  besides  the  disposition, 
there  is  a tendency  to  action,  of  which  tendencies  there  is  always 
an  infinity  at  once  in  each  subject ; and  these  tendencies  are  never 
without  some  effect.  Experience  is,  1 admit,  necessary  in  order 
that  the  soul  be  determined  to  such  or  shell  thoughts,  and  in  order 
that  it  take  notice  of  the  ideas  which  are  in  us ; but  by  what  means 
can  experience  and  the  senses  give  ideas  ? Has  the  soul  windows  ? 
does  it  resemble  tablets  ? is  it  like  wax  ? It  is  evident  that  all  who 
think  of  the  soul  thus,  make  it  at  bottom  corporeal.  This  axiom 
received  among  the  philosophers,  will  be  opposed  -to  me,  that  there 
is  nothing  in  the  soul  which  does  not  come  from  the  senses.  But 
the  soul  itself  and  its  affections  must  be  excepted.  Nihil  est  in 
intellectu,  quod  non  fuerit  in  sensu,  exipe:  nisi  ipse  intellectus. 


XEW  ESSAYS  : BOOK  XI. 


205 


Bow  the  soul  comprises  being,  substance,  unity,  identity,  cause, 
perception,  reason,  and  many  other  notions  which  the  senses  cannot 
give 

In  order  to  avoid  a discussion  upon  what  has  delayed  us  too  long, 
I declare  to  you  in  advance,  sir,  that  when  you  say  that  ideas  come 
to  us  from  one  or  the  other  of  these  causes  [sensation  or  reflection] , 
I understand  it  of  their  actual  perception,  for  I think  that  I have 
shown  that  they  are  in  us  before  they  are  perceived,  so  far  as  they 
have  anything  distinct  about  them. 

§§  9 and  10.  [IMe  soul  begins  to  have  ideas  when  it  begins  to 
perceive.  The  soul  thinks  not  always .]  Action  is  no  more  con- 
nected with  the  soxd  than  with  body ; a state  without  thought  in  the 
soul  and  an  absolute  repose  in  body,  appear  to  me  equally  con- 
trary to  nature,  and  without  example  in  the  world.  A substance 
once  in  action  will  be  so  always,  for  all  the  impressions  remain  and 
are  merely  mixed  with  other  new  ones.  By  striking  a body  we 
excite  or  rather  determine  an  infinity  of  voidices,  as  in  a liquid, 
for  at  bottom  every  solid  has  a degree  of  liquidity  and  every  liquid 
a degree  of  solidity,  and  there  is  no  means  of  ever  arresting  entirely 
these  internal  vortices.  ISTow  we  may  believe  that  if  the  body  is 
never  in  repose,  the  soul,  which  corresponds  to  it,  will  never  be 
without  perception  either. 

It  is  certain  that  we  slumber  and  sleep,  and  that  God  is  exempt 
from  this.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  while  sleeping  we  are  with- 
out perception.  Bather  just  the  opposite  is  found  to  he  the  case, 
if  it  is  well  considered. 

Beal  powers  are  never  simple  possibilities.  There  is  always  ten- 
dency and  action. 

I do  not  say  that  it  is  self-evident  that  the  soul  always  thinks.  A 
little  attention  and  reasoning  is  needed  to  discover  it.  The  com- 
mon people  perceive  it  as  little  as  the  pressure  of  the  air  or  the 
l'oundness  of  the  earth. 

It  is  decided  as  it  is  proved  that  there  are  impei’ceptible  bodies 
and  invisible  movements,  although  certain  persons  ridicule  them. 
There  are  likewise,  numberless  perceptions  which  are  not  suffi- 
ciently distinguished  for  them  to  be  perceived  or  remembered,  hut 
they  are  made  known  by  certain  consequences. 


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PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


I have  not  read  the  book  which  contains  this  objection  [that  it  is 
an  inference  from  Locke’s  position,  that  a thing  is  not,  because  we 
are  not  sensible  of  it  in  onr  sleep],  but  it  would  not  have  been 
wrong  merely  to  object  to  you,  that  it  does  not  follow  because  the 
thought  is  not  perceived  that  it  ceases  for  that  reason ; for  other- 
wise it  could  be  said,  for  the  same  reason,  that,  there  is  no  soul 
during  the  time  when  it  is  not  perceived.  And  in  order  to  refute 
this  objection  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  in  particular  of  the 
thought  that  it  is  essential  to  it  that  it  be  perceived. 

§ 11.  [It  is  not  ahvays  conscious  of  it.]  There  [that  it  is  not 
easy  to  conceive  that  a thing  can  think  and  not  be  conscious  that  it 
thinks]  is,  undoubtedly,  the  knot  of  the  affair  and  the  difficulty 
which  has  embarrassed  able  men.  But  here  is  the  means  of  getting 
out  of  it.  We  must  consider  that,  we  think  of  many  things  at  once, 
but  we  attend  only  to  the  thoughts  which  are  most  important ; and 
it  could  not  be  otherwise,  for  if  we  attend  to  all  it  would  be 
necessary  to  think  attentively  of  an  infinity  of  things  at  the  same 
time,  all  of  which  we  feel  and  which  make  an  impression  upon  our 
senses.  I say  even  more:  there  remains  something  of  all  our  past 
thoughts  and  none  can  ever  be  entirely  effaced.  How  when  we 
sleep  without  dreaming  and  when  we  are  stunned. by  some,  blow, 
fall,  symptom  or  other  accident,  there  is  formed  within  us  an 
infinite  number  of  minute  confused  sensations ; and  death  itself 
can  produce  no  pt.her  effect  upon  the  souls  of  animals  who,  without 
doubt,  ought,  sooner  or  later,  to  acquire  important  perceptions, 
for  all  goes  on  in  an  orderly  manner  in  nature.  I acknowledge, 
however,  that  in  this  state  of  confusion,  the  soul  would  be  without 
pleasure  and  without  pain,  for  these  are  noticeable  perceptions. 

§ 12.  [//  a sleeping  man  thinks  ivithout  knowing  it,  the  sleep- 

ing and  waking  man  are  two  persons.]  I,  in  turn,  will  make  you 
another  supposition  which  appears  more  natural.  Is  it  not  true 
that  it  must  always  be  admitted  that  after  some  interval  or  some 
great,  change,  one  may  fall  into  a condition  of  general  forgetful- 
ness? Sleidan,  it,  is  said,  before  his  death,  forgot  all  that  he  knew; 
and  there  are  numbers  of  other  examples  of  this  sad  occurrence. 
Let  us  suppose  that  such  a man  became  young  again  and  learned 
all  de  novo;  would  he  be  another  man  for  all  that?  It  is  not  then, 


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207 

memory  which,  properly,  makes  the  same  man.  nevertheless,  the 
fiction  of  a soul  which  animates  different  bodies  by  turns,  without 
what  happens  to  it  in  one  of  these  bodies  interesting  it  in  the  other, 
is  one  of  those  fictions  contrary  to  the  nature  of  things,  which 
come  from  the  incomplete  notions  of  the  philosophers,  like  space 
without  body,  and  body  without  motion,  and  which  disappear 
when  one  penetrates  a little  farther;  for  it  must  be  known  that 
each  soul  jireserves  all  its  preceding  impressions  and  cannot  divide 
itself  equally  in  the  way  just  mentioned.  The  future  in  each 
substance  has  a perfect  connection  with  the  past.  It  is  this  which 
constitutes  the  identity  of  the  individual.  Moreover,  memory  is 
not  necessary  nor  even  always  possible,  on  account  of  the  multi- 
tude of  present  and  past  impressions  which  cooperate  toward  our 
present  thoughts ; for  I do  not  believe  there  are  in  man  thoughts 
of  which  there  is  not  some  effect  at  least  confused,  or  some  remnant 
mixed  with  subsequent  thoughts.  Many  things  can  be  forgotten, 
but  they  could  also  be  remembered  long  afterward  if  they  were 
recalled  as  they  should  be. 

§ 13.  [Impossible  to  conceive  those  that  sleep  without  dream- 
ing, that  they  think.]  One  is  not  without  some  feeble  feeling  while 
asleep,  even  when  the  sleep  is  dreamless.  Waking  itself  shows  it, 
and  the  easier  it  is  to  awaken  one,  the  more  feeling  one  has  of  what 
is  going  on  without  him,  although  this  feeling  is  not  always  suffi- 
ciently strong  to  cause  the  awakening. 

§ 15.  [ Upon  this  hypothesis,  the  thoughts  of  a sleeping  man 

ought  to  be  the  most  rational.]  All  impressions  have  their  effect, 
but  all  the  effects  are  not  always  noticeable.  When  I turn  to  one 
side  rather  than  to  the  other,  it  is  very  often  through  a series  of 
minute  impressions  of  which  I am  not  conscious,  and  which  render 
one  movement  a little  more  uncomfortable  than  the  other.  All  our 
unpremeditated  actions  are  the  result  of  a concurrence  of  minute 
perceptions,  and  even  our  customs  and  passions,  which  have  such 
influence  in  our  deliberations,  come  therefrom ; for  these  habits 
grow  little  by  little,  and,  consequently,  without  the  minute  percep- 
tions, we  should  not  arrive  at  these  noticeable  dispositions.  I have 
already  remarked  that  he  who  would  deny  these  effects  in  morals, 
would  imitate  the  poorly  instructed  persons  who  deny  insensible 


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PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


corpuscles  in  physics ; and  yet  I see  that  there  are,  among  those 
who  speak  of  liberty,  those  who,  taking  no  notice  of  these  insensible 
impressions,  capable  of  inclining  the  balance,  imagine  an  entire 
indifference  in  moral  actions,  like  that  of  the  ass  of  Buridan 
divided  equally  between  two  meadows.  And  of  this  we  shall  speak 
more  fully  in  what  follows.  I acknowledge,  however,  that  these 
impressions  incline  without  necessitating. 

§ 23.  [ When  does  a man  begin  to  have  ideas?]  I am  of  the 

same  opinion  [namely,  that  it  is  when  he  has  some  sensation]  ; 
but  it  is  by  a principle  a little  peculiar,  for  I believe  that  we  are 
never  without  thoughts  and  also  never  without  sensation.  I dis- 
guish  only  between  ideas  and  thoughts ; for  we  have  always  all 
pure  or  distinct  ideas  independently  of  the  senses ; but  thoughts 
always  correspond  to  some  sensation. 

§ 25.  [In  the  'perception  of  simple  ideas  the  soul  is  for  the  most 
part  passive.  ] How  can  it  be  that  it  is  merely  passive  with  regard 
to  the  perception  of  all  simple  ideas,  since,  according  to  your  own 
avowal,  there  are  simple  ideas  the  perception  of  which  comes  from 
reflection,  and  since  the  mind  gives  itself  thoughts  from  reflection, 
for  it  is  itself  which  reflects  ? Whether  it  can  refuse  them  is 
another  question ; and  it  cannot  do  it  undoubtedly  without  some 
reason  which  turns  it  aside  from  them,  when  there  is  some  occasion 
for  this. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  solidity. 

§1.  [We  receive  this  idea  from  touch.]  And  at  bottom  solid- 
ity, in  so  far  as  the  notion  is  distinct,  is  conceived  by  the  pure 
reason,  although  the  senses  furnish  to  the  reason  the  proof  that  it 
is  in  nature. 

CHAPTER  v. 

Of  simple  ideas  of  divers  senses. 

These  ideas  which  are  said  to  come  from  more  than  one  sense,  as 
those  of  space,  figure,  motion,  rest,  are  given  us  rather  by  the  com- 
mon sense,  that  is  to  lay,  the  mind  itself,  for  these  are  ideas  of  the 
pure  understanding,  but  which  have  relation  to  externality  and 


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209 


which  the  senses  make  us  perceive ; also  they  are  capable  of  defini- 
tions and  demonstrations. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  ideas  which  come  from  sensation  and  from  reflection. 

§ 1.  [ Pleasure  and  pain,  power,  existence,  etc.]  It  seems  to 

me  that  the  senses  could  not  convince  ns  of  the  existence  of  sensible 
things  without  the  aid  of  the  reason.  Thus  I believe  the  consid- 
eration of  existence  comes  from  reflection.  Those  of  power  and  of 
unity  come  also  from  the  same  source  and  are  of  an  entirely  differ- 
ent nature  from  the  perceptions  of  pleasure  and  of  pain. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Other  considerations  concerning  simple  ideas. 

§2.  [Privative  qualities.]  I had  not  believed  that  the  privative 
nature  of  rest  could  be  doubted.  It  suffices  for  it  that  motion  in 
body  be  denied ; but  it  does  not  suffice  for  motion  that  rest  be 
denied,  and  something  more  must  be  added  in  order  to  determine 
the  degree  of  motion,  since  it  receives  essentially  more  or  less, 
while  all  rest  is  equal.  It  is  another  thing  when  we  speak  of 
the  cause  of  rest,  which  must  be  positive  in  secondary  matter  or 
mass.  I should  further  believe  that  the  very  idea  of  rest  is  priva- 
tive, that  is,  that  it  consists  only  in  negation.  It  is  true  that  the 
act  of  denying  is  a positive  thing. 

§ 10.  [Secondary  qualities.]  I believe  that  it  can  be  said  that 
power,  when  it  is  intelligible  and  can  be  distinctly  explained,  ought 
to  be  counted  among  primary  equalities ; but  when  it  is  only  sensi- 
ble and  gives  but  a confused  idea,  it  ought  to  be  put  among  second- 
ary qualities. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Of  perception. 

§ 1.  [Perception  the  first  simple  idea  of  reflection.]  It  might, 
perhaps,  be  added  that  brutes  have  perception,  and  that  it  is  not 
necessary  that  they  have  thought,  that  is  to  say,  that  they  have 
reflection  or  what  may  be  its  object.  Also  we  ourselves  have 
14 


210 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WOKIvS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


minute  perceptions  of  which  we  are  not  conscious  in  our  present 
state.  It  is  true  that  we  could  very  ivell  perceive  them  and  reflect 
on  them,  if  we  were  not  turned  aside  by  their  multitude,  which  dis- 
tracts our  minds,  or  if  they  were  not  effaced  or  rather  obscured  by 
the  greater  ones. 

§ 4.  I should  prefer  to  distinguish  between  perception  and  con- 
sciousness (s’apercevoir) . The  perception  of  light  or  of  color,  for 
example,  of  which  we  are  conscious,  is  composed  of  many  minute 
perceptions  of  which  we  are  not  conscious ; and  a noise  of  which 
we  have  a perception  but  to  which  we  do  not  attend,  becomes  apper- 
ceptible  by  a little  addition  or  augmentation.  For  if  what  pre- 
cedes  made  no  impression  on  the  soul,  this  small  addition  would 
also  make  none  and  the  whole  would  make  no  more. 

§ 8.  [“The  problem  of  Molineux I think  that  supposing 
that  the  blind  man  knows  that  these  two  figures  which  he  sees  are 
those  of  the  cube  and  of  the  globe,  he  would  be  able  to  discern 
them  and  to  say  without  touching  them,  this  is  the  globe,  this  is 
the  cube. 

Perhaps  Molineux  and  the  author  of  the  Essay  are  not  so  far 
from  my  opinion  as  at  first  appears,  and  that  the  reasons  of  their 
opinion,  contained  apparently  in  the  letter  of  the  former,  who  has 
employed  them  with  success  in  order  to  convince  people  of  their 
error,  have  been  suppressed  purposely  by  the  latter  in  order  to  give 
more  exercise  to  the  mind  of  his  readers.  If  you  will  weigh  my 
answer,  you  will  find  that  I have  put  a condition  in  it  which  can  be 
considered  as  comprised  in  the  question ; it  is,  that  the  only  thing 
in  question  is  that  of  distinguishing,  and  that  the  blind  man  knows 
that  the  two  figured  bodies  which  he  must  distinguish  are  there, 
and  that  thus  each"  of  the  appearances  which  lie  sees  is  that  of  the 
cube  or  that  of  the  globe.  In  this  case,  it  seems  to  me  beyond  doubt 
that  the  blind  man  who  ceases  to  be  blind,  can  distinguish  them  by 
the  principles  of  the  reason  joined  to  what  touch  has  provided  him 
with  beforehand  of  sensible  knowledge.  For  I do  not  speak  of 
what  he  will  do  perhaps  in  fact  and  immediately,  being  stunned 
and  confounded  by  the  novelty,  or  otherwise  little  accustomed 
to  drawing  consequences.  The  foundation  of  my  opinion  is  that 
in  the  globe  there  are  no  points  distinguishable  on  the  side  of  the 


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211 


globe  itself,  all  being  there  level  and  without  angles,  whereas  in 
the  cube  there  are  eight  points  distinguished  from  all  the  others. 
If  there  were  not  this  means  of  distinguishing  the  figures,  a blind 
man  could  not  learn  the  rudiments  of  geometry  by  touch.  Never- 
theless, we  see  that  those  born  blind  are  capable  of  learning  geome- 
try, and  have  even  always  some  rudiments  of  natural  geometry, 
and  that  most  often  geometry  is  learned  by  the  sight  alone,  with- 
out employing  touch,  as  a paralytic,  or  other  person  to  whom  touch 
has  been  almost  interdicted,  might  and  even  must  do.  And  it  must 
be  that  these  two  geometries,  that  of  the  blind  man  and  that  of  the 
paralytic,  meet  and  coincide,  and  even  reduce  to  the  same  ideas, 
although  there  are  no  common  images.  This  again  shows  how 
necessary  it  is  to  distinguish  images  from  exact  ideas,  which  con- 
sist in  definitions.  It  would  certainly  be  very  interesting  and  even 
instructive  to  examine  well  the  ideas  of  one  born  blind  to  hear  his 
descriptions  of  figures.  For  he  might  come  to  this  and  he  might 
even  understand  the  doctrine  of  optics  in  so  far  as  it  depends  upon 
distinct  and  mathematical  ideas,  although  he  would  not  be  able 
to  reach  a conception  of  what  is  clear-confused,  that  is  to  say,  the 
image  of  light  and  of  colors.  ...  It  would  also  be  very 
important  to  examine  the  ideas  that  a deaf  and  dumb  man  might 
have  of  non-figured  things.  . . Men  are  very  negligent  in  not 

getting  an  exact  knowledge  of  the  modes  of  thought  of  such  persons. 

§ 11.  [ Perception  puts  the  difference  between  animals  and 

inferior  beings.]  I am  inclined  to  believe  that  there  is  also  among 
plants  some  perception  and  desire,  because  of  the  great  analogy 
there  is  between  plants  and  animals ; and  if  there  is  a vegetable 
soul,  as  is  the  common  opinion,  it  must  have  perception.  However, 
I do  not  cease  to  ascribe  to  mechanism  all  that  takes  place  in  the 
body  of  plants  and  animals,  except  their  first  formation.  Thus 
I agree  that  the  movement  of  the  plant  called  sensitive  comes  from 
mechanism,  and  I do  not  approve  of  having  recourse  to  the  soul 
when  the  detail  of  the  phenomena  of  plants  and  animals  is  to  be 
explained. 

§ 13.  Very  good ; and  I think  almost  as  much  could  be  said  of 
plants.  But  as  to  man,  his  perceptions  are  accompanied  by  the 
power  of  reflection  which  passes  to  the  act  when  there  is  occasion. 


212 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


But  when  he  is  reduced  to  a state  in  which  he  is  like  one  in  a leth- 
argy and  almost  without  feeling,  reflection  and  consciousness  cease 
and  universal  truths  are  not  thought  of.  Nevertheless,  the  innate 
and  acquired  faculties  and  dispositions,  and  even  the  impressions 
which  are  received  in  this  state  of  confusion,  do  not  cease  for  that 
reason,  and  are  not  effaced,  although  they  are  forgotten ; they  will 
even  have  their  turn  to  contribute  some  day  toward  some  noticeable 
effect;  for  nothing  is  useless  in  nature;  all  confusion  must 
develop  itself ; animals  even,  having  passed  through  a condition 
of  stupidity,  ought  to  return  some  day  to  more  exalted  perceptions ; 
and  since  simple  substances  last  forever,  it  will  not  do  to  judge 
of  eternity  by  some  years. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Of  the  faculty  of  discerning  ideas. 

§ 10.  [Brutes  abstract  not.]  I am  of  the  same  opinion.  They 
know  apparently  whiteness  and  notice  it  in  chalk  as  in  snow ; but 
this  is  not  yet  abstraction,  for  that  requires  a consideration  of  what 
is  common,  separated  from  what  is  particular,  and  consequently 
there  enters  therein  the  knowledge  of  universal  truths,  which  is  not 
given  to  brutes.  It  is  well  observed  also  that  the  brutes  that  speak 
do  not  make  use  of  words  to  express  general  ideas,  and  that  men 
deprived  of  the  use  of  speech  and  of  words  do  not  fail  to  invent 
other  general  signs. 

§ 11.  The  brutes  pass  from  one  imagination  to  another  by  the 
connection  which  they  have  felt  here  before ; for  example,  when 
the  master  takes  a stick  the  dog  is  apprehensive  of  being  struck. 
And  on  many  occasions  children,  as  likewise  other  men,  have  no 
other  procedure  in  their  passages  from  thought  to  thought.  This 
might  be  called  consecution  and  reasoning  in  a very  broad  sense. 
But  I prefer  to  conform  to  the  received  usage  in  confining  these 
words  to  man  and  in  restricting  them  to  the  knowledge  of  some 
reason  of  the  connection  of  perceptions  which  sensations  alone 
could  not  give ; their  effect  being  but  to  cause  us  naturally  to  expect 
another  time  the  same  connection  which  has  been  noticed  before, 
although  perhaps  the  reasons  are  no  longer  the  same ; a fact  which 
often  deceives  those  who  govern  themselves  merely  by  the  senses. 


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213 


§17.  [Davik  room.]  [Cf.  opening  remarks  of  the  next 
chapter.] 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Of  complex  ideas. 

In  order  to  render  the  resemblance  greater  it  would  be  necessary 
to  suppose  that  there  was  in  the  dark  room  to  receive  the  images  a 
cloth,  which  was  not  smooth,  but  diversified  by  folds  representing 
innate  knowledge;  that,  furthermore,  this  cloth  or  canvas  being- 
stretched  had  a sort  of  elasticity  or  power  of  acting,  and  even  an 
action  or  reaction  accommodated  as  much  to  past  folds  as  to  newly 
arrived  impressions  of  the  images.  And  this  action  would  consist 
in  certain  vibrations  or  oscillations,  such  as  are  seen  in  a stretched 
cord  when  it  is  touched,  of  such  a kind  that  it  gives  forth  a sort  of 
musical  sound.  For  not  only  do  we  receive  images  or  traces  in  the 
brain  but  we  also  form  them  anew  when  we  consider  complex  ideas. 
Thus  the  cloth,  which  represents  our  brain,  must  be  active  and 
elastic.  This  comparison  would  explain’ tolerably  well  what  takes 
place  in  the  brain ; but  as  to  the  soul,  which  is  a simple  substance 
or  monad,  it  represents  without  extension  these  same  varieties  of 
extended  masses  and  has  perception  of  them. 

§ 3.  \Complex  ideas  are  either  modes,  substances,  or  relations.] 
This  division  of  the  objects  of  our  thoughts  into  substances,  modes 
and  relations  is  satisfactory  to  me.  I believe  that  qualities  are 
but  modifications  of  substances,  and  that  the  understanding  adds 
thereto  the  relations.  This  is  of  more  consequence  than  is  thought. 

§ 5.  [ Simple  and  mixed  modes.]  Perhaps  a dozen  or  score  are 

but  relations  and  are  constituted  by  connection  with  the  under- 
standing. Units  are  separate,  and  the  understanding  puts  them 
together  however  dispersed  they  may  be.  Nevertheless,  although 
relations  are  from  the  understanding  they  are  not  without  founda- 
tion and  reality.  For,  in  the  first  place,  understanding  is  the 
origin  of  things ; and  even  the  reality  of  all  things,  except  simple 
substances,  consists  ultimately  only  of  the  perceptions  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  simple  substances.  It  is  often  the  same  thing  with 
regard  to  mixed  modes ; that  is  to  say,  that  they  must  be  referred 
back  to  relations. 


214 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

Of  simple  modes,  and  first  of  those  of  space. 

§ 17.  [ Whether  space  is  substance  or  accident,  not  known. ] I 

have  reason  to  fear  that  I shall  be  accused  of  vanity  in  wishing  to 
determine  what  you,  sir,  acknowledge  not  to  know.  But  there  is 
room  for  believing  that  you  know  more  on  this  point  than  you  say 
or  believe  you  do.  Some  have  believed  that  God  is  the  place  of 
things.  Lessius  and  Guerike,  if  I am  not  mistaken,  were  of  this 
opinion  ; hut  then  place  contains  something  more  than  we  attribute 
to  space  which  we  strip  of  all  action ; and  in  this  way  it  is  no  more 
a substance  than  time,  and  if  it  has  parts  it  could  not  be  God.  It  is 
a relation,  an  order,  not  only  among  existing  things,  hut  also  among 
possible  things  as  they  may  exist.  But  its  truth  and  reality  is 
founded  in  God,  like  all  the  eternal  truths. 

It  is  best  then  to  say  that  space  is  an  order,  hut  that  God  is  its 
source. 

§ 19.  [Substance  and  accident  of  little  use  in  philosophy .]  I 
acknowledge  that  I am  of  another  opinion,  and  that  I believe  that 
the  consideration  of  substance  is  a point  of  philosophy  of  the  great- 
est importance  and  of  the  greatest  fruitfulness. 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

Of  duration  and  its  simple  modes. 

§ 16.  [It  is  not  motion  but  the  constant  train  of  ideas  in  oar 
minds  while  awake  that  furnishes  us  with  the  idea  of  duration .] 
A train  of  perceptions  awakens  in  us  the  idea  of  duration,  but  it 
does  not  make  it.  Our  perceptions  never  have  a train  sufficiently 
constant  and  regular  to  correspond  to  that  of  time,  which  is  a uni- 
form and  simple  continuum,  like  a straight  line.  The  change  of 
perceptions  gives  us  occasion  to  think  of  time,  and  it  is  measured 
by  uniform  changes ; but  if  there  should  he  nothing  uniform  in 
nature,  time  would  not  cease  to  be  determined,  just  as  place  would 
not  cease  to  be  determined  also  if  there  should  be  no  fixed  or 
immovable  body. 

§ 24.  The  void  which  can  be  conceived  in  time,  indicates,  like 
that  in  space,  that  time  and  space  apply  as  well  to  possible  as  to 
existing  things. 


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215 


§ 26.  Time  and  space  are  of  the  nature  of  eternal  truths  which 
concern  equally  the  possible  and  the  existing. 

§ 27.  [Eternity.]  But  in  order  to  derive  the  notion  of  eternity 
it  is  necessary  to  conceive  more,  viz.,  that  the  same  reason  subsists 
always  for  going  farther.  It  is  this  consideration  of  the  reasons 
which  completes  the  notion  of  the  infinite  or  of  the  indefinite  in 
possible  progress.  Thus  the  senses  alone  cannot  suffice  to  make  us 
form  these  notions.  And  at  bottom  it  may  be  said  that  the  idea  of 
the  absolute  is  anterior  in  the  nature  of  things  to  that  of  the  limits 
which  are  added.  But  we  do  not  notice  the  first  save  in  beginning 
with  what  is  limited  and  which  strikes  our  senses. 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

Of  infinity. 

§ 1.  [Infinity,  in  its  original  intention,  attributed  to  space, 
duration  and  number.]  The  true  infinite,  strictly  speaking,  is  only 
in  the  Absolute,  which  is  anterior  to  all  composition  and  is  not 
formed  by  the  addition  of  parts. 

§ 3.  [Hence  toe  come  by  the  idea  of  infinity.]  Take  a straight 
line  and  prolong  it  in  such  a way  that  it  is  double  the  first.  How 
it  is  clear  that  the  second,  being  perfectly  similar  to  the  first,  can 
be  doubled  in  the  same  way  in  order  to  give  a third,  which  is  also 
similar  to  the  preceding ; and  the  same  ratio  always  holding  it 
will  never  be  possible  to  stop ; thus  the  line  can  be  prolonged  ad 
infinitum ; in  such  a way  that  the  consideration  of  the  infinite 
comes  from  that  of  similarity  or  of  the  same  ratio,  and  its  origin 
is  the  same  as  that  of  universal  and  necessary  truths.  This  shows 
how  what  gives  completion  to  the  conception  of  this  idea  is  found 
in  us  and  could  not  come  from  the  experiences  of  the  senses ; just 
as  necessary  truths  could  not  be  proved  by  induction  nor  by  the 
senses.  The  idea  of  the  absolute  is  in  us  internally,  like  that  of 
being.  These  absolutes  are  nothing  but  the  attributes  of  God  and 
it  can  be  said  that  they  are  no  less  the  source  of  ideas  than  God 
is  himself  the  principle  of  beings.  The  idea  of  the  absolute  in 
relation  to  space,  is  no  other  than  that  of  the  immensity  of  God, 
and  so  of  the  others.  But  we  deceive  ourselves  in  wishing  to 


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PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


imagine  an  absolute  space,  which  would  be  an  infinite  whole,  com- 
posed of  parts.  There  is  no  such  thing.  It  is  a notion  which 
involves  a contradiction,  and  these  infinite  wholes,  and  their 
opposites,  the  infinitely  minutes,  are  only  admissible  in  the  calcula- 
tions of  geometers,  just  like  the  imaginary  roots  of  algebra. 

§ 16.  [We  have  no  'positive  idea  of  infinity  nor  of  infinite  dura- 
tion.]  I believe  that  we  have  a positive  idea  of  both,  and  this  idea 
will  be  true  provided  it  is  not  conceived  as  an  infinite  whole  but  as 
an  absolute  or  attribute  without  limits,  which  is  the  case  as  regards 
the  eternity  in  the  necessity  of  the  existence  of  God,  without 
depending  on  parts  and  without  forming  the  notion  by  an  addition 
of  times.  From  this  is  also  seen,  as  I have  already  said,  that  the 
origin  of  the  notion  of  the  infinite  comes  from  the  same  source 
as  that  of  necessary  truths. 

chapter  six. 

Of  the  modes  of  thinking. 

§ 1.  [ Sensation , remembrance,  contemplation,  &c.~\  It  is  well 

to  clear  up  these  notions,  and  I shall  try  to  aid  in  it.  I will  say 
then  that  it  is  sensation  when  we  perceive  an  external  object ; that 
remembrance  is  its  repetition  without  the  object  returning;  but 
when  we  know  that  we  have  had  it,  it  is  memory.  Contempla- 
tion is  commonly  employed  in  a sense  different  from  yours,  namely, 
for  a condition  where  we  free  ourselves  from  business  in  order  to 
apply  ourselves  to  some  meditation.  But  since  there  is  no  word 
that  I know  of  which  fits  your  notion,  sir,  the  one  you  employ  may 
be  applied  to  it.  We  give  attention  to  the  objects  which  we  dis- 
tinguish and  prefer  to  others.  When  attention  continues  in  the 
mind,  whether  the  external  object  continues  or  not,  and  even 
whether  it  is  present  or  not,  this  is  consideration ; which  tending 
to  knowledge  without  reference  to  action,  will  be  contemplation . 
Attention,  the  aim  of  which  is  to  learn  (that  is  to  say,  to  acquire 
knowledge  in  order  to  preserve  it),  is  study.  To  consider  in 
order  to  form  some  plan,  is  to  meditate ; but  revery  appears  to  be 
nothing  but  the  pursuing  of  certain  thoughts  through  the  pleasure 
taken  in  them  without  having  other  end ; this  is  why  revery  may 


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217 


lead  to  insanity : one  forgets  self,  forgets  the  die  cur  hie , 

approaches  dreams  and  chimeras,  builds  castles  in  Spain.  We  can- 
not distinguish  dreams  from  sensations  except  because  they  are 
not  connected  with  them ; they  are,  as  it  were,  a world  apart. 
Sleep  is  a cessation  of  sensations,  and  so  trance  is  a very  profound 
sleep  from  which  one  can  be  aroused  with  difficulty,  which  comes 
from  a transient  internal  cause,  which  distinguishes  it  from  the 
profound  sleep  which  comes  from  a narcotic  or  from  some  lasting 
injury  to  the  functions,  as  in  lethargy.  Trances  are  sometimes 
accompanied  by  visions;  but  there  are  some  without  trance;  and 
vision,  it  seems,  is  nothing  hut  a dream  which  passes  for  a sensa- 
tion, as  if  it  taught  us  the  truth  of  the  objects.  And  when  these 
visions  are  divine,  there  is  in  fact  truth;  which  may  be  known, 
for  example,  when  they  contain  particularized  prophecies  which 
the  event  justifies. 

§T.  [Hence  it  is  probable  that  thinleing  is  the  action,  not  the 
essence  of  the  soul.]  Undoubtedly  thought  is  an  action  and  could 
not  be  the  essence;  but  it  is  an  essential  action,  and  all  substances 
have  such.  I have  shown  above,  that  we  have  always  an  infinity 
of  minute  perceptions  without  our  being  conscious  of  them.  We 
are  never  without  perceptions  but  it  is  necessary  that  we  he  often 
without  apperceptions,  namely,  when  there  are  no  distinct  percep- 
tions. It  is  for  want  of  having  considered  this  important  point, 
that  a philosophy,  loose  and  as  little  noble  as  solid,  has  prevailed 
among  so  many  men  of  good  minds,  and  that  we  have  hitherto 
almost  ignored  what  there  is  most  beautiful  in  souls.  This  has 
also  caused  men  to  find  so  much  plausibility  in  the  error  which 
teaches  that  souls  are  of  a perishable  nature. 

CHAPTER  XX. 

Of  modes  of  pleasure  and  pain. 

§ 1.  [Pleasure  and  pain,  simple  ideas.']  I believe  that  there  are 
no  perceptions  which  are  entirely  indifferent  to  us,  but  it  is  enough 
that  their  effect  be  not  noticeable  in  order  that  they  may  be  called 
so,  for  pleasure  and  pain  appear  to  consist  in  an  aid  or  in  a notice- 
able impediment.  I assert  that  this  definition  is  not  nominal  and 
that  one  cannot  be  given. 


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PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


§ 2.  [ Good  and  evil,  what.\  I am  also  of  this  opinion.  The 

good  is  divided  into  the  praiseworthy,  agreeable,  and  useful ; but 
at  bottom  I believe  that  it  must  be  either  itself  agreeable  or  con- 
tributing to  something  else  which  can  give  us  an  agreeable  feeling ; 
that  is  to  say,  the  good  is  agreeable  or  useful  and  the  praiseworthy 
itself  consists  in  a pleasure  of  the  mind. 

§§  4,  5.  [Love.  Hatred. \ I gave  very  nearly  this  same  defini- 
tion of  love  when  I explained  the  principles  of  justice  in  the  pre- 
face to  my  Codex  Juris  Gentium  Diplomaticus,  namely,  that  to 
love  is  to  be  led  to  take  pleasure  in  the  perfection,  well-being  or 
happiness  of  the  beloved  object.  And  for  this  reason  we  do  not 
consider  or  demand  any  other  pleasure  for  self  than  just  that 
which  is  found  in  the  well-being  or  pleasure  of  the  one  loved ; but 
in  this  sense  we  do  not  properly  love  what  is  incapable  of  pleasure 
or  of  happiness,  and  we  enjoy  things  of  this  nature  without,  for 
that  reason,  loving  them,  unless  by  a prosopopoeia,  and  as  if  we 
imagine  that  they  themselves  enjoy  their  perfection.  It  is  not, 
then,  properly  love  when  we  say  that  we  love  a beautiful  picture 
because  of  the  pleasure  we  take  in  thinking  of  its  perfections.  But 
it  is  permissible  to  extend  the  meaning  of  the  terms,  and  usage 
varies  here.  Philosophers  and  theologians  even  distinguish  two 
kinds  of  love,  namely,  the  love  which  they  call  love  of  complacency , 
which  is  nothing  else  than  the  desire  or  feeling  we  have  for  the 
one  who  gives  us  pleasure  without  our  interesting  ourselves  as  to 
whether  he  receives  pleasure;  and  the  love  of  benevolence,  which 
is  the  feeling  we  have  for  him  who,  by  his  pleasure  or  happiness, 
gives  the  same  to  us.  The  first  causes  us  to  have  in  view  our 
pleasure  and  the  second  that  of  others,  but  as  making  or  rather 
constituting  ours,  for  if  it  should  not  react  upon  us  in  some  sort 
we  could  not  interest  ourselves  in  it,  since  it  is  impossible,  what- 
ever may  be  said,  to  be  indifferent  to  one’s  own  good.  And  this  is 
how  disinterested  or  non-mercenary  love  must  be  understood,  in 
order  to  conceive  well  its  nobleness  and  yet  not  to  fall  into  the 
chimerical. 

§ 6.  [Desire.]  This  consideration  of  uneasiness  is  a capital 
point,  in  which  this  author  has  particularly  shown  his  penetrating 
and  profound  spirit.  This  is  why  I have  given  it  some  attention, 


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219 


and  after  having  considered  the  matter  well,  it  appears  to  me  that 
the  French  word  inquietude  {restlessness) , if  it  does  not  suffi- 
ciently express  the  meaning  of  the  author,  fits  nevertheless,  in  my 
opinion,  the  nature  of  the  thing ; and  the  English  word  uneasiness, 
if  it  stands  for  a displeasure,  fretfulness  {chagrin) , inconvenience, 
and  in  a word  some  effective  pain,  would  be  inappropriate.  For 
I should  prefer  to  say  that  in  desire  in  itself  there  is  rather  a 
disposition  and  preparation  for  pain  than  pain  itself.  It  is  true 
that  this  perception  sometimes  does  not  differ  from  that  which  is  in 
pain  than  as  less  does  from  more,  but  this  is  because  the  degree  is 
the  essence  of  pain,  for  it  is  a noticeable  perception.  This  is  also 
seen  by  the  difference  which  there  is  between  appetite  and  hunger ; 
for  when  the  irritation  of  the  stomach  becomes  too  strong  it  incom- 
modes ; so  that  it  is  necessary  also  to  apply  here  our  doctrine 
of  perceptions  too  minute  to  be  apperceptible ; for  if  what  takes 
place  in  us  when  we  have  an  appetite  and  desire  were  sufficiently 
magnified  it  would  cause  pain.  This  is  why  the  infinitely  wise 
author  of  our  being  has  acted  for  our  good,  when  he  ordained  that 
Ave  should  be  often  in  ignorance  and  in  confused  perceptions.  This 
is  in  order  to  act  more  promptly  by  instinct  and  not  to  be  incom- 
moded by  the  too  distinct  sensations  of  many  objects,  Avhich  do 
not  altogether  come  back  to  us,  and  which  nature  has  not  been  able 
to  do  without  in  order  to  obtain  its  ends.  IToav  many  insects  do 
we  not  swalloAV  Avithout,  our  being  conscious  of  it?  hoiv  many 
persons  do  we  see  Avho  having  too  fine  a sense  of  smell  are  thereby 
incommoded  ? and  how  many  disgusting  objects  should  Ave  see  if 
our  ATision  were  sufficiently  piercing  ? It  is  also  by  this  skill  that 
nature  has  given  us  the  incitements  of  desire,  like  the  rudiments 
or  elements  of  pain  or,  so  to  speak,  semi-pains,  or  (if  you  Avish 
to  speak  so  as  to  express  yourself  more  forcibly)  minute  inapper- 
ceptible  pains,  to  the  end  that  we  may  enjoy  the  advantage  of  evil 
without  being  incommoded  thereby.  For  otheiuvise  if  this  percep- 
tion were  too  distinct  Ave  would  always  be  miserable  in  waiting  for 
the  good,  Avliereas  this  continual  victory  over  these  semi-pains 
which  are  felt  in  following  one’s  desire  and  satisfying  in  some  sort 
this  appetite  or  this  longing,  gives  us  many  semi-pleasures,  the 
continuation  and  collection  of  which  (as  in  the  continuation  of 


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PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


i lie  impulse  of  a heavy  body  which  descends  and  acquires  force) 
becomes  in  the  end  an  entire  and  real  pleasure.  And  at  bottom 
without  these  semi-pains  there  would  be  no  pleasure,  and  there 
would  he  no  means  of  perceiving  that  something,  by  being  an 
obstacle  which  prevents  us  from  putting  ourselves  at  our  ease, 
assists  us  and  aids  us.  It  is  also  in  this  that  the  affinity  of  pain 
and  of  pleasure  is  recognized,  which  Socrates  noticed,  in  the 
Phaedo  of  Plato,  when  his  feet  itched.  This  consideration  of 
the  minute  aids  or  small  deliverances  and  imperceptible  disen- 
gagements of  the  arrested  tendency  from  which  noticeable  pleasure 
finally  results,  serves  also  to  give  some  more  distinct  knowledge 
of  the  confused  idea  which  Ave  have  and  ought  to  have  of  'pleasure 
and  of  pain;  just  as  the  sensation  of  heat  or  of  light  results  from 
many  minute  motions  ivhich  express  those  of  objects,  as  I have  said 
above  (ch.  9,  § 13),  and  do  not  differ  therefrom  save  in  appearance 
and  because  we  are  not  conscious  of  this  analysis ; Avhereas  many 
to-day  believe  that  our  ideas  of  sensible  qualities  differ  toto  genere 
from  motions  and  from  ivhat  takes  place  in  the  objects,  and  are 
something  primitive  and  inexplicable,  and  even  arbitrary,  as  if 
God  made  the  soul  feel  what  seems  good  to  him  in  place  of  what 
takes  place  in  the  body ; an  opinion  very  far  removed  from  the 
true  analysis  of  our  ideas.  But  to  return  to  uneasiness , that  is  to 
say,  to  the  minute  imperceptible  solicitations  which  keep  us  always 
in  suspense ; these  are  confused  determinations  such  that  we  often 
do  not  knoAv  what  we  lack,  whereas  in  inclinations  and  passions, 
Ave  at  least  know  what  Ave  need,  although  the  confused  perceptions 
enter  also  into  their  manner  of  acting,  and  the  same  passions  also 
cause  this  uneasiness  or  longing.  These  impulses  are  like  so  many 
small  springs  which  try  to  unbend,  and  which  cause  our  machine  to 
act.  And  I have  already  remarked  thereon,  that  it  is  through  this 
that  we  are  never  indifferent,  Avhen  we  appear  to  be  most  so,  for 
example,  to  turning  to  the  right  rather  than  to  the  left  at  the  end 
of  a path.  For  the  side  which  we  take  comes  from  these  insensible 
determinations,  mingled  with  the  actions  of  objects  and  of  the 
interior  of  the  body,  which  cause  us  to  find  ourselves  more  at  ease 
in  one  than  in  the  other  way  of  moving  ourselves.  The  pendulum 
of  a clock  is  called  in  German  Unruhe,  that  is  to  say,  uneasiness. 


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221 


It  can  be  said  that  it  is  the  same  in  our  body,  which  can  never  be 
perfectly  at  its  ease  ; because  if  it  should  be  so,  a new  impression 
of  objects,  a slight  change  in  the  organs,  in  the  vessels,  and  in  the 
viscera  would  change  at  once  the  balance  and  would  cause  them  to 
make  some  slight  effort  in  order  to  regain  the  best  state  which  they 
can  be  in ; which  produces  a continual  strife,  which  causes,  so  to 
speak,  the  uneasiness  of  our  clock;  so  that  this  term  is  satisfactory 
to  me. 

§ 7.  [Joy.]  There  are  no  words  in  languages,  sufficiently 
appropriate  to  distinguish  kindred  notions.  Perhaps  the  Latin 
gaudium  approaches  nearer  this  definition  of  joy  that  laetitia, 
which  is  also  translated  by  the  word  joy;  but  then  it  seems  to  me 
to  signify  a state  in  which  pleasure  predominates  in  us,  for  during 
the  profoundest  sorrow  and  amidst  the  most  piercing  griefs  one 
can  take  some  pleasure,  as  in  drinking  or  in  listening  to  music, 
but  the  pain  predominates ; and  likewise  amid  the  sharpest  pains, 
the  mind  can  be  in  joy,  as  happened  to  the  martyrs. 

§ 8.  [Sorrow.]  Hot  only  the  actual  presence,  but  also  the  fear 
of  an  evil  to  come  can  make  one  sad,  so  that  I believe  the  defini- 
tions of  joy  and  of  sorrow,  which  I have  just  given,  agree  best  with 
usage.  As  to  uneasiness,  there  is  in  pain,  and  consequently  in 
sorrow,  something  more;  and  there  is  uneasiness  even  in  joy,  for 
it  makes  men  wide  awake,  active,  full  of  hope  for  going  farther. 
Joy  has  been  able  to  cause  death  by  excess  of  emotion,  and  then 
there  was  in  it  even  more  than  uneasiness. 

§§  9,  10.  [Hope  and  Fear.]  If  uneasiness  signifies  a pain,  I 
acknowledge  that  it  always  accompanies  fear;  but  taking  it  for 
this  insensible  incitement  which  urges  us  on,  it  can  also  be  applied 
to  hope.  The  Stoics  took  the  passions  for  thoughts  [opinions]  ; 
thus  hope,  for  them,  was  the  thought  of  a future  good,  and  fear,  the 
thought  of  a future  evil.  But  I prefer  to  say  that  the  passions  are 
neither  satisfactions  nor  displeasures,  nor  thoughts,  but  tendencies 
or  rather  modifications  of  the  tendencies,  which  come  from  thought 
or  from  feeling,  and  which  are  accompanied  by  pleasure  or  dis- 
pleasure. 

§ 11.  [Despair.]  Despair  taken  for  the  passion  will  be  a sort 
of  strong  tendency  which  finds  itself  wholly  arrested,  causing  a 


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PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


violent  struggle  and  mucli  displeasure.  But  when  the  despair  is 
accompanied  by  repose  and  indolence,  it  will  be  a thought  rather 
than  a passion. 

§ 12.  \_ Anger."]  Anger  seems  to  be  something  more  simple  and 

more  general,  since  brutes,  to  whom  no  injury  has  been  done,  are 
susceptible  of  it.  There  is  in  anger  a violent  effort  which  strives  to 
get  free  from  the  evil.  The  desire  of  vengeance  may  remain  when 
one  is  cool  and  when  one  experiences  hatred  rather  than  anger. 

§ 13.  [Envy.]  According  to  this  [Locke’s]  notion,  envy  would 
be  always  a praiseworthy  passion  and  always  founded  upon  justice, 
at  least  in  my  opinion.  But  I do  not  know  but  that  envy  is  often 
entertained  toward  recognized  merit,  which  one  would  not  hesitate 
to  misuse  if  one  were  master.  Envy  is  even  entertained  of  people 
who  have  a good  which  one  would  not  care  to  have  one’s  self.  One 
would  be  content  to  see  them  deprived  of  it  without  thinking  to 
profit  by  their  spoils,  and  even  without  being  able  to  hope  it.  For 
some  goods  are  like  pictures  painted  in  fresco,  which  can  be 
destroyed,  but  which  cannot  he  taken  away. 

§ 11.  [Shame.]  If  men  took  more  pains  to  observe  the  exterior 
movements  which  accompany  the  passions,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
conceal  them.  As  to  shame,  it  is  worthy  of  consideration  that 
modest  persons,  when  they  are  simply  witnesses  of  an  improper 
action,  sometimes  feel  movements  resembling  those  of  shame. 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

Of  power  and  of  liberty. 

§ 1.  [The  idea  of  power , how  got.]  If  poiver  corresponds  to 
the  Latin  potentia,  it  is  opposed  to  act , and  the  passage  from  power 
to  act  is  change.  This  is  what  Aristotle  understands  by  the  word 
motion,  when  he  says  that  it  is  the  act  or  perhaps  the  actuation  of 
what  is  in  power.  We  can  say  then  that  power  in  general  is  the 
possibility  of  change.  How  change  or  the  act  of  this  possibility, 
being  action  in  one  subject  and  passion  in  another,  there  will  be 
also  two  powers,  one  passive  the  other  active.  The  active  could  be 
called  faculty  and  perhaps  the  passive  could  be  called  capacity  or 
receptivity.  It  is  true  that  active  power  is  sometimes  taken  in  a 


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more  perfect  sense,  when  in  addition  to  the  simple  faculty  there  is  a 
tendency ; and  it  is  thus  that  I employ  it  in  my  dynamical  con- 
siderations. The  word  force  might  be  appropriated  to  it  in  par- 
ticular ; and  force  would  be  either  entelechy  or  effort;  for  entelechy 
(although  Aristotle  employs  it  so  generally  that  it  comprises  also 
all  action  and  all  effort)  appears  to  me  more  appropriate  to  primi- 
tive acting  forces,  and  that  of  effort  to  derivative  forces.  There 
is  even  also  a species  of  passive  power  more  particular  and  more 
endowed  with  reality ; it  is  this  which  is  in  matter  when  there  is 
not  only  mobility,  which  is  the  capacity  or  recepti\  ity  for  motion, 
but  also  resistance,  which  embraces  impenetrability  and  inertia, 
Entelechies,  that  is  to  say,  primitive  or  substantial  tendencies, 
when  they  are  accompanied  by  perception,  are  souls. 

§ 4.  [The  clearest  idea  of  active  power  had  from  spirit.']  I am 
thoroughly  in  accord  with  you,  that  the  clearest  idea  of  active 
power  comes  to  us  from  spirit.  It  is  also  only  in  things  which 
have  an  analogy  with  spirit,  that  is  to  say,  in  entelechies,  for 
matter  properly  only  indicates  passive  power. 

§ 8.  [Liberty.]  The  term  liberty  is  very  ambiguous.  There  is 
liberty  of  right  and  of  fact.  According  to  that  of  right  a slave  is 
not  free,  a subject  is  not  entirely  free,  but  a poor  man  is  as  free  as 
a rich  man.  Liberty  of  fact  consists  either  in  the  power  to  will  as 
one  ought,  or  in  the  power  to  do  what  one  wills.  It  is  the  liberty  of 
doing  of  which  you  speak,  and  it  has  its  degrees  and  varieties. 
Generally  he  who  has  most  means  is  most  free  to  do  what  he 
wills : but,  in  particular,  liberty  is  understood  of  the  use  of  things 
which  are  wont  to  be  in  our  power  and  especially  of  the  free  use  of 
our  body.  Thus  the  prison  or  sicknesses  which  prevent  us  from 
giving  to  our  body  and  to  our  limbs  the  motion  which  we  wish 
and  which  we  are  ordinarily  able  to  give,  lessens  our  liberty.  It 
is  thus  that  a prisoner  is  not  free,  and  that  a paralytic  has  not  the 
free  use  of  his  limbs.  Liberty  to  ivill  is  also  taken  in  two  different 
senses.  One  is  when  it  is  opposed  to  the  imperfection  or  to  the 
slavery  of  the  spirit,  which  is  a coaction  or  constraint,  but  internal 
like  that  which  comes  from  the  passions.  The  other  sense  appears 
when  liberty  is  opposed  to  necessity.  In  the  first  sense  the  Stoics 
said  that  the  wise  man  only  is  free;  and  in  fact  the  spirit  is  not 


221  PHILOSOPHICAL,  WORKS  OF  LE1BKITZ. 

free  when  it  is  occupied  with  a great  passion,  for  one  cannot  then 
will  as  he  ought  to,  that  is  to  say,  with  the  deliberation  which  is 
requisite.  It  is  thus  that  God  alone  is  perfectly  free,  and  that 
created  spirits  are  so  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  superior  to  the 
passions.  And  this  liberty  concerns  properly  our  understanding. 
But  the  liberty  of  the  spirit,  opposed  to  necessity,  concerns  the 
naked  will,  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  distinguished  from  the  under- 
standing. This  it  is  which  is  called  free-will and  it  consists  in 
this,  that  one  wills  that  the  strongest  reasons  or  impressions  which 
the  understanding  presents  to  the  will  do  not  prevent  the  act  of 
the  will  from  being  contingent,  and  do  not  give  it  an  absolute,  or, 
so  to  say,  metaphysical,  necessity.  And  it  is  in  this  sense  that  I 
am  accustomed  to  say  that  the  understanding  can  determine  the 
will,  in  accordance  with  the  prevalence  of  perceptions  and  reasons, 
in  such  a way  that  even  when  it  is  certain  and  infallible,  inclines 
without  necessitating. 

§ 13.  [N ecessity , ic/iah]  It  seems  to  me  that,  properly  speak- 
ing, although  volitions  are  contingent,  necessity  ought  not  to  be 
opposed  to  volition  but  to  contingency , and  that  necessity  ought  not 
to  he  confounded  with  determination,  for  there  is  not  less  of  con- 
nection or  of  determination  in  thoughts  than  in  motions  (to  be 
determined  being  quite  different  from  being  pushed  or  forced  with 
constraint).  And  if  we  do  not  always  notice  the  reason  which 
determines  us,  or  rather  by  which  we  determine  ourselves,  it  is 
because  we  are  as  little  capable  of  being  conscious  of  the  whole 
extent  of  our  spirit  and  of  its  thoughts,  most  often  impercejitible 
and  confused,  as  we  are  of  disentangling  all  the  mechanisms  which 
nature  makes  play  in  the  body.  Thus,  if  by  necessity  is  understood 
the  certain  determination  of  man,  which  a perfect  knowledge  of  all 
the  circumstances  of  what  takes  place  within  and  without  the  man 
could  enable  a perfect  mind  to  foresee,  it  is  certain  that  thoughts 
being  just  as  determined  as  the  motions  which  they  represent, -every 
free  act  would  he  necessary.  But  the  necessary  must  be  distin- 
guished from  the  contingent  though  determined ; and  not  only 
contingent  truths  are  not  necessary,  but  even  their  connections  are 
not  always  of  an  absolute  necessity ; for  it  must  be  acknowledged 
that  there  is  a difference  in  the  manner  of  determination  between 


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tlie  consequences  which  exist  in  necessary  matter  and  those  which 
exist  in  contingent  matter.  Geometrical  and  metaphysical  con- 
sequences necessitate,  but  physical  and  moral  incline  without 
necessitating ; the  physical  even  having  something  moral  and 
voluntary  in  relation  to  God,  since  the  laws  of  motion  have  no 
.other  necessity  than  that  of  [the  principle  of]  the  best.  ISTow  God 
chooses  freely  although  he  is  determined  to  choose  the  best;  and 
as  bodies  themselves  do  not  choose  (God  having  chosen  for 
them),  usage  has  settled  that  they  be  called  necessary  agents ; to 
which  I am  not  opposed,  provided  the  necessary  and  the  deter- 
mined be  not  confounded,  and  that  it  be  not  imagined  that  free 
beings  act  in  an  indetermined  manner ; an  error  which  has  pre- 
vailed in  certain  minds  and  which  destroys  the  most  important 
truths,  even  this  fundamental  axiom,  that  nothing  occurs  ivithout 
reason,  without  which  neither  the  existence  of  God  nor  other 
great  truths  could  be  well  demonstrated.  As  to  constraint , it  is 
well  to  distinguish  two  species  of  it.  The  one  physical,  as  when  a 
man  is  taken  to  prison  in  spite  of  himself,  or  is  thrown  over  a preci- 
pice ; the  other  moral,  as,  for  example,  the  constraint  of  a greater 
evil,  and  this  action  although  in  some  manner  forced,  is  neverthe- 
less voluntary.  One  can  also  be  forced  by  the  consideration  of  a 
greater  good,  as  when  a man  is  tempted  by  having  proposed  to  him 
a too  great  advantage,  although  this  is  not  customarily  called  con- 
straint. 

§ 21.  [ Liberty  belongs  to  the  agent,  or  man.]  When  we  reason 

about  the  liberty  of  the  will,  or  about  the  free  will,  we  do  not  ask 
if  the  man  can  do  what  he  wills,  hut  if  there  is  enough  independ- 
ence in  his  will  itself.  We  do  not  ask  if  he  has  his  limbs  free  or  has 
elbow-room,  hut  if  he  has  his  spirit  free,  and  in  what  this  consists. 
In  this  respect  one  intelligence  could  be  more  free  than  another, 
and  the  supreme  intelligence  will  enjoy  perfect  liberty  of  which  the 
creatures  are  not  capable. 

§§  41,  42.  [ All  desire  happiness.  Happiness,  what.]  I do  not 

know  whether  the  greatest  pleasure  is  possible.  I believe  rather 
that  it  can  grow  ad  infinitum ; for  we  do  not  know  how  far  our 
knowledge  and  our  organs  can  be  extended  in  all  that  eternity 
which  awaits  us.  I believe  then  that  happiness  is  a lasting 
15 


226 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


pleasure ; which  could  not  be  so  without  there  being  a continual 
progress  to  new  pleasures.  Therefore,  of  two  persons,  one  of  whom 
will  go  incomparably  quicker  and  through  greater  pleasures  than 
the  other,  each  will  be  happy  in  himself  and  apart  by  himself, 
although  their  happiness  will  he  very  unequal.  Happiness  is 
then,  so  to  speak,  a road  through  pleasures ; and  pleasure  is  merely 
a step  and  an  advancement  towards  happiness,  the  shortest  which 
can  be  made  according  to  the  present  impressions,  but  not  always 
the  best.  The  right  road  may  be  missed  in  the  desire  to  follow  the 
shortest,  as  the  stone  which  goes  straight  may  encounter  obstacles 
too  soon,  which  prevent  it  from  advancing  quite  to  the  center  of  the 
earth.  This  shows  that  it  is  the  reason  and  the  will  which  trans- 
port us  toward  happiness,  but  that  feeling  and  desire  merely  lead  us 
to  pleasure.  How,  although  pleasure  can  not  receive  a nominal 
definition,  any  more  than  light  or  color,  it  can  however  receive, 
like  them,  a causal  definition ; and  I believe  that  at  bottom 
pleasure  is  a feeling  of  perfection  and  pain  a feeling  of  imper- 
fection, provided  it  is  noticeable  enough  to  cause  us  to  be  conscious 
of  it. 

§ 47.  \The  power  to  suspend  the  prosecution  of  any  desire 
makes  tuay  for  consideration,  and.  in  this  freedom  of  will  consists .] 
The  execution  of  our  desire  is  suspended  or  arrested  when  this 
desire  is  not  strong  enough  to  move  us,  and  to  overcome  the  trouble 
and  inconvenience  of  satisfying  it.  But  when  the  desire  is  strong 
enough  in  itself  to  move  us,  if  nothing  prevents,  it  can  be  arrested 
by  contrary  inclinations;  be  it  that  they  consist  in  a simple  pro- 
pensity which  is  like  the  element  or  the  beginning  of  desire,  be  it 
that  they  extend  to  desire  itself,  nevertheless  as  these  inclina- 
tions, these  propensities,  and  these  contrary  desires  must  be  found 
already  in  the  soul,  it  does  not  have  them  in  its  power,  and  conse- 
quently it  cannot  resist  in  a free  and  voluntary  way  in  which  the 
reason  can  share,  if  it  had  not  also  another  means  which  is  that  of 
turning  the  mind  elsewhere.  But  how  can  we  think  of  doing  it 
when  there  is  need  ? for  there  is  the  point,  especially  when  we  are 
possessed  by  a strong  passion.  There  is  need,  therefore,  that  the 
mind  be  prepared  beforehand,  and  find  itself  already  ready  to  go 
from  thought  to  thought,  in  order  not  to  stop  too  long  in  a slippery 
and  dangerous  place. 


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227 


For  this,  it  is  well  to  accustom  one’s  self  generally  not  to  think 
except  in  passing  of  certain  things,  in  order  the  better  to  preserve 
the  freedom  of  the  mind.  But  the  best  way  is  to  accustom  one’s 
self  to  proceed  methodically,  and  to  attach  one's  self  to  a train  of 
thoughts  the  connection  of  which  reason  and  not  chance  ( that  is  to 
say,  insensible  and  casual  impressions)  establishes.  And  in  order 
to  do  this,  it  is  well  to  accustom  one’s  self  to  collect  one’s  self  from 
time  to  time,  and  to  raise  one’s  self  above  the  present  tumult  of 
impressions,  to  go  forth,  so  to  say,  from  the  place  where  one  is,  to 
say  to  one’s  self  “die  cur  hie ? respice  finem,  or  where  are  we  ? let 
us  come  to  the  point.”  Aden  would  often  have  need  of  some  one, 
established  with  an  official  title  (as  Philip,  the  father  of  Alexander 
the  Great,  had),  to  interrupt  them  and  to  recall  them  to  their  duty. 
But,  for  lack  of  such  an  officer,  it  is  well  for  us  to  be  accustomed 
to  perform  for  ourselves  this  office.  Xow  being  once  in  a condition 
to  arrest  the  effect  of  our  desires  and  of  our  passions,  that  is  to  say, 
to  suspend  action,  we  can  find  the  means  of  combating  them,  be  it 
by  the  contrary  desires  or  inclinations,  be  it  by  diversion,  that  is  to 
say,  by  occupations  of  another  nature.  It  is  by  these  methods  and 
these  artifices  that  we  become,  as  it  were,  masters  of  ourselves,  and 
that  we  can  make  ourselves  think  and  do  at  the  time  what  we 
should  wish  to  will  and  what  reason  commands.  ^Nevertheless,  it 
is  always  by  determined  ways,  and  never  without  ground  or  by  the 
imaginary  principle  of  a perfect  indifference  or  equilibrium,  in 
which  some  would  make  the  essence  of  liberty  to  consist ; as  if  one 
could  determine  himself  groundlessly  and  even  against  all  ground, 
and  go  directly  counter  to  the  prevalence  of  the  impressions  and  the 
propensities. 

§ 51.  [Idle  necessity  of  pursuing  true  happiness  the  foundation 
of  liberty .]  True  happiness  ought  always  to  be  the  object  of  our 
desires,  but  there  is  ground  for  doubting  whether  it  is.  For  often 
we  hardly  think  of  it,  and  I have  remarked  here  more  than  once 
that  the  less  desire  is  guided  by  reason  the  more  it  tends  to  present 
pleasure  and  not  to  happiness,  that  is  to  say,  to  lasting  pleasure, 
although  it  tends  to  make  it  last. 


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PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

Of  our  complex  ideas  of  substances. 

§ 1.  [ Ideas  of  substances,  how  made.']  On  the  contrary,  it  is 

rather  the  concretum  as  odorous,  as  warm,  as  glittering,  which 
comes  into  our  minds,  than  the  abstractions  or  qualities  (for  it  is 
they  which  are  in  the  substantial  object  and  not  the  ideas)  as, 
namely,  heat,  light,  etc.,  which  are  much  more  difficult  to  com- 
prehend. It  may  even  he  doubted  whether  these  accidents  are  real 
existences,  as  in  fact  they  are  very  often  only  relations.  It  is 
known  also  that  it  is  the  abstractions  which  occasion  most  difficulty 
when  it  is  desired  to  examine  them  minutely,  as  those  who  are 
acquainted  with  the  subtilties  of  the  scholastics,  whose  most  intri- 
cate speculations  fall  at  one  blow  if  we  will  banish  abstract  entities 
and  resolve  not  to  speak  ordinarily  except  by  concretes,  and  not  to 
admit  any  other  terms  in  the  demonstrations  of  the  sciences,  but 
those  which  represent  substantial  subjects.  Thus  it  is  nodum 
quaerere  in  scirpo,  if  I dare  say  it,  and  to  invert  things,  if  we  take 
the  qualities  or  other  abstract  terms  for  what  is  easiest  and  the 
concrete  ones  for  something  very  difficult. 

§ 2.  [Our  idea  of  substance  in  general.]  In  distinguishing  two 
things  in  substance,  attributes  or  predicates  and  the  common  sub- 
ject of  these  predicates,  it  is  not  strange  that  nothing  in  particular 
can  be  conceived  in  this  subject.  It  must  necessarily  be  so,  since 
we  have  already  separated  from  it  all  the  attributes  in  which  some 
detail  could  be  conceived.  Therefore  to  demand  something  more 
in  this  pure  subject  in  general  than  what  is  necessary  in  order 
to  conceive  that  it  is  the  same  thing  (e.  g.,  which  understands  and 
wills,  which  imagines  and  reasons),  this  is  to  demand  the  impossi- 
ble and  to  run  counter  to  one’s  own  supposition,  made  in  abstract- 
ing and  in  conceiving  separately  the  subject  and  its  qualities  or 
accidents.  The  same  pretended  difficulty  could  be  applied  to  the 
notion  of  being  and  to  all  that  is  most  clear  and  most  primitive; 
for  we  could  ask  philosophers  what  they  conceive  in  conceiving 
pure  being  in  general;  for  all  detail,  being  thereby  excluded, 
there  would  be  as  little  to  say  as  when  it  is  asked  what  pure 
substance  in  general  is.  I think,  therefore,  that  the  philosophers 
do  not  deserve  to  be  ridiculed,  as  is  done  here  in  comparing  them 


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to  tlie  Indian  philosopher,  who  when  asked  what  the  earth  rested 
on,  replied  that  it  was  a large  elephant,  and  when  asked  what  the 
elephant  rested  on,  said  that  it  was  a great  tortoise,  and,  finally, 
when  pressed  to  tell  what  the  tortoise  rested  on,  was  reduced  to 
saying  that  it  was  something , I know  not  what.  However,  the 
consideration  of  substance,  very  inconsiderable  as  it  seems  to  he, 
is  not  so  void  and  sterile  as  is  thought.  Certain  consequences 
come  from  it  which  are  most  important  to  philosophy,  and  which 
are  capable  of  giving  it  a new  aspect.  [Cf.  ch.  13,  § 19.] 

§ 4.  [No  clear  idea  of  substance  in  general.\  For  my  part,  I 
believe  that  this  opinion  of  our  ignorance  comes  from  our  demand- 
ing a kind  of  knowledge  which  the  object  does  not  permit  of.  The 
true  mark  of  a clear  and  distinct  notion  of  an  object  is  the  means 
we  have  of  knowing  many  truths  of  it  hv  a priori  proofs,  as  I have 
pointed  out  in  an  essay  on  truths  and  ideas  inserted  in  the  Acta  of 
Leipsic  of  the  year  1684.  [Cf.  Art.  III.] 

§ 5.  [Ideas  of  spiritual  substances,  as  clear  as  of  bodily  sub- 
stances.] It  is  well  said,  and  it  is  very  true,  that  the  existence  of 
the  mind  is  more  certain  than  that  of  sensible  objects. 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

Of  relation. 

§ 1.  [Relation,  what.]  Relations  and  orders  are  like  entities  of 
reason , although  they  have  their  foundation  in  things ; for  it  may 
he  said  that  their  reality,  like  that  of  eternal  truths  and  possibili- 
ties comes  from  the  supreme  reason. 

CHAPTER  XXVII. 

Of  identity  and  diversity. 

§ 1.  [Wherein  identity  consists.]  There  must  always  be,  in 
addition  to  the  difference  of  time  and  of  place,  an  internal  principle 
of  distinction ; and  although  there  are  many  things  of  the  same 
species,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  none  of  them  are  ever  perfectly 
alike:  thus  although  time  and  place  (that  is,  the  relation  to  the 
external)  serve  us  in  distinguishing  things  which  we  do  not  well 
distinguish  through  themselves,  things  are  none  the  less  distin- 


230 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


guishable  in  themselves.  The  characteristic  of  identity  and  of 
diversity  does  not  consist,  therefore,  in  time  and  in  place. 

§ 3.  [ Principium , individuationis .]  The  principle  of  indi- 

viduation corresponds  in  individuals  to  the  principle  of  distinction 
of  which  I have  just  spoken.  If  two  individuals  were  perfectly 
alike  and  equal,  and  (in  a word)  indistinguishame  in  themselves, 
there  would  he  no  principle  of  individuation;  and  I even  venture 
to  say  that  there  would  he  no  individual  distinction,  or  different 
individuals,  on  this  condition. 

§ 9.  [Personal  identity .]  I am  also  of  the  opinion  that  con- 
sciousness, or  the  feeling  of  the  ego , proves  a moral  or  personal 
identity.  And  it  is  in  this  that  I distinguish  the  unceasingness  of 
the  soul  of  a brute  from  the  immortality  of  the  soul  of  man : both 
retain  physical  and  real  identity ; hut  as  for  man,  it  is  conformed 
to  the  rules  of  divine  providence  that  the  soul  preserve  in  addition 
moral  identity,  apparent  to  ourselves,  in  order  to  constitute  the 
same  pelson,  capable  consequently  of  feeling  punishments  and 
rewards.  It  appears  that  you,  sir,  hold  that  this  apparent  identity 
might  he  preserved,  even  if  there  should  be  no  real  identity.  I 
should  think  that  this  might  perhaps  be  possible  by  the  absolute 
power  of  God ; hut  according  to  the  order  of  things  the  identity 
apparent  to  the  person  himself,  who  himself  feels  the  same,  sup- 
poses the  real  identity  at  each  following  stage,  accompanied  by 
reflection  or  by  the  feeling  of  the  ego:  an  intimate  and  immediate 
perception  not.  naturally  aide  to  deceive.  If  man  could  he  only 
a machine  and  have  in  addition  consciousness,  it  would  be  nec- 
essary to  lie  of  your  opinion,  sir ; but  I hold  that  this  case  is  not 
possible,  at  least  naturally,  I do  not  mean  to  say  either  that  per- 
sonal identity  and  even  the  ego  do  not  remain  in  us,  and  that  I am 
not.  that  ego  which  was  in  the  cradle,  under  the  pretext  that  I no 
longer  remember  anything  which  I then  did.  It  is  sufficient  in 
order  to  find  moral  identity  by  itself  that  there  be  a common  bond 
of  consciousness  from  a neighboring  state,  or  even  one  a little 
removed,  to  another,  even  if  some  leap  or  forgotten  interval  should 
lie  mingled  with  it.  Thus,  if  an  illness  had  caused  an  interruption 
of  the  continuity  of  the  connection  of  consciousness,  so  that  I 
should  not  know  how  I had  come  into  the  present,  state,  although 


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231 


I might  remember  more  distant  things,  the  testimony  of  others 
might  fill  the  gap  of  my  remembrance.  I might  even  he  punished 
on  this  testimony,  if  I had  done  some  evil  of  deliberate  purpose  in 
an  interval  which  I had  forgotten  a little  while  afterwards  through 
this  illness.  And  if  I came  to  forget  all  past  things,  so  that  I 
should  he  obliged  to  let  myself  be  taught  anew,  even  to  my  name 
and  to  reading  and  writing,  I could  always  learn  from  others  my 
past  life  in  my  preceding  state,  as  I have  preserved  my  rights 
without  its  being  necessary  to  divide  myself  into  two  persons,  and 
to  make  myself  my  own  heir.  All  this  suffices  for  maintaining 
moral  identity,  which  makes  the  same  person.  It  is  true  that  if 
others  conspired  to  deceive  me  (as  I might  even  be  deceived  by 
myself,  by  some  vision,  dream  or  illness,  believing  that  what  I 
dreamed  had  happened  to  me) , the  appearance  would  be  false  ; but 
there  are  cases  in  which  we  may  be  morally  certain  of  the  truth 
upon  the  report  of  others ; and  in  relation  to  God,  whose  bond  of 
union  with  us  makes  the  principal  point  of  morality,  error  cannot 
enter.  As  regards  the  ego,  it  will  he  well  to  distinguish  it  from  the 
appearance  of  the  ego  and  from  consciousness.  The  ego  forms 
the  real  and  physical  identity,  and  the  appearance  of  the  ego, 
accompanied  by  truth,  joins  to  it  personal  identity.  Thus  not 
wishing  to  say  that  personal  identity  does  not  extend  farther  than 
memory,  I would  say  still  less  that  the  ego  or  physical  identity 
depends  on  it.  Real  and  personal  identity  is  proved,  as  certainly 
as  is  possible  in  matter  of  fact,  by  present  and  immediate  reflec- 
tion ; it  is  proved  sufficiently  for  common  use  by  our  remembrance 
of  the  interval,  or  by  the  corroborating  testimony  of  others.  But. 
if  God  changed  extraordinarily  real  identity,  personal  identity 
would  remain,  provided  that  man  should  preserve  the  appearances 
of  identity,  as  well  the  internal  (that  is,  of  consciousness)  as  the 
external,  like  those  which  consist  in  what  is  evident  to  others.  Thus 
consciousness  is  not  the  only  means  of  establishing  personal 
identity,  and  the  report  of  others  or  even  other  marks  may  take  its 
place.  But  there  is  difficulty  if  contradiction  is  found  between 
these  different  evidences.  Consciousness  may  be  silent  as  in  for- 
getfulness ; but  if  it  said  very  distinctly  things  which  were  con- 
trary to  the  other  evidences,  we  should  be  embarrassed  in  the 


23*2 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


decision  and  sometimes  as  if  suspended  between  two  possibilities : 
that  of  the  error  of  our  memory  and  that  of  some  deception  in  the 
external  evidences. 

§ Id.  An  immaterial  being  or  spirit  cannot  be  despoiled  of  all 
perception  of  its  past  existence.  There  remain  to  it  impressions  of 
everything  which  has  formerly  happened  to  it,  and  it  has  even  pre- 
sentiments of  everything  which  will  happen  to  it ; but  these  feel- 
ings are  most  often  too  slight  to  be  distinguishable  and  for  us  to  be 
conscious  of  them,  although  they  may  be  developed  some  day. 
This  continuation  and  connection  of  perceptions  forms  the  same 
individual  really ; but  apperceptions  (that  is,  when  we  are  con- 
scious of  past  feelings)  prove,  farther,  a moral  identity  and  make 

the  real  identity  appear The  late  M.  Van  Helmont,  the 

younger,  believed,  with  certain  rabbis,  in  the  passing  of  the  soul  of 
Adam  into  the  Messiah  as  into  the  new  Adam.  And  I do  not  know 
whether  he  did  not  believe  that  he  himself  had  been  one  of  the 
ancients,  very  able  man  as  he  was  otherwise.  Vow,  if  this  passing* 
of  souls  was  true,  at  least  in  the  possible  way  which  I have 
explained  above  (but  which  does  not  appear  probable),  that  is,  that 
souls,  retaining  subtile  bodies,  should  pass  suddenly  into  other 
gross  bodies,  the  same  individual  would  subsist  always,  in  Vestor, 
in  Socrates,  and  in  some  modern,  and  he  might  even  make  known 
his  identity  to  that  one  who  should  sufficiently  penetrate  into  his 
nature,  by  reason  of  the  impressions  or  characters  which  would 
there  remain  of  all  that  Vestor  or  Socrates  has  done,  and  which 
any  sufficiently  penetrating  genius  might  read  there.  However,  if 
the  modern  man  had  no  internal  or  external  means  of  knowing 
what  he  has  been,  it  would  be,  so  far  as  ethics  is  concerned,  as  if 
he  had  not  been  at  all.  But  the  probability  is  that  nothing  is 
neglected  in  the  world,  even  in  relation  to  morals,  because  God 
is  its  monarch,  and  his  government  is  perfect. — Thus  if  souls 
passed  into  a new  body,  gross  or  sensitive,  they  would  always  retain 
the  expression  of  all  of  which  they  have  had  perception  in  the  old, 
and  it  would  even  be  necessary  that  the  new  body  should  feel  it  all, 
so  that  the  individual  continuity  will  always  have  its  real  marks. 

§ 18.  [ Object  of  reward  and  punishment. ] I confess  that  if 

God  caused  consciousnesses  to  be  transferred  to  other  souls,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  treat-  them,  according  to  ethical  ideas,  as  if 


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233 


they  were  the  same;  hut  this  would  be  to  disturb  the  order  of 
things  groundlessly,  and  to  make  a divorce  between  the  appercep- 
tible  and  truth,  which  is  preserved  by  insensible  perceptions.  This 
would  not  be  rational,  because  perceptions,  at  present  insensible, 
may  be  developed  some  day;  for  there  is  nothing  useless,  and 
eternity  presents  a large  field  for  changes. 

§ 29.  [Continued  existence  makes  identity .]  I have  pointed 
out  to  you  the  source  of  true  physical  identity ; I have  shown  you 
that  morals  do  not  contradict  it,  any  more  than  memory ; that  they 
cannot  always  mark  out  physical  identity  to  the  person  himself 
in  question,  nor  to  those  who  are  in  communication  with  him ; but 
that  nevertheless  they  never  contradict  physical  identity,  and  never 
are  divorced  from  it ; that  there  are  always  created  spirits  which 
know  or  may  know  what  is  the  truth  respecting  it ; but  that  there 
is  reason  for  thinking  that  what  is  indifferent  as  regards  persons 
themselves  can  be  so  only  for  a time. 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

Of  other  relations. 

§ 5.  [Moral  good  and  evil.]  I should  prefer,  for  myself,  to 
take  as  the  measure  of  moral  good  and  of  virtue  the  invariable 
rule  of  reason  that  God  has  charged  himself  to  maintain.  Also  we 
may  be  assured  that  by  his  means  every  moral  good  becomes  physi- 
cal, or  as  the  ancients  said,  all  that  is  praiseworthy  is  useful ; 
whereas,  in  order  to  express  the  idea  of  the  author,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  say  that  moral  good  or  evil  is  a good  or  evil  of  imposi- 
tion or  instituted,  which  he  who  has  the  power  tries  to  bring  about 
or  to  prevent  by  pains  or  recompenses.  Good  is  that  which  by  the 
general  institution  of  God  is  conformed  to  nature  or  to  reason. 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 

Of  clear  and  obscure,  distinct  and  confused  ideas. 

§ 2.  In  a short  essay  on  ideas,  true  or  false  or  obscure,  dis- 
tinct or  confused,  inserted  in  the  Acta  of  Leipsic  in  the  year  1684, 
I have  given  a definition  of  clear  ideas  which  is  common  to  simple 
ideas  and  to  composite  ones,  and  which  accounts  for  what  is  said 
thereon  here. 


234 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


13.  [■ Complex  ideas  may  be  distinct  in  one  part  and  confused 

in  another.']  This  example  [a  chiliagon]  shows  that  idea  is  here 
confounded  with  image.  If  someone  proposes  to  me  a regular 
polygon,  sight  and  imagination  could  not  make  me  understand 
the  thousand  sides  which  are  in  it;  I have  only  a confused  idea 
both  of  the  figure  and  of  its  number,  until  I distinguish  the  number 
by  counting.  But  having  found  it,  I know  very  well  the  nature 
and  the  properties  of  the  proposed  polygon,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
those  of  a chiliagon,  and  consequently  I have  the  idea  of  it;  but  I 
could  not  have  the  image  of  a chiliagon,  and  it  would  be  necessary 
to  have  senses  and  imagination  more  delicate  and  better  exercised 
in  order  to  thereby  distinguish  it.  from  a polygon  which  should  have 
one  side  less.  But  knowledge  of  figures  does  not  depend  upon  the 
imagination,  any  more  than  that  of  numbers,  although  it  is  of  use 
thereto;  and  a mathematician  may  know  exactly  the  nature  of  an 
enneagon  or  of  a decagon  because  he  has  the  means  of  making 
and  examining  them,  although  he  cannot  distinguish  them  by  sight. 
It  is  true  then  that  a workman  or  an  engineer,  who  should  not 
perhaps  know  the  nature  of  the  figures  sufficiently,  might  have  this 
advantage  over  a great  geometrician,  that  he  could  distinguish 
them  by  merely  seeing  them  without  measuring  them ; as  there 
are  porters  who  will  tell  the  weight  of  what  they  are  to  carry  with- 
out the  mistake  of  a pound,  in  which  they  will  surpass  the  most 
skillful  statistician  in  the  world.  This  empirical  knowledge, 
acquired  by  long  practice,  may  have  great  advantages  for  acting 
promptly,  as  an  engineer  very  often  needs  to  do  by  reason  of  the 
danger  to  which  he  exposes  himself  by  hesitating.  However  this 
clear  image,  or  this  feeling  which  we  may  have  of  a regular 
decagon  or  of  a weight  of  ninety-nine  pounds,  consists  only  in  a 
confused  idea,  since  it  is  of  no  use  in  discovering  the  nature  and 
the  properties  of  this  weight  or  of  the  regular  decagon,  which 
requires  a distinct  idea.  And  this  example  serves  to  show  better 
the  difference  between  ideas,  or  rather  that  between  idea  and  image. 

§ 15.  [ Instance  in  eternity .]  This  example  does  not  seem  to 
me  to  fit  your  purpose  any  better-;  but  it  is  very  appropriate  to 
mine,  which  is  to  disabuse  you  of  your  notions  on  this  point.  For 
there  reigns  here  the  same  confusion  between  image  and  idea.  We 


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235 


have  a complete  and  proper  idea  of  eternity,  since  we  have  a defini- 
tion of  it,  although  we  have  no  image  of  it ; but  the  idea  of  infinites 
is  not  formed  by  the  composition  of  parts,  and  the  errors  which  are 
committed  in  reasoning  concerning  the  infinite  do  not  come  from 
the  lack  of  image. 


Book  IV.  Or  Knowledge, 
chapter  i. 

Of  knowledge  in  general. 

§§  1 and  2.  [1.  Our  knowledge  conversant  about  our  ideas. 

2.  Knowledge  is  the  perception  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement 
of  two  ideas.]  Knowledge  is  employed  still  more  generally,  in 
such  a way  that  it  is  found  also  in  ideas  or  terms,  before  we  come  to 
propositions  or  truths.  And  it  may  be  said  that  he  who  shall  have 
seen  attentively  more  pictures  of  plants  and  of  animals,  more 
figures  of  machines,  more  descriptions  or  representations  of  houses 
or  of  fortresses,  who  shall  have  read  more  ingenious  romances, 
heard  more  curious  narratives,  he,  I say,  will  have  more  knowledge 
than  another,  even  if  there  should  not  be  a word  of  truth  in  all 
which  has  been  portrayed  or  related  to  him ; for  the  practice  which 
he  has  in  representing  to  himself  mentally  many  express  and 
actual  conceptions  or  ideas,  renders  him  more  fit  to  conceive  what 
is  proposed  to  him ; and  it  is  certain  that  he  will  be  better 
instructed  and  more  capable  than  another,  who  has  neither  seen 
nor  read  nor  heard  anything,  provided  that  in  these  stories  and 
representations  he  does  not  take  for  true  that  which  is  not  true, 
and  that  these  impressions  do  not  hinder  him  otherwise  from  dis- 
tinguishing the  real  from  the  imaginary,  or  the  existing  from  the 
possible  ....  But  taking  knowledge  in  a narrower  meaning, 
that  is,  for  knowledge  of  truth,  as  you  do  here,  sir,  I say  that  it 
is  very  true  that  truth  is  always  founded  in  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  ideas,  but  it  is  not  true  generally  that  our  knowl- 
edge of  truth  is  a perception  of  this  agreement  or  disagreement. 
For  when  we  know  truth  only  empirically,  from  having  experienced 
it,  without  knowing  the  connection  of  things  and  the  reason  which 
there  is  in  what  we  have  experienced,  we  have  no  perception  of 


236 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


this  agreement  or  disagreement,  unless  it  be  meant  that  we  feel 
it  confusedly  without  being  conscious  of  it.  But  your  examples, 
it  seems,  show  that  you  always  require  a knowledge  in  which  one 
is  conscious  of  connection  or  of  opposition,  and  this  is  what  cannot 
be  conceded  to  you. 

§§3-7.  [3.  This  agreement  fourfold.  4.  First,  Of  identity  or 

diversity.  5.  Secondly,  Relative.  6.  Thirdly,  Of  co-existence. 
7.  Fourthly,  Of  real  existence .]  1 believe  that  it  may  be  said  that 

connection  is  nothing  else  than  accordance  or  relation,  taken 
generally.  And  I have  remarked  on  this  point  that  every  rela- 
tion is  either  of  comparison  or  of  concurrence.  That  of  com- 
parison gives  diversity  and  identity,  either  complete  or  partial  ; 
that  which  makes  the  same  or  the  diverse,  the  like  or  unlike.  Con- 
currence contains  what  you  call  co-existence,  that  is,  connection  of 
existence.  But  when  it  is  said  that  a thing  exists  or  that  it  has 
real  existence,  this  existence  itself  is  the  predicate ; that  is,  it  has 
a notion  joined  with  the  idea  in  question,  and  there  is  connection 
between  these  two  notions.  One  may  conceive  also  the  existence  of 
the  object  of  an  idea,  as  the  concurrence  of  this  object  with  the 
Ego.  So  I believe  that  it  may  be  said  that  there  is  only  comparison 
or  concurrence;  but  that  comparison,  which  marks  identity  or 
diversity,  and  the  concurrence  of  the  thing  with  the  Ego,  are  rela- 
tions which  deserve  to  be  distinguished  among  others.  More  exact 
and  more  profound  researches  might  perhaps  be  made;  but  I 
content  myself  here  with  making  remarks. 

CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  degrees  of  our  hiowledge. 

§ 1.  \_Intuitive.\  Primitive  truths,  which  are  known  by  intui- 
tion, are  of  two  kinds,  like  the  derivative.  They  are  either  truths 
of  reason,  or  truths  of  fact.  Truths  of  reason  are  necessary,  and 
those  of  fact  are  contingent.  Primitive  truths  of  reason  are  those 
which  I call  by  the  general  name  of  identical,  because  it  seems 
that  they  do  nothing  but  repeat  the  same  thing  without  giving  us 
any  information.  They  are  affirmative  or  negative 

As  respects  primitive  truths  of  fact,  they  are  the  immediate 
internal  experiences  of  an  immecliateness  of  feeling.  And  here  it  is 


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237 


that  the  first  truth  of  the  Cartesians  or  of  St.  Augustine : I think, 
hence  I am,  that  is,  1 am  a thing  which  thinks,  holds  good.  But  it 
should  be  known  that  just  as  the  identicals  are  general  or  particu- 
lar, and  that  the  one  class  is  as  clear  as  the  other  (since  it  is  just 
as  clear  to  say  that  A is  A,  as  to  say  that  a thing  is  what  it  is),  so 
it  is  also  with  first  truths  of  fact.  Bor  not  only  is  it  clear  to  me 
immediately  that  I think;  but  it  is  just  as  clear  to  me  that  I have 
different  thoughts;  that  sometimes  I think  of  A,  and  that  some- 
times I think  of  B,  etc.  Thus  the  Cartesian  principle  is  good,  but 
it  is  not  the  only  one  of  its  kind.  You  see  by  this  that  all  primitive 
truths  of  reason  or  of  fact  have  this  in  common,  that  they  cannot 
he  proved  by  anything  more  certain. 

§ 14.  [Sensitive  knowledge  of  particular  existence .]  But  let 
us  come  to  this  controversy  which  the  sceptics  carry  on  with  the 
dogmatists  over  the  existence  of  things  outside  of  us.  We  have 
already  touched  upon  it,  but  it  is  necessary  to  return  to  it  here.  I 
have  formerly  discussed  it  thoroughly,  both  verbally  and  in  writ- 
ing, with  the  late  Abbe  Foueher,  Canon  of  Dijon,  a learned  and 
subtle  man. — ISfow  I made  him  admit  that  the  truth  of  sensible 
things  consisted  only  in  the  connection  of  phenomena,  which  must 
have  its  reason,  and  that  it  is  this  which  distinguishes  them  from 
dreams ; but  that  the  truth  of  our  existence  and  of  the  cause  of 
phenomena  is  of  another  kind,  because  it  establishes  substances ; 
and  that  the  sceptics  spoiled  whatever  they  say  that  is  good,  by 
carrying  it  too  far,  and  by  wishing  even  to  extend  their  doubts 
to  immediate  experiences  and  to  geometrical  truths  (a  thing  which 
M.  Boucher,  however,  did  not  do) , and  to  the  other  truths  of  reason, 
which  he  did  a little  too  much.  But  to  return  to  you,  sir ; you  are 
right  in  saying  that  there  is  ordinarily  a difference  between  feel- 
ings and  imaginations ; but  the  sceptics  will  say  that  more  or  less 
does  not  change  the  kind.  Besides,  although  feelings  are  wont  to 
be  more  vivid  than  imaginations,  it  is  a fact  nevertheless  that  there 
are  cases  where  an  imaginative  person  is  impressed  by  his  imagina- 
tions as  much  or  perhaps  more  than  another  is  by  the  truth  of 
things ; so  that  I believe  that  the  true  criterion  as  regards  the 
objects  of  the  senses  is  the  connection  of  phenomena,  that,  is,  the 
connection  of  that  which  takes  place  in  different  places  and  times. 


238 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


and  in  the  experience  of  different  men,  who  are  themselves,  each 
to  the  others,  very  important  phenomena  on  this  score.  And  the 
connection  of  phenomena,  which  guarantees  truths  of  fact  in 
respect  to  sensible  things  outside  of  us,  is  verified  by  means  of 
truths  of  reason;  as  the  phenomena  of  optics  are  explained  by 
geometry.  However  it  must  be  confessed  that  all  this  certainty 
is  not  of  the  highest  degree,  as  you  have  well  recognized.  For  it 
is  not  impossible,  speaking  metaphysically,  that  there  may  be  a 
dream,  continuous  and  lasting,  like  the  life  of  a man;  hut  it  is 
a thing  as  contrary  to  reason  as  would  he  the  fiction  of  a book  which 
should  he  formed  at  haphazard  by  throwing  the  type  together  pell- 
mell.  For  the  rest,  it  is  also  true  that,  provided  the  phenomena  be 
connected,  it  does  not  matter  whether  they  are  called  dreams  or 
not,  since  experience  shows  that  we  are  not  deceived  in  the 
measures  taken  concerning  phenomena  when  they  are  understood 
according  to  the  truths  of  reason. 

CHAPTER  III. 

Of  the  extent  of  human  knowledge. 

§ 6.  \“ Whether  any  mere  material  being  thinks  or  no.”]  In 
the  first  place,  I declare  to  you,  sir,  that  when  one  has  only  con- 
fused ideas  of  thought  and  of  matter,  as  one  ordinarily  has,  it  is 
not  to  be  wondered  at  if  one  does  not  see  the  means  of  solving  such 
questions.  It  is  as  I have  remarked  before,  that  a person  who  has 
not  ideas  of  the  angles  of  a triangle  except  in  the  way  in  which  one 
has  them  generally,  will  never  think  of  finding  out  that  they  are 
always  equal  to  two  right  angles.  We  must  consider  that  matter, 
taken  as  a complete  being  (that  is,  secondary  matter  as  opposed  to 
primary,  which  is  something  simply  passive  and  consequently 
incomplete),  is  only  a mass,  or  that  which  results  therefrom,  and 
that  every  real  mass  supposes  simple  substances  or  real  unities ; and 
when  we  farther  consider  what  belongs  to  the  nature  of  these  real 
unities,  that  is,  perception  and  its  consequences,  we  are  transported, 
so  to  speak,  into  another  world,  that  is  to  say,  into  the  intelligible 
world  of  substances,  whereas  before  we  have  been  only  among  the 
phenomena  of  the  senses.  And  this  knowledge  of  the  interior  of 
matter  sufficiently  shows  us  of  what  it  is  naturally  capable,  and 


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that  every  time  that  God  shall  give  it  organs  fitted  to  express 
reasoning,  the  immaterial  substance  which  reasons  will  not  fail  to 
he  also  given  to  it,  by  virtue  of  that  harmony  which  is  again  a 
natural  consequence  of  substances.  Matter  cannot  subsist  without 
immaterial  substances,  that  is,  without  unities ; after  which  it 
ought  no  longer  to  be  asked  whether  God  is  at  liberty  to  give  them 
to  it  or  not.  And  if  these  substances  did  not  have  in  themselves  the 
correspondence  or  harmony,  of  which  I have  just  spoken,  God  would 
not  act  according  to  the  natural  order.  To  speak  quite  simply 
of  giving  or  of  according  powers,  is  to  return  to  the  naked  faculties 
of  the  schoolmen,  and  to  imagine  minute  subsisting  entities,  which 
may  come  and  go  like  the  pigeons  of  a pigeon-house.  It  is  making 
substances  of  them  without  thinking  of  it.  The  primitive  powers 
constitute  substances  themselves ; and  the  derivative  powers,  or, 
if  you  like,  the  faculties,  are  only  modes  of  being,  which  must  be 
derived  from  substances,  and  are  not  derived  from  matter,  as  a 
machine  merely,  that  is,  in  so  far  as  we  consider  it  abstractly  only 
as  the  incomplete  being  of  primary  matter,  or  the  simply  passive. 
Here  I think  that  you  will  agree  with  me,  sir,  that  it  is  not  in  the 
power  of  a mere  mechanism  to  cause  perception,  sensation,  reason, 
to  arise.  They  must  therefore  spring  from  some  other  substantial 
thing.  To  wish  God  to  act  differently  and  give  to  things  accidents 
which  are  not  modes  of  being , or  modifications  derived  from  sub- 
stances, is  to  resort  to  miracles  and  to  what  the  schoolmen  called 
the  obediential  power,  by  a sort  of  supernatural  exaltation,  as 
when  certain  theologians  claim  that,  the  fire  of  hell  burns  disem- 
bodied souls  ; in  which  case  it  might  be  even  doubted  if  it  were  the 
fire  which  acted,  and  if  God  did  not  himself  produce  the  effect, 
by  acting  in  place  of  the  fire 

The  difficulty  which  remains  is  only  in  respect  to  those  who  wish 
to  imagine  what  is  only  .intelligible,  as  if  they  wanted  to  see  sounds, 
or  hear  colors. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  the  reality  of  human  hnowledge. 

§§  1-5.  [ Knowledge  placed  in  ideas  may  be  all  bare  vision. 
Answer.]  Our  certainty  would  be  slight  or  rather  none,  if  it  had 


240 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


no  other  foundation  for  simple  ideas  than  that  which  comes  from 
the  senses.  Have  you  forgotten,  sir,  how  I showed  that  ideas  are 
originally  in  our  mind  and  that  even  our  thoughts  come  to  us  from 
our  own  depths,  without  its  being  possible  for  other  creatures  to 
have  an  immediate  influence  upon  the  soul.  Moreover  the  ground 
of  our  certainty  in  regard  to*  universal  and  eternal  truths  lies 
in  the  ideas  themselves,  independently  of  the  senses ; as  also  pure 
and  intelligible  ideas  do  not  depend  upon  the  senses,  for  example, 
that  of  being,  of  unity,  of  identity,  etc.  But  the  ideas  of  sensible 
qualities,  as  of  color,  of  flavor,  etc.  (which  in  ■ reality  are  only 
appearances) , come  to  us  from  the  senses,  that  is,  from  our  con- 
fused perceptions.  And  the  ground  of  the  truth  of  contingent  and 
particular  things  is  in  the  succession,  whereby  the  phenomena 
of  the  senses  are  connected  just  as  the  intelligible  truths  require. 
This  is  the  difference  which  should  be  made  between  them ; whereas 
that  which  you  make  here  between  simple  and  complex  ideas,  and 
complex  ideas  belonging  to  substances  and  to  accidents,  does  not 
seem  to  me  well  founded,  since  all  intelligible  ideas  have  their 
archetypes  in  the  eternal  possibility  of  things. 

chapter  v. 

Of  truth  in  general. 

§§  1 and  2.  [1.  What  truth  is.  2.  A right  joining  or  separat- 

ing of  signs ; i.  e.,  ideas  or  words.^\  But  what  I find  least  to- my 
taste  in  your  definition  of  truth,  is  that  truth  is  there  sought  in 
words.  Thus  the  same  meaning,  being  expressed  in  Latin,  Ger- 
man, English,  French,  will  not  be  the  same  truth,  and  it  will  be 
necessary  to  say  with  Llobbes,  that  truth  depends  on  the  good 
pleasure  of  men ; which  is  speaking  in  a very  strange  way.  Truth 
is  even  attributed  to  God,  who  you  will  admit  (I  think)  has  no 
need  of  signs.  Finally,  I have  been  already  more  than  once  sur- 
prised at  the  humor  of  your  friends,  who  take  pleasure  in  making 
essences  and  species,  nominal  truths. 

We  shall  then  have,  also,  literal  truths,  which  may  be  dis- 
tinguished into  the  truths  of  paper  or  of  parchment,  of  the  black  of 
ordinary  ink,  or  of  printer’s  ink,  if  truths  must  be  distinguished  by 
signs.  It  is  better,  therefore,  to  jflace  truths  in  the  relation  between 


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241 


the  objects  of  ideas,  which  causes  one  to  be  included  or  not  to  be 
included  in  the  other.  This  does  not  depend  on  languages  and  is 
common  to  us  with  God  and  the  angels ; and  when  God  manifests 
a truth  to  us  we  acquire  that  which  is  in  his  understanding,  for 
although  there  is  an  infinite  difference  between  his  ideas  and  ours 
as  respects  perfection  and  extent,  it  is  always  true  that  they  agree 
in  the  same  relation.  It  is  therefore  in  this  relation  that  truth 
must  be  placed,  and  we  may  distinguish  between  truths,  which  are 
independent  of  our  good  pleasure,  and  expressions,  which  we  invent 
as  seems  good  to  us. 

§ 11.  [ Moral  and  metaphysical  truth.]  Moral  truth  is  called 

veracity  by  some,  and  metaphysical  truth  is  taken  commonly  by 
metaphysicians  for  an  attribute  of  being,  but  it  is  a very  useless 
attribute  and  one  almost  void  of  meaning.  Let  us  content  our- 
selves with  seeking  truth  in  the  correspondence  of  propositions 
which  are  in  the  mind  with  the  things  in  question.  It  is  true  that 
I have  also  attributed  truth  to  ideas  in  saying  that  ideas  are  true 
or  false;  but  in  that  case  I understand  it  in  fact  of  the  proposi- 
tions which  affirm  the  possibility  of  the  object  of  the  idea.  And  in 
this  same  sense  it  may  be  said  farther  that  a being  is  true,  that  is 
to  say,  the  proposition  which  affirms  its  actual,  or  at  least,  possible 
existence. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  maxims. 

§ 1.  [ They  are  self-evident.]  This  investigation  is  very  useful 

and  even  important.  But  you  must  not  imagine,  sir,  that  it  has 
been  entirely  neglected.  You  will  find  in  a hundred  places  that 
the  scholastic  philosophers  have  said  that  these  propositions  are 
evident  ex  terminis,  as  soon  as  their  terms  are  understood  ; so  that 
they  were  persuaded  that  the  force  of  conviction  was  founded  on 
the  apprehension  of  the  terms,  that  is,  in  the  connection  of  the 
ideas.  But  the  geometricians  have  done  much  more : for  they  have 

undertaken  very  often  to  demonstrate  them As  regards 

maxims,  they  are  sometimes  taken  for  established  propositions, 
whether  they  are  evident  or  not.  This  might  he  well  for  beginners, 
whom  scrupulousness  arrests ; but  when  the  establishing  of  science 
16 


242 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


is  in  question,  it  is  another  matter.  They  are  also  often  taken  thus 
in  ethics  and  even  by  the  logicians  in  their  Topics , in  which  there 
is  an  abundance  of  them,  but  a part  of  this  contains  some  which  are 
sufficiently  vague  and  obscure.  For  the  rest,  I said  publicly  and 
privately  a long  while  ago  that  it  would  be  important  to  demon- 
strate all  the  secondary  axioms  of  which  we  ordinarily  make  use, 
by  reducing  them  to  primitive,  or  immediate  and  undemonstrable, 
axioms,  which  are  those  which  I called  recently  and  elsewhere, 
identical  ones. 

§ 7.  It  may  always  be  said  that  this  proposition,  I exist , 
is  most  evident,  being  a proposition  which  cannot  lie  proved  by 
any  other,  or  an  immediate  truth.  And  to  say,  I think  therefore 
I am,  is  not  properly  to  prove  existence  by  thought,  since  to  think 
and  to  be  thinking  are  the  same  thing ; and  to  say,  I am  thinking 
is  already  to  say,  I am.  Nevertheless  you  may  exclude  this 
proposition  from  the  number  of  axioms  with  some  justice,  for  it 
is  a proposition  of  fact,  founded  upon  an  immediate  experience, 
and  it  is  not  a necessary  proposition,  whose  necessity  is  seen  in  the 
immediate  agreement  of  ideas.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  no  one  but 
God  who  sees  how  these  two  terms  / and  existence  are  connected, 
that  is,  why  I exist.  But  if  the  axiom  is  taken  more  generally  for 
an  immediate  or  non-provahle  truth,  it  may  be  said  that  the  proposi- 
tion I am  is  an  axiom,  and  in  any  case  we  may  be  assured  that  it 
is  a pnmitive  truth  or  unum  ex  primis  cognitis  inter  terminos 
complexos,  that  is,  that  it  is  one  of  the  first  known  statements, 
which  is  understood  in  the  natural  order  of  our  knowledge;  for 
it  is  possible  that  a man  may  never  have  thought  of  forming 
expressly  this  proposition,  which  is  yet  innate  in  him. 

§§  8,  9.  I had  further  added  that  in  the  natural  order  to  say 
that  a thing  is  what  it  is,  is  prior  to  saying  that  it  is  not  another ; 
for  here  it  is  not  a question  of  the  history  of  our  discoveries, 
which  is  different  in  different  men,  but  of  the  connection  and 
natural  order  of  truths,  which  is  always  the  same.  But  your 
remark,  namely,  that  what  the  child  sees  is  only  fact,  deserves  still 
more  reflection ; for  the  experiences  of  the  senses  do  not  give  abso- 
lutely certain  truths  (as  you  yourself  observed,  sir,  not  long  ago), 
nor  such  as  are  free  from  all  danger  of  illusion.  For  if  it  is  per- 


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243 


mitted  to  make  metaphysically  possible  fictions,  sugar  might  he 
changed  imperceptibly  into  a rod  to  punish  a child  if  it  has  been 
naughty,  just  as  water  is  changed  into  wine  with  us  on  Christmas 
Eve,  if  it  has  been  well  rectified  [morigene ].  But  the  pain  (you 
will  say)  which  the  rod  inflicts  will  never  be  the  pleasure  which  the 
sugar  gives.  I reply  that  the  child  will  think  of  making  an  express 
proposition  concerning  it  as  little  as  of  remarking  the  axiom  that  it 
cannot  be  said  truly  that  what  is,  at  the  same  time  is  not , although 
it  may  very  well  perceive  the  difference  between  pleasure  and  pain, 
as  well  as  the  difference  between  perceiving  and  not  perceiving. 

§ 10.  Thus  you  must  not  here  oppose  the  axiom  and  the 
example  as  different  truths  in  this  respect,  but  regard  the  axiom  as 
incorporated  in  the  example  and  rendering  the  example  true.  It  is 
quite  another  thing  when  the  evidence  is  not  remarked  in  the 
example  itself  and  when  the  affirmation  of  the  example  is  a conse- 
quence and  not  merely  a subsumption  of  the  universal  proposition, 
as  may  happen  also  in  respect  to  axioms. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Of  our  knowledge  of  existence. 

§§  2 and  3.  [2.  A threefold  knowledge  of  existence.  3.  Our 

knowledge  of  our  own  existence  is  intuitive .]  I am  fully  in  accord 
with  all  this.  And  I add  that  the  immediate  apperception  of  our 
existence  and  of  our  thoughts  furnishes  us  the  first  truths  a poste- 
riori, or  of  fact,  that  is,  the  first  experiences ; as  identical  propo- 
sitions contain  the  first  truths  a priori,  or  of  reason,  that  is,  the 
first  lights.  Both  are  incapable  of  being  proved,  and  may  be  called 
immediate ; the  former,  because  there  is  immediation  between  the 
understanding  and  its  object,  the  latter,  because  there  is  immedia- 
tion between  the  subject  and  predicate. 

CHAPTER  X. 

Of  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a God. 

§ 1.  I do  not  wish  to  repeat  what  has  been  discussed  between  us 
concerning  innate  ideas  and  truths,  among  which  I reckon  the  idea 
of  God  and  the  truth  of  his  existence. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


244 

§§  2— (5.  [2.  Man  knows  that  he  himself  is.  3.  He  knows  also 

that  nothing  cannot  produce  a being,  therefore  something  is  eternal. 
4.  That  eternal  being  must  be  most  powerful.  5.  And  most  know- 
ing. 0.  And  therefore  God.~\  I assure  you,  sir,  with  perfect  sin- 
cerity, that  I am  extremely  sorry  to  he  obliged  to  say  anything 
against  this  demonstration : but  I do  it  in  order  to  give  you  an 
opportunity  to  fill  up  the  gap  in  it.  It  is  principally  in  the  passage 
where  you  conclude  (§3)  that  something  has  existed  from  all 
eternity.  I find  ambiguity  in  it.  If  it  means  that  there  has  never 
been  a time  when  nothing  existed , I agree  to  this ; and  it  follows 
truly  from  the  preceding  propositions  by  a wholly  mathematical 
sequence.  For  if  there  never  had  been  anything,  there  would 
always  have  been  nothing,  nothing  not  being  able  to  produce 
being ; hence  we  ourselves  would  not  be,  which  is  contrary  to  the 
first  truth  of  experience.  But  what  follows  shows  at  once  that  in 
saying  that  something  has  existed  from  all  eternity,  you  mean  an 
eternal  thing.  Nevertheless  it  does  not  follow,  in  virtue  of  what 
you  have  advanced  up  to  this  time,  that  if  there  has  always  been 
something,  it  has  always  been  a certain  thing,  that  is,  that  there  is 
an  eternal  being.  Bor  some  opponents  will  say  that  I myself  have 
been  produced  by  other  things  and  these  things  again  by  others. 
Farther,  if  some  admit  eternal  beings  (as  the  Epicureans  their 
atoms)  they  will  not  believe  themselves  thereby  obliged  to  grant 
an  eternal  being  which  is  alone  the  source  of  all  others.  For  even 
if  they  should  admit  that  that  which  gives  existence  gives  also  the 
other  qualities  and  powers  of  a thing,  they  will  deny  that  a single 
thing  gives  existence  to  the  others,  and  they  will  even  say  that  for 
each  thing  several  others  must  concur.  Thus  ive  will  not  arrive  in 
this  way  alone  at  one  source  of  all  powers.  However  it  is  very 
reasonable  to  judge  that  there  is  one,  and  even  that  the  universe 
is  governed  with  wisdom.  But  if  one  believes  matter  susceptible 
of  thought,  one  may  he  disposed  to  believe  that  it  is  not  impossible 
that  it  may  produce  it.  At  least  it  will  be  difficult  to  bring  forward 
a proof  of  it  which  should  not  show  at  the  same  time  that  matter 
is  altogether  incapable  of  it ; and  supposing  that  our  thought  comes 
from  a thinking  being,  can  it  be  taken  for  granted  without  preju- 
dice to  the  demonstration,  that  this  must  be  God  ? 


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245 


§ 7.  [ Our  idea  of  a most  perfect  being,  not  the  sole  proof  of 

a God.]  Although  I hold  to  innate  ideas,  and  particularly  to  that 
of  God,  I do  not  believe  that  the  demonstrations  of  the  Cartesians 

drawn  from  the  idea  of  God,  are  perfect This  [ontological 

argument]  is  not  a paralogism,  but  it  is  an  imperfect  demonstra- 
tion which  supposes  something  which  has  still  to  be  proved  in  order 
to  render  it  mathematically  evident.  This  is,  that  it  is  tacitly 
supposed  that  this  idea  of  the  all-great  or  all-perfect  being  is  possi- 
ble, and  implies  no  contradiction The  other  argument  of 

M.  Descartes  which  undertakes  to  prove  the  existence  of  God 
because  his  idea  is  in  our  soul  and  it  must  have  come  from  the 
original,  is  still  less  conclusive.  For,  in  the  first  place,  this  argu- 
ment has  this  defect,  in  common  with  the  preceding,  that  it 
supposes  that  there  is  in  us  such  an  idea,  that  is,  that  God  is  possi- 
ble  And,  secondly,  this  same  argument  does  not  sufficiently 

prove  that  the  idea  of  God,  if  we  have  it,  must  come  from  the 
original.  But  1 do  not  wish  to  delay  here  at  present.  You  will 
say  to  me,  sir,  that  recognizing  in  ns  the  innate  idea  of  God,  I 
ought  not  to  say  that  we  may  question  whether  there  is  one.  But 
I permit  this  doubt  only  in  relation  to  a strict  demonstration, 
founded  upon  the  idea  alone.  For  we  are  sufficiently  assured  other- 
wise of  the  idea  and  of  the  existence  of  God.  And  yon  will  remem- 
ber that  I have  shown  how  ideas  are  in  us,  not  always  in  such 
a way  that  we  are  conscious  of  them,  but  always  so  that  we  may 
draw  them  from  our  own  depths  and  render  them  perceptible.  And 
this  is  also  what  I believe  of  the  idea  of  God,  whose  possibility  and 
existence  I hold  to  be  demonstrated  in  more  than  one  way.  And 
the  Preestablished  Harmony  itself  furnishes  a new  and  incon- 
testable means  of  doing  so.  I believe  besides  that  almost  all  the 
means  which  have  been  employed  to  prove  the  existence  of  God 
are  good,  and  might  serve,  if  they  were  perfected ; and  I am  not 
at  all  of  the  opinion  that  the  one  which  is  drawn  from  the  order 
of  things  is  to  be  neglected. 

§§  9,  10.  [9.  Two  sorts  of  beings,  cogitative  and  incogitative. 

10.  Incogitative  being  cannot  produce  a cogitative.]  I think  the 
present  reasoning  the  strongest  in  the  world,  and  not  only  exact  hut 
also  profound  and  worthy  of  its  author.  I am  entirely  of  his 


246  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

opinion  that  no  combination  and  modification  of  parts  of  matter, 
however  small  they  may  be,  can  produce  perception;  any  more 
than  the  gross  parts  could  give  it  (as  is  clearly  evident),  and 
as  everything  in  the  small  parts  is  proportional  to  what  may  take 
place  in  the  large  ones.  It  is  another  important  remark  upon 
matter,  which  the  author  here  makes,  that  it  must  not  be  taken 
for  a thing  single  in  number,  or  (as  I am  accustomed  to  say)  for 
a true  and  perfect  monad  or  unity,  since  it  is  but  a mass  of  an 
infinite  number  of  beings.  Here  this  excellent  author  needed 
but  one  more  step  to  reach  my  system.  For  in  fact  I give  percep- 
tion to  all  these  infinite  beings,  each  one  of  which  is  as  an  animal, 
endowed  with  a soul  (or  with  some  analogous  active  principle, 
which  forms  its  true  unity),  together  with  what  is  necessary  to 
this  being  in  order  to  be  passive  and  endowed  with  an  organic 
body.  How  these  beings  have  received  their  nature,  active  and 
passive  (that  is,  what  they  possess  of  immaterial  and  material), 
from  a general  and  supreme  cause,  because  otherwise,  as  the  author 
well  remarks,  being  independent  each  of  the  others,  they  could 
never  produce  that  order,  that  harmony,  that  beauty,  which  we 
observe  in  nature.  But  this  argument,  which  appears  to  be  only 
of  moral  certainty,  is  brought  to  a necessity  altogether  metaphysi- 
cal by  the  new  hind  of  harmony  which  I have  introduced,  which 
is  the  i ^reestablished  harmony.  For  each  one  of  these  souls  express- 
ing in  its  manner  that  which  takes  place  outside  it  and  not  being 
able  to  have  any  influence  on  other  particular  beings,  or  rather, 
being  obliged  to  draw  this  expression  from  the  depths  of  its  own 
nature,  each  one  must  necessarily  have  received  this  nature  (or 
this  internal  reason  of  the  expressions  of  what  is  outside)  from  a 
universal  cause  on  which  all  these  beings  depend,  and  which  causes 
one  to  be  perfectly  in  accord  and  correspondent  with  another ; a 
thing  which  is  not  possible  without  an  infinite  knowledge  and 
power,  and  by  an  artifice  great  as  regards  especially  the  sponta- 
neous agreement  of  the  mechanism  with  the  actions  of  the  rational 
soul.  In  regard  to  this,  the  illustrious  author  who  made  objections 
against  it  in  his  wonderful  Dictionary,  doubted  whether  it  did 
not  surpass  all  possible  wisdom ; saying  that  the  wisdom  of  God 


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247 


■did  not  appear  to  liim  too  great  for  such  an  effect,  and  he  at  least 
recognized  that  never  had  the  feeble  conceptions  which  we  are  able 
to  have  of  the  divine  perfection,  been  so  set  in  relief. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Of  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  other  things. 

§§  1-10.  [It  is  to  be  had  only  by  sensation,  etc.']  I have 
already  remarked  in  our  preceding  conversations  that  the  truth 
of  sensible  things  is  proved  by  their  connection,  which  depends  on 
the  intellectual  truths  founded  in  reason,  and  on  the  constant 
observations  in  sensible  things  themselves,  even  when  the  reasons 
do  not  appear.  And  as  these  reasons  and  observations  give  us  the 
means  of  judging  of  the  future  in  relation  to  our  interests,  and  as 
success  answers  to  our  rational  judgment,  we  could  not  ask 
nor  even  have  a greater  certainty  concerning  these  objects.  We 
can  account  also  even  for  dreams  and  for  their  slight  connection 
with  other  phenomena.  Nevertheless,  I believe  that  the  appellation 
of  knowledge  and  of  certainty  might  be  extended  beyond  actual 
sensations,  since  clearness  and  manifestness  extend  beyond,  which 
I consider  as  a kind  of  certainty:  and  it  would  undoubtedly  be 
folly  to  seriously  doubt  whether  there  are  men  in  the  world  when 
we  do  not  see  any.  To  doubt  seriously  is  to  doubt  in  relation  to 
practice,  and  certainty  might  be  taken  for  a knowledge  of  truth, 
of  which  one  cannot  doubt  in  relation  to  practice  without  madness ; 
and  sometimes  it  is  taken  still  more  generally  and  applied  to 
cases  where  we  cannot  doubt  without  deserving  to  be  greatly 
blamed.  But  evidence  would  be  a luminous  certainty,  that  is  to 
say,  where  we  do  not  doubt  on  account  of  the  connection  which 
we  see  between  ideas.  According  to  this  definition  of  certainty, 
we  are  certain  that  Constantinople  is  in  the  world,  that  Constan- 
tine and  Alexander  the  Great  and  Julius  Caesar  have  lived.  It  is 
true  that  some  peasant  of  Ardennes  might  with  reason  doubt  of 
these,  for  want  of  information ; but  a man  of  letters  and  of  the 
world  could  not  do  so  without  great  derangement  of  mind. 

§ 11.  [Past  existence  hnoivn  by  memory.]  It  has  already  been 
remarked  that  our  memory  sometimes  deceives  us.  And  we 
believe  it  or  not  according  as  it  is  more  or  less  vivid,  and  more  or 


248 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


less  connected  with  the  things  which  we  know.  And  even  when 
we  are  assured  of  the  principal  fact  we  may  often  question  the 
circumstances. 

§§  13,  14.  [13.  Particular  propositions  concerning  existence 

are  knowable.  14.  And  general  propositions  concerning  abstract 
ideas.]  Your  division  appears  to  amount  to  mine,  of  propositions 
of  fact  and  propositions  of  reason.  Propositions  of  fact  also  may 
become  general  in  a way,  but  it  is  by  induction  or  observation ; 
such  that  it  is  only  a multitude  of  similar  facts,  as  when  it  is 
observed  that  all  quicksilver  is  evaporated  by  the  force  of  fire; 
and  this  is  not  a perfect  generalization  because  we  do  not  see  its 
necessity.  General  propositions  of  reason  are  necessary,  although 
the  reason  also  furnishes  some  which  are  not  absolutely  general 
and  are  only  probable,  as,  for  example,  when  we  presume  that  an 
idea  is  possible  until  the  contrary  is  discovered  by  a more  exact 
research.  There  are,  finally,  mixed  propositions,  drawn  from 
premises,  some  of  which  come  from  facts  and  observations,  and 
others  are  necessary  propositions : and  such  are  a number  of 

geographical  and  astronomical  conclusions  concerning  the  globe 
of  the  earth  and  the  course  of  the  stars,  which  spring  from  the 
combination  of  the  observations  of  travelers  and  astronomers  with 
the  theorems  of  geometry  and  arithmetic.  But  as,  according  to 
the  usage  of  logicians,  the  conclusion  follows  the  weakest  of  the 
premises  and  cannot  have  more  certainty  than  they,  these  mixed 
propositions  have  only  the  certainty  and  universality  which  belong 
to  the  observations.  As  regards  eternal  truths,  it  must  be  observed 
that,  at  bottom  they  are  all  conditional  and  say  in  effect:  such  a 
thing  posited,  such  another  thing  is.  For  example,  in  saying,  evert / 
figure  which  has  three  sides  tvill  also  have  three  angles,  I do  noth- 
ing but  suppose  that  if  there  is  a figure  with  three  sides,  this  same 
figure  will  have  three  angles 

The  scholastics  have  disputed  hotly  de  constantia  subjecti,  as 
they  called  it,  that  is,  how  the  proposition  made  upon  a subject  can 
have  a real  truth,  if  this  subject  does  not  exist.  The  fact  is  that 
the  truth  is  only  conditional,  and  says,  that  in  case  the  subject 
ever  exists,  it  will  be  found  such.  But  it  will  he  asked  further, 
in  what  is  this  connection  founded,  since  there  is  in  it  some  reality 


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249 


which  does  not  deceive  ? The  reply  will  be  that  it  is  in  the  connec- 
tion of  ideas.  But  in  answer  it  will  be  asked,  where  would  these 
ideas  be  if  no  mind  existed,  and  what  then  would  become  of  the 
real  foundation  of  this  certainty  of  the  eternal  truths  ? This 
leads  us  finally  to  the  ultimate  ground  of  truths,  namely,  to  that 
Supreme  and  Universal  Mind,  which  cannot  fail  to  exist,  whose 
understanding,  to  speak  truly,  is  the  region  of  eternal  truths, 
as  St.  Augustine  has  recognized  and  expresses  in  a sufficiently 
vivid  way.  And  in  order  that  it  be  not  thought  that  it  is  unneces- 
sary to  recur  to  this,  we  must  consider  that  these  necessary  truths 
contain  the  determining  reason  and  the  regulative  principle  of 
existences  themselves,  and,  in  a word,  the  laws  of  the  universe. 
Thus  these  necessary  truths,  being  anterior  to  the  existence  of 
contingent  beings,  it  must  be  that  they  are  founded  in  the  existence 
of  a necessary  substance.  Here  it  is  that.  I find  the  original  of  the 
ideas  and  truths  which  are  graven  in  our  souls,  not  in  the  form  of 
propositions,  but  as  the  sources  from  which  application  and  occa- 
sion will  cause  actual  enunciations  to  arise. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Of  the  improvement  of  our  knowledge. 

§§  4—6.  [Dangerous  to  build  upon  precarious  principles.  But 
to  compare  clear  complete  ideas  under  steady  names.~\  I am  sur- 
prised, sir,  that  you  turn  against  maxims,  that  is,  against  evident 
principles,  that,  which  can  and  must  be  said  against  the  principles 
assumed  gratis.  AYhen  one  demands  praecogmta  in  the  sciences, 
or  anterior  knowledges,  which  serve  to  ground  science,  he  demands 
known  principles  and  not  arbitrary  positions,  the  truth  of  which  is 
not  known ; and  even  Aristotle  understands  that  the  inferior  and 
subaltern  sciences  borrow  their  principles  from  other  higher 
sciences  where  they  have  been  demonstrated,  except  the  first  of  the 
sciences,  which  we  call  metaphysics,  which,  according  to  him,  asks 
nothing  from  the  others,  and  furnishes  them  the  principles  of 
which  they  have  need ; and  when  he  says  8ei  ttlctt eveiv  tov  yav- 
OdvovTa  , the  apprentice  must  believe  his  master,  his  thought  is 
that  he  must  do  it  only  while  waiting,  while  he  is  not  yet  instructed 
in  the  higher  sciences,  so  that  it  is  only  provisionally.  Thus  one 


250 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


is  very  far  from  receiving  gratuitous  principles.  To  this  must  be 
added,  that  even  principles  whose  certainty  is  not  complete  may 
have  their  use  if  we  build  upon  them  only  by  demonstration ; for 
although  all  the  conclusions  in  this  case  are  only  conditional  and 
are  valid  solely  on  the  supposition  that  this  principle  is  true, 
nevertheless,  this  connection  itself  and  these  conditional  enuncia- 
tions would  at  least  he  demonstrated ; so  that  it  were  much  to  be 
desired  that  we  had  many  books  written  in  this  way,  where  there 
would  he  no  danger  of  error,  the  reader  or  disciple  being  warned 
of  the  condition.  And  practice  will  not  be  regulated  by  these  con- 
clusions except  as  the  supposition  shall  be  found  verified  otherwise. 
This  method  also  serves  very  often  itself  to  verify  suppositions  or 
hypotheses,  when  many  conclusions  arise  from  them,  the  truth 
of  which  is  known  otherwise,  and  sometimes  this  gives  a perfect 
proof  sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  truth  of  the  hypothesis. 

§ 13.  [Hie  true  use  of  hypotheses.^  The  art  of  discovering 
the  causes  of  phenomena,  or  true  hypotheses,  is  like  the  art 
of  deciphering,  where  an  ingenious  conjecture  often  short- 
ens the  road  very  much.  Lord  Bacon  began  to  put  the  art  of 
experimenting  into  precepts,  and  Sir  Robert  Boyle  had  a great 
talent  for  practising  it.  But  if  the  art  of  employing  experiments 
and  of  drawing  consequences  therefrom  is  not  joined  to  it,  we  shall 
never  with  the  utmost  cost  attain  to  what  a man  of  great  penetra- 
tion might  discover  at  first  sight.  Descartes,  who  was  assuredly 
such,  has  made  a similar  remark,  in  one  of  his  letters,  in  regard 
to  the  method  of  the  Chancellor  of  England ; and  Spinoza  (whom 
I do  not  hesitate  to  quote  when  he  says  something  good),  in  one 
of  his  letters  to  the  late  Mr.  Oldenburg,  Secretary  of  the  Royal 
Society  of  England,  printed  among  the  posthumous  works  of  this 
subtle  J ew,  makes  a like  reflection  concerning  a work  by  Mr.  Boyle, 
who,  to  speak  the  truth,  stops  a little  too  much  to  draw  from  a 
great  number  of  fine  experiments  no  other  conclusion  than  this 
which  he  might  take  for  a principle,  namely,  that  everything  takes 
place  in  nature  mechanically;  a principle  which  can  be  rendered 
certain  by  reason  alone,  and  never  by  experiments  however  numer- 
ous they  may  be. 


XXVII. 


Considerations  on  the  Principles  of  Life;  and  on  Plastic 

Natures  ; by  the  Author  of  the  System  of  Preestablished 

Harmony.  1705. 

[From  the  French.] 

As  the  dispute  which  has  arisen  on  plastic  natures  and  on  the 
principles  of  life  has  given  celebrated  persons  who  are  interested 
in  it  occasion  to  speak  of  my  system,  of  which  some  explanation 
seems  to  be  demanded  (see  Biblioth.  Chois.,  vol.  5,  art.  5,  p.  301, 
and  also  Vliistoire  des  Ouvmges  des  Savants,  of  1701,  art.  7,  p. 
393),  I have  thought  it  would  be  in  place  to  add  something  on  the 
subject  to  what  I have  already  published  in  various  passages  of 
the  Journals  quoted  by  Bayle  in  his  Dictionary,  article  Rorarius. 
I really  admit  principles  of  life  diffused  throughout  all  nature,  and 
immortal  since  they  are  indivisible  substances,  or  units;  just  as 
bodies  are  multitudes  liable  to  perish  by  dissolution  of  their  parts. 
These  principles  of  life,  or  these  souls,  have  perception  and  desire. 
When  I am  asked  if  they  are  substantial  forms,  I reply  in  making 
a distinction.  For  if  this  term  is  taken  as  Descartes  takes  it,  when 
he  maintains  against  Regis  that  the  rational  soul  is  the  substantial 
form  of  man,  I will  answer,  Yes.  But  I answer,  Xo,  if  the  term 
is  taken  as  those  take  it  who  imagine  that  there  is  a substantial 
form  of  a piece  of  stone,  or  of  any  other  non-organic  body ; for 
principles  of  life  belong  only  to  organic  bodies.  It  is  true 
(according  to  my  system)  that  there  is  no  portion  of  matter  in 
which  there  are  not  numberless  organic  and  animated  bodies ; 
under  which  I include  not  only  animals  and  plants,  but  perhaps 
also  other  kinds  which  are  entirely  unknown  to  us.  But  for  all 
this,  it  must  not  be  said  that  each  portion  of  matter  is  animated, 
just  as  we  do  not  say  that  a pond  full  of  fishes  is  an  animated 
body,  although  a fish  is. 

However,  my  opinion  on  the  principles  of  life  is  in  certain 
points  different  from  that  hitherto  taught.  One  of  these  points  is 
that  all  have  believed  that  these  principles  of  life  change  the  course 
of  the  motion  of  bodies,  or  at  least  give  occasion  to  God  to  change 


252 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


it,  whereas,  according  to  ray  system,  this  course  is  not  changed  at 
all  in  the  order  of  nature,  God  having  preestablished  it  as  it 
ought  to  he.  The  Peripatetics  believed  that  souls  had  an  influ- 
ence on  bodies  and  that  according  to  their  will  or  desire  they 
gave  some  impression  to  bodies.  And  the  celebrated  authors  who 
have  given  occasion  for  the  present  dispute,  by  their  principles  of 
life  and  their  plastic  natures,  have  held  the  same  view,  although 
they  are  not  Peripatetics.  We  cannot  say  as  much  of  those  who 
have  employed  or  hylarchic  principles,  or  other  immaterial 

principles  under  different  names.  Descartes  having  well  recog- 
nized that  there  is  a law  of  nature,  according  to  which  the  same 
quantity  of  force  is  preserved  (although  he  was  deceived  in  its 
application  in  confounding  quantity  of  force  with  quantity  of 
motion),  believed  that  we  ought  not  to  ascribe  to  the  soul  the  power 
of  increasing  or  diminishing  the  force  of  bodies,  hut  simply  that  of 
changing  their  direction,  by  changing  the  course  of  the  animal 
spirits.  And  those  Cartesians,  who  have  introduced  the  doctrine 
of  Occasional  Causes,  believed  that  the  soul  not  being  able  to 
exert  any  influence  on  body,  it  was  necessary  that  God  should 
change  the  course  or  direction  of  the  animal  spirits  according  to 
the  volitions  of  the  soul.  But  if  at  the  time  of  Descartes  the 
new  law  of  nature,  which  I have  demonstrated,  had  been  known, 
which  affirms  that  not  only  the  same  quantity  of  total  force  of 
bodies  which  are  in  communication,  but  also  their  total  direction,  is 
preserved,  he  would  probably  have  discovered  my  system  of  Pre- 
established  Harmony.  For  he  would  have  recognized  that  it  is  as 
reasonable  to  say  that  the  soul  does  not  change  the  quantity  of  the 
direction  of  bodies,  as  it  is  reasonable  to  deny  to  the  soul  the  power 
of  changing  the  quantity  of  their  force,  both  being  equally  contrary 
to  the  order  of  things  and  to  the  laws  of  nature,  as  both  are  equally 
inexplicable.  Thus,  according  to  my  system,  souls  or  the  principles 
of  life,  do  not  change  anything  in  the  ordinary  course  of  bodies, 
and  do  not  even  give  to  God  occasion  to  do  so.  Souls  follow  their 
laws,  which  consist  in  a certain  development  of  perceptions,  accord- 
ing to  the  goods  and  the  evils ; and  bodies  also  follow  their  laws, 
: which  consist  in  the  laws  of  motion ; and  nevertheless  these  two 
beings  of  entirely  different  kind  are  in  perfect  accord,  and  corres- 


OX  THE  PRINCIPLES  OE  LIFE. 


253 


pond  like  two  clocks  perfectly  regulated  on  the  same  basis,  although 
perhaps  of  an  entirely  different  construction.  This  is  what  I call 
Preestablished  Harmony,  which  removes  all  notion  of  miracles 
from  purely  natural  actions,  and  makes  things  run  their  course 
regulated  in  an  intelligible  manner;  whereas  the  common  system 
has  recourse  to  absolutely  inexplicable  influences,  and  in  that  of 
Occasional  Causes,  God,  by  a sort  of  general  law  and  as  if  by 
agreement,  is  obliged  to  change  at  each  moment  the  natural  course 
of  the  thoughts  of  the  soul  to  accomodate  them  to  the  impressions 
of  the  body,  and  to  disturb  the  natural  course  of  the  motions  of 
bodies  according  to  the  volitions  of  the  soul ; that  which  can  only 
be  explained  by  a perpetual  miracle,  while  I explain  it  quite  intel- 
ligibly by  the  natures  which  God  has  established  in  things. 

My  system  of  Preestablished  Harmony  furnishes  a new  proof, 
hitherto  unknown,  of  the  existence  of  God,  since  it  is  quite  manifest 
that  the  agreement  of  so  many  substances,  of  which  the  one  has  no 
influence  upon  the  other,  could  only  come  from  a general  cause, 
on  which  all  of  them  depend,  and  that  this  must  have  infinite 
power  and  wisdom  to  preestablish  all  these  harmonies.  M.  Bavle 
himself  has  thought  that  there  never  has  been  an  hypothesis  which 
so  sets  in  relief  the  knowledge  which  we  have  of  the  divine  wisdom. 
The  system  has  moreover  the  advantage  of  preserving  in  all  its 
rigor  and  generality  the  great  principle  of  physics,  that  a body 
never  receives  change  in  its  motion  except  by  another  body  in 
motion  which  impels  it.  Corpus  non  moveri  nisi  impulsum  a 
corpore  contiguo  et  moio.  This  law  has  been  violated  hitherto  by 
all  those  who  have  admitted  souls  or  other  immaterial  principles, 
all  Cartesians  even  included.  The  followers  of  Democritus,  Hobbes, 
and  some  other  thorough-going  materialists,  who  have  rejected  all 
immaterial  substance,  having  alone  up  to  this  time  preserved  this 
law,  have  believed  that  they  found  therein  ground  for  insulting 
other  philosophers,  as  if  they  thus  maintained  a very  irrational 
opinion.  But  the  ground  of  their  triumph  has  been  but  apparent 
and  ad  hominem;  and  far  from  serving  them,  it  serves  to  confound 
them.  And  now,  their  illusion  being  discovered  and  their  advan- 
tage turned  against  them,  it  seems  that  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  the 
first  time  that  the  better  philosophy  shows  itself  also  the  most  con- 


254: 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


formed  in  all  respects  to  reason,  nothing  remaining  which  can 
be  opposed  to  it.  This  general  principle,  although  it  excludes 
particular  prime  movers,  by  making  us  deny  this  quality  to 
souls,  or  to  immaterial  created  principles,  leads  us  so  much  the 
more  surely  and  clearly  to  the  universal  Prime  Mover, 
from  whom  comes  equally  the  succession  and  harmony 
of  perceptions.  There  are,  as  it  were,  two  kingdoms,  the  one 
of  efficient  causes,  the  other  of  final ; each  of  which  separ- 
ately suffices  in  detail  for  explaining  all  as  if  the  other  did  not 
exist.  But  the  one  does  not  suffice  without  the  other  in  what  is 
general  of  their  origin,  for  they  both  emanate  from  one  source  in 
which  the  power  which  constitutes  efficient  causes  and  the  wisdom 
which  regulates  final  causes  are  found  united.  This  maxim  also, 
that  there  is  no  motion  which  has  not  its  origin  in  another  motion, 
according  to  laws  of  mechanics,  leads  us  again  to  the  Prime  Mover ; 
because  matter  being  indifferent  in  itself  to  all  motion  or  rest, 
and  nevertheless  always  possessing  motion  with  all  its  force  and 
direction,  it  could  not,  have  been  put  in  motion  except  by  the  author 
himself  of  matter. 

There  is  still  another  difference  between  the  opinions  of  other 
authors  who  favor  the  principles  of  life,  and  mine.  It  is  that  I 
believe  at  the  same  time  both  that  these  principles  of  life  are 
immortal  and  that  they  are  everywhere;  whereas  according  to 
the  common  opinion  the  souls  of  brutes  perish,  and  according  to  the 
Cartesians,  man  only  has  really  a soul  and  even  perception  and 
desire;  an  opinion  which  will  never  be  approved,  and  which  has 
only  been  embraced  because  it  was  seen  that,  it  was  necessary  either 
to  accord  to  brutes  immortal  souls  or  to  avow  that  the  soul  of  man 
might  be  mortal.  But  it  ought  rather  to  have  been  said  that,  every 
simple  substance  being  imperishable  and  every  soul  being  con- 
sequently immortal,  that  which  could  not  he  reasonably  refused 
to  brutes,  cannot  fail  also  to  subsist,  always,  although  in  a way  very 
different  from  our  own,  since  brutes,  as  far  as  can  he  judged,  are 
lacking  in  that  reflection  which  makes  us  think  of  ourselves.  And 
we  do  not  see  why  men  have  been  so  loath  to  accord  to  the  bodies 
of  other  organic  creatures  immaterial,  imperishable  substances, 
since  the  defenders  of  atoms  have  introduced  material  substances 


ON  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  LIFE. 


255 


which  do  not  perish,  and  since  the  soul  of  the  brute  has  no  more 
reflection  than  an  atom.  For  there  is  a broad  difference  between 
feeling  which  is  common  to  these  souls  and  the  reflection  which 
accompanies  reason,  since  we  have  a thousand  feelings  without 
reflecting  upon  them ; and  I do  not  think  that  the  Cartesians  have 
ever  proved  or  can  prove  that  every  perception  is  accompanied 
by  consciousness.  It  is  reasonable  also  that  there  may  be  sub- 
stances capable  of  perception  below  us  as  there  are  above ; and  that 
our  soul  far  from  being  the  last  of  all  is  in  a middle  position  from 
which  one  may  descend  and  ascend ; otherwise  there  would  be  a 
defect  of  order  which  certain  philosophers  call  vacuum  formarum. 
Thus  reason  and  nature  lead  men  to  the  opinion  I have  just  pro- 
pounded; hut  prejudices  have  turned  them  aside  from  it. 

This  view  leads  us  to  another  in  which  I 'am  again  obliged  to 
diverge  from  the  received  opinion.  Those  who  are  of  my  opinion 
will  be  asked,  what  the  souls  of  brutes  will  do  after  the  death 
of  the  animal,  and  the  dogma  of  Pythagoras,  who  believed  in  the 
transmigration  of  souls,  will  be  imputed  to  us,  which  not  only 
the  late  M.  Van  Helmont,  the  younger,  but  also  an  ingenious 
author  of  certain  Metaphysical  Meditations,  published  at  Paris, 
have  wished  to  revive.  But  it  must  be  known  that  I am  far  from 
this  opinion,  because  I believe  that  not  only  the  soul  but  also  the 
animal  itself  subsists.  Persons  very  accurate  in  experiments  have 
already  in  our  day  perceived  that  it  may  he  doubted  whether  an 
altogether  new  animal  is  ever  produced,  and  whether  animals 
wholly  alive  as  well  as  plants  are  not  already  in  miniature  in  germs 
before  conception.  This  doctrine  being  granted,  it  will  be  reason- 
able to  think  that  what  does  not  begin  to  live  also  does  not  cease 
to  live,  and  that  death,  like  generation,  is  only  the  transformation 
of  the  same  animal,  which  is  sometimes  augmented  and  sometimes 
diminished.  This  again  reveals  to  us  hitherto  unthought-of 
marvels  of  divine  contrivance.  This  is,  that  the  mechanisms  of 
nature  being  mechanisms  even  to  their  smallest  parts,  are  inde- 
structible, by  reason  of  the  envelopment  of  one  little  mechanism 
in  a greater  ad  infinitum..  Thus  one  finds  one’s  self  obliged  at  the 
same  time  to  maintain  the  preexistence  of  the  soul  as  well  as 
of  the  animal,  and  the  substance  of  the  animal  as  well  as  of  the 
soul. 


256 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


I have  insensibly  been  led  on  to  explain  my  view  of  the  forma- 
tion of  plants  and  animals,  since  it  appears  from  what  I have  just 
said  that  they  are  never  formed  altogether  anew.  I am  therefore 
of  the  opinion  of  Cudworth  (the  greater  part  of  whose  excellent 
work  pleases  me  extremely)  that  the  laws  of  mechanics  alone  could 
not  form  an  animal  where  there  is  nothing  yet  organized ; and  I 
find  that,  with  reason,  he  is  opposed  to  what  some  of  the  ancients 
have  imagined  on  this  subject,  and  even  Descartes  in  his  U Homme, 
the  formation  of  which  costs  him  so  little,  but  which  is  also  very 
far  from  being  a real  man.  And  I reinforce  this  opinion  of  Cud- 
worth  by  presenting  for  consideration  the  fact  that  matter  arranged 
by  divine  wisdom  must  be  essentially  organized  throughout,  and 
that  thus  there  is  mechanism  in  the  parts  of  the  natural  mechanism 
ad  infinitum,  and  so  many  envelopes  and  organic  bodies  enfolded 
one  within  another,  that  an  organic  body  never  could  be  produced 
altogether  new  and  without  any  preformation ; nor  could  an 
animal  already  existing  be  entirely  destroyed.  Thus  I have 
no  need  to  resort  with  Cudworth  to  certain  immaterial  plastic 
natures,  although  I remember  that  Julius  Scaliger  and  other 
Peripatetics,  and  also  certain  partisans  of  the  Helmontian  doc- 
trine of  Archaei,  have  believed  that  the  soul  manufactures  its  own 
body.  I may  say  of  it  non  mi  bisogna,  e non  mi  basta,  for  the 
very  reason  of  the  preformation  and  organism  ad  infinitum,  which 
furnishes  me  the  material  plastic  natures  suited  to  the  require- 
ments of  the  case ; whereas  the  immaterial  plastic  principles  are 
as  little  necessary  as  they  are  little  capable  of  satisfying  the  case. 
For  since  animals  are  never  formed  naturally  of  a non-organic 
mass,  the  mechanism  incapable  of  producing  de  novo  these 
infinitely  varied  organs  can  very  well  derive  them  through  the 
development  and  through  the  transformation  of  a preexisting 
organic  body.  Meanwhile  those  who  employ  plastic  natures, 
whether  material  or  immaterial,  in  no  wise  weaken  the  proof  of  the 
existence  of  God  drawn  from  the  marvels  of  nature,  which  appear 
particularly  in  the  structure  of  animals,  provided  that  these 
defenders  of  immaterial  plastic  natures,  add  a particular  direction 
from  God,  and  provided  that  those  who  with  me  make  use  of  a 
material  cause  in  assenting  to  plastic  mechanism,  maintain  not 


ON  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  LIFE. 


257 


only  a continual  preformation,  but  also  an  original  divine  pre- 
establishment.  Thus  whatever  view  we  take,  we  cannot  over- 
look the  divine  existence  in  wishing  to  explain  these  marvels, 
which  have  always  been  admired,  but  which  have  never  been  more 
apparent  than  in  my  system. 

We  see  by  this,  that  not  only  the  soul  but  also  the  animal  must 
subsist  always,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things.  But  the  laws  of 
nature  are  made  and  applied  with  so  much  order  and  so  much  wis- 
dom that  they  serve  more  than  one  end,  and  God,  who  occupies 
the  position  of  inventor  and  architect  as  regards  the  mechanism 
and  works  of  nature,  occupies  the  position  of  king  and  father  to 
substances  possessing  intelligence ; and  of  these  the  soul  is  a spirit 
formed  after  his  image.  And  as  regards  spirits,  his  kingdom,  of 
which  they  are  the  citizens,  is  the  most  perfect  monarchy  which 
can  be  discovered ; in  which  there  is  no  sin  which  does  not  bring 
upon  itself  some  punishment,  and  no  good  action  without  some 
recompense ; in  which  everything  tends  finally  to  the  glory  of  the 
monarch  and  the  happiness  of  the  subjects,  by  the  most  beautiful 
combination  of  justice  and  goodness  which  can  be  desired.  ISTever- 
theless  I dare  not  assert  anything  positively  either  as  regards  pre- 
existence or  as  regards  the  details  of  the  future  condition  of  human 
souls,  since  God,  as  regards  this,  might  make  use  of  extraordinary 
ways  in  the  kingdom  of  grace ; nevertheless  that  which  natural 
reason  favors  ought  to  be  preferred,  at  least  if  Revelation  does  not 
teach  us  the  contrary,  a point  which  I do  not  here  undertake  to 
decide. 

Before  ending,  it  will  perhaps  be  well  to  note,  among  the  other 
advantages  of  my  system,  that  of  the  universality  of  the  laws 
which  I employ,  which  are  always  without  exception  in  my  general 
philosophy:  and  it  is  just  the  opposite  in  other  systems.  For 
example,  I have  already  said  that  the  laws  of  mechanics  are  never 
violated  in  natural  motions,  that  the  same  force  is  always  pre- 
served as  also  the  same  direction,  and  that  everything  takes  place 
in  souls  as  if  there  were  no  body,  and  that  everything  takes  place 
in  bodies  as  if  there  were  no  souls ; that  there  is  no  part  of  space 
which  is  not  full ; that  there  is  no  particle  of  matter  which  is  not 
actually  divided,  and  which  does  not  contain  organic  bodies ; that 
17 


258  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

there  are  also  souls  everywhere,  as  there  are  bodies  everywhere; 
that  squIs  and  animals  even,  always  subsist;  that  organic  bodies 
are  never  without  souls,  and  that  souls  are  never  separated  from  all 
organic  body ; although  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  there  is  no 
portion  of  matter  of  which  it  can  be  said  that  it  is  always  affected 
by  the  same  soul.  I do  not  admit  then  that  there  are  naturally 
souls  entirely  disembodied,  nor  that  there  are  created  spirits 
entirely  detached  from  all  body ; in  which  I am  of  the  opinion  of 
several  ancient  Church  Fathers.  God  only  is  above  all  matter, 
since  he  is  its  author ; but  creatures,  free  or  freed  from  matter, 
would  be  at  the  same  time  detached  from  the  universal  concatena- 
tion, and  like  deserters  from  the  general  order.  This  universality 
of  laws  is  confirmed  by  its  great  facility  of  explanation,  since  the 
uniformity,  which  I think  is  observed  in  all  nature,  brings  about 
that  everywhere  else,  in  all  time  and  in  every  place,  it  can  be  said 
that  all  is  as  it  is  here,  to  the  degrees  of  greatness  and  of  perfection 
nearly ; and  that  thus  those  things  which  are  f artherest  removed 
and  most  concealed  are  perfectly  explained  by  the  analogy  of  what 
is  visible  and  near  to  us. 


XXVIII. 


Letter,  to  M.  Coste  on  Xecessity  and  Contingency.  1707. 

[From  the  French.] 

Hanover,  Dec.  19,  1707. 

To  M.  Coste,  London: 

I thank  you  very  much  for  communicating  to  me  the  last  addi- 
tions and  corrections  of  Locke,  and  I am  pleased  also  to  learn  what 
you  tell  me  of  his  last  dispute  with  Limborch.  The  liberty  of 
indifference,  about  which  the  dispute  turns,  and  my  opinion  of 
which  you,  sir,  ask,  consists  in  a certain  subtilty  which  few  people 
trouble  themselves  to  understand,  and  of  which  many  people  never- 
theless reason.  This  carries  us  back  to  the  consideration  of 
necessity  and  of  contingency. 

A truth  is  necessary  when  the  opposite  implies  contradiction, 
and  when  it  is  not  necessary  it  is  called  contingent.  That  God 
exists,  that  all  right  angles  are  equal,  etc.,  are  necessary  truths ; but 
that  I myself  exist,  and  that  there  are  bodies  in  nature  which  show 
an  angle  actually  right,  are  contingent  truths.  For  the  whole  uni- 
verse might  be  otherwise;  time,  space,  and  matter  being  absolutely 
indifferent  to  motion  and  forms.  And  God  has  chosen  among  an 
infinite  number  of  possibles  what  he  judged  most  fit.  But  since  he 
has  chosen,  it  must  be  affirmed  that  everything  is  comprised  in  his 
choice  and  that  nothing  could  be  changed,  since  he  has  once  for  all 
foreseen  and  regulated  all ; he  who  could  not  regulate  things  piece- 
meal and  by  fits  and  starts.  Therefore  the  sins  and  evils  which 
he  has  judged  proper  to  permit  for  greater  goods,  are  comprised  in 
his  choice.  This  is  the  necessity,  which  can  now  be  ascribed  to 
things  in  the  future,  which  is  called  hypothetical  or  consequent 
necessity  (that  is  to  say,  founded  upon  the  consequence  of  the 
hypothesis  of  the  choice  made),  which  does  not  destroy  the  con- 
tingency of  things,  and  does  not  produce  that  absolute  necessity 
which  contingency  does  not  allow.  And  nearly  all  theologians  and 
philosophers  (for  we  must  except  the  Socinians)  acknowledge  the 
hypothetical  necessity,  which  I have  just  explained,  and  which  can- 


260 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


not  be  combated  without  overthrowing  the  attributes  of  God  and 
even  the  nature  of  things. 

Nevertheless,  although  all  the  facts  of  the.  universe  are  now  cer- 
tain in  relation  to  God,  or  (what  amounts  to  the  same  thing)  are 
determined  in  themselves  and  even  linked  among  themselves,  it 
does  not  follow  that  their  connection  is  always  truly  necessary ; 
that  is  to  say,  that  the  truth,  which  pronounces  that  one  fact  follows 
another,  is  necessary.  And  this  must  be  applied  particularly  to 
voluntary  actions.  When  a choice  is  proposed,  for  example  to  go 
out  or  not  to  go  out,  it  is  a question  whether,  with  all  the  circum- 
stances, internal  and  external,  motives,  perceptions,  dispositions, 
impressions,  passions,  inclinations  taken  together,  I am  still  in  a 
contingent  state,  or  whether  I am  necessitated  to  make  choice,  for 
example,  to  go  out ; that  is  to  say,  whether  this  proposition  true 
and  determined  in  fact,  In  all  these  circumstances  taken  together  I 
shall  choose  to  go  out,  is  contingent  or  necessary.  To  this  I reply 
that  it  is  contingent,  because  neither  I nor  any  other  mind  more 
enlightened  than  I,  could  demonstrate  that  the  opposite  of  this 
truth  implies  contradiction.  And  supposing  that  by  liberty  of 
indifference  is  understood  a liberty  opposed  to  necessity  (as  I have 
just  explained  it),  I acknowledge  this  liberty  for  I am  really  of 
opinion  that  our  liberty,  as  well  as  that  of  God  and  of  the  blessed 
spirits,  is  exempt  not  only  from  co-action,  but,  furthermore,  from 
absolute  necessity,  although  it  cannot  be  exempt  from  determina- 
tion and  from  certainty. 

But  I find  that  there  is  need  of  great  precaution  here  in  order 
not  to  fall  into  a chimera  which  shocks  the  principles  of  good 
.sense,  and  which  would  be  what  I call  an  absolute  indifference  or 
an  indifference  of  equilibrium ; which  some  conceive  in  liberty,  and 
which  I believe  chimerical.  It  must  be  observed  then  that  that 
connection,  of  which  I just  spoke,  is  not  necessary,  speaking 
absolutely,  but  that  it  is  none  the  less  certainly  true,  and  that  in 
general  every  time  that  in  all  the  circumstances  taken  together  the 
balance  of  deliberation  is  heavier  on  the  one  side  than  on  the  other, 
it  is  certain  and  infallible  that  that  side  will  carry  the  day.  God 
or  the  perfect  sage  would  always  choose  the  best  that  is  known,  and 
if  one  thing  was  no  better  than  another,  they  would  choose  neither. 


ON"  NECESSITY  AND  CONTINGENCY. 


261 


In  other  intelligent  subjects,  passions  often  take  the  place  of 
reason ; and  it  can  always  be  said  in  regard  to  the  will  in  general 
that  the  choice  follows  the  greatest  inclination,  under  which  I 
understand  passions  as  well  as  reasons,  true  or  apparent. 

Nevertheless  I see  that  there  are  people  who  imagine  that  we  are 
determined  sometimes  for  the  side  which  is  the  less  weighted ; that 
God  chooses  sometimes  the  least  good,  everything  considered ; and 
that  man  chooses  sometimes  without  object  and  against  all  his 
reasons,  dispositions,  and  passions ; finally,  that  one  chooses  some- 
times without  any  reason  Which  determines  the  choice.  But  this  I 
hold  to  be  false  and  absurd,  since  it  is  one  of  the  greatest  principles 
of  good  sense  that  nothing  ever  occurs  without  cause 'or  determin- 
ing reason.  Thus,  when  God  chooses,  it  is  by  reason  of  the  Best ; 
when  man  chooses,  it  will  be  the  side  which  shall  have  struck  him 
most.  If,  moreover,  he  chooses  that  which  he  sees  to  be  less  useful 
and  less  agreeable,  it  will  have  become  perhaps  to  him  the  most 
agreeable  through  caprice,  through  a spirit  of  contradiction,  and 
through  similar  reasons  of  a depraved  taste,  which  would  none  the 
less  be  determining  reasons,  even  if  they  should  not  be  conclusive 
reasons.  And  never  can  any  example  to  the  contrary  be  found. 

Thus,  although  we  have  a liberty  of  indifference  which  saves  us • 
from  necessity,  we  never  have  an  indifference  of  equilibrium 
which  exempts  us  from  determining  reasons ; there  is  always  some- 
thing which  inclines  us  and  makes  us  choose,  but  without  being  able 
to  necessitate  us.  And  just  as  God  is  always  infallibly  led  to  the 
best  although  he  is  not  led  necessarily  (other  than  by  a moral 
necessity),  so  we  are  always  infallibly  led  to  that  which  strikes  - 
us_most,  but  not  necessarily.  The  contrary  not  implying  any  con- 
tradiction, it  was  not  necessary  or  essential  that  God  should 
create,  nor  that  he  should  create  this  world  in  particular, 
although  his  wisdom  and  goodness  has  led  him  to  it. 

It  is  this  that  M.  Bayle,  very  subtle  as  he  has  been,  has  not 
sufficiently  considered  when  he  thought  that  a case  similar  to  the 
ass  of  Buridan  was  possible,  and  that  a man  placed  in  circum- 
stances of  perfect  equilibrium  could  none  the  less  choose.  For  it 
must  be  said  that  the  case  of  a perfect  equilibrium  is  chimerical 
and  never  occurs,  the  universe  not  being  able  to  be  parted  or  cut 


262 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


into  parts  equal  and  alike.  The  universe  is  not  like  an  ellipse  or 
other  such  oval,  which  the  straight  line  drawn  through  its  centre 
can  cut  in  two  congruent  parts.  The  universe  has  no  center  and 
its  parts  are  infinitely  varied  ; thus  it  will  never  happen  that  all 
will  be  perfectly  equal  and  will  strike"  equally  from  one  side  and 
from  the  other ; and,  although  we  are  not,  always  capable  of  per- 
ceiving all  the  little  impressions  which  contribute  to  determine  us, 
there  is  always  something  which  determines  us  between  two  con- 
tradictories, without  the  case  ever  being  perfectly  equal  on  the  one 
side  and  on  the  other. 

ISTevertheless,  although  our  choice  ex  dads  on  all  the  internal  and 
external  circumstances  taken  together,  is  always  determined,  and 
although  for  the  present  it  does  not  depend  upon  us  to  change  the 
will,  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  we  have  great  power  over  our 
future  wills  by  choosing  certain  objects  of  our  attention  and  by 
accustoming  ourselves  to  certain  ways  of  thinking;  and  by  this 
means  we  can  accustom  ourselves  the  better  to  resist  impressions 
and  the  better  make  the  reason  act,  to  the  end  that  we  can  con- 
tribute toward  making  ourselves  will  what  we  ought  to. 

For  the  rest,  I have  elsewhere  shown,  that,  regarding  matters  in 
a certain  metaphysical  sense,  we  are  always  in  a state  of  perfect 
spontaneity,  and  that  what  is  attributed  to  the  impressions  of 
external  things  comes  only  from  confused  perceptions  in  us  which 
correspond  to  them,  and  which  cannot  but  be  given  us  at  the  start 
in  virtue  of  the  preestablished  harmony  which  establishes  the  con- 
nection of  each  substance  with  all  others. 

If  it  were  true,  sir,  that  your  Sevennese  were  prophets,  that 
event  would  not  be  contrary  to  my  hypothesis  of  the  Preestablished 
Harmony  and  would  even  be  in  thorough  agreement  with  it.  I 
have  always  said  that  the  present  is  big  with  the  future  and  that 
there  is  a perfect  connection  between  things  however  distant  they 
may  be  one  from  another,  so  that  one  of  sufficient  penetration 
might  read  the  one  in  the  other.  I should  not  even  oppose  one 
who  should  maintain  that  there  are  globes  in  the  universe  where 
prophecies  are  more  common  than  on  our  own,  as  there  will  per- 
haps be  a world  in  which  dogs  will  have  sufficiently  good  noses  to 
scent  their  game  at  a thousand  leagues ; perhaps  also  there  are 


ON  NECESSITY  AND  CONTINGENCY. 


263 


globes  in  which  genii  have  more  freedom  than  here  below  to  mix 
in  the  actions  of  rational  animals.  But  when  the  question  is  to 
reason  on  what  is  actually  practised  here,  our  presumptive  judg- 
ment must  be  founded  on  the  custom  of  our  globe,  where  prophetic 
views  of  this  sort  are  very  rare.  We  cannot  swear  that  there  are 
none,  but  we  could  wager  that  these  in  question  are  not  such.  One 
of  the  reasons  which  would  most  lead  me  to  judge  favorably  of 
them  would  be  the  judgment  of  M.  Fatio,  but  it  would  be  necessary 
to  know  his  opinion  without  taking  it  from  the  newspaper.  If 
you  had  with  all  due  attention  associated  yourself  with  a gentle- 
man with  an  income  of  £2000  sterling  who  prophesies  in  Greek, 
in  Latin,  and  in  French,  although  he  only  knows  English  well, 
there  would  be  nothing  to  be  said.  So  I beg  you,  sir,  to  enlighten 
me  more  on  a matter  so  interesting  and  important.  I am,  etc. 


XXIX. 


Refutation  of  Spinoza,  c.  1708. 

[From  the  Latin.] 

The  author  [Wachter]  passes  on  (ch.  4)  to  Spinoza,  whom  he 
compares  with  the  cabalists.  Spinoza  (Eth.,  pt.  2,  prop.  10, 
schol.)  says:  “Every  one  must  admit  that  nothing  is  or  can  be 
conceived  without  God.  For  it  is  acknowledged  by  everyone  that 
God  is  the  sole  cause  of  all  things,  of  their  essence  as  well  as  of 
their  existence ; that  is,  God  is  the  cause  of  things,  not  only  in 
respect  to  their  being  made  ( secundum  fieri),  but  also  in  respect 
to  their  being  ( secundum  esse).”  This,  from  Spinoza,  the  author 
[Wachter]  appears  to  approve.  And  it  is  true  that  we  must  speak 
of  created  things  only  as  permitted  by  the  nature  of  God.  But 
I do  not  think  that  Spinoza  has  succeeded  in  this.  Essences  can  in 
a certain  way  he  conceived  of  without  God,  but  existences  involve 
God.  And  the  very  reality  of  essences  by  which  they  exert  an 
influence  upon  existences  is  from  God.  The  essences  of  things  are 
co-eternal  with  God.  And  the  very  essence  of  God  embraces  all 
other  essences  to  such  a degree  that  God  cannot  be  perfectly  con- 
ceived without  them.  But  existence  cannot  he  conceived  of  with- 
out God,  who  is  the  final  reason  of  things. 

This  axiom,  “To  the  essence  of  a thing  belongs  that  without 
which  it  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived,”  is  to  be  applied  in 
necessary  things  or  in  species,  but  not  in  individuals  or  contingent 
things.  For  individuals  cannot  be  distinctly  conceived.  Hence 
they  have  no  necessary  connection  with  God,  but  are  produced 
freely.  God  has  been  inclined  toward  these  by  a determining 
reason,  hut  he  has  not  been  necessitated. 

Spinoza  (de  Emend.  Intel.,  p.  374)  places  among  fictions  the 
dictum,  “Something  can  be  produced  from  nothing.”  But,  in 
truth,  modes  which  are  produced,  are  produced  from  nothing. 
Since  there  is  no  matter  of  modes,  assuredly  neither  the  mode,  nor 
a part  of  it,  has  preexisted,  but  only  another  mode  which  has  dis- 
appeared and  to  which  this  present  one  has  succeeded. 


REFUTATION  OF  SPINOZA. 


265 


The  cabalists  seem  to  say  that  matter,  on  account  of  the  vileness 
of  its  essence,  can  neither  be  created  nor  can  it  exist;  hence, 
that  there  is  absolutely  no  matter,  or  that  spirit  and  matter,  as 
Henry  More  maintains  in  his  cabalistic  theses,  are  one  and  the 
same  thing.  Spinoza,  likewise,  denies  that  God  could  have  created 
any  corporeal  and  material  mass  to  be  the  subject  of  this  world, 
“because,”  he  says,  “those  who  differ  do  not  know  by  what  divine 
power  it  could  have  been  created.”  There  is  some  truth  in  these 
words,  but  I think  it  is  not  sufficiently  understood.  Matter  does, 
in  reality,  exist,  but  it  is  not  a substance,  since  it  is  an  aggregate  or 
resultant  of  substances : I speak  of  matter  as  far  as  it  is  secondary 
or  of  extended  mass,  which  is  not  at  all  a homogeneous  body.  But 
that  which  we  conceive  of  as  homogeneous  and  call  primary  matter 
is  something  incomplete,  since  it  is  merely  potential.  Substance, 
on  the  contrary,  is  something  full  and  active. 

Spinoza  believed  that  matter,  as  commonly  understood,  did  not 
exist.  Hence  he  often  warns  us  that  matter  is  badly  defined  by 
Descartes  as  extension  (Bp.  73),  and  extension  is  poorly  explained 
as  a very  vile  thing  which  must  be  divisible  in  space,  “since  (de 
Emend.  Intel.,,  p.  385)  matter  ought  to  be  explained  as  an  attribute 
expressing  an  eternal  and  infinite  essence.”  I reply  that  extension, 
or  if  you  prefer,  primary  matter,  is  nothing  but  a certain  indefi- 
nite repetition  of  things  as  far  as  they  are  similar  to  each  other  or 
indiscernible.  But  just  as  number  supposes,  numbered  things,  so 
extension  supposes  things  which  are  repeated,  and  which  have,  in 
addition  to  common  characteristics,  others  peculiar  to  themselves. 
These  accidents,  peculiar  to  each  other,  render  the  limits  of  size 
and  shape,  before  only  possible,  actual.  Merely  passive  matter  is 
something  very  vile,  that  is,  wanting  in  all  force,  but  such  a thing 
consists  only  in  the  incomplete  or  in  abstraction. 

Spinoza  (Eth.,  pt.  1,  prop.  13,  carol.  and  prop.  15,  schol.)  says: 
“Ho  substance,  not  even  corporeal  substance,  is  divisible.”  This 
statement  is  not  surprising  according  to  his  system,  since  he  admits 
but  one  substance  ; but  it  is  equally  true  in  mine,  although  I admit 
innumerable  substances,  for,  in  my  system,  all  are  indivisible  or 
monads. 

He  says  (Etli.,  pt.  3,  prop.  2,  schol.)  that  “the  mind  and  the 
body  are  the  same  thing,  only  expressed  in  two  ways,”  and  (Eth., 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


266 


pt.  2,  prop.  7,  schol. ) that,  “thinking  substance  and  extended  sub- 
stance arc  one  and  the  same,  known  now  under  the  attribute  of 
thought,  now  under  that  of  extension.”  He  says  in  the  same  scho- 
lium, “This,  certain  Hebrews  seem  to  have  seen  as  through  a cloud, 
who  indeed  maintain  that  God,  the  intellect  of  God,  and  the  things 
known  by  it,  are  one  and  the  same.”  This  is  not  my  opinion. 
Mind  and  body  are  not  the  same  any  more  than  are  the  principle 
of  action  and  that  of  passion.  Corporeal  substance  has  a soul  and 
an  organic  body,  that  is,  a mass  made  up  of  other  substances.  It 
is  true  that  the  same  substance  thinks  and  has  an  extended  mass 
joined  to  it,  hut  it  does  not  consist  of  this  mass,  since  all  this  can 
he  taken  away  from  it,  without  altering  the  substance;  moreover, 
every  substance, perceives,  but  not  every  substance  thinks.  - Thought 
indeed  belongs  to  the  monads,  especially  all  perception,  but  exten- 
sion belongs  to  compounds.  It  can  no  more  be  said  that  God  and 
the  things  known  by  God  are  one  and  the  same  thing  than  that  the 
mind  and  the  things  perceived  bv  the  mind  are  the  same.  The 
author  [Wacliter]  believes  that  Spinoza  posited  a common  nature 
in  which  the  attributes  thought  and  extension  reside,  and  that  this 
nature  is  spiritual ; but  there  is  no  extension  belonging  to  spirits 
unless  the  word  be  taken  in  a broader  sense  for  a certain  subtile 
animal  such  as  angels  were  thought  to  be  by  the  ancients.  The 
author  [Wachter]  adds  that  mind  and  body  are  the  modes  of  these 
attributes.  But  how,  I ask,  can  the  mind  be  the  mode  of  thought, 
when  it  is  the  principle  of  thought  ? Thus  the  mind  should  rather 
be  the  attribute  and  thought  the  modification  of  this  attribute.  It 
is  astonishing  also  that  Spinoza,  as  was  seen  above  (de  Emend. 
Intel.,  p.  385),  seems  to  deny  that  extension  is  divisible  into  and 
composed  of  parts ; which  has-  no  meaning,  unless,  perchance, 
like  space,  it  is  not  a divisible  thing.  But  space  and  time  are 
orders  of  things  and  not  things. 

The  author  [Wachter]  rightly  says,  that  God  found  in  himself 
the  origins  of  all  things,  as  I remember  Julius  Scaliger  once  said 
that  “things  are  not  produced  by  the  passive  power  of  matter  but 
by  the  active  power  of  God.”  And  I assert  this  of  forms  or  of 
activities  or  entelechies. 

What  Spinoza  (Eth.,  pt.  1,  prop.  34)  says,  that  “God  is,  by  the 
same  necessity,  the  cause  of  himself  and  the  cause  of  all  things,” 


REFUTATION  OF  SPINOZA. 


267 


and  (Polit.  Tract.,  p.  270,  c.  2,  no.  2)  that  “the  power  of  things  is 
the  power  of  God,”  I do  not  admit.  God  exists  necessarily,  but 
he  produces  things  freely,  and  the  power  of  things  is  produced  by 
God  but  is  different  from  the  divine  power,  and  things  themselves 
operate,  although  they  have  received  their  power  to  act. 

Spinoza  (Ep.  21)  says:  “That  everything  is  in  God  and  moves 
in  God,  I assert  with  Paul  and  perhaps  with  all  other  philosophers, 
although  in  a different  manner.  I would  even  dare  to  say  that  this 
was  the  opinion  of  all  the  ancient  Plebrews,  so  far  as  it  can  be  con- 
jectured from  certain  traditions,  although  these  are  in  many  ways 
corrupted.”'  I think  that  everything  is  in  God,  not  as  the  part  in 
the  whole,  nor  as  an  accident  in  a subject,  but  as  place,  yet  a place 
spiritual  and  enduring  and  not  one  measured  or  divided,  is  in  that 
which  is  placed,  namely,  just  as  God  is  immense  or  everywhere; 
the  world  is  present  to  him.  And  it  is  thus  that  all  things  are  in 
him ; for  he  is  where  they  are  and  where  they  are  not,  and  he 
remains  when  they  pass  away  and  he  has  already  been  there  when 
they  come. 

The  author  [Wachter]  says  that  it  is  the  concordant  opinion  of 
the  cabalists  that  God  produced  certain  things  mediately  and  others 
immediately.  Whence  he  next  speaks  of  a certain  created  first 
principle  which  God  made  to  proceed  immediately  from  himself, 
and  by  the  mediation  of  which  all  other  things  have  been  produced 
in  series  and  in  order,  and  this  they  are  wont  to  salute  by  various 
names;  Adam  Cadmon,  Messiah,  the  Christ,  X0709,  the  word,  the 
first-born,  the  first  man,  the  celestial  man,  the  guide,  the  shepherd, 
the  mediator,  etc.  Elsewhere  he  gives  a reason  for  this  assertion. 
The  fact  itself  is  recognized  by  Spinoza,  so  that  nothing  is  wanting 
except  the  name.  “It  follows,”  he  says  (Eth.,  pt.  1,  prop.  28, 
schol.),  “in  the  second  place,  that  God  cannot  properly  be  called 
the  remote  cause  of  individual  things,  except  to  distinguish  these 
from  those  which  God  produces  immediately  or  rather  which  follow 
from  his  absolute  nature.”  Moreover  what  those  things  are  which 
are  said  to  follow  from  the  absolute  nature  of  God,  he  explained 
(prop.  21)  thus:  “All  things  which  follow  from  the  absolute 
nature  of  any  attribute  of  God  must  exist  always  and  be  infinite 
or  are  eternal  and  infinite  through  the  same  attribute.” — These 


268 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


propositions  of  Spinoza,  which  the  author  cites,  are  wholly  with- 
out foundation.  God  produces  no  infinite  creature,  nor  could  it  he 
shown  or  pointed  out  by  any  argument  in  what  respect  such  a 
creature  would  differ  from  God. 

The  theory  of  Spinoza,  namely,  that  from  each  attribute  there 
springs  a particular  infinite  thing,  from  extension  a certain  some- 
thing infinite  in  extension,  from  thought  a certain  infinite  under- 
standing, arises  from  his  varied  imagination  of  certain  heterogene- 
ous divine  attributes,  like  thought  and  extension,  and  perhaps 
innumerable  others,  for  in  reality  extension  is  not  an  attribute  of 
itself  since  it  is  only  the  repetition  of  perceptions.  An  infinitely 
extended  thing  is  only  imaginary:  an  infinite  thinking  being  is 
God  himself.  The  things  which  are  necessary  and  which  proceed 
from  the  infinite  nature  of  God,  are  the  eternal  truths.  A particu- 
lar creature  is  produced  by  another,  and  this  again  by  another. 
Thus,  therefore,  by  no  conception  could  we  reach  God  even  if  we 
should  suppose  a progress  ad  infinitum , and,  notwithstanding,  the 
last  no  less  than  the  one  which  precedes  is  dependent  upon  God. 

Tatian  says,  in  his  Oration  to  the  Greeks,  that  there  is  a spirit 
dwelling  in  the  stars,  the  angels,  the  plants,  the  waters  and  men, 
and  that  this  spirit,  although  one  and  the  same,  contains  differ- 
ences in  itself.  But  this  doctrine  I do  not  approve.  It  is  the  error 
of  the  world-soul  universally  diffused,  and  which,  like  the  air  in 
pneumatic  organs,  makes  different  sounds  in  different  organs. 
Thus  when  a pipe  is  broken,  the  soul  will  desert  it  and  will  return 
into  the  world-soul.  But  we  must  know  that  there  are  as  many 
incorporeal  substances,  or  if  you  will,  souls,  as  there  are  natural, 
organic  mechanisms. 

But  what  Spinoza  (Eth.,  pt.  2,  prop.  13,  schol.)  says:  “All 
things,  although  in  different  degrees,  are  animated,”  rests  upon 
another  strange  doctrine,  “for,”  , he  says,  “'of  everything  there 
is  necessarily  in  God  an  idea,  of  which  God  is  the  cause,  in  the 
same  way  as  there  is  an  idea  of  the  human  body.”  But  there  is 
plainly  no  reason  for  saying  that  the  soul  is  an  idea.  Ideas  are 
something  purely  abstract,  like  numbers  and  figures,  and  cannot 
act.  Ideas  are  abstract  and  numerical : the  idea  of  each  animal 
is  a possibility,  and  it  is  an  illusion  to  call  souls  immortal  because 


REFUTATION  OF  SPINOZA. 


269 


ideas  are  eternal,  as  if  the  soul  of  a globe  should  be  called  eternal 
because  the  idea  of  a spherical  body  is  eternal.  The  soul  is  not 
an  idea,  but  the  source  of  innumerable  ideas,  for  it  has,  besides 
the  present  idea,  something  active,  or  the  production  of  new  ideas. 
But  according  to  Spinoza,  at  any  moment  the  soul  will  be  differ- 
ent because  the  body  being  changed  the  idea  of  the  body  is  differ- 
ent. Hence  it  is  not  strange  if  be  considers  creatures  as  transitory 
modifications. — The  soul,  therefore,  is  something  vital  or  some- 
thing containing  active  force. 

Spinoza  (Eth.,  pt.  1,  prop.  16)  says:  “From  the  necessity  of 
the  divine  nature  must  follow  an  infinite  number  of  things  in 
infinite  modes,  that  is  to  say,  all  things  which  can  fall  under 
infinite  intellect.”  This  is  a most,  false  opinion,  and  this  error  is  the 
same  as  that  which  Descartes  insinuated,  viz.,  that  matter  succes- 
sively assumes  all  forms.  Spinoza  begins  where  Descartes  ended, 
in  Naturalism.  He  is  wrong  also  in  saying  (Ep.  58)  that  “the 
world  is  the  effect  of  the  divine  nature,”  although  he  almost  adds 
that  it  was  not  made  by  chance.  There  is  a mean  between  what  is 
necessary  and  what  is  fortuitous,  namely,  what  is  free.  The  world 
is  a voluntary  effect  of  God,  but  on  account  of  inclining  or 
prevailing  reasons.  And  even  if  the  world  should  he  supposed 
perpetual  nevertheless  it  would  not  be  necessary.  God  could  either 
not  have  created  it  or  have  created  it  otherwise,  but  he  was  not  to 
do  it.  Spinoza  thinks  (Ep.  49)  that  “God  produces  the  world  by 
that  necessity  by  which  he  knows  himself.”  But  it  must  be  replied 
that  things  are  possible  in  many  ways,  whereas  it  was  altogether 
impossible  that  God  should  not  know  himself. — Spinoza  says 
(Eth.,  pt.  1,  prop.  IT,  schol.)  : “I  know  that  there  are  many  who 
believe  that  they  can  prove  that  sovereign  intelligence  and  free  will 
belong  to  the  nature  of  God ; for  they  say  they  know  nothing  more 
perfect  to  attribute  to  God  than  that  which  i§  the  highest  perfection 
in  us Therefore,  they  prefer  to  assert  that  God  is  indiffer- 

ent to  all  things,  and  that  he  creates  nothing  except  what  he  has 
decided,  by  some  absolute  will,  to  create.  But  I think  I have 
shown  (Prop.  16)  sufficiently  clearly  that  all  things  follow  from 
the  sovereign  power  of  God  by  the  same  necessity ; in  the  same  way 
as  it  follows  from  the  nature  of  a triangle  that  its  three  angles  are 


270 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


equal  to  two  right  angles.” — From  the  first  words  it  is  evident  that 
Spinoza  does  not  attribute  to  God  intellect  and  will.  He  is  right 
in  denying  that  God  is  indifferent  and  that  he  decrees  anything 
by  absolute  will : lie  decrees  by  a will  which  is  based  on  reasons. 
That  things  proceed  from  God  as  the  properties  of  a triangle  pro- 
ceed from  its  nature  is  proved  by  no  argument,  besides  there  is 
no  analogy  between  essences  and  existing  things. 

In  the  scholium  of  Proposition  17,  Spinoza  says  that  “the 
intellect  and  the  will  of  God  agree  with  ours  only  in  name,  because 
ours  are  posterior  and  God’s  are  prior  to  things”  ; but  it  does  not 
follow  from  this,  that  they  agree  only  in  name.  Elsewhere,  never- 
theless, he  says  that  “thought  is  an  attribute  of  God,  and  that 
particular  modes  of  thought  must  be  referred  to  it  (Eth.,  pt.  2, 
prop.  1).”  But  the  author  [Wachter]  thinks  that  he  is  speaking 
there  of  the  external  word  of  God,  because  he  says  (Eth.,  pt.  5 ) 
“that  our  mind  is  a part  of  the  infinite  intellect.” 

“The  human  mind,”  says  Spinoza  (Eth.,  pt.  5,  prop.  23,  proof), 
“cannot  be  entirely  destroyed  with  the  body,  but  there  remains 
something  of  it  which  is  eternal.  But  this  has  no  relation  to  time, 
for  we  attribute  duration  to  the  mind  only  during  the  duration  of 
the  body.”  In  the  scholium  following,  lie  adds,  “This  idea  which 
expresses  the  essence  of  the  body  under  the  form  of  eternity  [sub 
specie  ceternitatis ] is  a certain  mode  of  thought  which  belongs  to 
the  essence  of  the  mind  and  which  is  necessarily  eternal,  etc.” 
This  is  illusory.  ' This  idea  is  like  the  figure  of  the  sphere,  the 
eternity  of  which  does  not  prejudge  its  existence,  since  it  is  but  the 
possibility  of  an  ideal  sphere.  Thus  it  is  saying  nothing  to  say 
that  “our  mind  is  eternal  in  so  far  as  it  expresses  the  body  under 
the  form  of  eternity,”  and  it  would  be  likewise  eternal  because 
it  understands  eternal  truths  as  to  the  triangle.  “Our  soul  has  no 
duration  nor  does  time  relate  to  anything  beyond  the  actual  exist- 
ence of  the  body.”  Thus  Spinoza,  l.  c.,  who  thinks  that  the  mind 
perishes  with  the  body  because  he  believes  that  only  a single  body 
remains  always,  although  this  can  be  transformed. 

The  author  [Wachter]  adds:  “I  do  not  see  that  Spinoza  has 
anywhere  said  positively  that  minds  migrate  from  one  body  into 
another,  and  into  different  dwellings  and  various  regions  of 


REFUTATION  OF  SPINOZA. 


271 


eternity.  Nevertheless  it  might  be  inferred  from  his  thought.” 
Bnt.  he  errs.  The  same  soul,  to  Spinoza,  cannot  he  the  idea  of 
another  body,  as  the  figure  of  a sphere  is  not  the  figure  of  a 
cylinder.  The  soul,  to  Spinoza,  is  so  fugitive,  that  it  does 
not  exist  even  in  the  present  moment,  and  the  body  too  only  exists 
in  idea.  Spinoza  says  (Eth.,  pt.  5,  prop.  2)  that  “memory  and 
imagination  disappear  with  the  body.”  But  I for  my  part  think 
that  some  imagination  and  some  memory  always  remain,  and  that, 
without  them,  there  would  be  no  soul.  It  must  not  be  believed  that 
the  mind  exists  without  feeling  or  without  a soul.  A reason  with- 
out imagination  and  memory  is  a conclusion  without  premises. 
Aristotle,  also,  thought  that  pop?,  mind,  or  the  active  intellect 
remains,  and  not  the  soul.  But  the  soul  itself  acts  and  the  mind 
is  passive. 

Spinoza  (de  Emend.  Intel.,  p.  381)  says,  “The  ancients  never, 
to  my  knowledge,  conceived,  as  we  do  here,  a soul  acting  according 
to  certain  laws  and  like  a spiritual  automat ’ (he  meant  to  say 
automaton').  The  author  [Wachter]  interprets  this  passage  of  the 
soul  alone  and  not  of  the  mind,  and  says  that  the  soul  acts 
according  to  the  laws  of  motion  and  according  to  external  causes. 
Both  are  mistaken.  I say  that  the  soul  acts  spontaneously  and  yet 
like  a spiritual  automaton ; and  that  this  is  time  also  of  the  mind. 
The  soul  is  not  less  exempt  than  the  mind  from  impulses  from 
external  things,  and  the  soul  no  more  than  the  mind  acts  deter- 
minately ; as  in  bodies  everything  is  done  by  motions  according  to 
the  laws  of  force,  so  in  the  soul  everything  is  done  through  effort 
or  desire,  according  to  the  laws  of  God.  The  two  realms  are  in 
harmony.  It  is  true,  nevertheless,  that  there  are  certain  things  in 
the  soul  which  cannot  be  explained  in  an  adequate  manner  except 
by  external  things,  and  so  far  the  soul  is  subject  to  the  external; 
but  this  is  not  a physical  influx,  but  so  to  speak  by  a moral,  in  so 
far,  namely,  as  God,  in  creating  the  mind,  had  more  regard  to 
other  things  than  to  it  itself.  Eor  in  the  creation  and  preservation 
of  each  thing  he  has  regard  to  all  other  things. 

Spinoza  is  wrong  in  calling  [Eth.,  pt.  3,  9,  schol.]  the  will  the 
effort  of  each  thing  to  persist  in  its  being;  for  the  will  tends  toward 
more  particular  ends  and  a more  perfect  mode  of  existence.  He  is 


272 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


wrong  also  in  saying  [pt.  3,  prop.  7]  that  the  effort  is  identical 
with  the  essence,  whereas  the  essence  is  always  the  same  and  efforts 
vary.  I do  not  admit  that  affirmation  is  the  effort  of  the  mind  to 
persist  in  its  being,  that  is,  to  preserve  its  ideas.  We  have  this 
effort  even  when  we  affirm  nothing.  Moreover,  with  Spinoza,  the 
mind  is  an  idea,  it  does  not  have  ideas.  lie  is  also  wrong  in  think- 
ing that  affirmation  or  negation  is  volition,  since,  moreover,  volition 
involves,  in  addition,  the  reason  of  the  Good. 

Spinoza  (Ep.  2,  ad  Oldenb.)  says  that  “the  will  differs  from 
this  or  that  volition,  just  as  whitness  from  this  or  that  white  color : 
consequently,  will  is  not  the  cause  of  volition,  as  humanity  is  not 
the  cause  of  Peter  and  of  Paul.  Particular  volitions  have  there- 
fore need  of  another  cause.  The  will  is  only  an  entity  of  reason.” 
So  Spinoza.  But  we  take  the  will  for  the  power  of  choosing,  the 
exercise  of  which  is  the  volition.  Therefore  it  is  indeed  by  the 
will  that  we  will ; but  it  is  true  that  there  is  need  of  other  special 
causes  to  determine  the  will,  namely,  in  order  that  it  produce  a 
certain  volition.  It  must  he  modified  in  a certain  manner.  The 
will  does  not  therefore  stand  to  volitions  as  the  species  or  the 
abstract  of  the  species  to  individuals.  Mistakes  are  not  free  nor 
acts  of  will,  although  often  we  concur  in  our  errors  by  free 
actions. 

Further,  Spinoza  says  (Tract.  Polit.,  c.  2,  no.  6),  “Men  conceive 
themselves  in  nature  as  an  empire  within  an  empire  (Malcuth  in 
Malcuth,  adds  the  author).  For  they  think  that  the  human  mind 
is  not  the  product  of  natural  causes,  but  that  it  is  immediately 
created  by  God  so  independent  of  other  things  that  it  has  absolute 
power  of  determining  itself  and  of  using  rightly  its  reason.  But 
experience  proves  to  us  over-abundantly  that  it  is  no  more  in  our 
power  to  have  a sound  mind  than  to  have  a sound  body.”  So 
Spinoza.  In  my  opinion,  each  substance  is  an  empire  within  an 
empire;  but  harmonizing  exactly  with  all  the  rest  it  receives  no 
influence  from  any  being  except  it  be  from  God,  but,  nevertheless, 
through  God,  its  author,  it  depends  upon  all  the  others.  It  comes 
immediately  from  God  and  yet  it  is  created  in  conformity  to  the 
other  things.  For  the  rest,  not  all  things  are  equally  in  our  power. 
For  we  are  inclined  more  to  this  or  to  that.  Malcuth,  or  the  realm 


REFUTATION  OF  SPINOZA. 


273 


of  God,  does  not  suppress  either  divine  or  human  liberty,  but  only 
the  indifference  of  equilibrium,  as  they  say  who  think  there  are 
no  reasons  for  those  actions  which  they  do  not  understand. 

Spinoza  thinks  that  the  mind  is  greatly  strengthened  if  it  knows 
that  what  happens  happens  necessarily : but  by  this  compulsion  he 
does  not  render  the  heart  of  the  sufferer  content  nor  cause  him  to 
feel  his  malady  the  less.  He  is,  on  the  contrary,  happy  if  he  under- 
stands that  good  results  from  evil  and  that  those  things  which 
happen  are  the  best  for  us  if  we  are  wise. 

From  what  precedes  it  is  seen  that  what  Spinoza  says  on  the 
intellectual  love  of  God  (Eth.,  pt.  4,  prop.  28)  is  only  trappings 
for  the  people,  since  there  is  nothing  loveable  in  a God  who  pro- 
duces without  choice  and  by  necessity,  without  discrimination  of 
good  and  evil.  The  true  love  of  God  is  founded  not  in  necessity 
but  in  goodness.  Spinoza  (de  Emend.  Intel.,  p.  388),  says  that 
“there  is  no  science,  but  that  we  have  only  experience  of  particular 
things,  that  is,  of  things  such  that  their  existence  has  no  connection 
with  their  essence,  and  which,  consequently,  are  not  eternal 
truths.” — This  contradicts  what  he  said  elsewhere,  viz:  that  all 
things  are  necessary,  that  all  things  proceed  necessarily  from  the 
divine  essence.  Likewise  he  combats  (Eth.,  pt.  2,  prop.  10,  schol.) 
those  who  pretend  that  the  nature  of  God  belongs  to  the  essence  of 
created  things,  and  yet  he  had  established  before  [Eth.,  pt.  1, 
prop.  15]  that  things  do  not  exist  and  cannot  be  conceived  without 
God,  and  that  they  necessarily  arise  from  him.  He  maintains 
(Eth.,  pt.  1,  prop.  21),  for  this  reason,  that  finite  and  temporal 
things  cannot  be  produced  immediately  by  an  infinite  cause,  but 
that  (Prop.  28)  they  are  produced  by  other  causes,  individual  and 
finite.  But  how  will  they  finally  then  spring  from  God  ? for  they 
cannot  come  from  him  mediately  in  this  case,  since  we  could  never 
reach  in  this  way  things  which  are  not  similarly  produced  by 
another  finite  thing.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  said  that  God  acts 
by  mediating  secondary  causes,  unless  he  produces  secondary 
causes.  Therefore,  it  is  rather  to  be  said  that  God  produces  sub- 
stances and  not  their  actions,  in  which  he  only  concurs. 


18 


XXX. 


Remarks  ok  the  Opinion  of  Males  pan  c iie  that  We  See  All 

Things  in  God,  with  reference  to  Locke’s  Examination 

of  it.  1708. 

[From  the  French.] 

There  is,  in  the  posthumous  works  of  Locke  published  at  Lon- 
don in  1706,  8vo.,  an  examination  of  the  opinion  of  Malebranche 
that  we  see  all  things  in  God.  It  is  acknowledged  at  the  start 
that  there  are  many  nice  thoughts  and  judicious  reflections  in  the 
hook  on  The  Search  after  Truth , and  that  this  made  him  hope  to 
find  therein  something  satisfactory  on  the  nature  of  our  ideas.  But 
he  has  remarked  at  the  beginning  (§2)  that  this  Father  [Male- 
branche] makes  use  of  what  Locke  calls  the  argumentum  ad 
ignorantiam,  in  pretending  to  prove  his  opinion,  because  there  is 
no  other  means  of  explaining  the  thing:  but  according  to  Mr. 
Locke,  this  argument  loses  its  force  when  the  feebleness  of  our 
understanding  is  considered.  I am  nevertheless  of  opinion  that 
this  argument  is  good  if  one  can  perfectly  enumerate  the  means 
and  exclude  all  but  one.  Even  in  Analysis,  M.  Frenicle  employed 
this  method  of  exclusion,  as  he  called  it.  Nevertheless,  Locke  is 
right  in  saying  that  it  is  of  no  use  to  say  that  this  hypothesis  is 
better  than  others,  if  it  is  found  not  to  explain  what  one  would 
like  to  understand,  and  even  to  involve  things  which  cannot 
harmonize. 

After  having  considered  what  is  said  in  the  first  chapter  of  the 
second  part  of  book  third,  where  Malebranche  claims  that  what  the 
soul  can  perceive  must  be  in  immediate  contact  with  it,  Mr.  Locke 
asks  ( § § 3,4)  what  it  is  to  be  in  immediate  contact,  this  not  appear- 
ing to  him  intelligible  except  in  bodies.  Perhaps  it  might  be 
replied  that  one  thing  acts  immediately  on  the  other.  And  as  Male- 
branche, admitting  that  our  bodies  are  united  to  our  souls,  adds 
that  it  is  not  in  such  a way  that  the  soul  perceives  it,  he  is  asked 
(§5)  to  explain  that  sort  of  union  or  at  least  in  what  it  differs 
from  that  which  he  does  not  admit?  Father  Malebranche  will 
perhaps  say  that  he  does  not  know  the  union  of  the  soul  with  the 


on  locke’s  examination  of  malebeanche. 


275 


body  except  by  faith,  and  that  the  nature  of  body  consisting  in 
extension  alone,  nothing  can  be  deduced  therefrom  toward  explain- 
ing the  soul’s  action  on  the  body.  He  grants  an  inexplicable  union, 
but  be  demands  one  which  shall  serve  to  explain  the  commerce  of 
the  soul  and  body. 

He  claims  also  to  explain  why  material  beings  could  not  be 
united  with  the  soul  as  is  demanded ; this  is  because  these  beings 
being  extended  and  the  soul  not  being  so,  there  is  no  similarity 
[proportion]  between  them.  But  thereupon  Locke  asks  very 
a propos  (§7)  if  there  is  any  more  similarity  between  God  and 
the  soul.  It  seems  indeed  that  the  Reverend  Father  Malebranche 
ought  to  have  urged  not  the  little  similarity,  but  the  little  connec- 
tion, which  appears  between  the  soul  and  the  body,  while  between 
God  and  the  creatures  there  is  a connection  such  that  they  could 
not  exist  without  him. 

When  the  Father  says  (§6)  that  there  is  no  purely  intelligible 
substance  except  God,  I declare  that  I do  not  sufficiently  under- 
stand him.  There  is  something  in  the  soul  that  we  do  not  distinctly 
understand ; and  there  are  many  things  in  God  that  we  do  not  at 
all  understand. 

Mr.  Locke  (§8)  makes  a remark  on  the  end  of  the  Father's 
chapter  which  is  tantamount  to  any  views ; for  in  order  to  show 
that  the  Father  has  not  excluded  all  the  means  of  explaining  the 
matter,  he  adds : “If  I should  say  that  it  is  possible  that  God  has 
made  our  souls  such,  and  has  so  united  them  to  bodies  that,  at 
certain  motions  of  the  body  the  soul  should  have  such  and  such 
perceptions  but  in  a manner  inconceivable  to  us,  I should  have 
said  something  as  apparent  and  as  instructive  as  that  which  he 
says.”  Mr.  Locke  in  saying  this  seems  to  have  had  in  mind  my 
system  of  Preestablished  Harmony,  or  something  similar. 

Mr.  Locke  objects  (§  20)  that  the  sun  is  useless  if  we  see  it  in 
God.  As  this  argument  applies  also  against  my  system,  which 
claims  that  we  see  the  sun  in  us,  1 answer  that  the  sun  is  not  made 
solely  for  us  and  that  God  wishes  to  show  us  the  truth  as  to  what  is 
without  us.  He  objects  (§  22)  that  he  does  not  conceive  how 
we  could  see  something  confusedly  in  God,  where  there  is  no  con- 
fusion. One  might  answer  that  we  see  things  confusedly  when  we 
see  too  many  of  them  at  a time. 


270 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


Father  Malebranche  having  said  that  God  is  the  place  of  spirits 
as  space  is  the  place  of  bodies,  Mr.  Locke  says  (§  25)  that  he  does 
not  understand  a word  of  this.  But  he  understands  at  least  what 
space,  place  and  body  are.  He  understands  also  that  the  Father 
draws  an  analogy  between  space,  place,  body  and  God,  place,  spirit. 
Thus  a good  part  of  what  he  here  says  is  intelligible.  It  may 
merely  be  objected  that  this  analogy  is  not  proven,  although  some 
relations  are  easily7-  perceived  which  might  give  occasion  for  the 
comparison.  I often  observe  that  certain  persons  seek  by  this 
affectation  of  ignorance  to  elude  what  is  said  to  them  as  if  they 
understood  nothing;  they  do  this  not  to  reproach  themselves,  but 
either  to  reproach  those  speaking,  as  if  their  jargon  was  unintelligi- 
ble, or  to  exalt  themselves  above  the  matter  and  those  who  tell  it, 
as  if  it  was  not  worthy  of  their  attention.  Nevertheless  Mr.  Locke 
is  right  in  saying  that  the  opinion  of  Father  Malebranche  is  unin- 
telligible in  connection  with  his  other  opinions,  since  with  him 
space  and  body  are  the  same  thing.  The  truth  has  escaped  him 
here  and  he  has  conceived  something  common  and  immutable,  to 
which  bodies  have  an  essential  relation  and  which  indeed  produces 
their  relation  to  one  another.  This  order  gives  occasion  for  making 
a fiction  and  for  conceiving  space  as  an  immutable  substance ; but 
what  there  is  real  in  this  notion  relates  to  simple  substances  (under 
which  spirits  are  included),  and  is  found  in  God,  who  unites  them. 

The  Father  saying  that  ideas  are  representative  beings,  Mr. 
Locke  asks  (§26)  if  these  beings  are  substances,  modes  or  rela- 
tions ? I believe  that  it  may  be  said  that  they  are  nothing  but 
relations  resulting  from  the  attitudes  of  God. 

When  Mr.  Locke  declares  (§  31)  that  he  does  not  understand 
bow  the  variety  of  ideas  is  compatible  with  the  simplicity  of  God, 
it  appears  to  me  that  he  ought  not  raise  an  objection  on  this  score 
against  Father  Malebranche,  for  there  is  no  system  which  can 
make  such  a thing  comprehensible.  We  cannot  comprehend  the 
incommensurable  and  a thousand  other  things,  the  truth  of  which 
we  nevertheless  know,  and  which  we  are  right  in  employing  to 
explain  others  which  are  dependent  on  them.  There  is  something 
approaching  to  this  in  all  simple  substances ; where  there  is  variety 
of  affections  in  unity  of  substance. 


ON  LOCKE  S EXA-MINATIQiN  OF  MALE  BEAN CHE. 


97 


l t 


The  F ather  maintains  that  the  idea  of  the  infinite  is  prior  to  that 
of  the  finite.  Mr.  Locke  objects  (§  34)  that  a child  has  the  idea 
of  a number  or  of  a square  sooner  than  that  of  the  infinite.  He  is 
right,  taking  the  ideas  for  images ; but  in  taking  them  as  the 
foundations  of  notions,  he  will  find  that  in  the  continuum  the 
notion  of  an  extended,  taken  absolutely,  is  prior  to  the  notion 
of  an  extended  where  the  modification  is  added.  This  must  he 
further  applied  to  what  is  said  in  §§  42  and  46. 

The  argument  of  the  Father  which  Mr.  Locke  examines  (§  40), 
that  God  . alone,  being  the  end  of  spirits,  is  also  their  sole  object,  is 
not  to  be  despised.  It  is  true  that  it  needs  something  in  order  to  be 
called  a demonstration.  There  is  a more  conclusive  reason  which 
shows  that  God  is  the  sole  immediate  external  object  of  spirits, 
and  that  is  that  there  is  naught  but  he  which  can  act  on  them. 

It  is  objected  (§  41)  that  the  Apostle  begins  with  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  creatures  in  order  to  lead  to  God  and  that  the  Father 
does  the  contrary.  I believe  that  these  methods  harmonize.  The 
one  proceeds  a priori,  the  other  a posteriori ; and  the  latter  is  the 
more  common.  It  is  true  that  the  best  way  to  know  things  is 
through  their  causes ; but  this  is  not  the  easiest.  It  requires  too 
much  attention  and  men  ordinarily  give  their  attention  to  things 
of  sense. 

In  replying  to  § 34,  I have  noticed  the  difference  there  is 
between  image  and  idea.  It  seems  that  this  difference  is  combated 
(§  38)  by  finding  difficulty  in  the  difference  which  there  is 
between  sensation  \_seniiment\  and  idea.  But  I think  that  the 
Father  understands  by  sensation  \_sentimenjj%\  a perception  of  the 
imagination,  whereas  there  may  be  ideas  of  things  which  are  not 
sensible  nor  imageable.  I affirm  that  we  have  as  clear  an  idea 
of  the  color  of  the  violet  as  of  its  figure  (as  is  objected  here)  but 
not  as  distinct  nor  as  intelligible. 

Mr.  Locke  asks  if  an  indivisible  and  unextended  substance  can 
have  at  the  same  time  modifications  different  and  even  relating 
to  inconsistent  objects.  I reply,  Yes.  That  which  is  inconsistent- 
in  the  same  object  is  not  inconsistent  in  the  representation  of 
different  objects,  conceived  at  the  same  time.  It  is  not  therefore 
necessary  that  there  be  different  parts  in  the  soul,  as  it  is  not 


278 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


necessary  that  there  be  different  parts  in  a point  although  different 
angles  come  together  there. 

It  is  asked  with  reason  (§43)  how  we  know  the  creatures,  if 
we  do  not  see  immediately  aught  but  God  ? Because  the  objects, 
the  representation  of  which  God  causes  us  to  have,  have  something 
which  resembles  the  idea  we  have  of  substance,  and  it  is  this  which 
makes  us  judge  that  there  are  other  substances. 

It  is  assumed  (§  46)  that  God  has  the  idea  of  an  angle  which  is 
the  nearest  to  the  right  angle,  but  that  he  does  not  show  it  to  any- 
one, however  one  may  desire  to  have  it.  I reply  that  such  an 
angle  is  a fiction,  like  the  fraction  nearest  to  unity,  or  the  number 
nearest  to  zero,  or  the  least  of  all  numbers.  The  nature  of  con- 
tinuity does  not  permit  any  such  thing. 

The  Father  had  said,  that  we  know  our  soul  by  an  inner  feeling 
of  consciousness,  and  that  for  this  reason  the  knowledge  of  our  soul 
is  more  imperfect  than  that  of  things,  which  we  know  in  God. 
Mr.  Locke  thereon  remarks  very  a propos  (§  47),  that  the  idea  of 
our  soul  being  in  God  as  well  as  that  of  other  things,  we  should  see 
it  also  in  God.  The  truth  is,  that  we  see  all  things  in  ourselves  and 
in  our  souls,  and  that  the  knowledge  which  we  have  of  the  soul  is 
very  true  and  just  provided  that  we  attend  to  it;  that  it  is  by  the 
knowledge  which  we  have  of  the  soul  that  we  know  being,  sub- 
stance, God  himself,  and  that  it  is  by  reflection  on  our  thoughts 
that  we  know  extension  and  bodies.  And  it  is  true,  nevertheless, 
that  God  gives  us  all  there  is  that  is  positive  in  this,  and  all  perfec- 
tion therein  involved,  by  an  immediate  and  continual  emanation, 
by  virtue  of  the  dependence  on  him  which  all  creatures  have;  and 
it  is  thus  that  a good  meaning  may  be  given  to  the  phrase  that  God 
is  the  object  of  our  souls  and  that  we  see  all  things  in  him. 

Perhaps  the  design  of  the  Father  in  the  saying,  which  is 
examined  (§  53)  that  Ave  see  the  essences  of  things  in  the  per- 
fections of  God  and  that  it  is  the  universal  reason  which  enlightens 
ns,  tends  to  show  that  the  attributes  of  God  are  the  bases  of  the 
simple  notions  which  Ave  have  of  things, — being,  power,  knowl- 
edge, diffusion,  duration,  taken  absolutely,  being  in  him  and  not 
being  in  creatures  save  in  a limited  Avav. 


XXXI. 


Letter  to  Wagner  on  the  Active  Force  of  Body,  on  the 
Soul  and  on  the  Sotte  of  Brutes.  1710. 

[From  the  Latin.] 

1.  I willingly  reply  to  the  inquiries  you  make  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  soul,  for  I see  from  the  doubt  which  you  present  that  my 
view  is  not  sufficiently  clear  to  you,  and  that  this  is  due  to  some 
pre judgment  drawn  from  my  essay,  inserted  in  the  Acta  Erudito- 
rurn,  wherein  I treated,  in  opposition  to  the  illustrious  Sturm,  of 
the  active  force  of  body.  You  say  that  I have  there  sufficiently 
vindicated  active  force  for  matter,  and  while  I attribute  resistance 
to  matter,  I have  also  attributed  reaction  to  the  same,  and  con- 
sequently action ; that  since  therefore  there  is  everywhere  in 
matter  an  active  principle,  this  principle  seems  to  suffice  for  the 
actions  of  brutes,  nor  is  there  need  in  them  of  an  incorruptible  soul. 

2.  I reply,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  active  principle  is  not 
attributed  by  me  to  bare  or  primary  matter,  which  is  merely  pas- 
sive, and  consists  only  in  antitypia  and  extension ; hut  to  body  or 
to  clothed  or  secondary  matter,  which  in  addition  contains  a primi- 
tive entelechy  or  active  principle.  I reply,  secondly,  that  the  resist- 
ance of  hare  matter  is  not  action,  but  mere  passivity,  inasmuch  as  it 
has  antitypia  or  impenetrability,  by  which  indeed  it  resists  what- 
ever would  penetrate  it,  hut  does  not  react,  unless  there  be  added 
an  elastic  force,  which  must  be  derived  from  motion,  and  therefore 
the  active  force  of  matter  must  be  superadded.  I reply,  thirdly, 
that  this  active  principle,  this  first  entelechy,  is,  in  fact,  a vital 
principle,  endowed  also  with  the  faculty  of  perception,  and  incor- 
ruptible, for  reasons  recently  stated  by  me.  And  this  is  the  very 
thing  which  in  brutes  I hold  to  be  their  soul.  AYhile,  therefore,  I 
admit  active  principles  superadded  everywhere  in  matter,  I also 
posit,  everywhere  disseminated  through  it,  vital  or  percipient  prin- 
ciples, and  thus  monads,  and  so  to  speak,  metaphysical  atoms 
wanting  parts  and  incapable  of  being  produced  or  destroyed 
naturally. 


280 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


3.  You  next  ask  my  definition  of  soul.  I reply  that  soul  may  be 
employed  in  a broad  and  in  a strict  sense.  Broadly  speaking,  soul 
will  be  the  same  as  life  or  vital  principle,  that  is,  the  principle  of 
internal  action  existing  in  the  simple  thing  or  monad,  to  which 
external  action  corresponds.  And  this  correspondence  of  internal 
and  external,  or  representation  of  the  external  in  the  internal,  of 
the  composite  in  the  simple,  of  multiplicity  in  unity,  constitutes  in 
reality  perception.  But  in  this  sense,  soul  is  attributed  not  only  to 
animals,  but  also  to  all  other  percipient  beings.  In  the  strict  sense, 
soul  is  employed  as  a noble  species  of  life,  or  sentient  life,  where 
there  is  not  only  the  faculty  of  perceiving,  but  in  addition  that  of 
feeling,  inasmuch,  indeed,  as  attention  and  memory  are  joined  to 
perception.  Just  as,  in  turn,  mind  is  a nobler  species  of  soul,  that 
is,  mind  is  rational  soul,  where  reason,  or  ratiocination  from  uni- 
versality of  truths,  is  added  to  feeling.  As  therefore  mind  is 
rational  soul,  so  soul  is  sentient  life,  and  life  is  perceptive  prin- 
ciple. I have  shown,  moreover,  by  examples  and  arguments,  that 
not  all  perception  is  feeling,  but  that  there  is  also  insensible  per- 
ception. For  example,  I could  not  perceive  green  unless  I per- 
ceived blue  and  yellow,  from  which  it  results.  At  the  same  time, 
I do  not  feel  blue  and  yellow,  unless  perchance  a microscope  is 
employed. 

4.  You  will  remember,  moreover,  that  according  to  my  opinion, 
not  only  are  all  lives,  all  souls,  all  minds,  all  primitive  entelechies, 
everlasting,  but  also  that  to  each  primitive  enteleehy  or  each  vital 
principle  there  is  perpetually  united  a certain  natural  mechanism, 
which  comes  to  us  under  the  name  of  organic  body : which  mechan- 
ism, moreover,  even  although  it  preserves  its  form  in  general, 
remains  in  flux,  and  is,  like  the  ship  of  Theseus,  perpetually 
repaired.  FTor,  therefore,  can  we  be  certain  that  the  smallest  par- 
ticle of  matter  received  by  us  at  birth,  remains  in  our  body,  even 
although  the  same  mechanism  is  by  degrees  completely  trans- 
formed, augmented,  diminished,  involved  or  evolved.  Hence,  not 
only  is  the  soul  everlasting,  but  also  some  animal  always  remains, 
although  no  particular  animal  ought  to  be  called  everlasting,  since 
the  animal  species  does  not  remain;  just  as  the  caterpillar,  and  the 
butterfly  are  not  the  same  animal,  although  the  same  soul  is  in  both. 


OH  THE  STATURE  OF  THE  SOUL. 


281 


Every  natural  mechanism,  therefore,  has  this  quality,  that  it  is 
never  completely  destructible,  since,  however  thick  a covering  may 
be  dissolved,  there  always  remains  a little  mechanism  not  yet 
destroyed,  like  the  costume  of  Harlequin,  in  the  comedy,  to  whom, 
after  the  removal  of  many  tunics,  there  always  remained  a fresh 
one.  And  we  ought  to  be  the  less  astonished  at  this  for  this  reason, 
that  nature  is  everywhere  organic  and  ordered  by  a most  wise 
author  for  certain  ends,  and  that  nothing  in  nature  ought  to  be 
criticized  as  unpolished,  although  it  may  sometimes  appear  to  our 
senses  as  but  a rude  mass.  Thus,  therefore,  we  escape  all  the 
difficulties  which  arise  from  the  nature  of  a soul  absolutely  sep- 
arated from  all  matter ; so  that,  in  truth,  a soul  or  an  animal  before 
birth  or  after  death  differs  from  a soul  or  an  animal  living  the 
present  life  only  in  condition  of  things  and  degrees  of  perfections, 
but  not  by  entire  genus  of  being.  And  likewise  I think  that  genii 
are  minds  endowed  with  bodies  very  penetrating  and  suitable  for 
action,  which  perhaps  they  are  aide  to  change  at  will ; whence 
they  do  not  deserve  to  he  called  even  animals.  Thus  all  things  in 
nature  are  analogous,  and  the  subtile  may  be  understood  from  the 
coarse,  since  both  are  constituted  in  the  same  way.  God  alone  is 
substance  really  separated  from  matter,  since  he  is  actus  punts, 
endowed  with  no  passive  power,  which,  wherever  it  is,  constitutes 
matter.  And,  indeed,  all  created  substances  have  antitypia,  by 
which  it  happens  naturally  that  one  is  outside  another,  and  so 
penetration  is  excluded. 

5.  But  although  my  principles  are  very  general  and  hold  not 
less  in  man  than  in  brutes,  yet  man  stands  out  marvellously 
above  brutes  and  approaches  the  genii,  because  from  the  use  of 
reason  he  is  capable  of  society  with  God,  and  thus  of  reward  and 
of  punishment  in  the  divine  government.  And,  therefore,  he  pre- 
serves not  only  life  and  soul  like  the  brutes,  but  also  self-conscious- 
ness and  memory  of  a former  state,  and,  in  a word,  personality. 
He  is  immortal,  not  only  physically,  but  also  morally ; whence,  in 
the  strict  sense,  immortality  is  attributed  only  to  the  human  soul. 
For  if  a man  did  not  know  that  in  the  other  life  rewards  or 
punishments  would  be  awarded  him  for  this  life,  there  would 
really  be  no  punishment,  no  reward ; and  as  regards  morals,  it 


282 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


V 


would  be  just  as  if  I were  extinguished  and  another,  happier  or 
unhappier,  should  succeed  me.  And  thus  I hold  that  souls,  latent 
doubtless  in  seminal  animalcules  from  the  beginning  of  things, 
are  not  rational  until,  by  conception,  they  are  destined  for  human 
life;  but  when  they  are  once  made  rational  and  rendered  capable 
of  consciousness  and  of  society  with  God,  I think  that  they  never 
lay  aside  the  character  of  citizens  in  the  Republic  of  God;  and 
since  it  is  most  justly  and  beautifully  governed,  it  is  a consequence 
that  by  the  very  laws  of  nature,  on  account  of  the  parallelism  of 
the  kingdom  of  grace  and  of  nature,  souls  by  the  force  of  their 
own  actions  are  rendered  more  fit  for  rewards  and  punishments. 
And  in  this  sense  it  may  be  said  that  virtue  brings  its  own  reward 
and  sin  its  own  punishment,  since  by  a certain  natural  consequence, 
before  the  last  state  of  the  soul,  according  as  it  departs  atoned  for 
or  unatoned  for,  there  arises  a certain  natural  divergence,  pre- 
ordained by  God  in  nature  and  with  divine  promises  and  threats, 
and  consistent  with  grace  and  justice;  the  intervention  also  being 
added  of  genii,  good  or  bad  according  as  we  have  associated  with 
either,  whose  operations  are  certainly  natural  although  their  nature 
is  sublimer  than  ours.  We  see,  indeed,  that  a man  awaking  from 
a profound  sleep,  or  even  recovering  from  apoplexy,  is  wont  to 
recover  the  memory  of  his  former  state.  The  same  must  be  said  of 
death,  which  can  render  our  perceptions  turbid  and  confused  but 
cannot  entirely  blot  them  from  memory,  the  use  of  which  return- 
ing, rewards  and  punishments  take  place.  Thus  the  Saviour  com- 
pared death  to  sleep.  Moreover  the  preservation  of  personality  and 
moral  immortality  cannot  be  attributed  to  brutes  incapable  of  the 
divine  society  and  law. 

6.  ISTo  one,  therefore,  need  fear  dangerous  consequences  from 
this  doctrine,  since  rather  a true  natural  theology,  not  only  not  at 
variance  with  revealed  truth  but  even  wonderfully  favorable  to  it, 
may  be  demonstrated  by  most  beautiful  reasoning  from  my  prin- 
ciples. Those  indeed  who  deny  souls  to  brutes  and  all  perception 
and  organism  to  other  parts  of  matter,  do  not  sufficiently  recognize 
the  Divine  Majesty,  and  introduce  something  unworthy  of  God, 
unpolished,  that  is,  a void  of  perfections  or  forms,  which  you  may 
call  a metaphysical  void,  which  is  no  less  to  be  rejected  than  a 


OjST  THE  HATTTBE  OE  THE  SOTTE. 


283 


material  or  physical  void.  Brit  those  who  grant  true  souls  and  per- 
ception to  brutes,  and  yet  affirm  that  their  souls  can  perish 
naturally,  take  away  thus  from  us  the  demonstration  which  shows 
that  our  minds  cannot  perish  naturally,  and  fall  into  the  dogma 
of  the  Socinians,  who  think  that  souls  are  preserved  only  miracu- 
lously or  by  grace,  hut  believe  that  by  nature  they  ought  to 
perish ; which  is  to  rob  natural  theology  of  its  most  important  part. 
Besides,  the  contrary  can  he  completely  demonstrated,  since  a sub- 
stance wanting  parts  cannot  naturally  be  destroyed. 

Wolfenbiittel,  June  4,  1710. 


XXXII. 


The  Theodicy. 

Abridgment  of  the  Argument  reduced  to  syllogistic  form. 

1710. 

[From  the  French.] 

Some  intelligent  persons  have  desired  that  this  supplement 
he  made  [to  the  Theodicy],  and  I have  the  more  readily  yielded  to 
their  wishes  as  in  this  way  I have  an  opportunity  to  again  remove 
certain  difficulties  and  to  make  some  observations  which  were  not 
sufficiently  emphasized  in  the  work  itself. 

I.  Objection.  Whoever  does  not  choose  the  best  is  lacking  in 
power,  or  in  knowledge,  or  in  goodness. 

God  did  not  choose  the  best  in  creating  this  world. 

Therefore,  God  has  been  lacking  in  power,  or  in  knowledge,  or  in 
goodness. 

Answer.  I deny  the  minor,  that  is,  the  second  premise  of  this 
syllogism;  and  our  opponent  proves  it  by  this 

Prosyllogism.  Whoever  makes  things  in  which  there  is  evil, 
which  could  have  been  made  without  any  evil,  or  the  making  of 
which  could  have  been  omitted,  does  not  choose  the  best. 

God  has  made  a world  in  which  there  is  evil ; a world,  I say, 
which  could  have  been  made  without  any  evil,  or  the  making  of 
which  could  have  been  omitted  altogether. 

Therefore,  God  has  not  chosen  the  best. 

Answer.  I grant  the  minor  of  this  prosyllogism ; for  it  must  be 
confessed  that  there  is  evil  in  this  world  which  God  has  made,  and 
that  it  was  possible  to  make  a world  without  evil,  or  even  not  to 
create  a world  at  all,  for  its  creation  has  depended  on  the  free  will 
of  God ; but  I deny  the  major,  that  is,  the  first  of  the  two  premises 
of  the  prosyllogism,  and  I might  content  myself  with  simply 
demanding  its  proof ; but  in  order  to  make  the  matter  clearer,  I 
have  wished  to  justify  this  denial  by  showing  that  the  best  plan  is 
not  always  that  which  seeks  to  avoid  evil,  since  it  may  happen  that  ' 
the  evil  be  accompanied  by  a greater  good.  For  example,  a general 


THE  THEODICY. 


285 


of  an  army  will  prefer  a great  victory  with  a slight  wound  to  a con- 
dition without  wound  and  without  victory.  We  have  proved  this 
more  fully  in  the  large  work  by  making  it  clear,  by  instances  taken 
from  mathematics  and  elsewhere,  that  an  imperfection  in  the  part 
may  he  required  for  a greater  perfection  in  the  whole.  In  this  I 
have  followed  the  opinion  of  St.  Augustine,  who  has  said  a hun- 
dred times,  that  God  has  permitted  evil  in  order  to  bring  about 
good,  that  is,  a greater  good  ; and  that  of  Thomas  Aquinas  (in  libr. 
II.  sent.  dist.  32,  qu.  I,  art.  1),  that  the  permitting  of  evil  tends 
to  the  good  of  the  universe.  I have  shown  that  the  ancients  called 
Adam’s  fall  felix  culpa,  a happy  sin,  because  it  had  been  retrieved 
with  immense  advantage  by  the  incarnation  of  the  Son  of  God, 
who  has  given  to  the  universe  something  nobler  than  anything  that 
ever  would  have  been  among  creatures  except  for  it.  Aud  in 
order  to  a clearer  understanding,  I have  added,  following  many 
good  authors,  that  it  was  in  accordance  with  order  and  the  general 
good  that  God  allowed  to  certain  creatures  the  opportunity  of 
exercising  their  liberty,  even  when  he  foresaw  that  they  would  turn 
to  evil,  but  which  he  could  so  well  rectify ; because  it  was  not  fit- 
ting that,  in  order  to  hinder  sin,  God  should  always  act  in  an  extra- 
ordinary' manner.  To  overthrow  this  objection,  therefore,  it  is 
sufficient  to  show  that  a world  with  evil  might  be  better  than  a 
world  without  evil ; hut  I have  gone  even  farther,  in  the  work,  and 
have  even  proved  that  this  universe  must  be  in  reality  better  than 
every  other  possible  universe. 

II.  Objection.  If  there  is  more  evil  than  good  in  intelligent 
creatures,  then  there  is  more  evil  than  good  in  the  whole  work  of 
God. 

How,  there  is  more  evil  than  good  in  intelligent  creatures. 

Therefore,  there  is  more  evil  than  good  in  the  whole  work  of 

God. 

Answer.  I deny  the  major  and  the  minor  of  this  conditional 
syllogism.  As  to  the  major,  I do  not  admit  it  at  all,  because  this 
pretended  deduction  from  a part  to  the  whole,  from  intelligent 
creatures  to  all  creatures,  supposes  tacitly  and  without  proof  that 
creatures  destitute  of  reason  cannot  enter  into  comparison  nor  into 
account  with  those  which  possess  it.  But  why  may  it  not  be  that 


286 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


the  surplus  of  good  in  the  non-intelligent  creatui’es  which  fill  the 
world,  compensates  for,  and  even  incomparably  surpasses,  the  sur- 
plus of  evil  in  the  rational  creatures  ? It  is  true  that  the  value  of 
the  latter  is  greater ; hut,  in  compensation,  the  others  are  beyond 
comparison  the  more  numerous,  and  it  may  be  that  the  proportion 
of  number  and  of  quantity  surpasses  that  of  value  and  of  quality. 

As  to  the  minor,  that  is  no  more  to  be  admitted  ; that  is,  it  is  not 
at  all  to  he  admitted  that  there  is  more  evil  than  good  in  the  intelli- 
gent creatures.  There  is  no  need  even  of  granting  that  there  is 
more  evil  than  good  in  the  human  race,  because  it  is  possible,  and 
in  fact  very  probable,  that  the  glory  and  the  perfection  of  the 
blessed  are  incomparably  greater  than  the  misery  and  the  imper- 
fection of  the  damned,  and  that  here  the  excellence  of  the  total  good 
in  the  smaller  number  exceeds  the  total  evil  in  the  greater  number. 
The  blessed  approach  the  Divinity,  hv  means  of  a Divine  Media- 
tor, as  near  as  may  suit  these  creatures,  and  make  such  progress  in 
good  as  is  impossible  for  the  damned  to  make  in  evil,  approach  as 
nearly  as  they  may  to  the  nature  of  demons.  God  is  infinite,  and 
the  devil  is  limited ; the  good  may  and  does  go  to  infinity,  while 
evil  has  its  bounds.  It  is  therefore  possible,  and  is  credible,  that 
in  the  comparison  of  the  blessed  and  the  damned,  the  contrary 
of  that  which  I have  said  might  happen  in  the  comparison  of 
intelligent  and  non-intelligent  creatures,  takes  place;  namely,  it  is 
possible  that  in  the  comparison  of  the  happy  and  the  unhappy,  the 
proportion  of  degree  exceeds  that  of  number,  and  that  in  the  com- 
parison of  intelligent  and  non-intelligent  creatures,  the  proportion 
of  number  is  greater  than  that  of  value.  I have  the  right  to  sup- 
pose that  a thing  is  possible  so  long  as  its  impossibility  is  not 
proved ; and  indeed  that  which  I have  here  advanced  is  more  than 
a supposition. 

But  in  the  second  place,  if  I should  admit  that  there  is  more  evil 
than  good  in  the  human  race,  I have  still  good  grounds  for  not 
admitting  that  there  is  more  evil  than  good  in  all  intelligent  crea- 
tures. .For  there  is  an  inconceivable  number  of  genii,  and  perhaps 
of  other  rational  creatures.  And  an  opponent  could  not  prove  that 
in  all  the  City  of  God,  composed  as  well  of  genii  as  of  rational  ani- 
mals without  number  and  of  an  infinity  of  kinds,  evil  exceeds  good. 


THE  THEODICY. 


287 


And  although  in  order  to  answer  an  objection,  there  is  no  need  of 
proving  that  a thing  is,  when  its  mere  possibility  suffices ; yet,  in 
this  work,  I have  not  omitted  to  show  that  it  is  a consequence  of 
the  supreme  perfection  of  the  Sovereign  of  the  universe,  that  the 
kingdom  of  God  be  the  most  perfect  of  all  possible  states  or  gov- 
ernments, and  that  consequently  the  little  evil  there  is,  is  required 
for  the  consummation  of  the  immense  good  which  is  there  found. 

III.  Objection.  If  it  is  always  impossible  not  to  sin,  it  is 
always  unjust  to  punish. 

How,  it  is  always  impossible  not  to  sin ; or,  in  other  words,  every 
sin  is  necessary. 

Therefore,  it  is  always  unjust  to  punish. 

The  minor  of  this  is  proved  thus : 

1.  Prosyllogism.  All  that  is  predetermined  is  necessary. 

Every  event  is  predetermined. 

Therefore,  every  event  (and  consequently  sin  also)  is  necessary. 

Again  this  second  minor  is  proved  thus : 

2.  Prosyllogism.  That  which  is  future,  that  which  is  fore- 
seen, that  which  is  involved  in  the  causes,  is  predetermined. 

Every  event  is  such. 

Therefore,  every  event  is  predetermined. 

Answer.  I admit  in  a certain  sense  the  conclusion  of  the 
second  prosyllogism,  which  is  the  minor  of  the  first ; but  I shall 
deny  the  major  of  the  first  prosyllogism,  namely,  that  every  thing 
predetermined  is  necessary ; understanding  by  the  necessity  of 
sinning,  for  example,  or  by  the  impossibility  of  not  sinning,  or  of 
not  performing  any  action,  the  necessity  with  which  we  are 
here  concerned,  that  is,  that  which  is  essential  and  absolute,  and 
which  destroys  the  morality  of  an  action  and  the  justice  of  punish- 
ments. Eor  if  anyone  understood  another  necessity  or  impossibil- 
ity, namely,  a necessity  which  should  be  only  moral,  or  which  was 
only  hypothetical  (as  will  be  explained  shortly)  ; it  is  clear  that  I 
should  deny  the  major  of  the  objection  itself.  I might  content 
myself  with  this  answer  and  demand  the  proof  of  the  proposition 
denied ; but  I have  again  desired  to  explain  my  procedure  in  this 
work,  in  order  to  better  elucidate  the  matter  and  to  throw  more 
light  on  the  whole  subject,  by  explaining  the  necessity  which  ought 


2SS 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBKITZ. 


to  be  rejected  and  the  determination  wliicb  must  take  place.  That 
necessity  which  is  contrary  to  morality  and  which  ought  to  be 
rejected,  and  which  would  render  punishment  unjust,  is  an  insur- 
mountable necessity  which  would  make  all  opposition  useless,  even 
if  we  should  wish  with  all  our  heart  to  avoid  the  necessary  action, 
and  should  make  all  possible  efforts  to  that  end.  Now,  it  is  mani- 
fest that  this  is  not  applicable  to  voluntary  actions,  because  we 
would  not  perform  them  if  we  did  not  choose  to.  Also  their  pre- 
vision and  j)redetermination  is  not  absolute,  but  it  presupposes  the 
will : if  it  is  certain  that  we  shall  perform  them,  it  is  not  less  cer- 
tain that  we  shall  choose  to  perform  them.  These  voluntary  actions 
and  their  consequences  will  not  take  place  no  matter  what  we  do 
or  whether  we  wish  them  or  not ; but,  through  that  which  we  shall 
do  and  through  that  which  we  shall  wish  to  do,  which  leads  to 
them.  And  this  is  involved  in  prevision  and  in  predetermination, 
and  even  constitutes  their  ground.  And  the  necessity  of  snch  an 
event  is  called  conditional  or  hypothetical,  or  the  necessity  of  con- 
sequence, because  it  supposes  the  will,  and  the  other  requisites ; 
whereas  the  necessity  which  destroys  morality  and  renders  punish- 
ment unjust  and  reward  useless,  exists  in  things  which  will  be 
whatever  we  may  do  or  whatever  we  may  wish  to  do,  and,  in  a 
Avord,  is  in  that  which  is  essential ; and  this  is  what  is  called  an 
absolute  necessity.  Thus  it  is  to  no  purpose,  as  regards  what  is 
absolutely  necessary,  to  make  prohibitions  or  commands,  to  pro- 
pose penalties  or  prizes,  to  praise  or  to  blame;  it  will  be  none  the 
less.  On  the  other  hand,  in  voluntary  actions  and  in  that  which 
depends  upon  them,  precepts  armed  Avith  poAver  to  punish  and  to 
recompense  are  very  often  of  use  and  are  included  in  the  order 
of  causes  which  make  an  action  exist.  And  it  is  for  this  reason 
that  not  only  cares  and  labors  but  also  prayers  are  useful ; God 
having  had  these  prayers  in  view  before  he  regulated  things  and 
having  had  that  consideration  for  them  which  avrs  proper.  This 
is  why  the  precept  which  says  ora  et  lahora  (pray  and  Avork),  holds 
altogether  good ; and  not  onty  those  who  (under  the  vain  pretext 
of  the  necessity  of  events)  pretend  that  the  care  which  business 
demands  may  be  neglected,  but  also  those  who  reason  against 
prayer,  fall  into  what  the  ancients  even  then  called  the  lazy 


THE  THEODICY. 


289 


sophism.  Thus  the  predetermination  of  events  by  causes  is  just 
what  contributes  to  morality  instead  of  destroying  it,  and  causes 
incline  the  will,  without  compelling  it.  This  is  why  the  deter- 
mination in  question  is  not  a necessitation — it  is  certain  (to  him 
who  knows  all)  that  the  effect  will  follow  this  inclination;  but 
this  effect  does  not  follow  by  a necessary  consequence,  that  is,  one 
the  contrary  of  which  implies  contradiction.  It  is  also  by.  an 
internal  inclination  such  as  this  that  the  will  is  determined,  with- 
out there  being  any  necessity.  Suppose  that  one  has  the  greatest 
passion  in  the  world  (a  great  thirst,  for  example),  you  will  admit 
to  me  that  the  soul  can  find  some  reason  for  resisting  it,  if  it  were 
only  that  of  showing  its  power.  Thus,  although  one  may  never  he 
in  a perfect  indifference  of  equilibrium  and  there  may  be  always 
a preponderance  of  inclination  for  the  side  taken,  it,  nevertheless, 
never  renders  the  resolution  taken  absolutely  necessary. 

IV.  Objection.  Whoever  can  prevent  the  sin  of  another  and 
does  not  do  so,  but  rafther  contributes  to  it  although  he  is  well 
informed  of  it,  is  accessory  to  it. 

God  can  prevent  the  sin  of  intelligent  creatures  ; hut  he  does  not 
do  so,  and  rather  contributes  to  it  by  his  concurrence  and  by  the 
opportunities  which  he  brings  about,  although  he  has  a perfect 
knowledge  of  it. 

ITence,  etc. 

Answer.  I deny  the  major  of  this  syllogism.  Tor  it  is  possible 
that  one  could  prevent  sin,  but  ought  not,  because  he  could  not  do 
it  without  himself  committing  a sin,  or  (when  God  is  in  question) 
without  performing  an  unreasonable  action.  Examples  have  been 
given  and  the  application  to  God  himself  has  been  made.  It  is 
possible  also  that  we  contribute  to  evil  and  that  sometimes  we  even 
open  the  road  to  it,  in  doing  things  which  we  are  obliged  to  do; 
and,  when  we  do  our  duty  or  (in  speaking  of  God)  when,  after 
thorough  consideration,  we  do  that  which  reason  demands,  we  are 
not  responsible  for  the  results,  even  when  we  foresee  them.  We 
do  not  desire  these  evils ; hut  we  are  willing  to  permit  them  for 
the  sake  of  a greater  good  which  we  cannot  reasonably  help  pre- 
ferring to  other  considerations.  And  this  is  a consequent  will, 
which  results  from  antecedent  wills  by  which  we  will  the  good.  I 
19 


290 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


know  that  some  persons,  in  speaking  of  the  antecedent  and  conse- 
quent will  of  God,  have  understood  by  the  antecedent  that  which, 
wills  that  all  men  should  he  saved;  and  by  the  consequent,  that 
which  wills,  in  consequence  of  persistent  sin,  that  some  should  be 
damned.  But  these  are  merely  illustrations  of  a more  general 
idea,  and  it  may  be  said  for  the  same  reason  that  God,  by  his 
antecedent  will,  wills  that  men  should  not  sin ; and  by  his  con- 
sequent or  final  and  decreeing  will  (that  which  is  always  followed 
by  its  effect),  he  wills  to  permit  them  to  sin,  this  permission  being 
the  result  of  superior  reasons.  And  we  have  the  right  to  say  in 
general  that  the  antecedent  will  of  God  tends  to  the  production  of 
good  and  the  prevention  of  evil,  each  taken  in  itself  and  as  if  alone 
(particulariter  et  secundum  quid,  Thom.  I,  qu.  19,  art  6),  accord- 
ing to  the  measure  of  the  degree  of  each  good  and  of  each  evil ; but 
that  the  divine  consequent  or  final  or  total  will  tends  toward  the 
liroduction  of  as  many  goods  as  may  be  put  together,  the  combina- 
tion of  which  becomes  in  this  way  determined,  and  includes  also 
the  permission  of  some  evils  and  the  exclusion  of  some  goods,  as 
the  best  possible  plan  for  the  universe  demands.  Arminius,  in  his 
Anti-perkinsus , has  very  well  explained  that  the  will  of  God  may 
be  called  consequent,  not  only  in  relation  to  the  action  of  the 
creature  considered  beforehand  in  the  divine  understanding,  but 
also  in  relation  to  other  anterior  divine  acts  of  will.  But  this  con- 
sideration of  the  passage  cited  from  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  that 
from  Scotus  (I.  disk  46,  qu.  XI),  is  enough  to  show  that  they  make 
this  distinction  as  I have  done  here.  Nevertheless,  if  anyone 
objects  to  this  use  of  terms  let  him  substitute  deliberating  will,  in 
place  of  antecedent,  and  final  or  decreeing  will,  in  place  of  con- 
sequent. For  I do  not  wish  to  dispute  over  words. 

V.  Objection.  AVhoever  produces  all  that  is  real  in  a thing,  is 
its  cause. 

God  produces  all  that  is  real  in  sin. 

Hence,  God  is  the  cause  of  sin. 

Answer.  I might  content  myself  with  denying  the  major  or  the 
minor,  since  the  term  real  admits  of  interpretations  which  would 
render  these  propositions  false.  But  in  order  to  explain  more 
clearly,  I will  make  a distinction.  Real  signifies  either  that  which 


THE  THEODICY. 


291 


is  positive  only,  or,  it  includes  also  privative  beings : in  the  first 
case,  I deny  the  major  and  admit  the  minor  ; in  the  second  case,  I 
do  the  contrary.  I might  have  limited  myself  to  this,  hut  I have 
chosen  to  proceed  still  farther  and  give  the  reason  for  this  dis- 
tinction. I have  been  very  glad  therefore  to  draw  attention  to  the 
fact  that  every  reality  purely  positive  or  absolute  is  a perfection ; 
and  that  imperfection  comes  from  limitation,  that  is,  from  the  priv- 
ative: for  to  limit  is  to  refuse  progress,  or  the  greatest  possible 
progress.  Now  God  is  the  cause  of  all  perfections  and  conse- 
quently of  all  realities  considered  as  purely  positive.  But  limita- 
tions or  privations  result  from  the  original  imperfection  of  crea- 
tures, which  limits  their  receptivity.  And  it  is  with  them  as  with 
a loaded  vessel,  which  the  river  causes  to  move  more  or  less  slowly 
according  to  the  weight  which  it  carries : thus  its  speed  depends 
upon  the  river,  but  the  retardation  which  limits  this  speed  comes 
from  the  load.  Thus  in  the  Theodicy,  we  have  shown  how  the 
creature,  in  causing  sin,  is  a defective  cause ; how  errors  and  evil 
inclinations  are  born  of  privation ; and  how  privation  is  accident- 
ally efficient;  and  I have  justified  the  opinion  of  St.-  Augustine 
(lib.  I.  ad  Simpl.  qu.  2)  who  explains,  for  example,  how  God 
makes  the  soul  obdurate,  not  by  giving  it  something  evil,  but 
because  the  effect  of  his  good  impression  is  limited  by  the  soul’s 
resistance  and  by  the  circumstances  which  contribute  to  this  resis- 
tance, so  that  he  does  not  give  it  all  the  good  which  would  over-  v. 
come  its  evil.  A ec  (inquit)  ab  illo  erogatur  aliquid  quo  homo  fit 
deterior,  sed  tantum  quo  fit  melior  non  erogatur.  But  if  God  had 
wished  to  do  more,  he  would  have  had  to  make  either  other  natures 
for  creatures  or  other  miracles  to  change  their  natures,  things 
which  the  best  plan  could  not  admit.  It  is  as  if  the  current  of  the 
river  must  be  more  rapid  than  its  fall  admitted  or  that  the  boats 
should  be  loaded  more  lightly,  if  it  were  necessary  to  make  them 
move  more  quickly.  And  the  original  limitation  or  imperfection  of 
creatures  requires  that  even  the  best  plan  of  the  universe  could 
not  receive  more  good,  and  could  not  be  exempt  from  certain  evils, 
which,  however,  are  to  result  in  a greater  good.  There  are  cer- 
tain disorders  in  the  parts  which  marvellously  enhance  the  beauty 
of  the  whole;  just  as  certain  dissonances,  when  properly  used, 


292 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WOKICS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


render  harmony  more  beautiful.  But  this  depends  on  what  has 
already  been  said  in  answer  to  the  first  objection. 

VI.  Objection.  Whoever  punishes  those  who  have  done  as  well 
as  it  was  in  their  power  to  do,  is  unjust. 

God  does  so. 

Hence,  etc. 

Answer.  I deny  the  minor  of  this  argument.  And  I believe 
that  God  always  gives  sufficient  aid  and  grace  to  those  who  have  a 
good  will,  that  is,  to  those  who  do  not  reject  this  grace  by  new  sin. 
Thus  I do  not  admit  the  damnation  of  infants  who  have  died  with- 
out baptism  or  outside  of  the  church ; nor  the  damnation  of  adults 
Avho  have  acted  according  to  the  light  which  God  has  given  them. 
And  I believe  that  if  any  one  has  followed  the  light  which  has  been 
given  him,  he  will  undoubtedly  receive  greater  light  when  he  has 
need  of  it,  as  the  late  M.  Hulseman,  a profound  and  celebrated 
theologian  at  Leipsic,  has  somewhere  remarked ; and  if  such  a man 
has  failed  to  receive  it  during  his  lifetime  he  will  at  least  receive 
it  when  at  the  point  of  death. 

VII.  Objection.  Whoever  gives  only  to  some,  and  not  to  all,  the 
means  which  produces  in  them  effectively  a good  will  and  salutary 
final  faith,  has  not  sufficient  goodness. 

God  does  this. 

Hence,  etc. 

Answer.  I deny  the  major  of  this.  It  is  true  that  God  could 
overcome  the  greatest  resistance  of  the  human  heart ; and  does  it, 
too,  sometimes,  be  it  by  internal  grace,  be  it  by  external  circum- 
stances which  have  a great  effect  on  souls;  but  he  does  not  always 
do  this.  Whence  comes  this  distinction  ? it  may  be  asked,  and  why 
does  his  goodness  seem  limited  ? It  is  because,  as  I have  already 
said  in  answering  the  first  objection,  it  would  not  have  been  in 
order  always  to  act  in  an  extraordinary  manner,  and  to  reverse 
the  Connection  of  things.  The  reasons  of  this  connection,  by  means 
of  which  one  is  placed  in  more  favorable  circumstances  than 
another,  are  hidden  in  the  depths  of  the  wisdom  of  God : they 
depend  upon  the  universal  harmony.  The  best  plan  of  the  uni- 
verse, which  God  could  not  fail  to  choose,  made  it  so.  We  judge 
from  the  event  itself ; since  God  has  made  it,  it  was  not  possible 


THE  THEODICY. 


29a 


to  do  better.  Far  from  being  true  that  this  conduct  is  contrary  to 
goodness,  it  is  supreme  goodness  which  led  him  to  it.  This  objec- 
tion with  its  solution  might  have  been  drawn  from  what  was  said 
in  regard  to  the  first  objection ; but  it  seemed  useful  to  touch  upon 
it  separately. 

VIII.  Objection.  Whoever  cannot  fail  to  choose  the  best,  is 
not  free. 

God  cannot  fail  to  choose  the  best. 

Hence,  God  is  not  free. 

Answer.  I deny  the  major  of  this  argument;  it  is  rather  true 
liberty,  and  the  most  perfect,  to  be  able  to  use  one’s  free  will  for 
the  best,  and  to  always  exercise  this  power,  without  ever  being 
turned  aside  either  by  external  force  or  by  internal  passions,  the 
first  of  which  causes  slavery  of  the  body,  the  second,  slavery  of 
the  soul.  There  is  nothing  less  servile,  and  nothing  more  in  accor- 
dance with  the  highest  degree  of  freedom,  than  to  be  always  led 
toward  the  good,  and  always  by  one’s  own  inclination,  without  any 
constraint  and  without  any  displeasure.  And  to  object  therefore 
that  God  had  need  of  external  things,  is  only  a sophism.  He 
created  them  freely ; but  having  proposed  to  himself  an  end,  which 
is  to  exercise  his  goodness,  wisdom  has  determined  him  to  choose 
the  means  best  fitted  to  attain  this  end.  To  call  this  a need,  is  to 
take  that  term  in  an  unusual  sense  which  frees  it  from  all  imper- 
fection, just  as  when  we  speak  of  the  wrath  of  God. 

Seneca  has  somewhere  said  that  God  commanded  but  once  but 
that  he  obeys  always,  because  he  obeys  laws  which  he  willed  to  pre- 
scribe to  himself : semel  jussit,  semper  paret.  But  he  might  better 
have  said  that  God  always  commands  and  that  he  is  always  obeyed  ; 
for  in  willing,  he  always  follows  the  inclination  of  his  own  nature, 
and  all  other  things  always  follow  his  will.  And  as  this  will  is 
always  the  same,  it  cannot  be  said  that  he  obeys  only  that  will 
which  he  formerly  had.  nevertheless,  although  his  will  is  always 
infallible  and  always  tends  toward  the  best,  the  evil,  or  the  lesser 
good,  which  he  rejects,  does  not  cease  to  be  possible  in  itself ; other- 
wise the  necessity  of  the  good  would  be  geometrical  (so  to  speak), 
or  metaphysical,  and  altogether  absolute;  the  contingency  of  things 
would  be  destroyed,  and  there  would  be  no  choice.  But  this  sort 


294 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBWITZ. 


of  necessity,  which  does  not  destroy  the  possibility  of  the  contrary, 
has  this  name  only  by  analogy ; it  becomes  effective,  not  by  the 
pure  essence  of  things,  but  by  that  which  is  outside  of  them,  above 
them,  namely,  by  the  will  of  God.  Ibis  necessity  is  called  moral, 
because,  to  the  sage,  necessity  and  what  ought  to  he  are  equivalent 
things ; and  when  it  always  has  its  effect,  as  it  really  has  in  the  per- 
fect sage,  that  is,  in  God,  it  may  he  said  that  it  is  a happy  necessity. 
The  nearer  creatures  approach  to  it,  the  nearer  they  approach  to 
perfect  happiness.  Also  this  kind  of  necessity  is  not  that  which 
we  try  to  avoid  and  which  destroys  morality,  rewards  and  praise. 
For  that  which  it  brings,  does  not  happen  whatever  we  may  do  or 
will,  hut  because  we  will  well.  And  a will  to  which  it  is  natural  to 
choose  well,  merits  praise  so  much  the  more ; also  it  carries  its 
reward  with  it,  which  is  sovereign  happiness.  And  as  this  consti- 
tution of  the  divine  nature  gives  entire  satisfaction  to  him  who 
possesses  it,  it  is  also  the  best  and  the  most  desirable  for  the  crea- 
tures who  are  all  dependent  on  God.  If  the  will  of  God  did  not 
have  for  a rule  the  principle  of  the  best,  it  would  either  tend 
toward  evil,  which  would  he  the  worst;  or  it  would  be  in  some  way 
indifferent  to  good  and  to  evil,  and  would  be  guided  by  chance : 
but  a will  which  would  allow  itself  always  to  act  by  chance,  would 
not  he  worth  more  for  the  government  of  the  universe  than  the 
fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms,  without  there  being  any  divinity 
therein.  And  even  if  God  should  abandon  himself  to  chance  only 
in  some  cases  and  in  a certain  Avay  (as  he  would  do,  if  he  did  not 
always  work  entirely  for  the  best  and  if  he  were  capable  of  pre- 
ferring a lesser  good  to  a greater,  that  is,  an  evil  to  a good,  since 
that  which  prevents  a greater  good  is  an  evil),  he  would  be  imper- 
fect, as  well  as  the  object  of  his  choice;  he  would  not  merit  entire 
confidence;  he  would  act  without  reason  in  such  a case,  and  the 
government  of  the  universe  would  be  like  certain  games,  equally 
divided  between  reason  and  chance.  All  this  proves  that  this 
objection  which  is  made  against  the  choice  of  the  best,  perverts  the 
notions  of  the  free  and  of  the  necessary,  and  represents  to  us  the 
best  even  as  evil : which  is  either  malicious  or  ridiculous. 


XXXIII. 


On  Wisdom — The  Art  of  Reasoning  Weed,  the  Art  of  Dis- 
covery, the  Art  of  Remembering. 

[From  the  French.] 

Wisdom  is  a perfect  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  all  the 
sciences  and  of  the  art  of  applying  them.  I call  principles  all  the 
fundamental  truths  which  suffice  for  drawing  thence  all  conclusions 
in  case  of  need,  after  some  exercise  and  with  some  little  application. 
In  a word,  that  which  serves  to  lead  the  mind  to  regulate  the 
manners,  to  subsist  honestly,  and  everywhere,  even  if  one  were 
amid  barbarians,  to  preserve  the  health,  to  perfect  one’s  self  in 
every  kind  of  thing  of  which  one  may  have  need,  and  to  provide, 
finally,  the  conveniences  of  life.  The  art  of  applying  these  prin- 
ciples to  exigencies,  embraces  the  art  of  judging  well  or  reasoning, 
the  art  of  discovering  unknown  truths,  and  finally,  of  remembering 
what  one  knows,  in  the  nick  of  time  and  when  one  has  need  of  it. 

The  Art  of  Reasoning  Well  consists  in  the  following 
maxims : 

1.  Xothing  is  ever  to  be  recognized  as  true  but  what  is  so  mani- 
fest that  no  ground  for  doubt  can  he  found.  This  is  why  it  will  be 
well,  in  beginning  one’s  investigations,  to  imagine  one’s  self  inter- 
ested in  sustaining  the  contrary,  in  order  to  see  if  this  incitement 
could  not  arouse  one  to  find  that  the  matter  has  something  solid  to 
be  said  in  its  favor.  For  prejudices  must  be  avoided  and  nothing 
he  ascribed  to  things  but  what  they  include.  But  also  one  must 
never  be  opinionated. 

2.  When  there  appears  to  he  no  means  of  attaining  this  assur- 
ance, we  must,  in  waiting  for  greater  light,  content  ourselves  with 
probability.  But  we  must  distinguish  the  degrees  of  probability 
and  we  must  remember  that  all  that  we  infer  from  a principle 
which  is  but  probable  must  hear  the  marks  of  the  imperfection  of 
its  source,  especially  when  several  probabilities  must  be  supposed 
in  order  to  reach  this  conclusion,  for  it  thereby  becomes  still  less 
certain  than  was  each  probability  which  serves  it  as  basis. 


296 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


3.  To  infer  one  truth  from  another,  a certain  connection,  which 
shall  be  without  interruption,  must  be  observed.  For  as  one  may- 
feel  sure  that  a chain  will  hold  when  he  is  assured  that  each 
separate  link  is  of  good  material  and  that  it  clasps  the  two  neigh- 
boring links,  viz.,  the  one  preceding  and  the  one  following  it,  so 
we  may  be  sure  of  the  accuracy  of  the  reasoning  when  the  matter 
is  good,  that  is  to  say,  when  nothing  doubtful  enters  into  it,  and 
when  the  form  consists  in  a perpetual  concatenation  of  truths 
which  allows  of  no  gap.  For  example,  A is  B and  B is  C and  C 
is  D,  hence  A is  D.  This  concatenation  will  always  teach  us  never 
to  put  in  the  conclusion  more  than  there  was  in  the  premises. 

The  Art  of  Discovery  consists  in  the  following  maxims: 

1.  In  order  to  know  a thing  we  must  consider  all  the  requisites 
of  that  thing,  that  is  to  say,  all  that  which  suffices  to  distinguish  it 
from  every  other  thing.  This  is  what  is  called  definition,  nature, 
reciprocal  property. 

2.  Having  once  found  a means  of  distinguishing  it  from  every 
other  thing,  this  same  first  rule  must  be  applied  to  the  considera- 
tion of  each  condition  or  requisite  which  enters  into  this  means, 
and  all  the  requisites  of  each  requisite  must  he  considered.  And 
this  is  what  I call  true  analysis  or  distribution  of  the  difficulty  into 
several  parts. 

3.  When  we  have  pushed  the  analysis  to  the  end,  that  is  to  say, 
when  we  have  considered  the  requisites  which  enter  into  the  con- 
sideration of  the  thing  proposed  and  even  the  requisites  of  the 
requisites,  and  when  we  have  finally  come  to  the  consideration  of 
some  natures  which  are  understood  only  through  themselves,  which 
are  without  requisites  and  which  need  nothing  outside  of  them- 
selves in  order  to  be  conceived,  we  have  reached  a perfect  knowl- 
edge of  the  thing  proposed. 

4.  When  the  thing  deserves  it,  we  must  try  to  have  this  perfect 
knowledge  present  in  the  mind  all  at  once,  and  this  is  done  by 
repeating  the  analysis  several  times  until  it  seems  to  us  that  we  see 
the  whole  of  it  at  a single  glance  of  the  mind.  And  for  this 
result  a certain  order  in  repetition  must  he  observed. 

5.  The  mark  of  perfect  knowledge  is  when  nothing  presents 
itself  in  the  thing  in  question  for  which  we  cannot  account  and 


ON  WISDOM. 


297 


when  there  is  no  conjuncture  the  outcome  of  which  we  cannot  pre- 
dict beforehand.  It  is  very  difficult  to  carry  through  an  analysis  of 
things,  hut  it  is  not  so  difficult  to  complete  the  analysis  of  truths 
of  which  we  have  need.  Because  the  analysis  of  a truth  is  com- 
pleted when  its  demonstration  has  been  found,  and  it  is  not 
always  necessary  to  complete  the  analysis  of  the  subject  or  predi- 
cate in  order  to  find  the  demonstration  of  a proposition.  Most 
often  the  beginning  of  the  analysis  of  a thing  suffices  for  the 
analysis  or  perfect  knowledge  of  the  truth  which  we  know  of  the 
thing. 

6.  We  must  always  begin  our  investigations  with  the  easiest 
thing,  such  as  the  most  general  and  the  simplest,  likewise  those  on 
which  it  is  easy  to  make  experiments  and  to  find  their  reason,  such 
as  numbers,  lines,  motions. 

7.  We  must  proceed  in  order,  and  from  easy  things  to  those 
which  are  difficult,  and  we  must  try  to  discover  some  progression 
in  the  order  of  our  meditations,  so  that  we  may  have  nature  itself 
as  our  guide  and  voucher. 

8.  We  must  try  to  omit  nothing  in  all  our  distributions  or  enu- 
merations. For  this,  dichotomies  by  opposite  members  are  very 
useful. 

9.  The  fruit  of  several  analyses  of  different  particular  matters 
will  be  the  catalogue  of  simple  thoughts,  or  those  which  are  not  far 
removed  from  simple. 

10.  Having  the  catalogue  of  simple  thoughts,  we  shall  be  in 
position  to  recommence  a priori  and  to  explain  the  origin  of  things, 
beginning  at  their  source,  in  a perfect  order  and  in  a combination 
or  synthesis  absolutely  complete.  And  this  is  all  that  our  mind 
can  do  in  the  state  in  which  it  is  at  present. 

The  Art  of  Remembering  in  the  nick  of  time  and  when  it  is 
needed  what  one  knows,  consists  in  the  following  observations : 

1.  We  must  accustom  ourselves  to  be  present-minded,  that  is  to 
say,  to  be  able  to  meditate  just  as  well  in  a tumult,  on  occasion, 
and  in  danger,  as  in  our  cabinet.  This  is  why  we  must  test  our- 
selves on  occasions  and  even  seek  them ; with  this  precaution, 
however,  that  we  do  not  expose  ourselves  without  good  reason  to 
irreparable  evil.  In  the  meanwhile  it  is  good  to  exercise  ourselves 


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on  occasions  when  the  danger  is  imaginary  or  small,  as  in  our 
sport,  conversations,  conferences,  exercises,  and  comedies. 

2.  We  must  accustom  ourselves  to  enumerations.  This  is  why  it 
is  well  to  exercise  ourselves  in  collecting  all  possible  cases  of  the 
matter  in  question,  all  the  species  of  a genus,  all  the  conveniences 
or  inconveniences  of  a means,  all  possible  ways  of  aiming  at  some 
end. 

3.  We  must  accustom  ourselves  to  distinctions ; namely,  two  or 
more  very  similar  things  being  given,  to  find  on  the  spot  all  their 
differences. 

■f.  We  must  accustom  ourselves  to  analogies;  namely,  two  or 
more  very  different  things  being  given  to  find  their  resemblances. 

5.  We  must  be  able  to  adduce  on  the  spot  things  which  closely 
resemble  the  given  thing  or  which  are  very  different  from  it.  Tor 
example,  when  one  denies  some  general  maxim,  it  is  well  if  I can 
adduce  on  the  spot  some  examples.  And  when  another  quotes 
some  , maxim  against  me,  it  is  well  if  1 can  forthwith  oppose  an 
instance  to  him.  When  one  tells  me  a story,  it  is  well  if  I can 
adduce  then  and  there  a similar  one. 

6.  When  there  are  truths  or  knowledges  in  which  the  natural 
connection  of  the  subject  with  its  predicate  is  not  known  to  us,  as 
happens  in  matters  of  fact  and  in  truths  of  experience,  in  order  to 
retain  them  we  must  make  use  of  certain  artifices,  as  for  example, 
for  the  specific  properties  of  simples,  natural,  civil  and  ecclesias- 
tical history,  geography,  customs,  laws,  canons,  languages.  I see 
nothing  so  fitted  to  make  us  retain  these  things  as  burlesque  verses 
and  sometimes  certain  figures ; also  hypotheses  invented  to  explain 
them  in  imitation  of  natural  things  (as  an  appropriate  etymology, 
true  or  false,  for  languages,  Regula  mundi , in  imagining  certain 
orders  of  providence  for  history). 

7.  Finally,  it  is  well  to  make  an  inventory  in  writing  of  the 
knowledges  which  are  the  most  useful,  with  a register  or  alpha- 
betical table.  And  finally  a portable  manual  must  be  drawn  there- 
from of  what  is  most  necessary  and  most  ordinary. 


XXXIV. 


The  Principles  of  Xature  and  of  Grace.  1714. 

[From  the  French.] 

1.  Substance  is  a being  capable  of  action.  It  is  simple  or  com- 
pound. Simple  substance  is  that  which  has  no  parts.  Compound 
substance  is  the  collection  of  simple  substances  or  monads.  Monas 
is  a Greek  word  which  signifies  unity,  or  that  which  is  one. 

Compounds,  or  bodies,  are  multitudes ; and  simple  substances, 
lives,  souls,  spirits  are  unities.  And  there  must  be  simple  sub- 
stances everywhere,  because  without  simple  substances  there  would 
be  uo  compounds;  and  consequently  all  nature  is  full  of  life. 

2.  Monads,  having  no  parts,  cannot  be  formed  or  decomposed. 
They  cannot  begin  or  end  naturally ; and  consequently  last  as  long 
as  the  universe,  which  will  be  changed  hut  will  not  be  destroyed. 
They  cannot  have  shapes  ; otherwise  they  would  have  parts.  And 
consequently  a monad,  in  itself  and  at  a given  moment,  could 
not  be  distinguished  from  another  except  by  its  internal  qualities 
and  actions,  which  can  be  nothing  else  than  its  perceptions  (that 
is  representations  of  the  compound,  or  of  what  is  external,  in  the 
simple),  and  its  appetitions  (that  is,  its  tendencies  to  pass  from  one 
perception  to  another),  which  are  the  principles  of  change.  For 
the  simplicity  of  substance  does  not  prevent  multiplicity  of  modi- 
fications, which  must  he  found  together  in  this  same  simple  sub- 
stance, and  must  consist  in  the  variety  of  relations  to  things  which 
are  external.  Just  as  in  a centre  or  point,  although  simple  as  it  is, 
there  is  found  an  infinity  of  angles  formed  by  the  lines  which 
there  meet. 

3.  All  nature  is  a plenum.  There  are  everywhere  simple  sub- 
stances, separated  in  reality  from  each  other  by  activities  of  their 
own  which  continually  change  their  relations  ; and  each  important 
simple  substance,  or  monad,  which  forms  the  centre  of  a compound 
substance  (as,  for  example,  of  an  animal)  and  the  principle  of  its 
unity,  is  surrounded  by  a mass  composed  of  an  infinity  of  other 
monads,  which  constitute  the  body  proper  of  this  central  monad ; 


300 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBKITZ. 


and  in  accordance  with  the  affections  of  its  body  the  monad 
represents,  as  in  a centre,  the  things  which  are  outside  of  itself. 
And  this  body  is  organic,  though  it  forms  a sort  of  automaton  or 
natural  machine,  which  is  a machine  not  only  in  its  entirety,  hut 
also  in  its  smallest  perceptible  parts.  And  as,  because  the 
world  is  a plenum,  everything  is  connected  and  each  body  acts 
upon  every  other  body,  more  or  less,  according  to  the  distance,  and 
by  reaction  is  itself  affected  thereby,  it  follows  that  each  monad 
is  a living  mirror,  or  endowed  with  internal  activity,  representa- 
tive according  to  its  point  of  view  of  the  universe,  and  as  regu- 
lated as  the  universe  itself.  And  the  perceptions  in  the  monad 
spring  one  from  the  other,  by  the  laws  of  desires  [appewts] 
or  of  the  final  causes  of  good  and  evil,  which  consist  in 
observable,  regulated  or  unregulated,  perceptions;  just  as  the 
changes  of  bodies  and  external  phenomena  spring  one  from 
another,  by  the  laws  of  efficient  causes,  that  is,  of  motions.  Thus 
there  is  a perfect  harmony  between  the  perceptions  of  the  monad 
and  the  motions  of  bodies,  preestablished  at  the  beginning  between 
the  system  of  efficient  causes  and  that  of  final  causes.  And  in 
this  consists  the  accord  and  physical  union  of  the  soul  and  the  body, 
although  neither  one  can  change  the  laws  of  the  other. 

4.  Each  monad,  with  a particular  body,  makes  a living  sub- 
stance. Thus  there  is  not  only  life  everywhere,  accompanied  with 
members  or  organs,  but  there  is  also  an  infinity  of  degrees  in  the 
monads,  some  dominating  more  or  less  over  others.  But  when  the 
monad  has  organs  so  adjusted  that  by  means  of  them  there  is  clear- 
ness and  distinctness  in  the  impressions  which  they  receive,  and 
consequently  in  the  perceptions  which  represent  these  (as,  for 
example,  when  by  means  of  the  shape  of  the  humors  of  the  eyes, 
the  rays  of  light  are  concentrated  and  act  with  more  force),  this 
may  lead  to  feeling  [ sentiment ] , that  is,  to  a perception  accom- 
panied by  memory,  namely,  one  a certain  echo  of  which  remains 
a long  time,  so  as  to  make  itself  heard  upon  occasion.  And  such 
a living  being  is  called  an  animal,  as  its  monad  is  called  a soul. 
And  when  this  soul  is  elevated  to  reason,  it  is  something  more 
sublime  and  is  reckoned  among  spirits,  as  will  soon  be  explained. 
It  is  true  that  animals  are  sometimes  in  the  condition  of  simple 


PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURE  AND  OF  GRACE.  301 

living  beings,  and  their  souls  in  the  condition  of  simple  monads, 
namely,  when  their  perceptions  are  not  sufficiently  distinct  to  be 
remembered,  as  happens  in  a deep  dreamless  sleep,  or  in  a swoon. 
But  perceptions  which  have  become  entirely  confused  must  be 
re-developed  in  animals,  for  reasons  which  I shall  shortly  (§  12) 
enumerate.  Thus  it  is  well  to  make  distinction  between  the  per- 
ception, which  is  the  inner  state  of  the  monad  representing 
external  things,  and  apperception , which  is  consciousness  or  the 
reflective  knowledge  of  this  inner  state;  the  latter  not  being 
given  to  all  souls,  nor  at  all  times  to  the  same  soul.  And  it  is  for 
want  of  this  distinction  that  the  Cartesians  have  failed,  taking 
no  account  of  the  perceptions  of  which  we  are  not  conscious  as 
people  take  no  account  of  imperceptible  bodies.  It  is  this  also 
which  made  the  same  Cartesians  believe  that  only  spirits  are 
monads,  that  there  is  no  soul  of  brutes,  and  still  less  other  prin- 
ciples of  life.  And  as  they  shocked  too  much  the  common  opinion 
of  men  by  refusing  feeling  to  brutes,  they  have,  on  the  other 
hand,  accommodated  themselves  too  much  to  the  prejudices  of  the 
multitude,  by  confounding  a long  swoon,  caused  by  a great  con- 
fusion of  perceptions,  with  death  strictly  speaking,  where  all 
perception  would  cease.  This  has  confirmed  the  ill-founded  belief 
in  the  destruction  of  some  souls,  and  the  bad  opinion  of  some 
so-called  strong  minds,  who  have  contended  against  the  immortal- 
ity of  our  soul. 

3.  There  is  a connection  in  the  perceptions  of  animals  which 
bears  some'  resemblance  to  reason ; but  it  is  only  founded  in  the 
memory  of  facts  or  effects,  and  not  at  all  in  the  kn  owl  edge  of 
causes.  Thus  a dog  shuns  the  stick  with  which  it  has  been  beaten, 
because  memory  represents  to  it  the  pain  which  the  stick  has  caused 
it.  And  men,  in  so  far  as  they  are  empirics,  that  is  to  say,  in 
three-fourths  of  their  actions,  act  simply  as  the  brutes  do.  Bor 
example,  we  expect  that  there  will  be  daylight  to-morrow  because 
we  have  always  had  the  experience ; only  an  astronomer  foresees 
it  by  reason,  and  even  this  prediction  will  finally  fail  when  the 
cause  of  day,  which  is  not  eternal,  shall  cease.  But  true  reasoning 
depends  upon  necessary  or  eternal  truths,  such  as  those  of  logic, 
of  numbers,  of  geometry,  which  establish  an  indubitable  connection 


302 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


of  ideas  and  unfailing  inferences.  Tlie  animals  in  whom  these 
inferences  are  not  noticed,  are  called  brutes ; hut  those  which  know 
these  necessary  truths  are  properly  those  which  are  called  rational 
animals,  and  their  souls  are  called  spirits.  These  souls  are  capable 
of  performing  acts  of  reflection,  and  of  considering  that  which  is 
called  the  ego,  substance,  monad,  sold,  spirit,  in  a word,  immaterial 
things  and  truths.  And  it  is  this  which  renders  us  capable  of 
the  sciences  and  of  demonstrative  knowledge. 

6.  Modern  researches  have  taught  us,  and  reason  approves  of  it, 
that  living  beings  whose  organs  are  known  to  us,  that  is  to  say, 
plants  and  animals,  do  not  come  from  putrefaction  or  from  chaos, 
as  the  ancients  believed,  but  from  pre-fonned  seeds,  and  conse- 
quently hv  the  transformation  of  preexisting  living  beings.  There 
are  animalcules  in  the  seeds  of  large  animals,  which  by  means  of 
conception  assume  a new  dress,  which  they  make  their  own,  and  by 
means  of  which  they  can  nourish  themselves  and  increase  their  size, 
in  order  to  pass  to  a larger  theatre  and  to  accomplish  the  propaga- 
tion of  the  large  animal.  It  is  true  that  the  souls  of  spermatic 
human  animals  are  not  rational,  and  do  not  become  so  until  con- 
ception destines  [ determine ] these  animals  to  human  nature. 
And  as  in  general  animals  are  not  born  entirely  in  conception  or 
generation,  neither  do  they  perish  entirely  in  what  we  call  death; 
for  it  is  reasonable  that  what  does  not  begin  naturally,  should  not 
end  either  in  the  order  of  nature.  Therefore,  quitting  their  mask 
or  their  rags,  they  merely  return  to  a more  minute  theatre,  where 
they  can,  nevertheless,  be  just  as  sensitive  and  just  as  well  ordered 
as  in  the  larger.  And  what  we  have  just  said  of  the  large  animals, 
takes  place  also  in  the  generation  and  death  of  spermatic  animals 
themselves,  that  is  to  say,  they  are  growths  of  other  smaller  sper- 
matic animals,  in  comparison  with  which  they  may  pass  for  large ; 
for  everything  extends  ad  infinitum  in  nature.  Thus  not  only 
souls,  but  also  animals,  are  ingenerable  and  imperishable : they 
are  only  developed,  enveloped,  reclothed,  unclothed,  transformed: 
souls  never  quit  their  entire  body  and  do  not  pass  from  one  body 
into  another  which  is  entirely  new  to  them.  There  is  therefore 
no  metempsychosis,  but  there  is  metamorphosis ; animals  change, 
take  and  leave  only  parts : the  same  thing  which  happens  little 


PRINCIPLES  OE  NATURE  AND  OF  GRACE. 


303 


by  little  and  by  small  invisible  particles,  but  continually,  in  nutri- 
tion ; and  suddenly,  visibly,  but  rarely,  in  conception  or  in  death, 
which  cause  a gain  or  loss  of  much  at  one  time. 

7.  Thus  far  we  have  spoken  as  simple  physicists:  now  we  must 
advance  to  metaphysics,  making  use  of  the  great  principle,  little 
employed  in  general,  which  teaches  that  nothing  happens  without 
a sufficient  reason;  that  is  to  say,  that  nothing  happens  without 
its  being  possible  for  him  who  should  sufficiently  understand 
things,  to  give  a reason  sufficient  to  determine  why  it  is  so  and 
not  otherwise.  This  principle  laid  down,  the  first  question  which 
should  rightly  be  asked,  will  be,  Why  is  there  something  rather 
than  nothing?  For  nothing  is  simpler  and  easier  than  something. 
Further,  suppose  that  things  must  exist,  we  must  be  able  to  give 
a reason  why  they  must  exist  so  and  not  otherwise. 

8.  Fow  this  sufficient  reason  for  the  existence  of  the  universe 
cannot  be  found  in  the  series  of  contingent  things,  that  is,  of 
bodies  and  of  their  representations  in  souls ; for  matter  being 
indifferent  in  itself  to  motion  and  to  rest,  and  to  this  or  another 
motion,  we  cannot  find  the  reason  of  motion  in  it,  and  still  less 
of  a certain  motion.  And  although  the  present  motion  which  is 
in  matter,  comes  from  the  preceding  motion,  and  that  from  still 
another  preceding,  yet  in  this  way  we  make  no  progress,  go  as  far 
as  we  may ; for  the  same  question  always  remains.  Thus  it  must 
be  that  the  sufficient  reason,  which  has  no  need  of  another  reason, 
be  outside  this  series  of  contingent  things  and  be  found  in  a sub- 
stance which  is  its  cause,  or  which  is  a necessary  being,  carrying 
the  reason  of  its  existence  within  itself ; otherwise  we  should  still 
not  have  a sufficient  reason  in  which  we  could  rest.  And  this 
final  reason  of  things  is  called  God. 

9.  This  primitive  simple  substance  must  contain  in  itself  emi- 
nently the  perfections  contained  in  the  derivative  substances  which 
are  its  effects ; thus  it  wrill  have  perfect  power,  knowledge  and  will : 
that  is,  it  will  have  supreme  omnipotence,  omniscience  and  good- 
ness. And  as  justice,  taken  very  generally,  is  only  goodness  con- 
formed to  wisdom,  there  must  too  be  supreme  justice  in  God.  The 
reason  which  has  caused  things  to  exist  by  him,  makes  them  still 
dependent  upon  him  in  existing  and  in  working:  and  they  con- 


304 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


tinually  receive  from  him  that  which  gives  them  any  perfection; 
hut  the  imperfection  which  remains  in  them,  comes  from  the 
essential  and  original  limitation  of  the  creature. 

10.  It  follows  from  the  supreme  perfection  of  God,  that  in 
creating  the  universe  he  has  chosen  the  best  possible  plan,  in  which 
there  is  the  greatest  variety  together  with  the  greatest  order ; the 
best  arranged  ground,  place,  time;  the  most  results  produced  in 
the  most  simple  ways;  the  most  of  power,  knowledge,  happiness 
and  goodness  in  the  creatures  that  the  universe  could  permit.  For 
since  all  the  possibles  in  the  understanding  of  God  laid  claim  to 
existence  in  proportion  to  their  perfections,  the  result  of  all  these 
claims  must  be  the  most  perfect  actual  world  that  is  possible.  And 
without  this  it  would  not  be  possible  to  give  a reason  why  things 
have  turned  out  so  rather  than  otherwise. 

11.  The  supreme  wisdom  of  God  led  him  to  choose  the  laws  of 
motion  best  adjusted  and  most  suited  to  abstract  or  metaphysical 
reasons.  There  is  preserved  the  same  quantity  of  total  and 
absolute  force,  or  of  action  ; the  same  quantity  of  respective  force  or 
of  reaction;  lastly  the  same  quantity  of  directive  force.  Farther, 
action  is  always  equal  to  reaction,  and  the  whole  effect  is  always 
equivalent  to  its  full  cause.  And  it  is  not  surprising  that  we  could 
not  by  the  mere  consideration  of  the  efficient  causes  or  of  matter, 
account  for  those  laws  of  motion  which  have  been  discovered  in 
our  time,  and  a part  of  which  have  been  discovered  by  myself. 
For  I have  found  that  it  was  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  final 
causes,  and  that  these  laws  do  not  depend  upon  the  'principle  of 
necessity,  like  logical,  arithmetical  and  geometrical  truths,  but 
upon  the  principle  of  fitness,  that  is,  upon  the  choice  of  wisdom. 
And  this  is  one  of  the  most  effective  and  evident  proofs  of  the 
existence  of  God,  to  those  who  can  examine  these  matters 
thoroughly. 

1 2.  It  follows,  farther,  from  the  perfection  of  the  supreme 
author,  that  not  only  is  the  order  of  the  entire  universe  the  most 
perfect  possible,  but  also  that  each  living  mirror  representing  the 
universe  in  accordance  with  its  point  of  view,  that  is  to  say,  that 
each  monad,  each  substantial  centre,  must  have  its  perceptions  and 
its  desires  as  well  regulated  as  is  compatible  with  all  the  rest. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURE  AND  OF  GRACE. 


305 


Whence  it  follows,  still  farther,  that  souls,  that  is,  the  most  domi- 
nating monads,  or  rather,  animals  themselves,  cannot  fail  to 
awaken  from  the  state  of  stupor  in  which  death  or  some  other 
accident  may  put  them. 

13.  For  all  is  regulated  in  things,  once  for  all,  with  as  much 
order  and  harmony  as  is  possible,  supreme  wisdom  and  goodness 
not  being  able  to  act  except  with  perfect  harmony.  The  present 
is  big  with  the  future,  the  future  could  be  read  in  the  past,  the 
distant  is  expressed  in  the  near.  One  could  become  acquainted 
with  the  beauty  of  the  universe  in  each  soul,  if  one  could  unfold 
all  its  folds,  which  only  develop  perceptibly  in  time.  But  as  each 
distinct  perception  of  the  soul  includes  innumerable  confused  per- 
ceptions, which  embrace  the  whole  universe,  the  soul  itself  knows 
the  things  of  which  it  has  perception  only  so  far  as  it  has  distinct 
and  clear  perceptions  of  them ; and  it  has  perfection  in  proportion 
to  its  distinct  perceptions.  Each  soul  knows  the  infinite,  knows  all, 
but  confusedly  ; as  in  walking  on  the  sea-shore  and  hearing  the 
great  noise  which  it  makes,  I hear  the  particular  sounds  of  each 
wave,  of  which  the  total  sound  is  composed,  but  without  distin- 
guishing them.  Our  confused  perceptions  are  the  result  of  the 
impressions  which  the  whole  universe  makes  upon  us.  It  is  the 
same  with  each  monad.  God  alone  has  a distinct  knowledge  of 
all,  for  he  is  the  source  of  all.  It  has  been  well  said  that  he  is  as 
centre  everywhere,  but  his  circumference  is  nowhere,  since  every- 
thing is  immediately  present  to  him  without  any  distance  from 
this  centre. 

14.  As  regards  the  rational  soul,  or  spirit,  there  is  something  in 
it  more  than  in  the  monads,  or  even  in  simple  souls.  It  is  not  only 
a mirror  of  the  universe  of  creatures,  but  also  an  image  of  the 
Divinity.  The  spirit  has  not  only  a perception  of  the  works  of 
God,  but  it  is  even  capable  of  producing  something  which  resem- 
bles them,  although  in  miniature.  For,  to  say  nothing  of  the  mar- 
vels of  dreams,  in  which  we  invent  without  trouble  (but  also  invol- 
untarily) things  which,  when  awake,  we  should  have  to  think  a 
long  time  in  order  to  hit  upon,  our  soul  is  architectonic  also  in  its 
voluntary  actions,  and,  discovering  the  sciences  according  to  which 
God  has  regulated  things  ( pondere , mensura,  numero,  etc.),  it 

20 


306 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


imitates,  in  its  department  and  in  its  little  world,  where  it  is  per- 
mitted to  exercise  itself,  what  God  does  in  the  large  world. 

15.  This  is  why  all  spirits,  whether  of  men  or  of  genii,  entering 
by  virtue  of  reason  and  of  eternal  truths  into  a sort  of  society 
with  God,  are  members  of  the  City  of  God,  that  is  to  say,  of  the 
most  perfect  state,  formed  and  governed  by  the  greatest  and  best 
of  monarchs ; where  there  is  no  crime  without  punishment,  no 
good  actions  without  proportionate  recompense;  and,  finally,  as 
much  virtue  and  happiness  as  is  possible ; and  this  is  not  by  a 
derangement  of  nature,  as  if  what  God  prepares  for  souls  disturbed 
the  laws  of  bodies,  but  by  the  very  order  of  natural  things,  in 
virtue  of  the  harmony  preestablished  for  all  time  between  the 
realms  of  nature  and  of  grace , between  God  as  Architect  and  God 
as  Monarch ; so  that  nature  itself  leads  to  grace,  and  grace,  in 
making  use  of  nature,  perfects  it. 

16.  Thus  although  reason  cannot  teach  us  the  details,  reserved  to 
Revelation,  of  the  great  future,  we  can  be  assured  by  this  same 
reason  that  things  are  made  in  a manner  surpassing  our  desires. 
God  also  being  the  most  perfect  and  most  happy,  and  consequently, 
the  most  lovable  of  substances,  and  truly  pure  love  consisting  in 
the  state  which  finds  pleasure  in  the  perfections  and  happiness  of 
the  loved  object,  this  love  ought  to  give  us  the  greatest  pleasure  of 
which  we  are  capable,  when  God  is  its  object. 

17.  And  it  is  easy  to  love  him  as  we  ought,  if  we  know  him  as 
I have  just  described.  For  although  God  is  not  visible  to  our 
external  senses,  he  does  not  cease  to  he  very  lovable  and  to  give 
very  great  pleasure.  We  see  how  much  pleasure  honors  give  men, 
although  they  do  not  at  all  consist  in  the  qualities  of  the  external 
senses.  Martyrs  and  fanatics  (although  the  emotion  of  the  latter 
is  ill- regulated),  show  what  pleasure  of  the  spirit  can  accomplish; 
and,  what  is  more,  even  sensuous  pleasures  are  really  confusedly 
known  intellectual  pleasures.  Music  charms  us,  although  its  beauty 
only  consists  in  the  harmonies  of  numbers  and  in  the  reckoning 
of  t he  beats  or  vibrations  of  sounding  bodies,  which  meet  at  certain 
intervals,  reckonings  of  which  we  are  not  conscious  and  which 
the  soul  nevertheless  does  make.  The  pleasures  which  sight  finds 
in  proportions  are  of  the  same  nature  ; and  those  caused  by  the 


PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURE  AND  OF  GRACE. 


307 


other  senses  amount  to  almost  the  same  thing,  although  we  may  not 
be  able  to  explain  it  so  distinctly. 

18.  It  may  even  he  said  that  from  the  present  time  on,  the  love 
of  God  makes  us  enjoy  a foretaste  of  future  felicity.  And  although 
it  is  disinterested,  it  itself  constitutes  our  greatest  good  and  interest 
even  if  we  should  not  seek  these  therein  and  should  consider  only 
the  pleasure  which  it  gives,  without  regard  to  the  utility  it  pro- 
duces ; for  it  gives  us  perfect  confidence  in  the  goodness  of  our 
author  and  master,  producing  a true  tranquillity  of  mind ; not  as 
with  the  Stoics  who  force  themselves  to  patience,  but  by  a present 
content  which  assures  to  us  also  a future  happiness.  And  besides 
the  present  pleasure,  nothing  can  be  more  useful  for  the  future; 
for  the  love  of  God  fulfills  also  our  hopes,  and  leads  us  in  the  road 
of  supreme  happiness,  because  by  virtue  of  the  perfect  order  estab- 
lished in  the  universe,  everything  is  done  in  the  best  possible  way, 
as  much  for  the  general  good  as  for  the  greatest  individual  good 
of  those  who  are  convinced  of  this  and  are  content  with  the  divine 
government ; this  conviction  cannot  be  wanting  to  those  who  know 
how  to  love  the  source  of  all  good.  It  is  true  that  supreme  felicity, 
by  whatever  beatific  vision  or  knowledge  of  God  it  be  accompanied, 
can  never  be  full ; because,  since  God  is  infinite,  he  cannot  be 
wholly  known.  Therefore  our  happiness  will  never,  and  ought 
not,  consist  in  full  joy,  where  there  would  be  nothing  farther  to 
desire,  rendering  our  mind  stupid ; hut  in  a perpetual  progress 
to  new  pleasures  and  to  new  perfections. 


XXXV. 


The  Monadology.  1714. 

[From  tlie  French.] 

1.  Ti-ie  monad  of  wliicli  we  shall  here  speak  is  merely  a simple 
substance,  which  enters  into  compounds ; simple,  that  is  to  say, 
without  parts.* 

2.  And  there  must  be  simple  substances,  since  there  are  com- 
pounds; for  the  compound  is  only  a collection  or  aggregation  of 
simple  substances. 

3.  Xow  where  there  are  no  parts,  neither  extension,  nor  figure, 
nor  divisibility  is  possible.  And  these  monads  are  the  true  atoms 
of  nature,  and,  in  a word,  the  elements  of  all  things. 

4.  Their  dissolution  also  is  not  at  all  to  be  feared,  and  there  is 
no  conceivable  way  in  which  a simple  substance  can  perish 
naturally,  f 

5.  For  the  same  reason  there  is  no  conceivable  way  in  which 
a simple  substance  can  begin  naturally,  since  it  cannot  be  formed 
by  composition. 

6.  Thus  it  may  he  said  that  the  monads  can  only  begin  or  end 
all  at  once,  that  is  to  say,  they  can  only  begin  by  creation  and  end 
by  annihilation ; whereas  that  which  is  compound  begins  or  ends 
by  parts. 

7.  There  is  also  no  way  of  explaining  how  a monad  can  be 
altered  or  changed  in  its  inner  being  by  any  other  creature,  for 
nothing  can  be  transposed  within  it,  nor  can  there  be  conceived  in 
it  any  internal  movement  which  can  be  excited,  directed,  aug- 
mented or  diminished  within  it,  as  can  be  done  in  compounds, 
where  there  is  change  among  the  parts.  The  monads  have  no 
windows  through  which  anything  can  enter  or  depart.  The 
accidents  cannot  detach  themselves  nor  go  forth  from  the  sub- 
stances, as  did  formeidy  the  sensible  species  of  the  Schoolmen. 
Thus  neither  substance  nor  accident  can  enter  a monad  from 
wi  thout. 

* Theodicee,  § 10. 


f § 89. 


THE  MOHADOEOGY. 


309 


S.  Nevertheless,  the  monads  must  have  some  qualities,  otherwise 
they  would  not  even  be  entities.  And  if  simple  substances  did  not 
differ  at  all  in  their  qualities  there  would  he  no  way  of  perceiving 
any  change  in  things,  since  what  is  in  the  compound  can  only 
come  from  the  simple  ingredients,  and  the  monads,  if  they  had  no 
qualities,  would  be  indistinguishable  from  one  another,  seeing  also 
they  do  not  differ  in  quantity.  Consequently,  a plenum  being- 
supposed,  each  place  would  always  receive,  in  any  motion,  only 
the  equivalent  of  what  it  had  had  before,  and  one  state  of  things 
would  be  indistinguishable  from  another. 

9.  It  is  necessary,  indeed,  that  each  monad  be  different  from 
every  other.  For  there  are  never  in  nature  two  beings  which  are 
exactly  alike  and  in  which  it  is  not  possible  to  find  an  internal 
difference,  or  one  founded  upon  an  intrinsic  quality. 

10.  I take  it  also  for  granted  that  every  created  being,  and  con- 
sequently the  created  monad  also,  is  subject  to  change,  and  even 
that  this  change  is  continual  in  each. 

11.  It  follows  from  what  has  just  been  said,  that  the  natural 
changes  of  the  monads  proceed  from  an  internal  principle,  since 
an  external  cause  could  not  influence  their  interior.* 

12.  But,  besides  the  principle  of  change,  there  must  be  a detail 
of  changes , which  forms,  so  to  speak,  the  specification  and  variety 
of  the  simple  substances. 

13.  This  detail  must  involve  multitude  in  the  unity  or  in  that 
which  is  simple.  For  since  every  natural  change  takes  place  by 
degrees,  something  changes  and  something  remains ; and  conse- 
quently, there  must  be  in  the  simple  substance  a plurality  of  affec- 
tions and  of  relations,  although  it  has  no  parts. 

14.  The  passing  state,  which  involves  and  represents  multitude 
in  unity  or  in  the  simple  substance,  is  nothing  else  than  what 
is  called  perception,  which  must  be  distinguished  from  appercep- 
tion or  consciousness,  as  will  appear  in  what  follows.  Here  it  is 
that  the  Cartesians  especially  failed,  having  made  no  account  of 
the  perceptions  of  which  we  are  not  conscious.  It  is  this  also 
which  made  them  believe  that  spirits  only  are  monads  and  that 
there  are  no  souls  of  brutes  or  of  other  entelechies.  They,  with 

* §§  396  and  400. 


310 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


the  vulgar,  have  also  confounded  a long  state  of  unconsciousness 
[e tourdissem ent ] with  death  strictly  speaking,  and  have  therefore 
agreed  with  the  old  scholastic  prejudice  of  entirely  separate  souls, 
and  have  even  confirmed  ill-balanced  minds  in  the  belief  in  the 
mortality  of  the  soul. 

1.1.  The  action  of  the  internal  principle  which  causes  the  change 
or  the  passage  from  one  perception  to  another,  may  he  called  appeti- 
tion ; it  is  true  that  the  desire  cannot  always  completely  attain  to 
the  whole  perception  which  it  strives  for,  but  it  always  attains 
something  of  it  and  reaches  new  perceptions. 

16.  We  experience  in  ourselves  a multiplicity  in  a simple  sub- 
stance, when  we  find  that  the  most  trifling  thought  of  which  we  are 
conscious  involves  a variety  in  the  object.  Thus  all  those  who 
admit  that  the  soul  is  a simple  substance  ought  to  admit  this 
multiplicity  in  the  monad,  and  M.  Bayle  ought  not  to  have  found 
any  difficulty  in  it,  as  he  has  done  in  his  Dictionary,  article 
Rorarius. 

17.  We  must  confess,  moreover,  that  perception  and  that  which 
depends  on  it  are  inexplicable  by  mechanical  causes,  that,  is,  by 
figures  and  motions.  And,  supposing  that  there  were  a machine  so 
constructed  as  to  think,  feel  and  have  perception,  we  could  con- 
ceive of  it  as  enlarged  and  yet  preserving  the  same  proportions, 
so  that,  we  might  enter  it  like  a mill.  And  this  granted,  we  should 
only  find  oh  visiting  it,,  pieces  which  push  one  against  another,  but 
never  anything  by  which  to  explain  a perception.  This  must  be 
sought  for,  therefore,  in  the  simple  substance  and  not  in  the  com- 
pound or  in  a machine.  Furthermore,  nothing  but  this  (namely, 
perceptions  and  their  changes)  can  be  found  in  the  simple  sub- 
stance. It  is  also  in  this  alone  that  all  the  internal  activities  of 
simple  substances  can  consist.* 

18.  The  name  of  entelechies  might  be  giVen  to  all  simple  sub- 
stances or  created  monads,  for  they  have  within  themselves  a cer- 
tain perfection  (ex0U(TL  ~°  eVreXe? ) ; there  is  a certain  sufficiency 
( avTap/ceia  ) which  makes  them  the  sources  of  their  internal  activi- 
ties, and  so  to  speak,  incorporeal  automata,  f 

19.  If  we  choose  to  give  the  name  soul  to  everything  that  has 
perceptions  and  desires  in  the  general  sense  which  I have  just 

* Preface,  p.  37.  f § 87. 


TI-IE  MONADOLOGY. 


311 


explained,  oil  simple  substances  or  created  monads  may  be  called 
souls,  but  as  feeling  is  something  more  than  a simple  perception, 
I am  willing  that  the  general  name  of  monads  or  entelechies  shall 
suffice  for  those  simple  substances  which  have  only  perception, 
and  that  those  substances  only  shall  be  called  souls  whose  percep- 
tion is  more  distinct  and  is  accompanied  by  memory. 

20.  For  we  experience  in  ourselves  a state  in  which  we  remem- 
ber nothing  and  have  no  distinguishable  perception,  as  when  we 
fall  into  a swoon  or  when  we  are  overpowered  by  a profound  and 
dreamless  sleep.  In  this  state  the  soul  does  not  differ  sensibly 
from  a simple  monad ; but  as  this  state  is  not  continuous  and  as 
the  soul  frees  itself  from  it,  the  soul  is  something  more  than  a 
mere  monad.* 

21.  And  it  does  not  at  all  follow  that  in  such  a state  the  simple 
substance  is  without  any  percejrtion.  This  is  indeed  impossible, 
for  the  reasons  mentioned  above;  for  it  cannot  perish,  nor  can  it 
subsist  without  some  affection,  which  is  nothing  else  than  its  per- 
ception ; but  when  there  is  a great  number  of  minute  perceptions, 
in  which  nothing  is  distinct,  we  are  stunned ; as  when  we  turn  con- 
tinually in  the  same  direction  many  times  in  succession,  whence 
arises  a dizziness  which  may  make  us  swoon,  and  which  does  not 
let  us  distinguish  anything.  And  death  may  produce  for  a time 
this  condition  in  animals. 

22.  And  as  every  present  state  of  a simple  substance  is  naturally 
the  consequence  of  its  preceding  state,  so  its  present  is  big  with  its 
future.f 

23.  Therefore,  since  on  being  awakened  from  a stupor,  we  are 
aware  of  our  perceptions,  we  must  have  had  them  immediately 
before,  although  we  were  entirely  unconscious  of  them ; for  one 
perception  can  come  in  a natural  way  only  from  another  percep- 
tion, as  a motion  can  come  in  a natural  way  only  from  a motion.! 

24.  From  this  we  see  that  if  there  were  nothing  distinct, 
nothing,  so  to  speak,  in  relief  and  of  a higher  flavor,  in  our  percep- 
tions, we  should  always  be  in  a dazed  state.  This  is  the  condition 
of  the  naked  monads. 

25.  We  also  see  that  nature  has  given  to  animals  heightened 
perceptions,  by  the  pains  she  has  taken  to  furnish  them  with  organs 

* § 64.  f § 360.  + §§  401  to  403. 


312 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


which  collect  many  rays  of  light  or  many  undulations  of  air,  in 
order  to  render  these  more  efficacious  by  their  union.  There  is 
something  of  the  same  kind  in  odor,  in  taste,  in  touch' and  perhaps 
in  a multitude  of  other  senses  which  are  unknown  to  us.  And  I 
shall  presently  explain  how  that  which  takes  place  in  the  soul 
represents  that  which  occurs  in  the  organs. 

26.  Memory  furnishes  souls  with  a sort  of  consecutiveness 
which  imitates  reason,  but  which  ought  to  be  distinguished  from 
it.  We  observe  that  animals,  having  the  perception  of  something 
which  strikes  them  and  of  which  they  have  had  a similar  percep- 
tion before,  expect,  through  the  representations  of  their  memory, 
that  which  Avas  associated  with  it  in  the  preceding  perception,  and 
experience  feelings  similar  to  those  which  they  had  had  at  that 
time.  For  instance,  if  we  show  dogs  a stick,  they  remember  the 
pain  it  has  caused  them  and  whine  and  run.* 

27.  And  the  strong  imagination  which  impresses  and  moves 
them,  arises  either  from  the  magnitude  or  the  multitude  of  preced- 
ing perceptions.  For  often  a strong  impression  produces  all  at 
once  the  effect  of  a long-continued  habit,  or  of  many  oft-repeated 
moderate  perceptions. 

28.  Men  act  like  the  brutes,  in  so  far  as  the  consecutiveness 
of  their  perceptions  results  from  the  principle  of  memory 
alone,  resembling  the  empirical  physicians  who  practice  without 
theory ; and  we  are  simple  empirics  in  three-fourths  of  our  actions. 
For  example,  when  Ave  expect  that  there  will  be  daylight 
to-morrow,  we  are  acting  as  empirics,  because  that  has  up  to  this 
time  always  taken  place.  It  is  only  the  astronomer  who  judges  of 
this  by  reason. 

29.  But  the  knowledge  of  necessary  and  eternal  truths  is  Avhat 
distinguishes  us  from  mere  animals  and  furnishes  us  with  reason 
and  the , sciences,  raising  us  to  a knowledge  of  ourselves  and  of 
God.  This  is  what  we  call  in  us  the  rational  soul  or  spirit. 

30.  It  is  also  by  the  knowledge  of  necessary  truths,  and  by  their 
abstractions,  that  we  rise  to  acts  of  reflection,  which  make  us  think 
of  that  which  calls  itself  “I,”  and  to  observe  that  this  or  that  is 
Avithin  vs:  and  it  is  thus  that,  in  thinking  of  ourselves,  we  think  of 
being,  of  substance,  simple  or  compound,  of  the  immaterial  and  of 


THE  MOHADOLOGY. 


313 


God  himself,  conceiving  that  what  is  limited  in  ns  is  in  him  with- 
out limits.  And  these  reflective  acts  furnish  the  principal  objects 
of  our  reasonings.* 

31.  Our  reasonings  are  founded  on  two  great  principles,  that  of 
contradiction , in  virtue  of  which  we  judge  that  to  be  false  which 
involves  contradiction,  and  that  true,  which  is  opposed  or  contra- 
dictory to  the  false,  f 

32.  And  that  of  sufficient  reason,  in  virtue  of  which  we  hold 
that  no  fact  can  be  real  or  existent,  no  statement  true,  unless  there 
be  a sufficient  reason  why  it  is  so  and  not  otherwise,  although 
most  often  these  reasons  cannot  be  known  to  us.  J 

33.  There  are  also  two  kinds  of  truths,  those  of  reasoning  and 
those  of  fact.  Truths  of  reasoning  are  necessary  and  their  oppo- 
site is  impossible,  and  those  of  fact  are  contingent  and  their  oppo- 
site is  possible.  Alien  a truth  is  necessary  its  reason  can  be  found 
by  analysis,  resolving  it  into  more  simple  ideas  and  truths  until  we 
reach  those  which  are  primitive.  || 

31.  It  is  thus  that  mathematicians  by  analysis  reduce  specula- 
tive theorems  and  practical  canons  to  definitions,  axioms  and 
postulates. 

35.  And  there  are  finally  simple  ideas,  definitions  of  which  can- 
not be  given;  there  are  also  axioms  and  postulates,  in  a word, 
primary  principles,  which  cannot  be  proved,  and  indeed  need  no 
proof ; and  these  are  identical  propositions,  whose  opposite 
involves  an  express  contradiction. 

36.  But  there  must  also  be  a sufficient  reason  for  contingent 
truths,  or  those  of  fact, — that  is,  for  the  sequence  of  things  diffused 
through  the  universe  of  created  objects — where  the  resolution  into 
particular  reasons  might  run  into  a detail  without  limits,  on 
account  of  the  immense  variety  of  the  things  in  nature  and  the 
division  of  bodies  ad  infinitum.  There  is  an  infinity  of  figures  and 
of  movements,  present  and  past,  which  enter  into  the  efficient  cause 
of  my  present  writing,  and  there  is  an  infinity  of  slight  inclinations 
and  dispositions,  past  and  present,  of  my  soul,  which  enter  into 
the  final  cause.]} 

* Pref.,  p.  27.  + §§  44,  169.  t §§  44,  196. 

1 §§  ItO,  174,  189,  280-282,  367,  Abridgment,  Objection  3. 

1[  §§  36,  37,  44,  45,  49,  52,  121,  122,  337,  340,  344. 


314 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBKITZ. 


37.  And  as  all  this  detail  only  involves  other  contingents,  ante- 
rior or  more  detailed,  each  one  of  which  needs  a like  analysis  for 
its  explanation,  we  make  no  advance : and  the  sufficient  or  final 
reason  must  he  outside  of  the  sequence  or  series  of  this  detail  of 
contingencies,  however  infinite  it  may  be. 

38.  And  thus  it  is  that  the  final  reason  of  things  must  be  found 
in  a necessary  substance,  in  which  the  detail  of  changes  exists  only 
eminently,  as  in  their  source ; and  this  is  what  we  call  God.* 

39.  ISTow  this  substance,  being  a sufficient  reason  of  all  this 
detail,  which  also  is  linked  together  throughout,  there  is  hut  one 
God,  and  this  God  is  sufficient. 

40.  We  may  also  conclude  that  this  supreme  substance,  which  is 
unique,  universal  and  necessary,  having  nothing  outside  of  itself 
which  is  independent  of  it,  and  being  a pure  sequence  of  possible 
being,  must  he  incapable  of  limitations  and  must-contain  as  much 
of  reality  as  is  possible. 

41.  Whence  it  follows  that  God  is  absolutely  perfect,  perfection 
being  only  the  magnitude  of  positive  reality  taken  in  its  strictest 
meaning,  setting  aside  the  limits  or  bounds  in  things  which  have 
them.  And  where  there  are  no  limits,  that  is,  in  God,  perfection 
is  absolutely  infinite. f 

42.  It  follows  also  that  the  creatures  have  their  perfections  from 
the  influence  of  God,  but  that  their  imperfections  arise  from  their 
own  nature,  incapable  of  existing  without  limits.  For  it  is  by  this 
that  they  are  distinguished  from  God.t 

43.  It  is  also  true  that  in  God  is  the  source  not  only  of  existences 
but  also  of  essences,  so  far  as  they  are  real,  or  of  that  which  is  real 
in  the  possible.  This  is  because  the  understanding  of  God  is  the 
region  of  eternal  truths,  or  of  the  ideas  on  which  they  depend,  and 
because,  without  him,  there  would  be  nothing  real  in  the  possibili- 
ties, and  not  only  nothing  existing  but  also  nothing  possible.  || 

44.  For,  if  there  is  a reality  in  essences  or  possibilities  or  indeed 
in  the  eternal  truths,  this  reality  must  be  founded  in  something- 
existing  and  actual,  and  consequently  in  the  existence  of  the 

* § 7.  f § 22  ; Preface,  p.  27. 

t §§  20,  27-31,  153,  107,  377  seqq.  [In  the  first  copy,  revised  by  Leibnitz,  the 
following  is  added:  “This  original  imperfection  of  creatures  is  noticeable  in  the 

natural  inertia  of  bodies.  §§  30,  380;  Abridgment,  Objection  5.’’] 

II  § 20. 


THE  JIOXADOLOGT. 


315 


necessary  being,  in  whom  essence  involves  existence,  or  with  whom 
it  is  sufficient  to  he  possible  in  order  to  be  actual.* 

45.  Hence  God  alone  (or  the  necessaiw  being)  has  this  preroga- 
tive, that  he  must  exist  if  he  is  possible.  And  since  nothing  can 
hinder  the  possibility  of  that  which  possesses  no  limitations,  no 
negation,  and,  consequently,  no  contradiction,  this  alone  is  suffi- 
cient to  establish  the  existence  of  God  a priori.  We  have  also 
proved  it  by  the  reality  of  the  eternal  truths.  But  we  have  a little 
while  ago  [§§  36-39],  proved  it  also  a posteriori,  since  contingent 
beings  exist,  which  can  only  have  their  final  or  sufficient  reason 
in  a necessary  being  who  has  the  reason  of  his  existence  in  himself. 

46.  Yet  we  must  not  imagine,  as  some  do,  that  the  eternal 
truths,  being  dependent  upon  God,  are  arbitrary  and  depend  upon 
his  will,  as  Descartes  seems  to  have  held,  and  afterwards  M. 
Poiret.  This  is  true  only  of  contingent  truths,  the  principle  of 
which  is  fitness  or  the  choice  of  the  best,  whereas  necessary  truths 
depend  solely  on  his  understanding  and  are  its  internal  object. f 

47.  Thus  God  alone  is  the  primitive  unity  or  the  original  simple 
substance;  of  which  all  created  or  derived  monads  ai’e  the  prod- 
ucts, and  are  generated,  so  to  speak,  by  continual  figurations 
of  the  Divinity,  from  moment  to  moment,  limited  by  the  receptiv- 
ity of  the  creature,  to  whom  limitation  is  essential,  t 

48.  In  God  is  Power,  which  is  the  source  of  all ; then  Knowl- 
edge, which  contains  the  detail  of  ideas ; and  finally  Will,  which 
effects  changes  or  products  according  to  the  principle  of  the  best. 
These  correspond  to  xvhat  in  created  monads  form  the  subject  or 
basis,  the  perceptive  faculty,  and  the  appetitive  faculty.  But  in 
God  these  attributes  are  absolutely  infinite  or  perfect ; and  in  the 
created  monads  or  in  the  entelechies  (or  perfectihabies,  as  Harmo- 
laus  Barbaras  translated  the  word),  they  are  only  imitations  pro- 
portioned to  the  perfection  of  the  monads.  || 

49.  The  creature  is  said  to  act  externally  in  so  far  as  it  has 
perfection,  and  to  suffer  from  another  in  so  far  as  it  is  imperfect. 
Thus  action  is  attributed  to  the  monad  in  so  far  as  it  has  distinct 
perceptions,  and  passivity  [ passion ] in  so  far  as  it  has  confused 
perceptions.]) 

* §§  184,  189,  335.  t §§  180,  184,  185,  335,  351,  380. 

X §§  382-391,  398,  395.  ||  §§  7,  149,  150.  87. 

IT  §§  22,  66,  386. 


316  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OK  LEIBHITZ. 

50.  And  on©  creature  is  more  perfect  than  another,  in  this 
that  there  is  found  in  it  that  which  serves  to  account  a priori  for 
what  takes  place  in  the  other,  and  it  is  in  this  way  that  it  is  said 
to  act  upon  the  other. 

51.  But  in  simple  substances  the  influence  of  one  monad  upon 
another  is  purely  ideal  and  it  can  have  its  effect  only  through  the 
intervention  of  God,  inasmuch  as  in  the  ideas  of  God  a monad 
may  demand  with  reason  that  God  in  regulating  the  others  from 
the  commencement  of  things,  have  regard  to  it.  For  since  a created 
monad  can  have  no  physical  influence  upon  the  interior  of  another, 
it  is  only  in  this  way  that  one  can  be  dependent  upon  another.'" 

52.  And  hence  it  is  that  the  actions  and  passions  of  creatures  are 
mutual.  For  God,  in  comparing  two  simple  substances,  finds  in 
each  one  reasons  which  compel  him  to  adjust  the  other  to  it,  and 
consequently  that  which  in  certain  respects  is  active,  is  according 
to  another  point  of  view,  passive;  active  in  so  far  as  that  what  is 
known  distinctly  in  it,  serves  to  account  for  that  which  takes  place 
in  another  ; and  passive  in  so  far  as  the  reason  for  what  takes  place 
in  it,  is  found  in  that  which  is  distinctly  known  in  another. f 

53.  ISTow,  as  there  is  an  infinity  of  possible  universes  in  the  ideas 
of  God,  and  as  only  one  of  them  can  exist,  there  must  be  a sufficient 
reason  for  the  choice  of  God,  which  determines  him  to  select  one 
rather  than  another,  t 

54.  And  this  reason  can  only  be  found  in  the  fitness,  or  in  the 
degrees  of  perfection,  which  these  worlds  contain,  each  possible 
world  having  a right  to  claim  existence  according  to  the  measure 
of  perfection  which  it  possesses.  || 

55.  And  this  is  the  cause  of  the  existence  of  the  Best;  namely, 
that  his  wisdom  makes  it  known  to  God,  his  goodness  makes  him 
choose  it,  and  his  power  makes  him  produce  it.ff 

56.  ISTow  this  connection,  or  this  adaptation,  of  all  created  things 
to  each  and  of  each  to  all,  brings  it  about  that  each  simple  sub- 

* §§  9,  54,  65,  66,  201;  Abridgment,  Objection  3. 

f § 66.  \ §§  8,  10,  44,  173,  196  seqq.,  225,  414-416. 

| §§  74,  167,  350,  201,  130,  352,  345  seqq.,  354.  [In  the  first  copy  revised  by 
Leibnitz  the  following  is  found  added  here:  “Thus  there  is  nothing  abso- 

lutely arbitrary.”] 

T[  §§  8,  78,’ 80,  84,  119,  204,  206,  208  ; Abridgment,  Objections  1 and  8. 


THE  MONAPOLOGY. 


317 


stance  lias  relations  which  express  all  the  others,  and  that,  conse- 
quently, it  is  a perpetual  living  mirror  of  the  universe.* 

57.  And  as  the  same  city  regarded  from  different  sides  appears 
entirely  different,  and  is  as  if  multiplied  perspectively ; so  also  it 
happens  that,  because  of  the  infinite  multitude  of  simple  sub- 
stances, there  are  as  it  were  so  many  different  universes,  which  are 
nevertheless  only  the  perspectives  of  a single  one,  according  to  the 
different  points  of  view  of  each  monad,  f 

58.  And  this  is  the  way  to  obtain  as  great  a variety  as  possible, 
but  with  the  greatest  possible  order ; that  is,  it  is  the  way  to  obtain 
as  much  perfection  as  possible,  t 

59.  Moreover,  this  hypothesis  (which  I dare  to  call  demon- 
strated) is  the  only  one  which  brings  into  relief  the  grandeur  of 
God.  M.  Bayle  recognized  this,  when  in  his  Dictionary  (Art. 
Eorarius ) he  raised  objections  to  it;  in  which  indeed  he  was  dis- 
posed to  think  that  I attributed  too  much  to  God  and  more  than 
is  possible.  But  he  can  state  no  reason  why  this  universal  har- 
mony, which  brings  it  about  that  each  substance  expresses  exactly 
all  the  others  through  the  relations  which  it  sustains  to  them,  is 
impossible. 

60.  Besides,  we  can  see,  in  what  I have  just  said,  the  a priori 
reasons  why  things  could  not  be  otherwise  than  they  are.  Because 
God,  in  regulating  all,  has  had  regard  to  each  part,  and  particularly 
to  each  monad,  whose  nature  being  representative,  nothing  can 
limit  it  to  representing  only  a part  of  things ; although  it  may  be 
true  that  this  representation  is  but  confused  as  regards  the  detail  of 
the  whole  universe,  and  can  be  distinct  only  in  the  case  of  a small 
part  of  things,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  case  of  those  which  are  nearest 
or  greatest  in  relation  to  each  of  the  monads ; otherwise  each 
monad  would  he  a divinity.  It  is  not  in  the  object  but  only  in 
the  modification  of  the  knowledge  of  the  object,  that  monads  are 
limited.  They  all  tend  confusedly  toward  the  infinite,  toward 
the  whole ; but  they  are  limited  and  differentiated  by  the  degrees 
of  their  distinct  perceptions. 

61.  And  compound  substances  resemble  in  this  respect  simple 
substances.  Bor  since  the  world  is  a plenum , rendering  all  matter 

*§§  130,360.  \ § 147. 

$ §§  120,  124,  241  seqq. , 214,  243,  275. 


31 S 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


connected,  and  since  in  a plenum  every  motion  lias  some  effect  on 
distant  bodies  in  proportion  to  their  distance,  so  that  each  body  is 
affected  not  only  by  those  in  contact  with  it,  and  feels  in  some 
way  all  that  happens  to  them,  but  also  by  their  means  is  affected 
by  those  which  are  in  contact  with  the  former,  with  which  it 
itself  is  in  immediate  contact,  it  follows  that  this  intercommuni- 
cation extends  to  any  distance  whatever.  And  consequently,  each 
body  feels  all  that  passes  in  the  universe,  so  that  he  who  sees  all, 
could  read  in  each  that  which  passes  everywhere,  and  even  that 
which  has  been  or  shall  be,  discovering  in  the  present  that  which 
is  removed  in  time  as  well  as  in  space;  a-ufXTrvota  Trdvra , said 
Hippocrates.  But  a soul  can  read  in  itself  only  that  which  is  dis- 
tinctly represented  in  it.  It  cannot  develop  its  laws  all  at  once, 
for  they  reach  into  the  infinite. 

62.  Thus,  although  each  created  monad  represents  the  entire 
universe,  it  represents  more  distinctly  the  body  which  is  particu- 
larly appropriated  to  it,  and  of  which  it  forms  the  entelechy; 
and  as  this  body  expresses  the  whole  universe  through  the  con- 
nection of  all  matter  in  a plenum,  the  soul  also  represents  the 
whole  universe  in  representing  this  body,  which  belongs  to  it  in 
a particular  way.* 

63.  The  body  belonging  to  a monad,  which  is  its  entelechy  or 
soul,  constitutes  together  with  the  entelechy  what  may  be  called 
a living  being,  and  together  with  the  soul  what  may  be  called 
an  animal.  How  this  body  of  a living  being  or  of  an  animal  is 
always  organic,  for  since  every  monad  is  in  its  way  a mirror  of 
the  universe,  and  since  the  universe  is  regulated  in  perfect  order, 
there  must  also  be  order  in  the  representative,  that  is,  in  the  per- 
ceptions  of  the  soul,  and  hence  in  the  body,  through  which  the 
universe  is  represented  in  the  soul.f 

64.  Thus  each  organic  body  of  a living  being  is  a kind  of  divine 
machine  or  natural  automaton,  which  infinitely  surpasses  all  artifi- 
cial automata.  Because  a machine  which  is  made  by  man’s  art 
is  not  a machine  in  each  one  of  its  parts;  for  example,  the  teeth 
of  a brass  wheel  have  parts  or  fragments  which  to  us  are  no  longer 
artificial  and  have  nothing  in  themselves  to  show  the  use  to  which 
the  wheel  was  destined  in  the  machine.  But  nature’s  machines, 

* § 400.  f § 403. 


THE  MOfffiJDOLOGY. 


319 


that  is,  living  bodies,  are  machines  even  in  their  smallest  parts 
ad  infinitum.  Herein  lies  the  difference  between  nature  and  art, 
that  is,  between  the  divine  art  and  ours. 

65.  And  the  author  of  nature  has  been  able  to  employ  this 
divine  and  infinitely  marvellous  artifice,  because  each  portion  of 
matter  is  not  only  divisible  ad  infinitum,  as  the  ancients  recog- 
nized, hut  also  each  part  is  actually  endlessly  subdivided  into  parts, 
of  which  each  has  some  motion  of  its  own : otherwise  it  would  be 
impossible  for  each  portion  of  matter  to  express  the  whole 
universe.* 

66.  Whence  we  see  that  there  is  a world  of  creatures,  of  living 
beings,  of  animals,  of  entelechies,  of  souls,  in  the  smallest  particle 
of  matter. 

67.  Each  portion  of  matter  may  be  conceived  of  as  a garden  full 
of  plants,  and  as  a pond  full  of  fishes.  But  each  branch  of  the 
plant,  each  member  of  the  animal,  each  drop  of  its  humors  is  also 
such  a garden  or  such  a pond. 

68.  And  although  the  earth  and  air  which  lies  between  the 
plants  of  the  garden,  or  the  water  between  the  fish  of  the  pond, 
is  neither  plant  nor  fish,  they  yet  contain  more  of  them,  but  for  the 
most  part  so  tiny  as  to  be  to  us  imperceptible. 

69.  Therefore  there  is  nothing  uncultivated,  nothing  sterile, 
nothing  dead  in  the  universe,  no  chaos,  no  confusion  except  in 
appearance ; somewhat  as  a pond  would  appear  from  a distance, 
in  which  we  might  see  the  confused  movement  and  swarming, 
so  to  speak,  of  the  fishes  in  the  pond,  without  discerning  the  fish 
themselves,  f 

70.  We  see  thus  that  each  living  body  has  a ruling  entelechy, 
which  in  the  animal  is  the  soul ; but  the  members  of  this  living 
body  are  full  of  other  living  beings,  plants,  animals,  each  of  which 
has  also  its  entelechy  or  governing  soul. 

71.  But  it  must  not  be  imagined,  as  has  been  done  by  some  peo- 
ple who  have  misunderstood  my  thought,  that  each  soul  has  a mass 
or  portion  of  matter  belonging  to  it  or  attached  to  it  forever,  and 
that  consequently  it  possesses  other  inferior  living  beings,  destined 
to  its  sendee  forever.  For  all  bodies  are,  like  rivers,  in  a per- 

* Prelim.,  § 70  ; Theod.,  § 195.  f Preface,  pp.  40,  41. 


I 


320  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

petual  flux,  and  parts  are  entering  into  them  and  departing  from 
them  continually. 

7 2.  Thus  the  soul  changes  its  body  only  gradually  and  by 
degrees,  so  that  it  is  never  deprived  of  all  its  organs  at  once. 
There  is  often  a metamorphosis  in  animals,  hut  never  metempsy- 
chosis nor  transmigration  of  souls.  There  are  also  no  entirely 
separate  souls,  nor  genii  without  bodies.  Gtod  alone  is  wholly  with- 
out body.* 

73.  For  which  reason  also,  it  happens  that  there  is,  strictly 
speaking,  neither  absolute  generation  nor  entire  death,  consisting 
in  the  separation  of  the  soul  from  the  body.  What  we  call  genera- 
tion is  development  or  growth,  as  what  we  call  death  is  envelop- 
ment and  diminution. 

74.  Philosophers  have  been  greatly  puzzled  over  the  origin  of 
forms,  entelechies,  or  souls ; but  to-day,  when  we  know  by  exact 
investigations  upon  plants,  insects  and  animals,  that  the  organic 
bodies  of  nature  are  never  products  of  chaos  or  putrefaction,  but 
always  come  from  seeds,  in  which  there  was  undoubtedly  some 
pre-formation,  it  has  been  thought  that  not  only  the  organic  body 
was  already  there  before  conception,  but  also  a soul  in  this  body, 
and,  in  a word,  the  animal  itself ; and  that  by  means  of  conception 
this  animal  has  merely  been  prepared  for  a great  transformation, 
in  order  to  become  an  animal  of  another  kind.  Something  similar 
is  seen  outside  of  generation,  as  when  worms  become  flies,  and 
caterpillars  become  butterflies.! 

75.  The  animals,  some  of  which  are  raised  by  conception  to  the 
grade  of  larger  animals,  may  be  called  spermatic ; but  those  among 
them,  which  remain  in  their  class,  that  is,  the  most  part,  are 
born,  multiply,  and  are  destroyed  like  the  larger  animals,  and  it 
is  only  a small  number  of  chosen  ones  which  pass  to  a larger 
theatre. 

76.  But  this  is  only  half  the  truth.  I have,  therefore,  held 
that  if  the  animal  never  commences  by  natural  means,  no  more 
does  it  end  by  natural  means ; and  that  not  only  will  there  be  no 
generation,  but  also  no  utter  destruction  or  death,  strictly  speaking. 

* Tlieocl.,  § 90,  124. 

f §§  86,  89,  90,  187,  188,  403,  397;  Preface,  p.  40,  seq. 


THE  MONADOEOGY. 


321 


xYnd  tliese  reasonings,  made  a posteriori  and  drawn  from  experi- 
ence, harmonize  perfectly  with  my  principles  deduced  a priori, 
as  above  [cf.  3,  4,  5].* 

77.  Thus  it  may  be  said  that  not  only  the  soul  (mirror  of  an 
indestructible  universe)  is  indestructible,  but  also  the  animal 
itself,  although  its  mechanism  often  perishes  in  part  and  takes  on 
or  puts  off  organic  coatings. 

78.  These  principles  have  given  me  the  means  of  explaining  nat- 
urally the  union  or  rather  the  conformity  of  the  soul  and  the 
organic  body.  The  soul  follows  its  own  peculiar  laws  and  the  body 
also  follows  its  own  laws,  and  they  agree  in  virtue  of  the  preestab- 
lished harmony  between  all  substances,  since  they  are  all  represen- 
tations of  one  and  the  same  universe. f 

. 79.  Souls  act  according  to  the  laws  of  final  causes,  by  appeti- 

tions,  ends  and  means.  Bodies  act  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of 
efficient  causes  or  of  motion.  And  the  two  realms,  that  of  effi- 
cient causes  and  that  of  final  causes,  are  in  harmony  with  each 
other. 

80.  Descartes  recognized  that  souls  cannot  impart  any  force  to 
bodies,  because  there  is  always  the  same  quantity  of  force  in 
matter.  Nevertheless  he  believed  that  the  soul  could  change  the 
direction  of  bodies.  But  this  was  because,  in  his  day,  the  law 
of  nature  which  affirms  also  the  conservation  of  the  same  total 
direction  in  matter,  was  not  known.  If  he  had  known  this,  he 
would  have  lighted  upon  my  system  of  preestablished  harmony.! 

81.  According  to  this  system,  bodies  act  as  if  (what  is  impossi- 
ble) there  were  no  souls,  and  that  souls  act  as  if  there  were  no 
bodies,  and  that  both  act  as  if  each  influenced  the  other. 

82.  As  to  spirits  or  rational  souls,  although  I find  that  the  same 
thing  which  I have  stated  (namely,  that  animals  and  souls  begin 
only  with  the  world  and  end  only  with  the  world)  holds  good  at 
bottom  with  regard  to  all  living  beings  and  animals,  yet  there  is 
this  peculiarity  in  rational  animals,  that  their  spermatic  animal- 
cules, as  long  as  they  remain  such,  have  only  ordinary  or  sensitive 
souls ; but  as  soon  as  those  which  are,  so  to  speak,  elected,  attain 

* § 90.  f Preface,  p.  36;  Theod.,  §§  340,  352,  353,  358. 

± Pref.,  p.  44;  Tlieod.,  §§  22,  59,  60,  61,  63,  66,  345,  346  seqq.,  354,  355. 

21 


322 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


bv  actual  conception  to  human  nature,  their  sensitive  souls  are 
elevated  to  the  rank  of  reason  and  to  the  perogative  of  spirits.* 

S3.  Among  other  differences  which  exist  between  ordinary  souls 
and  spirits,  some  of  which  I have  already  mentioned,  there  is  also, 
this,  that  souls  in  general  are  the  living  mirrors  or  images  of  the 
universe  of  creatures,  but  spirits  are  in  addition  images  of  the 
Divinity  itself,  or  of  the  author  of  nature,  able  to  know  the  system 
of  the  universe,  and  to  imitate  something  of  it  by  architectonic 
samples,  each  spirit  being  like  a little  divinity  in  its  own  depart- 
ment. f 

84.  Hence  it  is  that  spirits  are  capable  of  entering  into  a sort 
of  society  with  God,  and  that  he  is,  in  relation  to  them,  not  only 
what  an  inventor  is  to  his  machine  (as  God  is  in  relation  to  the 
other  creatures),  but  also  what  a prince  is  to  his  subjects,  and 
even  a father  to  his  children. 

85.  Whence  it  is  easy  to  conclude  that  the  assembly  of  all  spirits 
must  compose  the  City  of  God,  that  is,  the  most  perfect  state  which 
is  possible,  under  the  most  perfect  of  monarehs.  x 

86.  This  City  of  God,  this  truly  universal  monarchy,  is  a moral 
world  within  the  natural  world,  and  the  highest  and  most  divine  of 
the  works  of  God ; it  is  in  this  that  the  glory  of  God  truly  consists, 
for  he  would  have  none  if  his  greatness  and  goodness  were  not 
known  and  admired  by  spirits.  It  is,  too,  in  relation  to  this 
divine  city  that  he  properly  has  goodness ; whereas  his  wisdom 
and  his  power  are  everywhere  manifest. 

87.  As  we  have  above  established  a perfect  harmony  between 
two  natural  kingdoms,  the  one  of  efficient,  the  other  of  final  causes, 
we  should  also  notice  here  another  harmony  between  the  physical 
kingdom  of  nature  and  the  moral  kingdom  of  grace ; that  is, 
between  God  considered  as  the  architect  of  the  mechanism  of  the 
universe  and  God  considered  as  monarch  of  the  divine  city  of 
spirits.  1 1 

88.  This  harmony  makes  things  progress  toward  grace  by 
natural  methods.  This  globe,  for  example,  must  be  destroyed  and 
repaired  by  natural  means,  at  such  times  as  the  government  of 

* §§  91,  397.  f § 147.  J § 146;  Abridgment,  Objection  2. 

||  §§  62,  72,  118,  248,  112,  130,  247. 


THE  MOHADOEOGY. 


323 


spirits  may  demand  it,  for  the  punishment  of  some  and  the  reward 
of  others.* 

89.  It  may  be  said,  farther,  that  God  as  architect  satisfies  in 
every  respect  God  as  legislator,  and  that  therefore  sins,  by  the 
order  of  nature  and  in  virtue  even  of  the  mechanical  structure  of 
things,  must  carry  their  punishment  with  them ; and  that  in  the 
same  way,  good  actions  will  obtain  their  rewards  by  mechanical 
ways  through  their  relations  to  bodies,  although  this  cannot  and 
ought  not  always  happen  immediately. 

90.  Finally,  under  this  perfect  government,  there  will  he  no 
good  action  unrewarded,  no  bad  action  unpunished ; and  every- 
thing must  result  in  the  well-being  of  the  good,  that  is,  of  those 
who  are  not  disaffected  in  this  great  State,  Avho,  after  having 
done  their  duty,  trust  in  providence,  and  who  love  and  imitate,  as 
is  meet,  the  author  of  all  good,  pleasing  themselves  with  the  con- 
templation of  his  perfections,  according  to  the  nature  of  truly 
pure  love,  which  takes  pleasure  in  the  happiness  of  the  beloved. 
This  is  what  causes  wise  and  virtuous  persons  to  work  at  all  which 
seems  conformable  to  the  divine  will,  presumptive  or  antecedent, 
and  nevertheless  to  content  themselves  with  that  which  God  in 
reality  brings  to  pass  by  his  secret,  consequent  and  decisive  will, 
recognizing  that  if  we  could  sufficiently  comprehend  the  order 
of  the  universe,  we  should  find  that  it  surpasses  all  the  wishes  of 
the  wisest,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  render  it  better  than  it  is, 
not  only  for  all  in  general,  hut  also  for  ourselves  in  particular,  if 
we  are  attached,  as  we  should  be,  to  the  author  of  all,  not  only 
as  to  the  architect  and  efficient  cause  of  our  being,  but  also  as  to 
our  master  and  final  cause,  who  ought  to  be  the  whole  aim  of  our 
will,  and  who,  alone,  can  make  our  happiness. f 

* §§  IS  seqq.,  110,  244,  245,  340. 

f §§  134  fin.,  278;  Preface,  pp.  27,  28. 


XXXVI. 


On  the  Doctrine  of  Malebranche.  A Letter  to  M.  Remond 
de  Montmort,  containing  Remarks  on  the  Book  of  Father  Tertre 
against  Father  Malebranche.  1715. 

[From  the  French.] 

Sir,  I have  just  received  your  package,  and  I thank  you  for  the 
interesting  articles  which  you  have  sent  me.  I say  nothing  on  the 
continuation  of  Homer;  hut  as,  after  the  sacred  books,  he  is  the 
most  ancient  of  all  the  authors  whose  works  remain  to  us,  I wish 
that  some  one  would  undertake  to  clear  up  the  historical  and  geo- 
graphical difficulties  which  remote  antiquity  has  produced  in  these 
works,  and  principally  in  the  Odyssey,  relating  to  ancient  geog- 
raphy ; for,  however  fabulous  the  travels  of  Ulysses  may  be,  it  is 
nevertheless  certain  that  Ilomer  carried  him  into  countries  then 
spoken  of  but  which  it  is  difficult  now  to  recognize. 

I pass  to  the  philosophical  articles  which  relate  to  the  Reverend 
Father  Malebranche  (whose  loss  I greatly  regret),  and  which  tend 
to  elucidate  the  natural  theology  of  the  Chinese.  The  Refutation 
of  the  system  of  this  Father,  divided  into  three  small  volumes,  is 
without  doubt  from  a man  of  ability,  for  it  is  clear  and  ingenious. 
I even  approve  of  a part  of  it,  but  part  of  it  is  too  extreme.  Too 
much  divergence  is  here  shown  from  the  views  of  Descartes  and  of 
Father  Malebranche,  even  when  they  receive  a good  meaning.  It 
should  be  time  to  give  up  these  enmities,  which  the  Cartesians 
have  perhaps  drawn  upon  themselves  by  showing  too  much  con- 
tempt for  the  ancients  and  for  the  schoolmen,  in  whom  there  is 
nevertheless  solidity  meriting  our  attention.  Thus  justice  ought  to 
be  shown  on  both  sides,  and  we  are  to  profit  by  the  discoveries 
of  both,  as  it  is  right  to  reject  that  which  each  advances  without 
foundation. 

1.  It  is  right  to  refute  the  Cartesians  when  they  say  that  the 
soul  is  nothing  but  thought;  as  also  when  they  say  that  matter  is 
nothing  but  extension.  For  the  soul  is  a subject  or  concretum 
which  thinks,  and  matter  is  an  extended  subject  or  subject  endowed 


ON  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MALE B R AN C HE . 


325 


with  extension.  This  is  why  I hold  that  space  must  not  be  con- 
founded with  matter,  although  I agree  that  naturally  there  is  no 
void  space ; the  scholastics  are  right  in  distinguishing  the  concretes 
and  the  abstracts,  when  it  is  a matter  of  exactness. 

2.  I concede  to  the  Cartesians  that  the  soul  actually  always 
thinks,  but  I do  not  grant  that  it  is  conscious  of  all  these  thoughts. 
For  our  great  perceptions  and  our  great  appetites  of  which  we  are 
conscious,  are  composed  of  innumerable  little  perceptions  and  little 
inclinations  of  which  we  cannot  be  conscious.  And  it  is  in  the 
insensible  perceptions  that  the  reason  is  found  of  what  passes  in 
us ; as  the  reason  of  what  takes  place  in  sensible  bodies  consists  in 
insensible  movements. 

3.  There  is  good  reason  also  for  refuting  Reverend  Father 
Malebranche  especially  when  he  maintains  that  the  soul  is  purely 
passive.  I think  I have  demonstrated  that  every  substance  is 
active,  and  especially  the  soul.  This  is  also  the  idea  which  the 
ancients  and  the  moderns  have  had  of  it ; and  the  entelechy  of 
Aristotle,  which  has  made  so  much  noise,  is  nothing  else  but  force 
or  activity;  that  is,  a state  from  which  action  naturally  flows  if 
nothing  hinders  it.  But  matter,  'primary  and  pure,  taken  without 
the  souls  or  lives  which  are  united  to  it,  is  purely  passive;  prop- 
erly speaking  also  it  is  not  a substance,  but  something  incomplete. 
And  secondary  matter,  as  for  example,  body,  is  not  a substance, 
hut  for  another  reason ; which  is,  that  it  is  a collection  of  several 
substances,  like  a pond  full  of  fish,  or  a flock  of  sheep ; and  conse- 
quently it  is  what  is  called  unum  per  accidens,  in  a word,  a 
phenomenon.  A true  substance,  such  as  an  animal,  is  composed  of 
an  immaterial  soul,  and  an  organized  body;  and  it  is  the  com- 
pound of  these  two  which  is  called  unum  per  se. 

4.  As  to  the  efficiency  of  second  causes,  it  is  again  right  to  main- 
tain it  against  the  opinion  of  this  Father.  I have  demonstrated 
that  each  simple  substance,  or  monad  (such  as  souls),  follows  its 
own  laws  in  producing  its  actions,  without  being  capable  of  being 
troubled  therein  by  the  influence  of  another  created  simple  sub- 
stance ; and  that  thus  bodies  do  not  change  the  ethico-logical  laws 
of  souls,  any  more  than  souls  change  the  physico-mechanical  laws 
of  bodies.  This  is  why  second  causes  realty  act,  hut  without  any 


326 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


influence  of  one  created  simple  substance  upon  another ; and  souls 
harmonize  with  bodies  and  among  themselves,  in  virtue  of  the 
preestablished  harmony,  and  not  at  all  by  a mutual  physical  influ- 
ence ; except  in  the  case  of  the  metaphysical  union  of  the  soul  and 
its  body  which  makes  them  compose  unum  per  se,  an  animal,  a 
living  being.  It  has  been  right,  therefore,  to  refute  the  opinion  of 
those  who  deny  the  action  of  second  causes ; but  it  must  be  done 
without  renewing  false  influences,  such  as  the  species  of  the  school. 

5.  Father  Malebranche  made  use  of  this  argument:  That  exten- 
sion not  being  a mode  of  being  of  matter,  must  be  its  substance. 
The  author  of  the  Refutation  (Vol.  I,  p.  91),  distinguishes 
between  the  positive  modes  of  being;  and  he  claims  that  extension 
is  one  of  the  modes  of  being  of  the  second  sort,  which  he  thinks  can 
be  conceived  by  themselves.  But  these  are  not  positive  modes  of 
being;  they  all  consist  in  the  variety  of  limitations,  and  none  of 
them  can  be  conceived  save  by  the  being  of  which  they  are  the 
modes  and  ways.  And  as  to  extension  it  may  be  said  that  it  is 
not  a mode  of  being  of  matter,  and  nevertheless  is  not  a substance 
either.  What  is  it,  then?  you  will  ask,  sir.  I reply  that  it  is  an 
attribute  of  substances,  and  there  is  a clear  difference  between 
attributes  and  modes  of  being. 

6.  It  appears  to  me,  also,  that  the  author  of  the  Refutation  does 
not  combat  well  the  opinion  of  the  Cartesians  on  the  infinite, 
which  they  with  reason  consider  as  prior  to  the  finite,  and  of  which 
the  finite  is  but  a limitation.  He  says  (p.  303  of  Vol.  I),  that  if 
the  mind  had  a clear  and  direct  view  of  the  infinite,  Father  Male- 
branche would  not  have  had  need  of  so  much  reasoning  to  make  us 
think  of  it.  But  by  the  same  argument  he  would  reject  the  very 
simple  and  very  natural  knowledge  we  have  of  the  Divinity. 
These  kinds  of  objections  amount  to  nothing,  for  there  is  need  of 
labor  and  application  in  order  to  give  to  men  the  attention  neces- 
sary for  the  simplest  notions,  and  this  end  will  only  be  reached  by 
recalling  them  from  their  dissipation  to  themselves.  It  is  also  for 
this  reason  that  the  theologians  who  have  composed  works  on 
eternity,  have  much  need  of  discourse,  of  comparison  and  of 
examples  to  make  it  well  understood ; although  there  is  nothing 
more  simple  than  the  notion  of  eternity.  But  it  is  because,  in  such 


OX  THE  DOCTBINE  OF  MALEBEAWCHE. 


327 


matters,  all  depends  on  attention.  The  author  adds  (Vol.  I,  p. 
307),  that  in  the  pretended  knowledge  of  the  infinite,  the  mind 
sees  merely  that  lengths  may  he  put  end  to  end  and  repeated  as 
many  times  as  is  wished.  Very  good  ; but  this  author  should  con- 
sider that  to  know  this  repetition  can  always  be  made,  is  already  to 
know  the  infinite. 

7.  The  same  author  examines  in  his  second  volume  the  natural 
theology  of  Father  Malehranche;  but  his  performance  appears  to 
me  overdone,  although  he  declares  that  he  merely  presents  the 
doubts  of  others.  The  Father  saying  that  God  is  being  in  general, 
this  is  taken  for  a vague  and  notional  being,  as  is  the  genus  in 
logic ; and  little  more  is  needed  to  accuse  Malehranche  of  atheism. 
But  I think  that  the  Father  did  not  understand  a vague  and  inde- 
terminate being,  but  absolute  being,  which  differs  from  particular 
limited  beings  as  absolute  and  boundless  space  differs  from  a cir- 
cle or  square. 

8.  There  is  more  likelihood  of  combating  the  opinion  of  Male- 
branche  on  ideas.  For  there  is  no  necessity  (seemingly)  for 
taking  them  for  something  external  to  us.  It  is  sufficient  to  regard 
ideas  as  notions,  that  is  to  say,  as  modifications  of  our  soul.  It  is 
thus  that  the  schoolmen,  Descartes  and  Arnauld,  regard  them. 
But  as  God  is  the  source  of  possibilities  and  consequently  of  ideas, 
the  Father  may  be  excused  and  even  praised  for  having  changed  the 
terms  and  given  to  ideas  a more  exalted  signification,  in  distin- 
guishing them  from  notions  and  in  taking  them  for  perfections  in 
God  which  we  participate  in  by  our  knowledge.  This  mystical 
language  of  the  Father  was  not  then  necessary;  but  I find  it  use- 
ful, for  it  better  brings  before  the  mind  our  dependence  on  God. 
It  even  seems  that  Plato,  speaking  of  ideas,  and  St.  Augustine, 
speaking  of  truth,  had  kindred  thoughts,  which  I find  very  remark- 
able ; and  this  is  the  part  of  Malehranche’ s system  which  I should 
like  to  have  retained,  with  the  phrases  and  formulas  which  depend 
on  it,  as  I am  very  glad  that  the  most  solid  part  of  the  theology  of 
the  mystics  is  preserved.  And  far  from  saying  with  the  author  of 
the  Refutation  (Vol.  2,  p.  304),  that-  the  system  of  St.  Augustine 
is  a little  infected  with  the  language  and  opinions  of  the  Plato - 
nists,  I would  say  that  it  is  thereby  enriched  and  set  in  relief. 


328  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

9.  I say  almost  as  much,  of  the  opinion  of  Father  Malebranche 
when  he  affirms  that  ive  see  all  things  in  God.  I say  that  it  is  an 
expression  which  may  he  excused  and  even  praised,  provided  it  be 
rightly  taken  ; for  it  is  easier  to  fall  into  mistake  in  this  than  in  the 
preceding  article  on  ideas.  It  is,  therefore,  well  to  observe  that  not 
only  in  Malebranche’s  system  but  also  in  mine,  God  alone  is  the 
immediate  external  object  of  souls,  exercising  upon  them  a real 
influence.  And  although  the  current  school  seems  to  admit  other 
influences,  by  means  of  certain  species,  which  it  believes  that 
objects  convey  into  the  soul,  it  does  not  fail  to  recognize  that  all 
our  perfections  are  a continual  gift  of  God,  and  a limited  participa- 
tion in  his  infinite  perfection.  This  suffices  to  show  that  what 
there  is  true  and  good  in  our  knowledge  is  still  an  emanation  from 
the  light  of  God,  and  that  it  is  in  this  sense  that  it  may  be  said, 
that  ive  see  all  things  in  God. 

10.  The  third  volume  refutes  the  system  of  revealed  theology  of 
Father  Malebranche,  in  reference  especially  to  grace  and  predesti- 
nation. But  as  I have  not  sufficiently  studied  the  particular  theo- 
logical opinions  of  the  author,  and  as  I think  I have  sufficiently 
elucidated  the  matter  in  my  essay  La  Theodicee,  I excuse  myself 
from  entering  upon  it  at  present. 

It  would  now  remain  to  speak  to  you,  sir,  of  the  natural  theology 
of  the  Lettres  Cliinois,  according  to  what  the  Jesuit  Father  Longo- 
bardi  and  Father  Antoine  de  St.  Marie,  of  the  Minorite  order, 
report  to  us  thereon,  in  the  treatises  which  you  have  sent  me,  in 
order  to  have  my  opinion  of  them ; as  well  as  of  the  mode  which 
Reverend  Father  Malebranche  has  employed  to  give  to  a cultivated 
Chinaman  some  insight  into  our  theology.  But  this  requires  a sep- 
arate letter;  this  which  I have  just  written  being  already  suffi- 
ciently long.  Referring  for  the  rest  to  my  preceding  letter, 
I am  zealously,  sir,  your  very  humble  and  very  obedient  servant, 

Leibnitz. 


Hanover,  November  4,  1715. 


XXXVII. 


Letters  to  Sam.  Clarke. 

Mr.  Leibnitz’s  First  Paper:  Being  an  Extract  of  a Letter 
written  in  Movember,  1715. 

1.  Natural  religion  itself  seems  to  decay  [in  England ] very 
much.  Many  will  have  human  souls  to  be  material : others  make 
God  himself  a corporeal  Being. 

2.  Mr.  Locke , and  his  followers,  are  uncertain  at  least,  whether 
the  soul  be  not  material,  and  naturally  perishable. 

3.  Sir  Isaac  Newton  says,  that  space  is  an  organ,  which  God 
makes  use  of  to  perceive  things  by.  But  if  God  stands  in  need  of 
any  organ  to  perceive  things  by,  it  will  follow,  that  they  do  not 
depend  altogether  upon  him,  nor  were  produced  by  him. 

4.  Sir  Iaaac  Newton,  and  his  followers,  have  also  a very  odd 
opinion  concerning  the  work  of  God.  According  to  their  doctrine, 
God  Almighty  wants  to  wind  up  his  watch  from  time  to  time : 
otherwise  it  would  cease  to  move.  He  had  not,  it  seems,  sufficient 
foresight  to  make  it  a perpetual  motion.  Xay,  the  machine  of 
God’s  making,  is  so  imperfect,  according  to  these  gentlemen,  that 
he  is  obliged  to  clean  it  now  and  then  by  an  extraordinary  con- 
course, and  even  to  mend  it,  as  a clockmaker  mends  his  work ; who 
must  consequently  be  so  much  the  more  unskillful  a workman,  as 
he  is  oftener  obliged  to  mend  his  work  and  to  set  it  right.  Accord- 
ing to  my  opinion,  the  same  force  and  vigor  remains  always  in 
the  world,  and  only  passes  from  one  part  of  matter  to  another, 
agreeably  to  the  laws  of  nature,  and  the  beautiful  preestablished 
order.  And  I hold,  that  when  God  works  miracles,  he  does  not  do 
it  in  order  to  supply  the  wants  of  nature,  but  those  of  grace.  Who- 
ever thinks  otherwise,  must  needs  have  a very  mean  notion  of  the 
wisdom  and  power  of  God. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


330 

Mr.  I leibnitz's  Second  Paper  : Being  an  Answer  to  Dr.  Clarke’s 

First  Reply. 

1.  It  is  rightly  observed  in  the  paper  delivered  to  the  Princess 
of  1 Vales,  which  her  Boy  al  Highness  has  been  pleased  to  com- 
municate to  me,  that,  next  to  corruption  of  manners,  the  principles 
of  the  materialists  do  very  much  contribute  to  keep  up  impiety. 
But  1 believe  the  author  had  no  reason  to  add,  that  the  mathemati- 
cal principles  of  philosophy  are  opposite  to  those  of  the  materialists. 
On  the  contrary,  they  are  the  same;  only  with  this  difference,  that 
the  materialists,  in  imitation  of  Democritus,  Epicurus,  and 
Hobbes,  confine  themselves  altogether  to  mathematical  principles, 
and  admit  only  bodies;  whereas  the  Christian  mathematicians 
admit  also  immaterial  substances.  AVherefore,  not  mathematical 
principles  (according  to  the  usual  sense  of  that  word)  but  meta- 
physical principles  ought  to  he  opposed  to  those  of  the  materialists. 
Pythagoras,  Plato,  and  Aristotle  in  some  measure,  had  a knowl- 
edge of  these  principles ; hut  I pretend  to  have  established  them 
demonstratively  in  my  Theodiccea,  though  I have  done  it,  in  a 
popular  manner.  The  great  foundation  of  mathematics  is  the 
principle  of  contradiction  or  identity,  that  is,  that  a proposition 
cannot  lie  true  and  false  at  the  same  time ; and  that  therefore  A 
is  A,  and  cannot  be  not  A.  This  single  principle  is  sufficient  to 
demonstrate  every  part  of  arithmetic  and  geometry,  that  is,  all 
mathematical  principles.  But  in  order  to  proceed  from  mathe- 
matics to  natural  philosophy , another  principle  is  requisite,  as  I 
have  observed  in  my  Theodiccea:  I mean,  the  pnnciple  of  a suffi- 
cient reason,  viz:  that  nothing  happens  without  a reason  why  it 
should  be  so,  rather  than  otherwise.  And  therefore  Archimedes 
being  desirous  to  proceed  from  mathematics  to  natural  philosophy , 
in  his  book  De  Aequilibrio , was  obliged  to  make  use  of  a particular 
case  of  the  great  principle  of  a sufficient  reason.  He  takes  it  for 
granted,  that  if  there  be  a balance,  in  which  every  thing  is  alike 
on  both  sides,  and  if  equal  weights  are  hung  on  the  two  ends  of 
that  balance,  the  whole  will  be  at  rest.  ’Tis  because  no  reason 
can  be  given,  why  one  side  should  weigh  down,  rather  than  the 
other.  How,  by  that  single  principle,  viz:  that  there  ought  to  be 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


331 


a sufficient  reason  why  things  should  he  so,  and  not  otherwise,  one 
may  demonstrate  the  being  of  a God,  and  all  the  other  parts  of 
metaphysics  or  natural  theology ; and  even,  in  some  measure,  those 
principles  of  natural  philosophy , that  are  independent  upon  mathe- 
matics: I mean,  the  dynamic  principles,  or  the  principles  of  force. 

2.  The  author  proceeds  and  says,  that  according  to  the  mathe- 
matical principles,  that  is,  according  to  Sir  Isaac  Newton  s philos- 
ophy (for  mathematical  principles  determine  nothing  in  the  pres- 
ent case),  matter  is  the  most  inconsiderable  part  of  the  universe. 
The  reason  is,  because  he  admits  empty  space,  besides  matter ; and 
because,  according  to  his  notions,  matter  fills  up  only  a very  small 
part  of  space.  But  Democritus  and  Epicurus  maintained  the 
same  thing:  they  differed  from  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  only  as  to  the 
quantity  of  matter;  and  perhaps  they  believed  there  was  more 
matter  in  the  world,  than  Sir  Isaac  Newton  will  allow:  wherein  I 
think  their  opinion  ought  to  be  preferred ; for,  the  more  matter 
there  is,  the  more  God  has  occasion  to  exercise  his  wisdom  and 
power.  "Which  is  one  reason,  among  others,  why  I maintain  that 
there  is  no  vacuum  at  all. 

3.  I find,  in  express  words,  in  the  Appendix  to  Sir  Isaac  New- 
ton s Optics,  that  space  is  the  sensorium  of  God.  But  the  word 
sensorium  hath  always  signified  the  organ  of  sensation.  Tie,  and 
his  friends,  may  now,  if  they  think  fit,  explain  themselves  quite 
otherwise : I shall  not  be  against  it. 

4.  The  author  supposes  that  the  presence  of  the  soul  is  sufficient 
to  make  it  perceive  what  passes  in  the  brain.  But  this  is  the  very 
thing  which  Father  Malehranche,  and  all  the  Cartesians  deny; 
and  they  rightly  deny  it.  More  is  requisite  besides  hare  presence, 
to  enable  one  thing  to  perceive  what  passes  in  another.  Some 
communication,  that  may  be  explained ; some  sort  of  influence,  is 
requisite  for  this  purpose.  Space,  according  to  Sir  Isaac  Newton, 
is  intimately  present  to  the  body  contained  in  it,  and  commensu- 
rate with  it.  Does  it  follow  from  thence,  that  space  perceives  what 
passes  in  a body ; and  remembers  it,  when  that  body  is  gone  away  ? 
Besides,  the  soul  being  indivisible,  it’s  immediate  presence,  which 
may  be  imagined  in  the  body,  would  only  be  in  one  point.  How 
then  could  it  perceive  what  happens  out  of  that  point  ? I pretend 


332 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


to  be  the  first  wlio  has  shown  how  the  soul  perceives  what  passes 
in  the  body. 

5.  The  reason  why  God  perceives  every  thing,  is  not  his  hare 
presence,  but  also  his  operation.  ’Tis  because  he  preserves  things 
by  an  action,  which  continually  produces  whatever  is  good  and 
perfect  in  them.  But  the  soul  having  no  immediate  influence 
over  the  body,  nor  the  body  over  the  soul,  their  mutual  corres- 
pondence cannot  be  explained  by  their  being  present  to  each  other. 

6.  The  true  and  principal  reason  why  we  commend  a machine, 
is  rather  grounded  upon  the  effects  of  the  machine,  than  upon  its 
cause.  We  don’t  enquire  so  much  about  the  power  of  the  artist, 
as  we  do  about  his  shill  in  his  workmanship.  And  therefore  the 
reason  alleged  by  the  author  for  extolling  ihe  machine  of  God’s 
making,  grounded  upon  his  having  made  it  entirely,  without  want- 
ing any  materials  to  make  it  of ; that  reason,  I say,  is  not  suffi- 
cient. ’Tis  a mere  shift  the  author  has  been  forced  to  have  recourse 
to:  and  the  reason  why  God  exceeds  any  other  artist  is  not  only 
because  he  makes  the  whole,  whereas  all  other  artists  must  have 
matter  to  work  upon.  This  excellency  in  God,  would  be  only  on 
the  account  of  power.  But  God’s  excellency  arises  also  from 
another  cause,  viz:  wisdom,  whereby  his  machine  lasts  longer,  and 
moves  more  regularly,  than  those  of  any  other  artist  whatsoever. 
He  who  buys  a watch,  does  not  mind  whether  the  workman  made 
every  part  of  it  himself,  or  whether  he  got  the  several  parts  made 
hv  others , and  did  only  put  them  together.;  provided  the  watch 
goes  right.  And  if  the  workman  had  received  from  God  even  the 
gift  of  creating  the  matter  of  the  wheels ; yet  the  buyer  of  the 
watch  would  not  be  satisfied,  unless  the  workman  had  also  received 
the  gift  of  putting  them  well  together.  In  like  manner,  he  who 
will  be  pleased  with  God’s  workmanship,  cannot  be  so,  without 
some  other  reason  than  that  which  the  author  has  here  alleged. 

7.  Thus  the  shill  of  God  must  not  be  inferior  to  that  of  a work- 
man ; nay,  it  must  go  infinitely  beyond  it.  The  bare  production 
of  every  thing,  would  indeed  show  the  power  of  God ; hut  it 
would  not  sufficiently  show  his  wisdom.  They  who  maintain  the 
contrary,  will  fall  exactly  into  the  error  of  the  materialists,  and  of 
Spinoza,  from  whom  they  profess  to  differ.  They  would,  in  such 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


333 


case,  acknowledge  power , but  not  sufficient  wisdom,  in  the  princi- 
ple or  cause  of  all  things. 

8.  I do  not  say,  the  material  world  is  a machine,  or  watch,  that 
goes  without  God’s  interposition ; and  I have  sufficiently  insisted, 
that  the  creation  wants  to  be  continually  influenced  by  its  Creator. 
But  I maintain  it  to  be  a watch,  that  goes  ivitliout  wanting  to  be 
mended  by  him : otherwise  we  must  say,  that  God  bethinks  himself 
again.  1ST o ; God  has  foreseen  everything;  he  has  provided  a 
remedy  for  everything  beforehand ; there  is  in  his  works  a har- 
mony, a beauty,  already  preestablished. 

9.  This  opinion  does  not  exclude  God’s  providence,  or  his 
government  of  the  world : on  the  contrary,  it  makes  it  perfect.  A 
true  providence  of  God,  requires  a perfect  foresight.  But  then  it 
requires,  moreover,  not  only  that  he  should  have  foreseen  every- 
thing ; but  also  that  he  should  have  provided  for  everything  before' 
hand,  with  proper  remedies : otherwise,  he  must  want  either  wis- 
dom to  foresee  things,  or  power  to  provide  against  them.  He  will 
be  like  the  God  of  the  Socinians,  who  lives  only  from  day  to  day, 
as  Mr.  Jurieu  says.  Indeed  God,  according  to  the  Socinians,  does 
not  so  much  as  foresee  inconveniences ; whereas,  the  gentlemen  I 
am  arguing  with,  who  put  him  upon  mending  his  work,  say  only, 
that  he  does  not  provide  against  them.  But  this  seems  to  me  to 
be  still  a very  great  imperfection.  According  to  this  doctrine, 
God  must  want  either  power,  or  good  will. 

10.  I don’t  think  I can  be  rightly  blamed,  for  saying  that  God 
is  intelligentia  supramundana.  Will  they  say,  that  he  is  intelli- 
gentia  mundana ; that  is,  the  soul  of  the  world ? I hope  not. 
However,  they  will  do  well  £o  take  care  not  to  fall  into  that  notion 
unawares. 

11.  The  comparison  of  a king,  under  whose  reign  everything 
should  go  on  without  his  interposition,  is  by  no  means  to  the 
present  purpose ; since  God  preserves  everything  continually,  and 
nothing  can  subsist  without  him.  His  kingdom  therefore  is  not  a 
nominal  one.  ’Tis  just  as  if  one  should  say,  that  a king,  who 
should  originally  have  taken  care  to  have  his  subjects  so  well 
educated,  and  should,  by  his  care  in  providing  for  their  substance, 
preserve  them  so  well  in  their  fitness  for  their  several  stations,  and 


334 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


iu  their  good  affection  towards  him,  as  that  he  should  have  no 
occasion  ever  to  be  amending  anything  amongst  them,  would  be 
only  a nominal  king. 

12.  To  conclude.  If  God  is  obliged  to  mend  the  course  of 
nature  from  time  to  time,  it  must  he  done  either  supernaturam) 
or  naturally.  If  it  he  done  super  naturally , we  must  have  recourse 
to  miracles,  in  order  to  explain  natural  things:  which  is  reducing 
an.  hypothesis  ad  absurdum:  for,  everything  may  easily  be 

accounted  for  by  miracles.  But  if  it  be  done  naturally , then  God 
will  not  he  intelligentia  supramundana : he  will  be  compre- 
hended under  the  nature  of  things ; that  is,  he  will  be  the  soul  of 
the  world. 


Mb.  Leibnitz’s  Third  Paper:  Being  an  Answer  to  Dr.  Clarke’s 

Second  Reply. 

1.  According  to  the  usual  way  of  speaking,  mathematical 
principles  concern  only  mere  mathematics,  viz : numbers,  figures, 
arithmetic,  geometry.  But  metaphysical  principles  concern  more 
general  notions,  such  as  are  cause  and  effect. 

2.  The  author  grants  me  this  important  principle;  that  nothing 
happens  without  a sufficient  reason,  why  it  should  be  so,  rather 
than  otherwise.  But  he  grants  it  only  in  ivords  and  in  reality 
denies  it.  Which  shows  that,  he  does  not  fully  perceive  the 
strength  of  it.  And  therefore  he  makes  use  of  an  instance,  which 
exactly  falls  in  with  one  of  my  demonstrations  against  real  absolute 
space,  which  is  an  idol  of  some  modern  Englishmen.  I call  it  an 
idol,  not  in  a theological  sense,  but  in  a philosophical  one;  as 
Chancellor  Bacon  says,  that  there  are  idola  tribus,  idola  speeds. 

3.  These  gentlemen  maintain  therefore,  that  space  is  a real 
absolute  being.  But,  this  involves  them  in  great  difficulties;  for 
such  a being  must  needs  be  eternal  and  infinite.  Hence  some  have 
believed  it  to  be  God  himself  , or,  one  of  his  attributes,  his  immen- 
sity. But  since  space  consists  of  parts,  it  is  not  a thing  which 
can  belong  to  God. 

I.  As  for  my  own  opinion,  I have  said  more  than  once,  that  I 
hold  space  to  he  something  merely  relative,  as  time  is ; that  I hold 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


335 


it  to  be  an  order  of  coexistences , as  time  is  an  order  of  successions. 
For  space  denotes,  in  terms  of  possibility,  an  order  of  things  which 
exist  at  the  same  time,  considered  as  existing  together ; without 
inquiring  into  their  particular  manner  of  existing.  And  when 
many  things  are  seen  together,  one  perceives  that  order  of  things 
among  themselves. 

5.  I have  many  demonstrations,  to  confute  the  fancy  of  those 
who  take  space  to  be  a substance,  or  at  least  an  absolute  being. 
But  I shall  only  use,  at  the  present,  one  demonstration,  which  the 
author  here  gives  me  occasion  to  insist  upon.  I say  then,  that  if 
space  was  an  absolute  being,  there  would  something  happen,  for 
which  it  would  be  impossible  there  should  be  a sufficient  reason . 

Which  is  against  lny  Axiom.  And  I can  prove  it  thus.  Space  is 
something  absolutely  uniform ; and,  without  the  things  placed  in 
it,  one  point  of  space  does  not  absolutely  differ  in  any  respect 
whatsoever  from  another  point  of  space.  ISTow  from  hence  it  fol- 
lows, (supposing  space  to  be  something  in  itself,  besides  the  order 
of  bodies  among  themselves,)  that  ’tis  impossible  there  should  be  a 
reason,  why  God,  preserving  the  same  situations  of  bodies  among 
themselves,  should  have  placed  them  in  space  after  one  certain  par- 
ticular manner,  and  not  otherwise;  why  everything  was  not  placed 
the  quite  contrary  way,  for  instance,  by  changing  east  into  ivest. 
But  if  space  is  nothing  else,  but  that  order  or  relation;  and  is 
nothing  at  all  without  bodies,  but  the  possibility  of  placing  them ; 
then  those  two  states,  the  one  such  as  it  now  is,  the  other  sup- 
posed to  be  the  quite  contrary  way,  would  not  at  all  differ  from  one 
another.  Their  difference  therefore  is  only  to  be  found  in  our 
chimerical  supposition  of  the  reality  of  space  in  itself.  But  in 
truth  the  one  would  exactly  be  the  same  thing  as  the  other,  they 
being  absolutely  indiscernible ; and  consequently  there  is  no  room 
to  enquire  after  a reason  of  the  preference  of  the  one  to  the  other. 

6.  The  case  is  the  same  with  respect  to  time.  Supposing  any 
one  should  ask,  why  God  did  not  create  everything  a year  sooner; 
and  the  same  person  should  infer  from  thence,  that  God  has  done 
something,  concerning  which  ’tis  not  possible  there  should  be  a 
reason,  why  he  did  it  so,  and  not  otherwise : the  answer  is,  that  his 
inference  would  be  right,  if  time  was  any  thing  distinct  from  things 


330 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


existing  in  time.  For  it  would  be  impossible  there  should  be  any 
reason,  why  things  should  be  applied  to  such  particular  instants, 
rather  than  to  others,  their  succession  continuing  the  same.  But 
then  the  same  argument  proves,  that  instants,  considered  without 
the  things,  are  nothing  at  all;  and  that  they  consist  only  in  the 
successive  order  of  things  : which  order  remaining  the  same,  one  of 
the  two  states,  viz.  that  of  a supposed  anticipation,  would  not  at  all 
differ,  nor  could  be  discerned  from,  the  other  which  now  is. 

7.  It  appears  from  what  I have  said,  that  my  axiom  has  not  been 
well  understood ; and  that  the  author  denies  it,  tho’  he  seems  to 
grant  it.  ’Tis  true,  says  he,  that  there  is  nothing  without  a suf- 
ficient reason  why  it  is,  and  why  it  is  thus,  rather  than  otherwise: 
but  he  adds,  that  this  sufficient  reason,  is  often  the  simple  or  mere 
will  of  God:  as,  when  it  is  asked  why  matter  was  not  placed  other- 
wise in  space;  the  same  situations  of  bodies  among  themselves 
being  preserved.  But  this  is  plainly  maintaining,  that  God  wills 
something,  without  any  sufficient  reason  for  his  will : against  the 
axiom,  or  the  general  rule  of  whatever  happens.  This  is  falling 
back  into  the  loose  indifference,  which  I have  confuted  at  large, 
and  showed  to  be  absolutely  chimerical  even  in  creatures,  and  con- 
trary to  the  wisdom  of  God,  as  if  he  could  operate  without  acting 
by  reason. 

8.  The  author  objects  against  me,  that  if  we  don’t  admit  this 
simple  and  mere  will,  we  take  away  from  God  the  power  of  choos- 
ing, and  bring  in  a fatality.  But  the  quite  contrary  is  true.  I 
maintain  that  God  has  the  power  of  choosing,  since  I ground  that 
power  upon  the  reason  of  a choice  agreeable  to  his  wisdom.  And 
’tis  not  this  fatality,  (which  is  only  the  wisest  order  of  Provi- 
dence) but  a blind  fatality  or  necessity,  void  of  all  wisdom  and 
choice,  which  we  ought  to  avoid. 

9.  I had  observed,  that  by  lessening  the  quantity  of  matter,  the 
quantity  of  objects,  upon  which  God  may  exercise  his  goodness, 
will  be  lessen’d.  The  author  answers,  that  instead  of  matter,  there 
are  other  things  in  the  void  space,  on  which  God  may  exercise 
his  goodness.  Be  it  so : tho’  I don’t  grant  it ; for  I hold  that  every 
created  substance  is  attended  with  matter.  However,  let  it  be  so: 
1 answer,  that  more  matter  was  consistent  with  those  same  things ; 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


337 


and  consequently  the  said  objects  will  be  still  lessened.  The 
instance  of  a greater  number  of  men,  or  animals,  is  not  to  the  pur- 
pose; for  they  would  fill  up  place,  in  exclusion  of  other  things. 

10.  It  will  be  difficult  to  make  me  believe,  that  sensorium  does 
not,  in  its  usual  meaning,  signify  an  organ  of  sensation.  See  the 
words  of  Rudolphus  Goclenius,  in  bis  Dictionarium  Philosoph- 
icum ; v.  sensiterium.  Barb  arum  Scholasticorum,  says  be,  qui 
interdum  sunt  Simice  Groecorum,  Hi  dicunt  ’AiOrjTripLov.  Ex 
quo  illi  fecerunt  sensiterium  pro  sensorio,  id  est,  organo  sensationis. 

11.  The  mere  presence  of  a substance,  even  an  animated  one,  is 
not  sufficient  for  perception.  A blind  man,  and  even  a man  whose 
thoughts  are  wandering,  does  not  see.  The  author  must  explain, 
bow  the  soul  perceives  what  is  without  itself. 

12.  God  is  not  present  to  things  by  situation,  but  by  essence: 
bis  presence  is  manifest  by  bis  immediate  operation.  The  pres- 
ence of  the  soil  is  quite  of  another  nature.  To  say  that  it  is  dif- 
fused all  over  the  body,  is  to  make  it  extended  and  divisible.  To 
say  it  is,  the  whole  of  it,  in  every  part  of  the  body,  is  to  make  it 
divided  from  itself.  To  fix  it  to  a point,  to  diffuse  it  all  over  many 
points,  are  only  abusive  expressions,  idola  tribus. 

13.  If  active  force  should  diminish  in  the  universe,  by  the  nat- 
ural laws  which  God  has  established ; so  that  there  should  be  need 
for  him  to  give  a neiv  impression  in  order  to  restore  that  force,  like 
an  artist’s  mending  the  imperfections  of  bis  machine ; the  disorder 
would  not  only  be  with  respect  to  us,  but  also  with  respect  to  God 
himself.  He  might  have  prevented  it,  and  taken  better  measures 
to  avoid  such  an  inconvenience:  and  therefore,  indeed,  be  has 
actually  done  it. 

Id.  When  I said  that  God  has  provided  remedies  beforehand 
against  such  disorders,  I did  not  say  that  God  suffers  disorders  to 
happen,  and  then  finds  remedies  for  them ; but  that  be  has  found  a 
way  beforehand  to  prevent  any  disorders  happening. 

15.  The  author  strives  in  vain  to  criticize  my  expression,  that 
God  is  intelligentia  supramundana.  To  say  that  God  is  above  the 
world,  is  not  denying  that  he  is  in  the  world. 

16.  I never  gave  any  occasion  to  doubt,  but  that  God’s  conser- 
vation is  an  actual  preservation  and  continuation  of  the  beings, 

22 


338 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


powers,  orders,  dispositions,  and  motions  of  all  things  : and  I think 
I have  perhaps  explained  it  better  than  many  others.  But,  says 
the  author,  this  is  all  that  I contended  for.  To  this  I answer; 
your  humble  servant  for  that,  sir.  Our  dispute  consists  in  many 
other  things.  The  question  is,  whether  God  does  not  act  in  the 
most  regular  and  most  perfect  manner?  whether  his  machine  is 
liable  to  disorder,  which  he  is  obliged  to  mend  by  extraordinary 
means  ? whether  the  will  of  God  can  act  with  out  reason  ? whether 
space  is  an  absolute  being  ? also  concerning  the  nature  of  miracles ; 
and  many  such  things,  which  make  a wide  difference  between  us. 

17.  Divines  will  not  grant  the  author’s  position  against  me,  viz. 
that  there  is  no  difference,  with  respect  to  God,  between  natural 
and  supernatural : and  it  will  be  still  less  approved  by  most  philos- 
ophers. There  i$  a vast  difference  between  these  two  things  ; but  it 
plainly  appears,  it  has  not  been  duly  consider’d.  That  which  is 
supernatural  exceeds  all  the  powers  of  creatures.  I shall  give  an 
instance,  which  I have  often  made  use  of  with  good  success.  If 
God  would  cause  a body  to  move  free  in  the  aether  round  about  a 
certain  fixed  center,  without  any  other  creature  acting  upon  it : I 
say,  it  could  not  be  done  without  a miracle ; since  it  cannot  be 
explained  by  the  nature  of  bodies.  Tor,  a free  body  does  naturally 
recede  from  a curve  in  the  tangent.  And  therefore  I maintain, 
that  the  attraction  of  bodies,  properly  so  called,  is  a miraculous 
thing,  since  it  cannot  be  explained  by  the  nature  of  bodies. 


Mr.  Leibnitz’s  Fourth  Paper;  Being  an  Answer  to  Dr.  Clarke’s 

Third  Reply. 

1.  In  things  absolutely  indifferent,  there  is  no  [foundation  for] 
choice;  and  consequently  no  election,  nor  will;  since  choice  must 
be  founded  on  some  reason,  or  principle. 

2.  A mere  will  without  any  motive,  is  a fiction,  not  only  con- 
trary to  God’s  perfection,  but  also  chimerical  and  contradictory ; 
inconsistent  with  the  definition  of  the  will,  and  sufficiently  con- 
futed in  my  Theodiccea. 

3.  ’Tis  a thing  indifferent,  to  place  three  bodies,  equal  and  per- 
fectly alike,  in  any  order  whatsoever;  and  consequently  they  will 


LETTERS  TO  CLARICE. 


339 


never  be  placed  in  any  order,  by  him  who  does  nothing  without 
wisdom.  But  then,  he  being  the  author  of  things,  no  such  things 
will  be  produced  by  him  at  all ; and  consequently  there  are  no 
such  things  in  nature. 

4.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  two  individuals  indiscernible  from 
each  other.  An  ingenious  gentleman  of  my  acquaintance,  discours- 
ing with  me,  in  the  presence  of  her  Electoral  Highness  the  Princess 
Sophia,  in  the  garden  of  Herrenhausen,  thought  he  could  find 
two  leaves  perfectly  alike.  The  princess  defied  him  to  do  it,  and 
he  ran  all  over  the  garden  a long  time  to  look  for  some ; but  it 
was  to  no  purpose.  Two  drops  of  water,  or  milk,  viewed  with  a 
microscope,  will  appear  distinguishable  from  each  other.  This  is 
an  argument  against  atoms;  which  are  confuted,  as  well  as  a 
vacuum,  by  the  principles  of  true  metaphysics. 

5.  Those  great  principles  of  a sufficient  reason,  and  of  the  iden- 
tity of  indiscernibles,  change  the  state  of  metaphysics.  That 
science  becomes  real  and  demonstrative  by  means  of  these  princi- 
ples ; whereas  before,  it  did  generally  consist  in  empty  words. 

6.  To  suppose  two  things  indiscernible,  is  to  suppose  the  same 
thing  under  two  names.  And  therefore  to  suppose  that  the  uni- 
verse could  have  had  at  first  another  position  of  time  and  place, 
than  that  which  it  actually  had ; and  yet  that  all  the  parts  of  the 
universe  should  have  had  the  same  situation  among  themselves,  as 
that  which  they  actually  had ; such  a supposition,  I say,  is  an 
impossible  fiction. 

7.  The  same  reason,  which  shows  that  extramundane  space  is 
imaginary , proves  that  all  empty  space  is  an  imaginary  thing;  for 
they  differ  only  as  greater  and  less. 

8.  If  space  is  a property  or  attribute,  it  must  be  the  property  of 
some  substance.  But  what  substance  will  that  bounded  empty 
space  be  an  affection  or  property  of,  which  the  persons  I am  argu- 
ing with,  suppose  to  be  between  two  bodies  ? 

9.  If  infinite  space  is  immensity,  finite  space  will  be  the  opposite 
to  immensity,  that  is,  ’twill  be  mensur ability , or  limited  extension, 
ISTow  extension  must  be  the  affection  of  some  thing  extended.  But 
if  that  space  be  empty,  it  will  be  an  attribute  without  a subject,  an 
extension  without  any  thing  extended.  Wherefore  by  making 


340 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OK  LEIBNITZ. 


space  a property,  tlie  author  falls  in  with  my  opinion,  which  makes 
it  an  order  of  things,  and  not  any  thing  absolute. 

10.  If  space  is  an  absolute  reality ; far  from  being  a property  or 
an  accident  opposed  to  substance,  it  will  have  a greater  reality  than 
substances  themselves.  God  cannot  destroy  it,  nor  even  change  it 
in  any  respect.  It  will  be  not  only  immense  in  the  whole,  but  also 
immutable  and  eternal  in  every  part.  There  will  be  an  infinite 
number  of  eternal  things  besides  God. 

11.  To  say  that  infinite  space  has  fio  parts,  is  to  say  that  it  does 
not  consist  of  finite  spaces ; and  that  infinite  space  might  subsist, 
though  all  finite  space  should  be  reduced  to  nothing.  It  would  be, 
as  if  one  should  say,  in  the  Cartesian  supposition  of  a material 
extended  unlimited  world,  that  such  a world  might  subsist,  though 
all  the  bodies  of  which  it  consists,  should  be  reduced  to  nothing. 

12.  The  author  ascribes  parts  to  space,  p.  19  of  the  3d  edition  of 
his  Defense  of  the  Argument  against  Mr.  Dodwell ; and  makes 
them  inseparable  one  from  another.  But,  p.  30  of  his  Second 
Defense , he  says  they  are  parts  improperly  so-called:  which  may 
be  understood  in  a good  sense. 

13.  To  say  that  God  can  cause  the  whole  universe  to  move  for- 
ward in  a right  line,  or  in  any  other  line,  without  making  other- 
wise any  alteration  in  it,  is  another  chimerical  supposition.  For, 
two  states  indiscernible  from  each  other,  are  the  same  state;  and 
consequently,  ’tis  a change  without  any  change.  Besides,  there  is 
neither  rhyme  nor  reason  in  it.  But  God  does  nothing  without 
reason;  and  ’tis  impossible  there  should  be  any  here.  Besides,  it 
would  be  agendo  nihil  agere , as  I have  just  now  said,  because  of 
the  indiscernibility. 

14.  These  are  idola  tribus,  mere  chimeras,  and  superficial 
imaginations.  All  this  is  only  grounded  upon  the  supposition,  that 
imaginary  space  is  real. 

15.  It  is  a like  fiction,  (that  is)  an  impossible  one,  to  suppose 
that  God  might  have  created  the  world  some  millions  of  years 
sooner.  They  who  run  into  such  kind  of  fictions,  can  give  no 
answer  to  one  that  should  argue  for  the  eternity  of  the  world.  For 
since  God  does  nothing  without  reason,  and  no  reason  can  be  given 
why  he  did  not  create  the  world  sooner;  it  will  follow,  either  that 


LEXTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


341 


lie  lias  created  nothing  at  all,  or  that  he  created  the  world  before 
any  assignable  time,  that  is,  that  the  world  is  eternal.  But  when 
once  it  has  been  shown,  that  the  beginning,  whenever  it  was,  is 
always  the  same  thing ; the  question,  why  it  was  not  otherwise 
ordered,  becomes  needless  and  insignificant. 

16.  If  space  and  time  were  anything  absolute,  that  is,  if  they 
were  anything  else,  besides  certain  orders  of  things ; then  indeed 
my  assertion  would  be  a contradiction.  But  since  it  is  not  so,  the 
hypothesis  [that  space  and  time  are  anything  absolute]  is  contra- 
dictory, that  is,  ’tis  an  impossible  fiction. 

17.  And  the  case  is  the  same  as  in  geometry ; where  by  the  very 
supposition  that  a figure  is  greater  than  it  really  is,  we  sometimes 
prove  that  it  is  not  greater.  This  indeed  is  a contradiction ; but  it 
lies  in  the  hypothesis,  which  appears  to  be  false  for  that  very 
reason. 

18.  Space  being  uniform,  there  can  be  neither  any  external  nor 
internal  reason,  by  which  to  distinguish  its  parts,  and  to  make  any 
choice  among  them.  For,  any  external  reason  to  discern  between 
them,  can  only  be  grounded  upon  some  internal  one.  Otherwise 
we  should  discern  what  is  indiscernible,  or  choose  without  discern- 
ing. A will  without  reason,  would  be  the  chance  of  the  Epicu- 
reans. A God,  who  should  act  by  such  a will,  would  be  a God  only 
in  name.  The  cause  of  these  errors  proceeds  from  want  of  care  to 
avoid  what  derogates  from  the  divine  perfections. 

19.  When  two  things  which  cannot  both  be  together,  are  equally 
good;  and  neither  in  themselves,  nor  by  their  combination  with 
other  things,  has  the  one  any  advantage  over  the  other;  God  will 
produce  neither  of  them. 

20.  God  is  never  determined  by  external  things,  but  always  by 
what  is  in  himself ; that  is,  by  his  knowledge  of  things,  before  any 
thing  exists  without  himself. 

21.  There  is  no  possible  reason,  that  can  limit  the  quantity  of 
matter;  and  therefore  such  limitation  can  have  no  place. 

22.  And  supposing  an  arbitrary  limitation  of  the  quantity  of 
matter  is  the  fittest  for  the  present  constitution  of  things.  And 
from  the  perfection  of  those  things  which  do  already  exist ; and 
consequently  something  must  always  be  added,  in  order  to  act 


34:2 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


according  to  the  principle  of  the  perfection  of  the  divine  opera- 
tions. 

23.  And  therefore  it  cannot  be  said,  that  the  present  quantity  of 
matter  is  the  fittest  for  the  present  constitution  of  things.  And 
supposing  it  were,  it  would  follow  that  this  present  constitution  of 
things  would  not  he  the  fittest  absolutely,  if  it  hinders  God  from 
using  more  matter.  It  were  therefore  better  to  choose  another  con- 
stitution of  things,  capable  of  something  more. 

21.  1 should  he  glad  to  see  a passage  of  any  philosopher,  who 
takes  sensorium  in  any  other  sense  than  Goclenius  docs. 

25.  If  Scapula  says  that  sensorium  is  the  place  in  which  the 
understanding  resides,  he  means  by  it  the  organ  of  internal  sensa- 
tion. And  therefore  he  does  not  differ  from  Goclenius. 

26.  Sensorium  has  always  signified  the  organ  of  sensation. 
The  glandula  penealis  would  be,  according  to  Cartesius,  the  sen- 
sorium,  in  the  above-mentioned  sense  of  Scapula. 

27.  There  is  hardly  any  expression  less  proper  upon  this  subject, 
than  that  which  makes  God  to  have  a sensorium.  It  seems  to  make 
God  the  soul  of  the  world.  And  it  will  be  a hard  matter  to  put  a 
justifiable  sense  upon  this  word,  according  to  the  use  Sir  Isaac 
Newton  makes  of  it. 

28.  Though  the  question  be  about  the  sense  put  upon  that  word 
by  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  and  not  by  Goclenius;  yet  I am  not  to  blame 
for  quoting  the  philosophical  dictionary  of  that  author,  because  the 
design  of  dictionaries  is  to  show  the  use  of  words. 

29.  God  perceives  things  in  himself.  Space  is  the  place  of 
things,  and  not  the  place  of  God’s  ideas:  unless  we  look  upon 
sjiace  as  something  that  makes  an  union  between  God  and  things, 
in  imitation  of  the  imagined  union  between  the  soul  and  the  body; 
which  would  still  make  God  the  soul  of  the  world. 

30.  And  indeed  the  author  is  much  in  the  wrong,  when  he  com- 
pares God’s  knowledge  and  operation,  with  the  knowledge  and 
operation  of  souls.  The  soul  knows  things,  because  God  has  put 
into  it  a principle  representative  of  things  without.  But  God 
knows  things,  hecaitse  lie  produces  them  continually. 

31.  The  soul  does  not  act  upon  things,  according  to  my  opinion, 
any  otherwise  than  because  the  body  adapts  itself  to  the  desires  of 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


343 


the  soul,  by  virtue  of  the  harmony,  which  God  has  preestablished 
between  them. 

32.  But  they  who  fancy  that  the  soul  can  give  a new  force  to  the 
body ; and  that  God  does  the  same  in  the  world,  in  order  to  mend 
the  imperfections  of  his  machine;  make  God  too  much  like  the 
soul,  by  ascribing  too  much  to  the  soul,  and  too  little  to  God. 

33.  For,  none  but  God  can  give  a new  force  to  nature;  and  he 
does  it  only  sup ernatur ally.  If  there  was  need  for  him  to  do  it  in 
the  natural  course  of  things ; he  would  have  made  a very  imper- 
fect work.  At  that  rate,  he  would  be  with  respect  to  the  world, 
what  the  soul,  in  the  vulgar  notion,  is  with  respect  to  the  body. 

34.  Those  who  undertake  to  defend  the  vulgar  opinion  concern- 
ing the  soul’s  influence  over  the  body,  by  instancing  in  God’s 
operating  on  things  external ; make  God  still  too  much  like  a soul 
of  the  world.  To  which  I add,  that  the  author’s  affecting  to  find 
fault  with  the  words,  intelligentia  supramundana,  seems  also  to 
incline  that  way. 

35.  The  images,  with  which  the  soul  is  immediately  affected,  are 
within  itself ; hut  they  correspond  to  those  of  the  body.  The 
presence  of  the  soul  is  imperfect,  and  can  only  be  explained  by  that 
correspondence.  But  the  presence  of  God  is  perfect,  and  mani- 
fested by  his  operation. 

36.  The  author  wrongly  supposes  against  me,  that  the  presence 
of  the  soul  is  connected  with  its  influence  over  the  body;  for  he 
knows,  I reject  that  influence. 

37.  The  soul’s  being  diffused  through  the  brain,  is  no  less  inex- 
plicable, than  its  being  diffused  through  the  whole  body.  The 
difference  is  only  in  more  and  less. 

38.  They  who  fancy  that  active  force  lessens  of  itself  in  the 
world,  do  not  well  understand  the  principal  laws  of  nature,  and  the 
beauty  of  the  works  of  God. 

39.  How  will  they  be  able  to  prove,  that  this  defect  is  a conse- 
quence of  the  dependence  of  things  l 

40.  The  imperfection  of  our  machines,  which  is  the  reason  why 
they  want  to  be  mended,  proceeds  from  this  very  thing,  that  they 
do  not  sufficiently  depend  upon  the  workman.  And  therefore  the 
dependence  of  nature  upon  God,  far  from  being  the  cause  of  such 


344  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

an  imperfection,  is  rather  the  reason  why  there  is  no  such  imper- 
fection in  nature,  because  it  depends  so  much  upon  an  artist,  who 
is  too  perfect  to  make  a work  that  wants  to  he  mended.  ’Tis  true 
that  every  particular  machine  of  nature,  is,  in  some  measure,  liable 
to  be  disordered;  but  not  the  whole  universe,  which  cannot 
diminish  in  perfection. 

41.  The  author  contends,  that  space  does  not  depend  upon  the 
situation  of  bodies.  I answer:  ’Tis  true,  it  does  not  depend  upon 
such  or  such  a situation  of  bodies ; hut  it  is  that  order,  which 
renders  bodies  capable  of  being  situated,  and  by  which  they  have  a 
situation  among  themselves  when  they  exist  together ; as  time  is 
that  order,  with  respect  to  their  successive  position.  But  if  there 
were  no  creatures,  space  and  time  would  be  only  in  the  ideas  of 
God. 

42.  The  author  seems  to  acknowledge  here,  that  his  notion  of  a 
miracle  is  not  the  same  with  that  which  divines  and  philosophers 
usually  have.  It  is  therefore  sufficient  for  my  purpose,  that  my 
adversaries  are  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  what  is  commonly  called 
a miracle. 

43.  I am  afraid  the  author,  by  altering  the  sense  commonly  put 
upon  the  word  miracle,  will  fall  into  an  inconvenient  opinion. 
The  nature  of  a miracle  does  not  at  all  consist  in  usefulness  or 
unusefulness ; for  then  7nonsters  would  be  miracles. 

44.  There  are  miracles  of  an  inferior  sort,  which  an  angel  can 
work.  He  can,  for  instance,  make  a man  walk  upon  the  water 
without  sinking.  But  there  are  mi  racles,  which  none  but  God  can 
work;  they  exceeding  all  natural  powers.  Of  which  kind,  are 
creating  and  annihilating. 

45.  ’Tis  also  a supernatural  thing,  that  bodies  should  attract  one 
another  at  a distance,  without  any  intermediate  means ; and  that  a 
body  should  move  around,  without  receding  in  the  tangent,  though 
nothing  hinder  it  from  so  receding.  For  these  effects  cannot  be 
explained  by  the  nature  of  things. 

46.  Why  should  it  be  impossible  to  explain  the  motion  of  ani- 
mals by  natural  forces  ? Though  indeed,  the  beginning  of  animals 
is  no  less  inexplicable  by  natural  forces,  than  the  beginning  of 
the  world. 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


345 


P.  S. — All  those  who  maintain  a vacuum,  are  more  influenced 
by  imagination  than  by  reason.  When  I was  a young  man,  I also 
gave  in  to  the  notion  of  a vacuum  and  atoms;  but  reason  brought 
me  into  the  right  way.  It  was  a pleasing  imagination.  Men  carry 
their  inquiries  no  farther  than  those  two  things:  they  (as  it  were) 
nail  down  their  thoughts  to  them : they  fancy,  they  have  found  out 
the  first  elements  of  things,  a non  plus  ultra.  We  would  have 
nature  to  go  no  farther;  and  to  be  finite,  as  our  minds  are:  but 
this  is  being  ignorant  of  the  greatness  and  majesty  of  the  author 
of  things.  The  least  corpuscle  is  actually  subdivided  in  infinitum, 
and  contains  a world  of  other  creatures,  which  would  be  wanting 
in  the  universe,  if  that  corpuscle  was  an  atom,  that  is,  a body  of 
one  entire  piece  without  subdivision.  In  like  manner,  to  admit 
a vacuum  in  nature,  is  ascribing  to  God  a very  imperfect  work : 
’tis  violating  the  grand  principle  of  the  necessity  of  a sufficient 
reason;  which  many  have  talked  of,  without  understanding  its 
true  meaning;  as  I have  lately  shown,  in  proving,  by  that  prin- 
ciple, that  space  is  only  an  order  of  things  as  time  also  is,  and  not 
at  all  an  absolute  being.  To  omit  many  other  arguments  against 
a vacuum  and  atoms,  I shall  here  mention  those  which  I ground 
upon  God’s  perfection,  and  upon  the  necessity  of  a sufficient 
reason.  I lay  it  down  as  a principle,  that  every  perfection,  which 
God  could  impart  to  things  without  derogating  from  their  other 
perfections,  has  actually  been  imparted  to  them.  How,  let  us 
fancy  a space  wholly  empty.  God  could  have  placed  some  matter 
in  it,  without  derogating  in  any  respect  from  all  other  things: 
therefore  he  hath  actually  placed  some  matter  in  that  space: 
therefore,  there  is  no  space  wholly  empty:  therefore  all  is  full. 
The  same  argument  p roves  that  there  is  no  corpuscle,  but  what  is 
subdivided.  I shall  add  another  argument,  grounded  upon  the 
necessity  of  a sufficient  reason.  ’Tis  impossible  there  should  be 
any  principle  to  determine  what  proportion  of  matter  there  ought 
to  be,  out  of  all  the  possible  degrees  from  a plenum  to  a vacuum, 
or  from  a vacuum  to  a plenum.  Perhaps  it  will  be  said,  that  the 
one  should  be  equal  to  the  other:  but,  becaiise  matter  is  more 
perfect  than  a vacuum , reason  requires  that  a geometrical  pro- 
portion should  be  observed,  and  that  there  should  be  as  much 


316 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


more  matter  than  vacuum,  as  the  former  deserves  to  have  the 
preference  before  the  latter.  But  then  there  must  he  no  vacuum 
at  all ; for  the  perfection  of  matter  is  to  that  of  a vacuum,  as 
something  to  nothing.  And  the  case  is  the  same  with  atoms:  What 
reason  can  any  one  assign  for  confining  nature  in  the  progression 
of  subdivision  ? These  are  fictions  merely  arbitrary,  and 
unworthy  of  true  philosophy.  The  reasons  alleged  for  a vacuum, 
are  mere  sophisms. 


Mr.  Leibnitz’s  Fifth  Paper:  Being  an  answer  to  Dr.  Clarke’s 

Fourth  Reply. 

To  § 1 and  2,  of  the  foregoing  paper  [Clarke’s  Fourth  Reply]. 

1.  I shall  at  this  time  make  a larger  answer;  to  clear  the  difficul- 
ties ; and  to  try  whether  the  author  be  willing  to  hearken  to  reason, 
and  to  show  that  he  is  a lover  of  truth ; or  whether  he  will  only 
cavil,  without  clearing  anything. 

2.  He  often  endeavors  to  impute  to  me  necessity  and  fatality ; 
though  perhaps  no  one  has  better  and  more  fully  explained,  than  I 
have  done  in  my  Theodiccea,  the  true  difference  between  liberty, 
contingency , spontaneity , on  the  one  side;  and  absolute  necessity, 
chance,  coaction,  on  the  other.  I know  not  yet,  whether  the  author 
does  this,  because  he  will  do  it,  whatever  I may  say ; or  whether  he 
does  it,  (supposing  him  sincere  in  those  imputations,)  because  he 
has  not  yet  duly  considered  my  opinions.  I shall  soon  find  what  I 
am  to  think  of  it,  and  I shall  take  my  measures  accordingly. 

3.  It  is  true,  that  reason  in  the  mind  of  a wise  being,  and 
motives  in  any  mind  whatsoever,  do  that  which  answers  to  the 
effect  produced  by  weights  in  a balance.  The  author  objects,  that 
this  notion  leads  to  necessity  and  fatality.  But  he  says  so,  without 
proving  it,  and  without  taking  notice  of  the  explications  I have 
formerly  given,  in  order  to  remove  the  difficulties  that  may  be 
raised  upon  that  head. 

I.  ITe  seems  also  to  play  with  equivocal  terms.  There  are  neces- 
sities, which  ought  to  be  admitted.  For  we  must  distinguish 
between  an  absolute  and  an  hypothetical  necessity.  We  must  also 
distinguish  between  a necessity,  which  takes  place  because  the 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


347 


opposite  implies  a contradiction  ; (which  necessity  is  called  logical, 
metaphysical,  or  mathematical ;)  and  a necessity  which  is  moral, 
whereby  a wise  being  chooses  the  best,  and  every  mind  follows  the 
strongest  inclination. 

5.  Hypothetical  necessity  is  that,  which  the  supposition  or 
hypothesis  of  God’s  foresight  and  pre-ordination  lays  upon  future 
contingents.  And  this  must  needs  he  admitted,  unless  we  deny,  as 
the  Socinians  do,  God’s  foreknowledge  of  future  contingents,  and 
his  providence  which  regulates  and  governs  every  particular  thing. 

6.  But  neither  that  foreknowledge,  nor  that  pre-ordination, 
derogate  from  liberty.  For  God,  being  moved  by  his  supreme 
reason  to  choose,  among  many  series  of  things  or  worlds  possible, 
that,  in  which  free  creatures  should  take  such  or  such  resolutions, 
though  not  without  his  concourse ; lias  thereby  rendered  every 
event  certain  and  determined  once  for  all ; without  derogating 
thereby  from  the  liberty  of  those  creatures : that  simple  decree  of 
choice,  not  at  all  changing,  but  only  actualizing  their  free  natures, 
which  he  saw  in  his  ideas. 

7.  As  for  moral  necessity,  this  also  does  not  derogate  from 
liberty.  For  when  a wise  being,  and  especially  God,  who  has 
supreme  wisdom,  chooses  what  is  best,  he  is  not  the  less  free  upon 
that  account : on  the  contrary,  it  is  the  most  perfect  liberty,  not 
to  he  hindered  from  acting  in  the  best  manner.  And  when  any 
other  chooses  according  to  the  most  apparent  and  the  most  strongly 
inclining  good,  he  imitates  therein  the  liberty  of  a truly  wise 
being,  in  proportion  to  his  disposition.  Without  this,  the  choice 
would  be  a blind  chance. 

8.  But  good,  either  true  or  apparent;  in  a word,  the  motive, 
inclines  without  necessitating ; that  is,  without  imposing  an 
absolute  necessity.  For  when  God  (for  instance)  chooses  the  best; 
what  he  does  not  choose,  and  is  inferior  in  perfection,  is  neverthe- 
less possible.  But  if  what  he  chooses,  was  absolutely  necessary  ; 
any  other  way  would  he  impossible : which  is  against  the  hypothe- 
sis. For  God  chooses  among  possibles,  that  is,  among  many  ways, 
none  of  which  implies  a contradiction. 

9.  But  to  say,  that  God  can  only  choose  what  is  best;  and  to 
infer  from  thence,  that  what  he  does  not  choose,  is  impossible ; 


31S 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


this,  I say,  is  confounding  of  terms:  ’tis  blending  power  and  will, 
metaphysical  necessity  and  moral  necessity,  essences  and  existences. 
For  what  is  necessary,  is  so  by  its  essence,  since  the  opposite 
implies  a contradiction ; but  a contingent  which  exists,  owes  its 
existence  to  the  principle  of  what  is  best,  which  is  a sufficient 
reason  for  the  existence  of  things.  And  therefore  I say,  that 
motives  incline  without  necessitating ; and  that  there  is  a certainty 
and  infallibility,  but  not  an  absolute  necessity  in  contingent  things. 
Add  to  this,  what  will  be  said  hereafter,  Nos.  73  and  76. 

10.  And  I have  sufficiently  shown  in  my  Theodiccea,  that  this 
moral  necessity  is  a good  thing,  agreeable  to  the  divine  perfection ; 
agreeable  to  the  great  principle  or  ground  of  existences,  which  is 
that  of  the  want  of  a sufficient  reason:  whereas  absolute  and 
metaphysical  necessity,  depends  upon  the’ other  great  principle  of 
our  reasonings,  viz.  that  of  essences;  that  is,  the  principle  of  iden- 
tity or  contradiction:  for  what  is- absolutely  necessary,  is  the  only 
possible  way,  and  its  contrary  implies  a contradiction. 

11.  I have  also  shown,  that  our  will  does  not  always  exactly 
follow  the  practical  understanding ; because  it  may  have  or  find 
reasons  to  suspend  its  resolution  till  a further  examination. 

12.  To  impute  to  me  after  this,  the  notion  of  an  absolute 
necessity,  without  having  anything  to  say  against  the  reasons  which 
I have  just  now  alleged,  and  which  go  to  the  bottom  of  things, 
perhaps  beyond  what  is  to  be  seen  elsewhere;  this,  I say,  will  be 
an  unreasonable  obstinacy. 

13.  As  to  the  notion  of  fatality,  which  the  author  lays  also  to 
my  charge ; this  is  another  ambiguity.  There  is  a fatum  Mahom- 
etanum,  a fatum  Stoicum,  and  a fatum  Christianum.  The  Turkish 
fate  will  have  an  effect  to  happen,  even  though  its  cause  should  be 
avoided;  as  if  there  was  an  absolute  necessity.  The  Stoical  fate 
will  have  a man  to  be  quiet,  because  he  must  have  patience  whether 
he  will  or  not,  since  ’tis  impossible  to  resist  the  course  of  things. 
But  'tis  agreed,  that  there  is  fatum  Christianum,  a certain  destiny 
of  every  thing,  regulated  by  the  foreknowledge  and  providence  of 
God.  Fatum  is  derived  from  fari;  that  is  to  pronounce,  to  decree; 
and  in  its  right  sense,  it  signifies  the  decree  of  providence.  And 
those  who  submit  to  it  through  a knowledge  of  the  divine  perfec- 
tions, whereof  the  love  of  God  is  a consequence,  have  not  only 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


349 


patience,  like  the  heathen  philosophers,  but  are  also  contented  with 
what  is  ordained  by  God,  knowing  he  does  every  thing  for  the  best ; 
and  not  only  for  the  greatest  good  in  general,  hut  also  for  the 
greatest  particular  good  of  those  who  love  him. 

14.  I have  been  obliged  to  enlarge,  in  order  to  remove  ill- 
grounded  imputations  once  for  all ; as  I hope  I shall  be  able  to  do 
by  these  explications,  so  as  to  satisfy  equitable  persons.  I shall 
now  come  to  an  objection  raised  here,  against  my  comparing  the 
weights  of  a balance  with  the  motives  of  the  will.  ’Tis  objected, 
that  a balance  is  merely  passive  and  moved  by  the  weights ; 
whereas  agents  intelligent,  and  endowed  with  will,  are  active.  To 
this  I answer,  that  the  principle  of  the  want  of  a sufficient  reason 
is  common  both  to  agents  and  patients:  they  want  a sufficient 
reason  of  their  action,  as  well  as  of  their  passion.  A balance  does 
not  only  act,  when  it  is  equally  pulled  on  both  sides ; but  the 
equal  weights  likewise  do  not  act  when  they  are  in  an  equilibrium, 
so  that  one  of  them  cannot  go  down  without  the  other’s  rising  up  as 
much. 

15.  It  must  also  be  considered,  that,  properly  speaking,  motives 
do  not  act  upon  the  mind,  as  weights  do  upon  a balance ; hut  ’tis 
rather  the  mind  that  acts  by  virtue  of  the  motives,  which  are  its 
dispositions  to  act.  And  therefore  to  pretend,  as  the  author  does 
here,  that  the  mind  prefers  sometimes  weak  motives  to  strong  ones, 
and  even  that  it  prefers  that  which  is  indifferent  before  motives: 
this,  I say,  is  to  divide  the  mind  from  the  motives,  as  if  they  were 
without  the  mind,  as  the  weight  is  distinct  from  the  balance;  and 
as  if  the  mind  had,  besides  motives,  other  dispositions  to  act,  by 
virtue  of  which  it  could  reject  or  accept  the  motives.  Whereas,  in 
truth,  the  motives  comprehend  all  the  dispositions,  which  the  mind 
can  have  to  act  voluntarily ; for  they  include  not  only  the  reasons, 
but  also  the  inclinations  arising  from  passions,  or  other  preceding 
impressions.  Wherefore,  if  the  mind  should  prefer  a weak  incli- 
nation to  a strong  one,  it  would  act  against  itself,  and  otherwise 
than  it  is  disposed  to  act.  Which  shows  that  the  author’s  notions, 
contrary  to  mine,  are  superficial,  and  appear  to  have  no  solidity  in 
them,  when  they  are  well  considered. 

16.  To  assert  also,  that  the  mind  may  have  good  reasons  to  act, 
when  it  has  no  motives,  and  when  things  are  absolutely  indifferent , 


350 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


as  the  author  explains  himself  here;  this,  I say,  is  a manifest  con- 
tradiction. For  if  the  mind  has  good  reasons  for  taking  the  part 
it  takes,  then  the  things  are  not  indifferent  to  the  mind. 

17.  And  to  affirm  that  the  mind  will  act,  when  it  has  reasons  to 
act,  even  though  the  ways  of  acting  were  absolutely  indifferent : 
this,  1 say,  is  to  speak  again  very  superficially,  and  in  a manner 
that  cannot  be  defended.  For  a man  never  has  a sufficient  reason 
to  act,  when  he  has  not  also  a sufficient  reason  to  act  in  a certain 
particular  manner ; every  action  being  individual,  and  not  general, 
nor  abstract  from  its  circumstances,  hut  always  needing  some  par- 
ticular way  of  being  put  in  execution.  Wherefore,  when  there  is 
a sufficient  reason  to  do  any  particular  thing,  there  is  also  a suffi- 
cient reason  to  do  it  in  a certain  particular  manner ; ' and  conse- 
quently, several  manners  of  doing  it  are  not  indifferent.  As  often 
as  a man  has  sufficient  reasons  for  a single  action,  he  has  also  suffi- 
cient reasons  for  all  its  requisites.  See  also  what  I shall  say  below, 
No.  66. 

18.  These  arguments  are  very  obvious:  and  'tis  very  strange  to 
charge  me  with  advancing  my  principle  of  the  want  of  a sufficient 
reason,  without  any  proof  drawn  either  from  the  nature  of  things, 
or  from  the  divine  perfections.  For  the  nature  of  things  requires, 
that  every  event,  should  have  beforehand  its  proper  conditions, 
requisites,  and  dispositions,  the  existence  whereof  makes  the  suffi- 
cient reason  of  such  event. 

19.  And  God’s  perfection  requires,  that  all  his  actions  should  be 
agreeable  to  his  wisdom ; and  that  it  may  not  be  said  of  him,  that 
he  has  acted  without  reason ; or  even  that  he  has  preferred  a 
weaker  reason  before  a stronger. 

20.  But  I shall  speak  more  largely  at  the  conclusion  of  this 
paper,  concerning  the  solidity  and  importance  of  this  great  prin- 
ciple, of  the  want  of  a sufficient  reason  in  order  to  every  event ; the 
overthrowing  of  which  principle,  would  overthrow  the  best  part  of 
all  philosophy.  ’Tis  therefore  very  strange  that  the  author  should 
say,  I am  herein  guilty  of  a petitio  principii;  and  it  plainly 
appears  he  is  desirous  to  maintain  indefensible  opinions,  since  he  is 
reduced  to  deny  that  great  principle,  which  is  one  of  the  most 
essential  principles  of  reason. 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


351 


To  § 3 and  4. 

21.  It  must  be  confessed,  that  though  this  great  principle  has 
been  acknowledged,  yet  it  has  not  been  sufficiently  made  use  of. 
Which  is,  in  great  measure,  the  reason  why  the  prima  philosophia 
has  not  been  hitherto  so  fruitful  and  demonstrative,  as  it  should 
have  been.  I infer  from  that  principle,  among  other  consequences, 
that  there  are  not  in  nature  two  real,  absolute  beings,  indiscernible 
from  each  other ; because  if  there  were,  God  and  nature  would  act 
without  reason,  in  ordering  the  one  otherwise  than  the  other ; and 
that  therefore  God  does  not  produce  two  pieces  of  matter  perfectly 
equal  and  alike.  The  author  answers  this  conclusion,  without  con- 
futing the  reason  of  it ; and  he  answers  with  a very  weak  ob j ec- 
tion.  That  argument,  says  he,  if  it  was  good,  would  prove  that  it 
would  be  impossible  for  God  to-  create  any  matter  at  all.  For,  the 
perfectly  solid  parts  of  matter,  if  we  take  them  of  equal  figure  and 
dimensions,  ( which  is  always  possible  in  supposition) , would  be 
exactly  alike.  But  ’tis  a manifest  petitio  principii  to  suppose  that 
perfect  likeness,  which,  according  to  me,  cannot  be  admitted.  This 
supposition  of  two  indiscer  rubles,  such  as  two  pieces  of  matter  per- 
fectly alike,  seems  indeed  to  be  possible  in  abstract  terms ; but  it 
is  not  consistent  with  the  order  of  things,  nor  with  the  divine  wis- 
dom, by  which  nothing  is  admitted  without  reason.  The  vulgar 
fancy  such  things,  because  they  content  themselves  with  incomplete 
notions.  And  this  is  one  of  the  faults  of  the  atomists. 

22.  Besides ; I don’t  admit  in  matter,  parts  perfectly  solid,  or 
that  are  the  same  throughout,  without  any  variety  or  particular 
motion  in  their  parts,  as  the  pretended  atoms  are  imagined  to  be. 
To  suppose  such  bodies,  is  another  popular  opinion  ill-grounded. 
According  to  my  demonstrations,  every  part  of  matter  is  actually 
subdivided  into  parts  differently  moved,  and  no  one  of  them  is  per- 
fectly like  another. 

23.  I said,  that  in  sensible  things,  two,  that  are  indiscernible 
from  each  other,  can  never  be  found ; that  (for  instance)  two 
leaves  in  a garden,  or  two  drops  of  water,  perfectly  alike,  are  not 
to  be  found.  The  author  acknowledges  it  as  to  leaves,  and  perhaps 
as  to  drops  of  water.  But  he  might  have  admitted  it,  with- 
out any  hesitation,  without  a perhaps,  (an  Italian  would  say, 
senza  forse, ) as  to  drops  of  water  likewise. 


352 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


24.  I believe  that  these  general  observations  in  things  sensible, 
hold  also  in  proportion  in  things  insensible,  and  that  one  may  say, 
in  this  respect,  what  Harlequin  says  in  the  Emperor  of  the  Moon; 
’ tis  there,  just  as  ’ tis  here.  And  ’tis  a great  objection  against 
indiscernibles,  that  no  instance  of  them  is  to  be  found.  But  the 
author  opposes  this  consequence,  because  (says  he)  sensible  bodies 
are  compounded ; whereas  he  maintains  there  are  insensible 
bodies  which  are  simple.  I answer  again  that  I don’t  admit 
simple  bodies.  There  is  nothing  simple,  in  my  opinion,  but  true 
monads,  which  have  neither  parts  nor  extension.  Simple  bodies, 
and  even  perfectly  similar  ones,  are  a consequence  of  the  false 
hypothesis  of  a vacuum  and  of  atoms,  or  of  lazy  philosophy,  which 
does  not  sufficiently  carry  on  the  analysis  of  things,  and  fancies 
it  can  attain  to  the  first  material  elements  of  nature,  because  our 
imagination  would  be  therewith  satisfied. 

25.  When  I deny  that  there  are  two  drops  of  water  perfectly 
alike,  or  any  two  other  bodies  indiscernible  from  each  other;  I 
don’t  say,  ’tis  absolutely  impossible  to  suppose  them;  but  that  ’tis 
a thing  contrary  to  the  divine  wisdom,  and  which  consequently 
does  not  exist. 

To  § 5 and  6. 

26.  I own,  that  if  two  tilings  perfectly  indiscernible  from  each 
other  did  exist,  they  would  be  two;  but  that  supposition  is  false, 
and  contrary  to  the  grand  principle  of  reason.  The  vulgar  phi- 
losophers were  mistaken,  when  they  believed  that  there  are  things 
different  solo  numero,  or  only  because  they  are  two;  and  from 
this  error  have  arisen  their  perplexities  about  what  they  called 
the  principle  of  individuation.  Metaphysics  have  generally  been 
handled  like  a science  of  mere  words,  like  a philosophical  diction- 
ary, without  entering  into  the  discussion  of  things.  Superficial 
philosophy,  such  as  is  that  of  the  atomists  and  vacuists,  forges 
things,  which  superior  reasons  do  not  admit.  I hope  my  demon- 
strations will  change  the  face  of  philosophy,  notwithstanding  such 
weak  objections  as  the  author  raises  here  against  me. 

27.  The  parts  of  time  or  place,  considered  in  themselves,  are 
ideal  things ; and  therefore  they  perfectly  resemble  one  another, 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


353 


like  two  abstract  units.  But  it  is  not  so  with  two  concrete  ones , or 
with  two  real  times,  or  two  spaces  filled  up,  that  is,  truly  actual. 

28.  I don’t  say  that  two  points  of  space  are  one  and  the  same 
point,  nor  that  two  instants  of  time  are  one  and  the  same  instant, 
as  the  author  seems  to  charge  me  with  saying.  But  a man  may 
fancy,  for  want  of  knowledge,  that  there  are  two  different  instants, 
where  there  is  but  one : in  like  manner  as  I observed  in  the  17th 
paragraph  of  the  foregoing  answer,  that  frequently  in  geometry 
we  suppose  two,  in  order  to  represent  the  error  of  a gainsayer, 
when  there  is  really  hut  one.  If  any  man  should  suppose  that 
a right  line  cuts  another  in  two  points ; it  will  be  found  after 
all,  that  those  two  pretended  points  must  coincide,  and  make  but 
one  point. 

29.  I have  demonstrated,  that  space  is  nothing  else  but  an  order 
of  the  existence  of  things,  observed  as  existing  together ; and  there- 
fore the  fiction  of  a material  finite  universe,  moving  forward  in  an 
infinite  empty  space,  cannot  he  admitted.  It  is  altogether  unrea- 
sonable and  impracticable.  For,  besides  that  there  is  no  real  space 
out  of  the  material  universe;  such  an  action  would  be  without  any 
design  in  it ; it  would  be  Avorking  without  doing  anything,  agendo 
nihil  agere.  There  Avould  happen  no  change,  which  could  be 
observed  by  any  person  whatsoever.  These  are  imaginations  of 
philosophers  who  have  incomplete  notions,  who  make  space  an 
absolute  reality.  Mere  mathematicians,  who  are  only  taken  up 
with  the  conceits  of  imagination,  are  apt  to  forge  such  notions ; 
but  they  are  destroyed  by  superior  reasons. 

30.  Absolutely  speaking,  it  appears  that  God  can  make  the 
material  universe  finite  in  extension;  but  the  contrary  appears 
more  agreeable  to  his  wisdom. 

31.  I don’t  grant,  that  every  finite  is  movable.  According  to 
the  hypothesis  of  my  adversaries  themselves,  a part  of  space, 
though  finite,  is  not  movable.  What  is  movable,  must  be  capable 
of  changing  its  situation  with  respect  to  something  else,  and  to  be 
in  a new  state  discernible  from  the  first:  otherwise  the  change  is 
but  a fiction.  A movable  finite,  must  therefore  make  part  of 
another  finite,  that  any  change  may  happen  which  can  be  observed. 

32.  Cartesius  maintains,  that  matter  is  unlimited ; and  I don't 
think  he  has  been  sufficiently  confuted.  And  though  this  be 

23 


354 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


granted  him,  yet  it  does  not  follow  that  matter  would  he  necessary , 
nor  that  it  would  have  existed  from  all  eternity;  since  that 
unlimited  diffusion  of  matter,  would  only  he  an  effect  of  God’s 
choice  judging  that  to  be  the  better. 

To  § 7. 

33.  Since  space  in  itself  is  an  ideal  thing,  like  time ; space  out 
of  the  world  must  needs  be  imaginary,  as  the  schoolmen  them- 
selves have  acknowledged.  The  case  is  the  same  with  empty  space 
within  the  world ; which  I take  also  to  he  imaginary,  for  the 
reasons  before  alleged. 

34.  The  author  objects  against  me  the  vacuum  discovered  by 
Mr.  Guerike  of  Magdeburg , which  is  made  by  pumping  the  air 
out  of  a receiver ; and  he  pretends  that  there  is  truly  a perfect 
vacuum , or  a space  without  matter  (at  least  in  part),  in  that 
receiver.  The  Aristotelians  and  Cartesians,  who  do  not  admit  a 
true  vacuum,  have  said  in  answer  to  that  experiment  of  Mr. 
Guerike,  as  well  as  to  that  of  Torricellius  of  Florence  (who 
emptied  the  air  out  of  a glass-tube  by  the  help  of  quicksilver), 
that  there  is  no  vacuum  at  all  in  the  tube  or  in  the  receiver : since 
glass  has  small  pores,  which  the  beams  of  light,  the  effluvia  of  the 
loadstone,  and  other  very  thin  fluids  may  go  through.  I am  of 
their  opinion:  and  I think  the  receiver  may  be  compared  to 
a box  full  of  holes  in  the  water,  having  fish  or  other  gross  bodies 
shut  up  in  it ; which  being  taken  out,  their  place  would  never- 
theless be  filled  up  with  water.  There  is  only  this  difference 
that  though  water  be  fluid  and  more  yielding  than  those 
gross  bodies,  yet  it  is  as  heavy  and  massive,  if  not  more,  than 
they:  whereas  the  matter  which  gets  into  the  receiver  in  the 
room  of  the  air,  is  much  more  subtile.  The  new  sticklers  for 
a vacuum  allege  in  answer  to  this  instance,  that  it  is  not  the  gross- 
ness of  matter,  but  its  mere  quantity,  that  makes  resistance;  and 
consequently  that  there  is  of  necessity  more  vacuum,  where  there 
is  less  resistance.  They  add,  that  the  subtileness  of  matters  has 
nothing  to  do  here;  and  that  the  particles  of  quicksilver  are  as 
subtile  and  fine  as  those  of  water ; and  yet  that  quicksilver  resists 
above  ten  times  more.  To  this  I reply,  that  it  is  not  so  much  the 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


355 


quantity  of  matter,  as  its  difficulty  of  giving  place,  that  makes 
resistance.  For  instance;  floating  timber  contains  less  of  heavy 
matter,  than  an  equal  bulk  of  water  does ; and  yet  it  makes  more 
resistance  to  a boat,  than  the  water  does. 

35.  And  as  for  quicksilver ; ’tis  true,  it  contains  about  fourteen 
times  more  of  heavy  matter,  than  an  equal  bulk  of  water  does ; 
but  it  does  not  follow,  that  it  contains  fourteen  times  more  matter 
absolutely.  On  the  contrary, ' water  contains  as  much  matter ; if 
we  include  both  its  own  matter,  which  is  heavy ; and  the  extrane- 
ous matter  void  of  heaviness,  which  passes  through  its  pores.  For, 
both  quicksilver  and  water  arq  masses  of  heavy  matter,  full  of 
pores,  through  which  there  passes  a great  deal  of  matter  void  of 
heaviness  [and  which  does  not  sensibly  resist]  ; such  as  is 
probably  that  of  the  rays  of  light,  and  other  insensible  fluids ; and 
especially  that  which  is  itself  the  cause  of  the  gravity  of  gross 
bodies,  by  receding  from  the  center  towards  which  it  drives  those 
bodies.  For,  it  is  a strange  imagination  to  make  all  matter 
gravitate,  and  that  towards  all  other  matter,  as  if  each  body  did 
equally  attract  every  other  body  according  to  their  masses  and 
distances ; and  this  by  an  attraction  properly  so  called,  which  is 
not  derived  from  an  occult  impulse  of  bodies  : whereas  the  gravity 
of  sensible  bodies  towards  the  center  of  the  earth,  ought  to  be 
produced  by  the  motion  of  some  fluid.  And  the  case  must  be 
the  same  with  other  gravities,  such  as  is  that  of  the  planets 
towards  the  sun  or  towards  each  other.  [A  body  is  never  moved 
naturally  except  by  another  body  which  impels  it  by  touching 
it;  and  afterwards  it  advances  until  it  is  stopped  by  another 
body  which  touches  it.  Every  other  operation  on  bodies  is  either 
miraculous  or  imaginary.] 

To  § 8 and  9. 

36.  I objected,  that  space,  taken  for  something  real  and 
absolute  without  bodies,  would  be  a thing  eternal,  impassible,  and 
independent  upon  God.  The  author  endeavors  to  elude  this 
difficulty,  by  saying  that  space  is  a property  of  God.  In  answer 
to  this,  I have  said,  in  my  foregoing  paper,  that  the  property  of 
God  is  immensity ; but  that  space  (which  is  often  commensurate 
with  bodies),  and  God’s  immensity,  are  not  the  same  thing. 


356 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


37.  I objected  further,  that  if  space  he  a property,  and  infinite 
space  he  the  immensity  of  God ; finite  space  will  be  the  extension 
or  measurability  of  something  finite.  And  therefore  the  space 
taken  up  by  a body,  will  be  the  extension  of  that  body.  Which  is 
an  absurdity ; since  a body  can  change  space,  but  cannot  leave  its 
extension. 

38.  I asked  also:  if  space  is  a property,  what  thing  will  an 
empty  limited  space,  (such  as  that  which  my  adversary  imagines 
in  an  exhausted  receiver,)  be  the  property  of?  It  does  not  appear 
reasonable  to  say,  that  this  empty  space  either  round  or  square,  is 
a property  of  God.  Will  it  be  then  perhaps  the  property  of  some 
immaterial,  extended,  imaginary  substances,  which  the  author 
seems  to  fancy  in  the  imaginary  spaces  ? 

39.  If  space  is  the  property  or  affection  of  the  substance,  which 
is  in  space;  the  same  space  will  be  sometimes  the  affection  of  one 
body,  sometimes  of  another  body,  sometimes  of  an  immaterial  sub- 
stance, and  sometimes  perhaps  of  God  himself,  when  it  is  void  of 
all  other  substance  material  or  immaterial.  But  this  is  a strange 
property  or  affection,  which  passes  from  one  subject  to  another. 
Thus  subjects  will  leave  off  their  accidents,  like  clothes ; that  other 
subjects  may  put  them  on.  At  this  rate,  how  shall  we  distinguish 
accidents  and  substances  ? 

10.  And  if  limited  spaces  are  the  affections  of  limited  sub- 
stances, which  are  in  them ; and  infinite  space  be  a property  of 
God;  a property  of  God  must  (which  is  very  strange)  be  made 
up  of  the  affections  of  creatures ; for  all  finite  spaces  taken 
together  make  up  infinite  space, 

41.  But  if  the  author  denies,  that  limited  space  is  an  affection 
of  limited  things;  it  will  not  be  reasonable  neither,  that  infinite 
space  should  be  the  affection  or  property  of  an  infinite  thing.  I 
have  suggested  all  these  difficulties  in  my  foregoing  paper;  but  it 
does  not  appear  that  the  author  has  endeavored  to  answer  them. 

42.  I have  still  other  reasons  against  this  strange,  imagination, 
that  space  is  a property  of  God.  If  it  be  so,  space  belongs  to  the 
essence  of  God.  But  space  has  parts:  therefore  there  would  be 
parts  in  the  essence  of  God.  Spectatum  admissi. 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


357 


43.  Moreover,  spaces  are  sometimes  empty,  and  sometimes 
filled  up.  Therefore  there  will  be  in  the  essence  of  God,  parts 
sometimes  empty  and  sometimes  full,  and  consequently  liable  to 
a perpetual  change.  Bodies,  filling  up  space,  would  fill  up  part 
of  God’s  essence,  and  would  be  commensurate  with  it ; and  in  the 
supposition  of  a vacuum,  part  of  God’s  essence  will  be  within 
the  receiver.  Such  a God  having  parts,  will  very  much  resemble 
the  Stoic  s God,  which  was  the  whole  universe  considered  as  a 
divine  animal. 

44.  If  infinite  space  is  God’s  immensity,  infinite  time  will  be 
God’s  eternity ; and  therefore  we  must  say,  that  what  is  in  space, 
is  in  God’s  immensity,  and  consequently  in  his  essence;  and  that 
what  is  in  time,  is  also  in  the  essence  of  God.  Strange  expres- 
sions.; which  plainly  show,  that  the  author  makes  a wrong  use  of 
terms. 

45.  I shall  give  another  instance  of  this.  God’s  immensity 
makes  him  actually  present  in  all  spaces.  But  now  if  God  is  in 
space,  how  can  it  be  said  that  space  is  in  God,  or  that  it  is  a prop- 
erty of  God?  We  have  often  heard,  that  a property  is  in  its  sub- 
ject; but  we  never  heard,  that  a subject  is  in  its  property.  In 
like  manner,  God  exists  in  all  time.  ITow  then  can  time  be  in 
God ; and  how  can  it  he  a property  of  God  ? These  are  perpetual 
alloglossies. 

46.  It  appears  that  the  author  confounds  immensity,  or  the 
extension  of  things , with  the  space  according  to  which  that  exten- 
sion is  taken.  Infinite  space  is  not  the  immensity  of  God  ; finite 
space  is  not  the  extension  of  bodies : as  time  is  not  their  duration. 
Things  keep  their  extension,  but  they  do  not  always  keep  their 
space.  Everything  lias  its  own  extension,  its  own  duration ; but 
it  has  not  its  own  time,  and  does  not  keep  its  own  space. 

47.  I 'will  here  show,  how  men  come  to  form  to  themselves  the 
notion  of  space.  They  consider  that  many  things  exist  at  once, 
and  they  observe  in  them  a certain  order  of  co-existence,  according 
to  which  the  relation  of  one  thing  to  another  is  more  or  less  simple. 
This  order  is  their  situation  or  distance.  When  it  happens  that 
one  of  those  co-existent  things  changes  its  relation  to  a multitude 
of  others,  which  do  not  change  their  relation  among  themselves; 


358 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


and  that  another  thing,  newly  come,  acquires  the  same  relation  to 
the  others,  as  the  former  had ; we  then  say  it  is  come  into  the 
place  of  the  former ; and  this  change,  we  call  a motion  in  that 
body,  wherein  is  the  immediate  cause  of  the  change.  And  though 
many,  or  even  all  the  co-existent  things,  should  change  according 
to  certain  known  rules  of  direction  and  swiftness ; yet  one  may 
always  determine  the  relation  of  situation,  which  every  co-existent 
acquires  with  respect  to  every  other  co-existent;  and  even  that 
relation,  which  any  other  co-existent  would  have  to  this,  or  which 
this  would  have  to  any  other,  if  it  had  not  changed,  or  if  it  had 
changed  any  otherwise.  And  supposing,  or  feigning,  that  among 
those  co-existents  there  is  a sufficient  number  of  them,  ivliich  have 
undergone  no  change;  then  we  may  say,  that  those  which  have 
such  a relation  to  those  fixed  existents,  as  others  had  to  them 
before,  have  now  the  same  place  which  those  others  had.  And 
that  which  comprehends  all  those  places,  is  called  space.  Which 
shows,  that  in  order  to  have  an  idea  of  place,  and  consequently 
of  space,  it  is  sufficient  to  consider  these  relations,  and  the  rules 
of  their  changes,  without  needing  to  fancy  any  absolute  reality 
out  of  the  things  whose  situation  we  consider,  and,  to  give  a kind 
of  definition:  place  is  that,  which  we  say  is  the  same  to  A,  and 
to  B,  when  the  relation  of  the  co-existence  of  B,  with  C,  E , F,  G, 
&c.,  agrees  perfectly  with  the  relation  of  the  co-existence,  which 
A had  with  the  same  C,  E,  F,  G,  &c.,  supposing  there  has  been 
no  cause  of  change  in  C,  E,  F,  G,  &c.  It  might  be  said  also,  with- 
out entering  into  any  further  particularity,  that  place  is  that, 
which  is  the  same  in  different  moments  to  different  existent 
things,  when  their  relations  of  co-existence  with  certain  other 
existents,  which  are  supposed  to  continue  fixed  from  one  of  those 
moments  to  the  other,  agree  entirely  together.  And  fixed  existents 
are  those,  in  which  there  has  been  no  cause  of  any  change  of  the 
order  of  their  co-existence  with  others ; or  (which  is  the  same 
thing),  in  which  there  has  been  no  motion.  Lastly,  space  is  that 
which  results  from  places  taken  together.  And  here  it  may  not  be 
amiss  to  consider  the  difference  between  place , and  the  relation  of 
situation,  which  is  in  the  body  that  fills  up  the  place.  For,  the 
place  of  A and  B,  is  the  same ; whereas  the  relation  of  A to  fixed 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


359 


bodies,  is  not  precisely  and  individually  the  same,  as  tbe  rela- 
tion which  B (that  conies  into  its  place)  will  have  to  the  same 
fixed  bodies;  but  these  relations  agree  only.  For  two  different 
subjects,  as  A and  B,  cannot  have  precisely  the  same  individual 
affection;  it  being  impossible,  that  the  same  individual  accident 
should  be  in  two  subjects,  or  pass  from  one  subject  to  another. 
But  the  mind  not  contented  with  an  agreement,  looks  for  an 
identity,  for  something  that  should  be  truly  the  same;  and  con- 
ceives it  as  being  extrinsic  to  the  subject : and  this  is  what  we  here 
call  place  and  space.  But  this  can  only  be  an  ideal  thing;  con- 
taining a certain  order,  wherein  the  mind  conceives  the  applica- 
tion of  relations.  In  like  manner,  as  the  mind  can  fancy  to  itself 
an  order  made  up  of  genealogical  lines,  whose  bigness  would  con- 
sist only  in  the  number  of  generations,  wherein  every  person 
would  have  his  place:  and  if  to  this  one  should  add  the  fiction  of 
a metempsychosis,  and  bring  in  the  same  human  souls  again ; the 
persons  in  those  lines  might  change  place;  he  who  was  a father, 
or  a grand-father,  might  become  a son,  or  a grand-son,  &c.  And 
yet  those  genealogical  places,  lines,  and  spaces,  though  they  should 
express  real  truths,  would  only  be  ideal  things.  I shall  allege 
another  example,  to  show  how  the  mind  uses,  upon  occasion  of 
accidents  which  are  in  subjects,  to  fancy  to  itself  something 
answerable  to  those  accidents,  out  of  the  subjects.  The  ratio  or 
proportion  between  two  lines  L and  M,  may  be  conceived  three 
several  ways ; as  a ratio  of  the  greater  L to  the  lesser  M ; as  a 
ratio  of  the  lesser  M to  the  greater  L;  and  lastly,  as  something- 
abstracted  from  both,  that  is,  the  ratio  between  L and  M,  without 
considering  which  is  the  antecedent,  or  which  the  consequent; 
which  the  subject,  and  which  the  object.  And  thus  it  is,  that 
proportions  are  considered  in  music.  In  the  first  way  of  con- 
sidering them,  L the  greater;  in  the  second,  M the  lesser,  is  the 
subject  of  that  accident,  which  philosophers  call  relation.  But, 
which  of  them  will  be  the  subject,  in  the  third  way  of  considering 
them  ? It  cannot  be  said  that  both  of  them,  L and  M together, 
are  the  subject  of  such  an  accident;  for  if  so,  we  should  have 
an  accident  in  two  subjects,  with  one  leg  in  one,  and  the  other 
in  the  other ; which  is  contrary  to  the  notion  of  accidents.  There- 


360 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LFIBNITZ. 


for©  we  must  say  that  this  relation,  in  this  third  way  of  consider- 
ing it,  is  indeed  out  of  the  subjects;  but  being  neither  a substance, 
nor  an  accident,  it  must  be  a mere  ideal  thing,  the  consideration 
of  which  is  nevertheless  useful.  To  conclude:  I have  here  done 
much  like  Euclid , who  not  being  able  to  make  his  readers  well 
understand  what  ratio  is  absolutely  in  the  sense  of  geometricians ; 
defines  what  are  the  same  ratios.  Thus,  in  like  manner,  in  order 
to  explain  what  place  is,  I have  been  content  to  define  what  is  the 
same  place.  Lastly ; I observe,  that  the  traces  of  movable  bodies, 
which  they  leave  sometimes  upon  the  immovable  ones  on  which 
they  are  moved ; have  given  men  occasion  to  form  in  their 
imagination  such  an  idea,  as  if  some  trace  did  still  remain,  even 
when  there  is  nothing  unmoved.  But  this  is  a mere  ideal  thing, 
and  imports  only,  that  if  there  ivas  any  unmoved  thing  there,  the 
trace  might  he  marked  out  upon  it.  And  ’tis  this  analogy,  which 
makes  men  fancy  places,  traces  and  spaces ; though  these  things 
consist  only  in  the  truth  of  relations,  and  not  at  all  in  any  absolute 
reality. 

48.  To  conclude.  If  the  space  (which  the  author  fancies)  void 
of  all  bodies,  is  not  altogether  empty ; what  is  it  then  full  of  ? Is 
it  full  of  extended  spirits  perhaps,  or  immaterial  substances,  capa- 
ble of  extending  and  contracting  themselves ; which  move  therein, 
and  penetrate  each  other  without  any  inconveniencv,  as  the 
shadows  of  two  bodies  penetrate  one  another  upon  the  surface  of 
a wall  ? Methinks  I see  the  revival  of  the  odd  imaginations  of 
Dr.  Henry  More  (otherwise  a learned  and  well-meaning  man), 
and  of  some  others,  who  fancied  that  those  spirits  can  make  them- 
selves impenetrable  whenever  they  please.  Hay,  some  have 
fancied,  that  man  in  the  state  of  innocency,  had  also  the  gift 
of  penetration ; and  that  he  became  solid,  opaque,  and  impene- 
trable by  his  fall.  Is  it  not  overthrowing  our  notions  of  things,  to 
make  God  have  parts,  to  make  spirits  have  extension  ? The  prin- 
ciple of  the  want  of  a sufficient  reason  does  alone  drive  away  all 
these  spectres  of  imagination.  Men  easily  run  into  fictions,  for 
want  of  making  a right  use  of  that  great  principle. 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


361 


To  § 10. 

49.  It  cannot  be  said,  that  [a  certain]  duration  is  eternal ; but 
that  things,  which  continue  always,  are  eternal,  [by  gaining 
always  new  duration.]  Whatever  exists  of  time  and  of  duration, 
[being  successive]  perishes  continually : and  how  can  a thing 
exist  eternally,  which,  (to  speak  exactly,)  does  never  exist  at  all? 
Tor,  how  can  a thing  exist,  whereof  no  part  does  ever  exist? 
ISTothing  of  time  does  ever  exist,  but  instants ; and  an  instant  is 
not  even  itself  a part  of  time.  Whoever  considers  these  observa- 
tions, will  easily  apprehend  that  time  can  only  be  an  ideal  thing. 
And  the  analogy  between  time  and  space,  will  easily  make  it 
appeal*,  that  the  one  is  as  merely  ideal  as  the  other.  [However, 
if  by  saying  that  the  duration  of  a thing  is  eternal,  is  merely 
understood  that  it  lasts  eternally,  I have  no  objection.] 

50.  If  the  reality  of  space  and  time,  is  necessary  to  the  immen- 
sity and  eternity  of  God;  if  God  must  be  in  space;  if  being  in 
space,  is  a property  of  God;  he  will,  in  some  measure,  depend 
upon  time  and  space,  and  stand  in  need  of  them.  For  I have 
already  prevented  that  subterfuge,  that  space  and  time  are  [in 
God  and  as  it  were]  properties  of  God.  [Could  the  opinion  which 
should  affirm  that  bodies  move  about  in  the  parts  of  the  divine 
essence  be  maintained  ?] 

To  § 11  and  13. 

51.  I objected  that  space  cannot  be  in  God,  because  it  has  parts. 
Hereupon  the  author  seeks  another  subterfuge,  by  departing  from 
the  received  sense  of  words ; maintaining  that  space  has  no  parts, 
because  its  parts  are  not  separable,  and  cannot  be  removed  from 
one  another  by  discerption.  But  ’tis  sufficient  that  space  has 
parts,  whether  those  parts  be  separable  or  not;  and  they  may  be 
assigned  in  space,  either  by  the  bodies  that  are  in  it,  or  by  lines 
and  surfaces  that  may  be  drawn  and  described  in  it. 

To  § 13. 

52.  In  order  to  prove  that  space,  without  bodies,  is  an  absolute 
reality ; the  author  objected,  that  a finite  material  universe  might 
move  forward  in  space.  I answered,  it  does  not  appear  reasonable 


362 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


that  the  material  universe  should  be  finite;  and,  though  we  should 
suppose  it  to  be  finite;  yet  ’tis  unreasonable  it  should  have  motion 
any  otherwise,  than  as  its  parts  change  their  situation  among 
themselves ; because  such  a motion  would  produce  no  change  that 
could  be  observed,  and  would  be  without  design.  ’Tis  another 
thing,  when  its  parts  change  their  situation  among  themselves ; 
for  then  there  is  a motion  in  space ; but  it  consists  in  the  order  of 
relations  which  are  changed.  The  author  replies  now,  that  the 
reality  of  motion  does  not  depend  upon  being  observed;  and  that 
a ship  may  go  forward,  and  yet  a man,  who  is  in  the  ship,  may 
not  perceive  it.  I answer,  motion  does  not  indeed  depend  upon 
being  observed;  but  it  does  depend  upon  being  possible  to  be 
observed.  There  is  no  motion,  when  there  is  no  change  that  can 
be  observed.  And  when  there  is  no  change  that  can  be  observed, 
there  is  no  change  at  all.  The  contrary  opinion  is  grounded  upon 
the  supposition  of  a real  absolute  space,  which  I have  demon- 
stratively confuted  by  the  principle  of  the  want  of  a sufficient 
reason  of  things. 

53.  I find  nothing  in  the  eighth  definition  of  the  Mathematical 
Principles  of  Nature,  nor  in  the  scholium  belonging  to  it,  that 
proves,  or  can  prove,  the  reality  of  space  in  itself.  However,  I 
grant  there  is  a difference  between  an  absohde  true  motion  of  a 
body,  and  a mere  relative  change  of  its  situation  with  respect  to 
another  body.  For  when  the  immediate  cause  of  the  change  is  in 
the  body,  that  body  is  truly  in  motion ; and  then  the  situation  of 
other  bodies,  with  respect  to  it,  will  be  changed  consequently, 
though  the  cause  of  that  change  be  not  in  them.  ’Tis  time  that, 
exactly  speaking,  there  is  not  any  one  body,  that  is  perfectly  and 
entirely  at  rest ; but  we  will  frame  an  abstract  notion  of  rest,  by 
considering  the  thing  mathematically.  Thus  have  I left  nothing 
unanswered,  of  what  lias  been  alleged  for  the  absolute  reality  of 
space.  And  I have  demonstrated  the  falsehood  of  that  reality,  by 
a fundamental  principle,  one  of  the  most  certain  both  in  reason 
and  experience;  against  which,  no  exception  or  instance  can  be 
alleged.  Upon  the  whole,  one  may  judge  from  what  has  been  said, 
that  I ought  not  to  admit  a movable  universe ; nor  any  place  out 
of  the  material  universe. 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


363 


To  § 14. 

54.  I am  not  sensible  of  any  objection,  but  what  I think  I have 
sufficiently  answered.  As  for  the  objection  that  spoxe  and  time  are 
quantities,  or  rather  things  endowed  with  quantity ; and  that 
situation  and  order  are  not  so:  I answer,  that  order  also  has  its 
quantity;  there  is  in  it,  that  which  goes  before,  and  that  which 
follows ; there  is  distance  or  interval.  Relative  things  have  their 
quantity,  as  well  as  absolute  ones.  For  instance,  ratios  or  pro- 
portions in  mathematics,  have  their  quantity , and  are  measured 
by  logarithms ; and  yet  they  are  relations.  And  therefore  though 
time  and  space  consist  in  relations,  yet  they  have  their  quantity. 

To  § 15. 

55.  As  to  the  question,  whether  God  could  have  created  the 
world  sooner;  ’tis  necessary  here  to  understand  each  other  rightly. 
Since  I have  demonstrated,  that  time,  without  things,  is  nothing 
else  but  a mere  ideal  possibility ; ’tis  manifest,  if  any  one  should 
say  that  this  same  world,  which  has  been  actually  created,  might- 
have  been  created  sooner,  without  any  other  change ; he  would  say 
nothing  that  is  intelligible.  For  there  is  no  mark  or  difference, 
whereby  it  would  be  possible  to  know,  that  this  world  was  created 
sooner.  And  therefore,  (as  I have  already  said),  to  suppose  that 
God  created  the  same  world  sooner,  is  supposing  a chimerical 
thing.  ’Tis  making  time  a thing  absolute,  independent  upon  God; 
whereas  time  must  co-exist  with  creatures,  and  is  only  conceived 
by  the  order  and  quantity  of  their  changes. 

56.  But  yet  absolutely  speaking,  one  may 
conceive  that  an  universe  began  sooner,  than 
it  actually  did.  Let  us  suppose  our  uni- 
verse, or  any  other,  to  be  represented  by  the 
figure  A F ; and  that  the  ordinate  A B 
represents  its  first  state ; and  the  ordinates 
C D,  E F,  its  following  states : I say,  one 
may  conceive  that  such  a world  began 
sooner,  by  conceiving  the  figure  prolonged 
backwards,  and'by  adding  to  it  S R A B S. 
For  thus,  things  being  increased,  time  will 


R 

A. 

C 


E 


F 


304: 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


be  also  increased.  But  whether  such  an  augmentation  be  reasona- 
able  and  agreeable  to  God’s  wisdom,  is  another  question,  to  which 
we  answer  in  the  negative;  otherwise  God  would  have  made  such 
an  augmentation.  It  would  be  like  as 

Humano  capiti  cervicem  pictor  equinam 
Jungere  si  vclit. 

The  case  is  the  same  with  respect  to  the  destruction  [duration — 
Ger.~\  of  the  universe.  As  one  might  conceive  something  added 
to  the  beginning,  so  one  might  also  conceive  something  taken  off 
towards  the  end.  But  such  a retrenching  from  it,  would  be  also 
unreasonable. 

57.  Thus  it  appears  how  we  are  to  understand,  that  God 
created  things  at  what  time  he  pleased ; for  this  depends  upon  the 
things , which  he  resolved  to  create.  But  things  being  once 
resolved  upon,  together  with  their  relations ; there  remains  no 
longer  any  choice  about  the  time  and  the  place,  which  of  them- 
selves have  nothing  in  them  real,  nothing  that  can  distinguish 
them,  nothing  that  is  at  all  discernible. 

58.  One  cannot  therefore  say,  as  the  author  does  here,  that  the 
wisdom  of  God  may  have  good  reasons  to  create  this  world  at 
such  or  such  a particular  time:  that  particular  time,  considered 
without  the  things , being  an  impossible  fiction;  and  good  reasons 
for  a choice,  being  not  to  be  found,  where  everything  is  indis- 
cernible. 

59.  When  I speak  of  this  world,  I mean  the  whole  universe  of 
material  and  immaterial  creatures  taken  together,  from  the  begin- 
ning of  things.  But  if  any  one  mean  only  the  beginning  of  the 
material  world,  and  suppose  immaterial  creatures  before  it ; he 
would  have  somewhat  more  reason  for  his  supposition.  Bor  time 
then  being  marked  by  things  that  existed  already,  it  would  be  no 
longer  indifferent;  and  there  might  be  room  for  choice.  And  yet 
indeed,  this  would  be  only  putting  off  the  difficulty.  For,  suppos- 
ing the  whole  universe  of  immaterial  and  material  creatures 
together,  to  have  a beginning ; there  is  no  longer  any  choice  about 
the  time,  in  which  God  would  place  that  beginning. 

60.  And  therefore  one  must  not  say,  as  the  author  does  here, 
that  God  created  things  in  what  particular  space,  and  at  what  par- 


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365 


ticular  time  lie  pleased.  For,  all  time  and  all  spaces  being  in 
themselves  perfectly  uniform  and  indiscernible  from  each  other, 
one  of  them  cannot  please  more  than  another. 

61.  I shall  not  enlarge  here  upon  my  opinion  explained  else- 
where, that  there  are  no  created  substances  wholly  destitute  of 
matter.  For  I hold  with  the  ancients,  and  according  to  reason, 
that  angels  or  intelligences,  and  souls  separated  from  a gross  body, 
have  always  subtile  bodies,  though  they  themselves  be  incorporeal. 
The  vulgar  philosophy  easily  admits  all  sorts  of  fictions : mine 
is  more  strict. 

62.  I don’t  say  that  matter  and  space  are  the  same  thing.  I 
only  say,  there  is  no  space , where  there  is  no  matter ; and  that 
space  in  itself  is  not  an  absohite  reality.  Space  and  matter  differ, 
as  time  and  motion.  However,  these  things,  though  different,  are 
inseparable. 

63.  But  yet  it  does  not  at  all  follow,  that,  matter  is  eternal  and 
necessary ; unless  we  suppose  space  to  be  eternal  and  necessary ; 
a supposition  ill-grounded  in  all  respects. 

To  § 16  and  17. 

64.  I think  I have  answered  everything;  and  I have  particu- 
larly replied  to  that  objection,  that  space  and  time  have  quan- 
tity',  and  that  order  has  none.  See  above,  Number  54. 

65.  I have  clearly  shown  that  the  contradiction  lies  in  the 
hypothesis  of  the  opposite  opinion,  which  looks  for  a difference 
where  there  is  none.  And  it  would  be  a manifest  iniquity  to  infer 
from  thence,  that  I have  acknowledged  a contradiction  in  my  own 
opinion. 

To  § 18. 

66.  Here  I find  again  an  argument,  which  I have  overthrown 
above,  Number  17.  The  author  says,  God  may  have  good  reasons 
to  make  two  cubes  perfectly  equal  and  alike:  and  then  (says  he) 
God  must  needs  assign  them  to  their  places,  though  every  other 
respect  be  perfectly  equal.  But  things  ought  not  to  be  separated 
from  their  circumstances.  This  argument  consists  in  incomplete 
notions.  God’s  resolutions  are  never  abstract  and  imperfect : as  if 
God  decreed,  first,  to  create  the  two  cubes ; and  then,  made 


360 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OK  LEIBNITZ. 


another  decree  where  to  place  them.  Men,  being  such  limited 
creatures  as  they  are,  may  act  in  this  manner.  They  may  resolve 
upon  a thing’,  and  then  find  themselves  perplexed  about  means, 
ways,  places,  and  circumstances.  But  God  never  takes  a resolu- 
tion about  the  ends,  without  resolving  at  the  same  time  about  the 
means,  and  all  the  circumstances.  1ST ay,  I have  shown  in  my 
Theodiccea,  that  properly  speaking,  there  is  but  one  decree  for 
the  whole  universe,  whereby  God  resolved  to  bring  it  out  of  possi- 
bility into  existence.  And  therefore  God  will  not  choose  a cube, 
without  choosing  its  place  at  the  same  time;  and  he  will  never 
choose  among  indiscernibles. 

67.  The  parts  of  space  are  not  determined  and  distinguished, 
but  by  the  things  which  are  in  it:  and  the  diversity  of  things  in 
space,  determines  God  to  act  differently  upon  different  parts  of 
space.  But  space  without  things,  has  nothing  whereby  it  may  be 
distinguished ; and  indeed  not  anything  actual. 

68.  If  God  is  resolved  to  place  a certain  cube  of  matter  at  all, 
he  is  also  resolved  in  which  particular  place  to  put  it.  But  ’tis 
with  respect  to  other  parts  of  matter;  and  not  with  respect  to 
bare  space  itself,  in  which  there  is  nothing  to  distinguish  it. 

69.  But  wisdom  does  not  allow  God  to  place  at  the  same  time 
two  cubes  perfectly  equal  and  alike;  because  there  is  no  way  to 
find  any  reason  for  assigning  them  different  places.  At  this  rate, 
there  would  be  a will  without  a motive. 

70.  A will  without  motive  (such  as  superficial  reasoners 
suppose  to  be  in  God),  I compared  to  Epicurus’s  chance.  The 
author  answers ; Epicurus’s  chance  is  a blind  necessity,  and  not 
a choice  of  will.  I reply,  that  Epicurus’s  chance  is  not  a necessity, 
but  something  indifferent.  Epicurus  brought  it  in  on  purpose  to 
avoid  necessity.  ’Tis  true,  chance  is  blind ; but  a will  without 
motive  would  be  no  less  blind,  and  no  less  owing  to  mere  chance. 

To  § 19. 

71.  The  author  repeats  here,  what  has  been  already  confuted 
above,  Number  21 ; that  matter  cannot  be  created,  without  God’s 
choosing  among  indiscernibles.  He  would  be  in  the  right,  if  mat- 
ter consisted  of  atoms,  similar  particles,  or  other  the  like  fictions 


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367 


of  superficial  philosophy . But  that  great  principle,  which  proves 
there  is  no  choice  among  indiscernibles,  destroys  also  these  ill-con- 
trived fictions. 

To  § 20. 

72.  The  author  objected  against  me  in  his  third  paper  ( Num- 
bers 7 and  8)  ; that  God  would  not  have  in  himself  a principle  of 
acting,  if  he  was  determined  by  things  external.  I answered,  that 
the  ideas  of  external  things  are  in  him:  and  that  therefore  he  is 
determined  by  internal  reasons,  that  is,  by  his  wisdom.  But  the 
author  here  will  not  understand,  to  what  end  I said  it. 

To  § 21. 

73.  He  frequently  confounds,  in  his  objections  against  me, 
what  God  will  not  do,  with  what  he  cannot  do.  See  above,  Num- 
ber 9 [and  beloio  Number  76] . Bor  example;  God  can  do  every- 
thing that  is  possible,  but  he  will  do  only  what  is  best.  And  there- 
fore I don’t  say,  as  the  author  here  will  have  it,  that  God  cannot 
limit  the  extension  of  matter ; but  ’tis  likely  he  will  not  do  it, 
and  that  he  has  thought  it  better  to  set  no  bounds  to  matter. 

74.  Brom  extension  to  duration,  non  valet  consequentia. 
Though  the  extension  of  matter  were  rinlimited,  yet  it  would  not 
follow  that  its  duration  would  be  also  unlimited ; nay  even  a 
parte  ante,  it  would  not  follow,  that  it  had  no  beginning.  If  it  is 
the  nature  of  things  in  the  whole,  to  grow  uniformly  in  perfec- 
tion ; the  universe  of  creatures  must  have  had  a beginning.  And 
therefore,  there  will  be  reasons  to  limit  the  duration  of  things, 
even  though  there  were  none  to  limit  their  extension.  Besides, 
the  world’s  having  a beginning,  does  not  derogate  from  the  infinity 
of  its  duration  a parte  post ; hut  bounds  of  the  universe  would 
derogate  from  the  infinity  of  its  extension.  And  therefore  it  is 
more  reasonable  to  admit  a beginning  of  the  world,  than  to  admit 
any  bounds  of  it ; that  the  character  of  its  infinite  author,  may 
be  in  both  respects  preserved. 

75.  However,  those  who  have  admitted  the  eternity  of  the 
world,  or,  at  least,  (as  some  famous  divines  have  done,)  the 
possibility  of  its  eternity;  did  not,  for  all  that,  deny  its  depen- 
dence upon  God ; as  the  author  here  lays  to  their  charge,  without 
any  ground. 


368 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


To  § 22,  23. 

76.  He  liere  further  objects,  without  any  reason,  that,  accord- 
ing to  my  opinion,  whatever  God  can  do,  he  must  needs  have  done. 
As  if  he  was  ignorant,  that  I have  solidly  confuted  this  notion  in 
my  Theodiccea ; and  that  I have  overthrown  the  opinion  of  those, 
who  maintain  that  there  is  nothing  possible  but  what  really  hap- 
pens ; as  some  ancient  philosophers  did,  and  among  others  Dio- 
dorus in  Cicero.  The  author  confounds  moral  necessity,  which 
proceeds  from  the  choice  of  what  is  best,  with  absolute  necessity: 
he  confounds  the  will  of  God,  with  his  power.  God  can  produce 
everything  that  is  possible,  or  whatever  does  not  imply  a con- 
tradiction ; hut  he  ivills  only  to  produce  what  is  the  best  among 
things  possible.  See  wliat  has  been  said  above,  Number  9 [and 
Number  74.] 

77.  God  is  not  therefore  a necessary  agent  in  producing  crea- 
tures, since  he  acts  with  choice.  However,  what  the  author  adds 
here,  is  ill-grounded,  viz.  that  a necessary  agent  would  not  be 
an  agent  at  all.  He  frequently  affirms  things  boldly,  and  without 
any  ground;  advancing  [against  me]  notions  which  cannot  be 
proved. 

To  § 24-28. 

78.  The  author  alleges,  it  was  not  affirmed  that  space  is  God’s 
sensorium,  but  only  as  it  were  his  sensorium.  The  latter  seems  to 
be  as  improper,  and  as  little  intelligible,  as  the  former. 

To  § 29. 

79.  Space  is  not  the  place  of  all  things;  for  it  is  not  the  place 
of  Cod.  Otherwise  there  would  be  a thing  co-eternal  with  God, 
and  independent  upon  him ; nay,  he  himself  would  depend  upon 
it,  if  he  has  need  of  place. 

80.  Hor  do  I see,  how  it  can  be  said,  that  space  is  the  place  of 
ideas ; for  ideas  are  in  the  understanding. 

81.  ’Tis  also  very  strange  to  say,  that  the  sold  of  man  is  the  soul 
of  the  images  it  perceives.  The  images,  which  are  in  the  under- 
standing, are  in  the  mind : but  if  the  mind  was  the  soul  of  the 
images,  they  would  then  be  extrinsic  to  it.  And  if  the  author 


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369 


means  corporeal  images,  how  then  will  he  have  a human  mind  to 
be  the  sold  of  those  images,  they  being  only  transient  impressions 
in  a body  belonging’  to  that  sonl  ?■ 

82.  If  ’tis  by  means  of  a sensorium , that  God  perceives  what 
passes  in  the  world  ; it  seems  that  things  act  upon  him ; and  that 
therefore  he  is  what  we  mean  by  a soul  of  the  world.  The  author 
charges  me  with  repeating  objections,  without  taking  notice  of  the 
answers;  but  I don’t  see  that  he  has  answered  this  difficulty. 
They  had  better  wholly  lay  aside  this  pretended  sensorium. 

To  § 30. 

83.  The  author  speaks,  as  if  he  did  not  understand,  how, 
according  to  my  opinion,  the  soul  is  a representative  principle. 
Which  is,  as  if  he  had  never  heard  of  my  preestablished  harmony. 

84.  I don’t  assent  to  the  vulgar  notions,  that  the  images  of 
things  are  conveyed  by  the  organs  [of  sense]  to  the  soul.  Tor,  it 
is  not  conceivable  by  what  passage,  or  by  what  means  of  convey- 
ance, these  images  can  be  carried  from  the  organ  to  the  soul.  This 
vulgar  notion  in  philosophy  is  not  intelligible,  as  the  new  Carte- 
sians have  sufficiently  shown.  It  cannot  be  explained,  how 
immaterial  substance  is  affected  by  matter:  and  to  maintain  an 
unintelligible  notion  thereupon,  is  having  recourse  to  the  scholastic 
chimerical  notion  of  I know  not  what  inexplicable  species  inten- 
tionales,  passing  from  the  organs  to  the  soul.  Those  Cartesians 
saw  the  difficulty;  but  they  could  not  explain  it.  They  had 
recourse  to  a [certain  wholly  special]  concourse  of  God,  which 
would  really  be  miraculous.  But,  I think,  I have  given  the  true 
solution  of  that  enigma. 

85.  To  say  that  God  perceives  what  passes  in  the  world,  because 
he  is  present  to  the  things,  and  not  by  [the  dependence  which  the 
continuation  of  their  existence  has  upon  him  and  which  may  be 
said  to  involve]  a continual  production  of  them ; is  saying  some- 
thing unintelligible.  A mere  presence  or  proximity  of  co-exist- 
ence, is  not  sufficient  to  make  us  understand,  how  that  which 
passes  in  one  being,  should  answer  to  what  passes  in  another. 

86.  Besides;  this  is  exactly  falling  into  that  opinion,  which 
makes  God  to  be  the  soul  of  the  world ; seeing  it  supposes  God  to 

24 


370 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


perceive  things,  not  by  their  dependence  upon  him,  that  is,  by  a 
continual  production  of  what  is  good  and  perfect  in  them;  but 
by  a kind  of  perception,  such  as  that  by  which  men  fancy  our  soul 
perceives  what  passes  in  the  body.  This  is  a degrading  of  God’s 
knowledge  very  much. 

ST.  In  truth  and  reality,  this  way  of  perception  is  wholly 
chimerical,  and  has  no  place  even  in  human  souls.  They 
perceive  what  passes  without  them,  by  what  passes  within  them, 
answering  to  the  things  without;  in  virtue  of  the  harmony,  which 
God  has  preestablished  by  the  most  beautiful  and  the  most  admir- 
able of  all  his  productions ; whereby  every  simple  substance  is 
by  its  nature  (if  one  may  so  say),  a concentration,  and  a living 
mirror  of  the  whole  universe,  according  to  its  point  of  view. 
Which  is  likewise  one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  most  undeniable 
proofs  of  the  existence  of  God ; since  none  but  God,  viz.  the  uni- 
versal cause,  can  produce  such  a harmony  of  things.  But  God 
himself  cannot  perceive  things  by  the  same  means  whereby  he 
makes  other  beings  perceive  them.  He  perceives  them,  because 
he  is  able  to  produce  that  means.  And  other  beings  would  not 
be  caused  to  perceive  them,  if  he  himself  did  not  produce  them  all 
harmonious,  and  had  not  therefore  in  himself  a representation 
of  them ; not  as  if  that  representation  came  from  the  things,  but 
because  the  things  proceed  from  him,  and  because  he  is  the  efficient 
and  exemplary  cause  of  them.  He  perceives  them,  because  they 
proceed  from  him;  if  one  may  be  allowed  to  say,  that  he  perceives 
them : which  ought  not  to  be  said,  unless  we  divest  that  word  of 
its  imperfection ; for  else  it  seems  to  signify,  that  things  act  upon 
him.  They  exist,  and  are  known  to  him,  because  he  understands 
and  wills  them ; and  because  what  he  wills,  is  the  same,  as  what 
exists.  Which  appears  so  much  the  more,  because  he  makes  them 
to  be  perceived  by  one  another ; and  makes  them  perceive  one 
another  in  consequence  of  the  natures  which  he  has  given  them 
once  for  all,  and  which  he  keeps  up  only  according  to  the  laws 
of  every  one  of  them  severally ; which,  though  different  one  from 
another,  yet  terminate  in  an  exact  correspondence  of  the  results 
of  the  whole.  This  surpasses  all  the  ideas,  which  men  have 
generally  framed  concerning  the  divine  perfections,  and  the  works 


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371 


of  God;  and  raises  [ our  notion  of]  them,  to  the  highest  degree; 
as  Mr.  Bayle  has  acknowledged,  though  he  believed,  without  any 
ground,  that  it  exceeded  possibility. 

88.  To  infer  from  that  passage  of  Holy  Scripture,  wherein  God 
is  said  to  have  rested  from  his  works,  that  there  is  no  longer  a con- 
tinual production  of  them ; would  he  to  make  a very  ill  use  of 
that  text.  ’Tis  true,  there  is  no  production  of  new  simple  sub- 
stances : but  it  would  be  wrong  to  infer  from  thence,  that  God  is 
now  in  the  world,  only  as  the  soul  is  conceived  to  be  in  the  body, 
governing  it  merely  by  his  presence,  without  any  concourse  being, 
necessary  to  continue  its  existence. 

To  § 31. 

89.  The  harmony,  or  correspondence  between  the  soul  and  the 
body,  is  not  a perpetual  miracle ; but  the  effect  or  consequence 
of  an  original  miracle  worked  at  the  creation  of  things ; as  all 
natural  things  are.  Though  indeed  it  is  a perpetual  wonder,  as 
many  natural  things  are. 

90.  The  word,  preestablished  harmony,  is  a term  of  art,  I con- 
fess ; but  ’tis  not  a term  that  explains  nothing,  since  it  is  made  out 
very  intelligibly;  and  the  author  alleges  nothing,  that  shows  there 
is  any  difficulty  in  it. 

91.  The  nature  of  every  simple  substance,  soul,  or  true  monad, 
being  such,  that  its  following  state  is  a consequence  of  the  preced- 
ing one;  here  now  is  the  cause  of  the  harmony  found  out.  Tor 
God  needs  only  to  make  a simple  substance  become  once  and  from 
the  beginning,  a representation  of  the  universe,  according  to  its 
point  of  view ; since  from  thence  alone  it  follows,  that  it  will  be  so 
perpetually ; and  that  all  simple  substances  will  always  have  a 
harmony  among  themselves,  because  they  always  represent  the 
same  universe. 

To  § 32. 

92.  ’Tis  true,  that,  according  to  me,  the  soul  does  not  disturb 
the  laws  of  the  body,  nor  the  body  those  of  the  soul;  and  that  the 
soxd  and  body  do  only  agree  together;  the  one  acting  freely 
according  to  the  rules  of  final  causes ; and  the  other  acting 
mechanically , according  to  the  laws  of  efficient  causes.  But  this 


372 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


does  not  derogate  "from  the  liberty  of  our  souls,  as  the  author  here 
will  have  it.  For,  every  agent  which  acts  [with  choice — Ger.] 
according  to  final  causes,  is  free,  though  it  happens  to  agree  with 
an  agent  acting  only  by  efficient  causes  without  knowledge,  or 
mechanically ; because  God,  foreseeing  what  the  free  cause  would 
do,  did  from  the  beginning  regulate  the  machine  in  such  manner, 
that  it  cannot  fail  to  agree  with  that  free  cause.  Mr.  Jaquelot  has 
very  well  resolved  this  difficulty,  in  one  of  his  books  against  Mr. 
Bayle;  and  I have  cited  the  passage,  in  my  Theodiccea,  Part  I, 
§ 63.  I shall  speak  of  it  again  below,  Number  124. 

To  § 33. 

93.  I don’t  admit,  that  every  action  gives  a new  force  to  the 
patient.  It  frequently  happens  in  the  concourse  of  bodies,  that 
each  of  them  preserves  its  force;  as  when  two  equal  hard  bodies 
meet  directly.  Then  the  direction  only  is  changed,  without  any 
change  in  the  force ; each  of  the  bodies  receiving  the  direction  of 
the  other,  and  going  hack  with  the  same  swiftness  it  came. 

94.  However,  I am  far  from  saying  that  it  is  supernatural  to 
give  a neio  force  to  a body;  for  I acknowledge  that  one  body 
does  frequently  receive  a new  force  from  another,  which  loses  as 
much  of  its  own.  But  I say  only,  ’tis  supernatural  that  the  whole 
universe  of  bodies  should  receive  a new  force ; and  consequently 
that  one  body  should  acquire  any  new  force,  without  the  loss  of  as 
much  in  others.  And  therefore  I say  likewise,  ’tis  an  indefensible 
opinion  to  suppose  the  soul  gives  force  to  the  body ; for  then  the 
whole  universe  of  bodies  would  receive  a neto  force. 

95.  The  author’s  dilemma  here,  is  ill-grounded ; viz.  that 
according  to  me,  either  a man  must  act  supematurally,  or  be  a 
mere  machine,  like  a watch.  For,  man  does  not  act  supernatu- 
rally : and  his  body  is  truly  a machine,  acting  only  mechanic- 
ally; and  yet  his  soul  is  a free  cause. 

To  § 34  and  35. 

96.  I here  refer  to  what  has  been  or  shall  be  said  in  this  paper, 

Numbers  82,  86,  [88]  and  111:  concerning  the  comparison 

between  God  and  a soul  of  the  world ; and  how  the  opinion  con- 
trary to  mine,  brings  the  one  of  these  too  near  to  the  other. 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


373 


To  § 36. 

97.  I here  also  refer  to  what  I have  before  said,  concerning  the 
harmony  between  the  soul  and  the  body.  Number  89,  &c. 

To  § 37. 

98.  The  author  tells  us,  that  the  soul  is  not  in  the  brain,  hut  in 
the  sensorium ; without  saving  what  that  sensorium  is.  But  sup- 
posing that  sensorium  to  be  extended,  as  I believe  the  author 
understands  it ; the  same  difficulty  still  remains,  and  the  question 
returns,  whether  the  soul  be  diffused  through  that  whole  extension, 
he  it  great  or  small.  For,  more  or  less  in  bigness,  is  nothing  to  the 
purpose  here. 

To  § 38. 

99.  T don’t  undertake  here  to  establish  my  Dynamics,  or  my 
doctrine  of  forces:  this  would  not  be  a proper  place  for  it.  How- 
ever, I can  very  well  answer  the  objection  here  brought  against  me. 
I have  affirmed  that  active  forces  are  preserved  in  the  world  [with- 
out diminution ].  The  author  objects,  that  two  soft  or  unelastic 
bodies  meeting  together,  lose  some  of  their  force.  I answer,  no. 
’Tis  true,  their  wholes  lose  it  with  respect  to  their  total  motion; 
but  their  parts  receive  it,  being  shaken  [internally]  by  the  force 
of  the  concourse.  And  therefore  that  loss  of  force,  is  only  in 
appearance.  The  forces  are  not  destroyed,  hut  scattered  among 
the  small  parts.  The  bodies  do  not  lose  their  forces ; but  the  case 
here  is  the  same,  as  when  men  change  great  money  into  small. 
However,  I agree  that  the  quantity  of  motion  does  not  remain 
the  same;  and  herein  I approve  what  Sir  Isaac  Newton  says, 
page  341  of  his  Optics,  which  the  author  here  quotes.  But  I 
have  shown  elsewhere,  that  there  is  a difference  between  the 
quantity  of  motion,  and  the  quantity  of  force. 

To  § 39. 

100.  The  author  maintained  against  me,  that  force  does 
naturally  lessen  in  the  material  universe;  and  that  this  arises 
from  the  dependence  of  things  ( Third  Reply,  § 13  and  14).  In 
my  third  answer,  I desired  him  to  prove  that  this  imperfection 


374 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


is  a consequence  of  the  dependence  of  things.  He  avoids  answer- 
ing my  demand ; by  falling  upon  an  incident,  and  denying  this 
to  be  an  imperfection.  But  whether  it  be  an  imperfection  or  not, 
he  should  have  proved  that  ’tis  a consequence  of  the  dependence 
of  things. 

101.  However;  that  which  would  make  the  machine  of  the 
world  as  imperfect,  as  that  of  an  unskillful  watchmaker;  surely 
must  needs  be  an  imperfection. 

102.  The  author  says  now,  that  it  is  a consequence  of  the 
inertia,  of  matter.  But  this  also,  he  will  not  prove.  That  inertia, 
alleged  here  by  him,  mentioned  by  Kepler,  repeated  by  Cartesius 
[in  his  letters],  and  made  use  of  by  me  in  my  Tlieodiccea,  in  order 
to  give  a notion  [and  at  the  same  time  an  example]  of  the  natural 
imperfection  of  creatures ; has  no  other  effect,  than  to  make  the 
velocities  diminish,  when  the  quantities  of  matter  are  increased: 
but  this  is  without  any  diminution  of  the  forces. 

To  § 40. 

103.  I maintained,  that  the  dependence  of  the  machine  of  the 
world  upon  its  divine  author,  is  rather  a reason  why  there  can  be 
no  such  imperfection  in  it ; and  that  the  work  of  God  does  not 
want  to  be  set  right  again;  that  it  is  not.  liable  to  be  disordered; 
and  lastly,  that  it  cannot  lessen  in  perfection.  Let  any  one  guess 
now,  how  the  author  can  hence  infer  against  me,  as  he  does,  that, 
if  this  be  the  case,  then  the  material  world  must  be  infinite  and 
eternal,  without  any  beginning;  and  that  God  must  always  have 
created  as  many  men  and  other  kinds  of  creatures,  as  can  possibly 
be  created. 

To  § 41. 

104.  I don’t  say,  that  space  is  an  order  or  situation,  which 
makes  things  capable  of  being  situated:  this  would  be  nonsense. 
Any  one  needs  only  consider  my  own  words,  and  add  them  to  what 
I said  above,  ( Number  47)  in  order  to  show  how  the  mind  comes 
to  form  to  itself  an  idea  of  space,  and  yet  that  there  needs  not  be 
any  real  and  absolute  being  answering  to  that  idea,  distinct  from 
the  mind,  and  from  all  relations.  I don’t  say  therefore,  that 
space  is  an  order  or  situation,  but  an  order  of  situations;  or  [an 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


375 


order]  according  to  which,  situations  are  disposed ; and  that 
abstract  space  is  that  order  of  situations,  when  they  are  conceived 
as  being  possible.  Space  is  therefore  something  [merely^  ideal. 
But,  it  seems  the  author  will  not  understand  me.  I have  already, 
in  this  paper,  ( Number  54)  answered  the  objection,  that  order  is 
not  capable  of  quantity. 

105.  The  author  objects  here,  that  time  cannot  be  an  order  of 
successive  things,  because  the  quantity  of  time  may  become  greater 
or  less,  and  yet  the  order  of  successions  continue  the  same.  I 
answer:  this  is  not  so.  For  if  the  time  is  greater,  there  will  be 
more  successive  and  like  states  interposed ; and  if  it  be  less,  there 
will  be  fewer;  seeing  there  is  no  vacuum,  nor  condensation,  nor 
penetration  (if  I may  so  speak),  in  times,  any  more  than  in  places. 

106.  ’Tis  true,  [I  maintain  that]  the  immensity  and  eternity  of 
God  would  subsist,  though  there  were  no  creatures ; hut  those 
attributes  would  have  no  dependence  either  on  times  or  places.  If 
there  were  no  creatures,  there  would  he  neither  time  nor  place,  and 
consequently  no  actual  space.  The  immensity  of  God  is  indepen- 
dent upon  space,  as  his  eternity  is  independent  upon  time.  These 
attributes  signify  only  [in  respect  to  these  two  orders  of  things], 
that  God  would  be  present  and  co-existent  with  all  the  things  that 
should  exist.  And  therefore  I don’t  admit  what’s  here  alleged, 
that  if  God  existed  alone,  there  would  be  time  and  space  as  there 
is  now;  whereas  then,  in  my  opinion,  they  would  be  only  in  the 
ideas  of  God  as  mere  possibilities.  The  immensity  and  eternity 
of  God  are  things  more  transcendent,  than  the  duration  and  exten- 
sion of  creatures ; not  only  with  respect  to  the  greatness,  but  also 
to  the  nature  of  the  things.  Those  divine  attributes  do  not  imply 
the  supposition  of  things  extrinsic  to  God,  such  as  are  actual 
places  and  times.  These  truths  have  been  sufficiently  acknowl- 
edged hv  divines  and  philosophers. 

To  § 42. 

107.  I maintained,  that  an  operation  of  God,  by  which  he 
should  mend  the  machine  of  the  material  world,  tending  in  its 
nature  (as  this  author  pretends)  to  lose  all  its  motion,  would  be 
a miracle.  His  answer  was;  that  it  would  not  be  a miraculous 


376 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


operation,  because  it  would  be  usual,  and  must  frequently  happen. 
I replied ; that  ' tis  not  usualness  or  unusualness , that  makes  a 
miracle  properly  so  called,  or  a miracle  of  the  highest  sort;  but 
its  surpassing  the  poivers  of  creatures ; and  that  this  is  the 
[ general ] opinion  of  divines  and  philosophers:  and  that  therefore 
the  author  acknowledg'es  at  least,  that  the  thing  he  introduces,  and 
I disallow,  is,  according  to  the  received  notion,  a miracle  of  the 
highest  sort,  that  is,  one  which  surpasses  all  created  powers : and 
that  this  is  the  very  thing  which  all  men  endeavor  to  avoid  in 
philosophy.  He  answers  now,  that  this  is  appealing  from  reason 
to  vulgar  opinion.  But  I reply  again,  that  this  vulgar  opinion, 
according  to  which  we  ought  in  philosophy  to  avoid,  as  much  as 
possible,  what  surpasses  the  natures  of  creatures ; is  a very 
reasonable  opinion.  Otherwise  nothing  will  be  easier  than  to 
account  for  anything  by  bringing  in  the  Deity,  Deum  ex  machina, 
without  minding  the  natures  of  things. 

108.  Besides;  the  common  opinion  of  divines,  ought  not  to 
be  looked  upon  merely  as  vulgar  opinion.  A man  should  have 
weighty  reasons,  before  he  ventures  to  contradict  it ; and  I see  no 
such  reasons  here. 

109.  The  author  seems  to  depart  from  his  own  notion,  according 
to  which  miracle  ought  to  be  unusual;  when,  in  § 31,  he  objects 
to  me  (though  without  any  ground),  that  the  preestablished  har- 
mony would  be  a perpetual  miracle.  Here,  I say,  he  seems  to 
depart  from  his  own  notion;  unless  he  had  a mind  to  argue 
against  me  ad  hominem. 

To  § 43. 

110.  If  a miracle  differs  from  what  is  natural , only  in  appear- 
ance and  with  respect  to  us;  so  that  we  call  that  only  a miracle, 
which  we  seldom  see;  there  will  be  no  internal  real  difference, 
between  a miracle  and  what  is  natural ; and  at  the  bottom,  every 
thing  will  be  either  equally  natural,  or  equally  miraculous.  Will 
divines  like  the  former,  or  philosophers  the  latter? 

111.  Will  not  this  doctrine,  moreover,  tend  to  make  God  the 
soul  of  the  world;  if  all  his  operations  are  natural,  like  those  of 
our  souls  upon  our  bodies  ? And  so  God  will  be  a part  of  nature. 


LETTERS  TO  CLARKE. 


377 


112.  In  good  philosophy,  and  sound  theology,  we  ought  to  dis- 
tinguish between  what  is  explicable  by  the  natures  and  powers  of 
creatures,  and  what  is  explicable  only  by  the  powers  of  the  infinite 
substance.  We  ought  to  make  an  infinite  difference  between  the 
operation  of  God,  which  goes  beyond  the  extent  of  natural 
powers ; and  the  operations  of  things  that  follow  the  law  which 
God  has  given  them,  and  which  he  has  enabled  them  to  follow  by 
their  natural  powers,  though  not  without  his  assistance. 

113.  This  overthrows  attractions,  properly  so  called,  and  other 
operations  inexplicable  by  the  natural  powers  of  creatures ; which 
kinds  of  operations,  the  assertors  of  them  must  suppose  to  be 
effected  by  miracle;  or  else  have  recourse  to  absurdities,  that  is, 
to  the  occult  qualities  of  the  schools ; which  some  men  begin  to 
revive  under  the  specious  name  of  forces ; but  they  bring  us  back 
again  into  the  kingdom  of  darkness.  This  is,  invent  a fruge, 
glandibus  vesci. 

11 4.  In  the  time  of  Mr.  Boyle,  and  other  excellent  men,  who 
flourished  in  England  under  Charles  the  lid,  nobody  would  have 
ventured  to  publish  such  chimerical  notions.  I hope  that  happy 
time  will  return  under  so  good  a government  as  the  present  [and 
that  minds  a little  too  much  carried  away  by  the  misfortune  of  the 
times  will  betake  themselves  to  the  better  cultivation  of  sound 
learning].  Mr.  Boyle  made  it  his  chief  business  to  inculcate,  that 
everything  was  done  mechanically  in  natural  philosophy.  But  it 
is  men’s  misfortune  to  grow,  at  last,  out  of  conceit  with  reason 
itself,  and  to  he  weary  of  light.  Chimeras  begin  to  appear  again, 
and  they  are  pleasing  because  they  have  something  in  them  that  is 
wonderful.  What  has  happened  in  poetry,  happens  also  in  the 
philosophical  world.  People  are  grown  weary  of  rational 
romances,  such  as  were  the  French  Clelia,  or  the  German 
Aramene ; and  they  are  become  fond  again  of  the  tales  of  fairies. 

115.  As  for  the  motions  of  the  celestial  bodies,  and  even  the 
formation  of  plants  and  animals ; there  is  nothing  in  them  that 
looks  like  a miracle,  except  their  beginning.  The  organism  of 
animals  is  a mechanism,  which  supposes  a divine  pre-formation. 
What  follows  upon  it,  is  purely  natural,  and  entirely  mechanical. 

116.  Whatever  is  performed  in  the  body  of  man,  and  of  every 
animal,  is  no  less  mechanical,  than  what  is  performed  in  a watch. 


378 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


The  difference  is  only  such,  as  ought  to  be  between  a machine  of 
divine  invention,  and  the  workmanship  of  such  a limited  artist  as 
man  is. 

To  § 44. 

117.  There  is  no  difficulty  among  divines,  about  the  miracles  of 
angels.  The  question  is  only  about  the  use  of  that  word.  It  may 
be  said  that  angels  work  miracles ; but  less  properly  so  called,  or 
of  an  inferior  order.  To  dispute  about  this,  would  be  a mere 
question  about  a word.  It  may  be  said  that  the  angel,  who  carried 
Habakkulc  through  the  air,  and  he  who  troubled  the  water  of  the 
pool  of  Bethesda , worked  a miracle.  But  it  was  not  a miracle  of 
the  highest  order ; for  it  may  be  explained  by  the  natural  powers 
of  angels,  which  surpass  those  of  man. 

To  § 45. 

118.  I objected,  that  an  attraction,  properly  so  called,  or  in  the 
scholastic  sense,  would  be  an  operation  at  a distance,  without  any 
means  intervening.  The  author  answers  here,  that  an  attraction 
without  any  means  intervening,  would  be  indeed  a contradiction. 
Very  well!  But  then  what  does  he  mean,  when  he  will  have  the 
sun  to  attract  the  globe  of  the-  earth  through  an  empty  space?  Is 
it  God  himself  that  performs  it?  But  this  would  be  a miracle,  if 
ever  there  was  any.  This  would  surely  exceed  the  powers  of 
creatures. 

119.  Or,  are  perhaps  some  immaterial  substances,  or  some 
spiritual  rays,  or  some  accident  without  a substance,  or  some  kind 
of  species  intentionalis,  or  some  other  I know  not  what,  the  means 
by  which  this  is  pretended  to  be  performed  ? Of  which  sort  of 
things,  the  author  seems  to  have  still  a good  stock  in  his  head,  with- 
out explaining  himself  sufficiently. 

120.  That  means  of  communication  (says  he)  is  invisible, 
intangible,  not  mechanical.  He  might  as  well  have  added,  inex- 
plicable, unintelligible,  precarious,  groundless,  and  unexampled. 

121.  But  it  is  regular  (says  the  author),  it  is  constant,  and  con- 
sequently natural.  I answer;  it  cannot  be  regular,  without  being- 
reasonable  ; nor  natural,  unless  it  can  be  explained  by  the  natures 
of  creatures. 


LETTERS  TO  CLARICE . 


379 


122.  If  the  means,  which  causes  an  attraction  properly  so 
called,  be  constant,  and  at  the  same  time  inexplicable  by  the 
powers  of  creatures,  and  yet  be  true;  it  must  be  a perpetual 
miracle:  and  if  it  is  not  miraculous,  it  is  false.  ’Tis  a chimerical 
thing,  a scholastic  occult  quality. 

123.  The  case  would  he  the  same,  as  in  a body  going  round 
without  receding  in  the  tangent,  though  nothing  that  can  be 
explained,  hindered  it  from  receding.  Which  is  an  instance  I 
have  already  alleged  ; and  the  author  has  not  thought  fit  to 
answer  it,  because  it  shows  too  clearly  the  difference  between  what 
is  truly  natural  on  the  one  side,  and  a chimerical  occult  quality  of 
the  schools  on  the  other. 


To  § 46. 

124.  All  the  natural  forces  of  bodies,  are  subject  to  mechanical 
laws;  and  all  the  natural  powers  of  spirits,  are  subject  to  moral 
laws.  The  former  follow  the  order  of  efficient  causes ; and  the 
latter  follow  the  order  of  final  causes.  The  former  operate  with- 
out liberty,  like  a watch ; the  latter  operate  with  liberty,  though 
they  exactly  agree  with  that  machine,  which  another  cause,  free 
and  superior,  has  adapted  to  them  beforehand.  I have  already 
spoken  of  this,  above,  No.  92. 

125.  I shall  conclude  with  what  the  author  objected  against  me 
at  the  beginning  of  this  fourth  reply : to  which  I have  already 
given  an  answer  above  ( Numbers  18,  19,  20).  But  I deferred 
speaking  more  fully  upon  that  head,  to  the  conclusion  of  this 
paper.  He  pretended,  that  I have  been  guilty  of  a petitio  prin- 
cipii.  But,  of  what  principle,  I beseech  you?  AYould  to  God, 
less  clear  principles  had  never  been  laid  down.  The  principle  in 
question,  is  the  principle  of  the  want  of  a sufficient  reason ; in 
order  to  any  thing’s  existing,  in  order  to  any  event’s  happening, 
in  order  to  any  truth’s  taking  place.  Is  this  a principle,  that 
wants  to  be  proved ? The  author  granted  it,  or  pretended  to  grant 
it,  Number  2,  of  his  third  paper ; possibly,  because  the  denial  of 
it  would  have  appeared  too  unreasonable.  But  either  he  has  done 
it  only  in  words,  or  he  contradicts  himself,  or  retracts  his 


concession. 


380 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBHITZ. 


126.  I dare  say,  that  without  this  great  principle,  one  cannot 
prove  the  existence  of  God,  nor  account  for  many  other  important 
truths. 

127.  Idas  not  everybody  made  use  of  this  principle,  upon  a 
thousand  occasions  ? ’Tis  true,  it  has  been  neglected,  out  of  care- 
lessness, on  many  occasions : but  that  neglect  has  been  the  true 
cause  of  chimeras ; such  as  are  (for  instance),  an  absolute  real 
time  or  space,  a vacuum , atoms,  attraction  in  the  scholastic  sense, 
a physical  influence  of  the  soul  over  the  hocly,  and  a thousand 
other  fictions,  either  derived  from  erroneous  opinions  of  the 
ancients,  or  lately  invented  by  modern  philosophers. 

128.  Was  it  not  upon  account  of  Epicurus’ s violating  this  great 
principle,  that  the  ancients  derided  his  groundless  declination  of 
atoms  ? And  I dare  say,  the  scholastic  attraction,  revived  in  our 
days,  and  no  less  derided  about  thirty  years  ago,  is  not  at  all  more 
reasonable. 

129.  I have  often  defied  people  to  allege  an  instance  against 
that  great  principle,  to  bring  any  one  uncontested  example 
wherein  it  fails.  But  they  have  never  done  it,  nor  ever  will. 
’Tis  certain,  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  instances,  wherein 
it  succeeds,  [or  rather  it  succeeds]  in  all  the  known  cases  in  which 
it  has  been  made  use  of.  From  whence  one  may  reasonably  judge, 
that  it  will  succeed  also  in  unknown  cases,  or  in  such  cases  as  can 
only  by  its  means  become  known : according  to  the  method  of 
experimental  philosophy,  which  proceeds  a posteriori ; though 
the  principle  were  not  perhaps  otherwise  justified  by  bare  reason, 
or  a priori. 

130.  To  deny  this  great  principle,  is  likewise  to  do  as  Epicurus 
did ; who  was  reduced  to  deny  that  other  great  principle,  viz.  the 
principle  of  contradiction ; which  is,  that  every  intelligible  enun- 
ciation must  be  either  true,  or  false.  Chrysippus  undertook  to 
prove  that  principle  against  Epicurus ; but  I think  I need  not 
imitate  him.  I have  already  said,  what  is  sufficient  to  justify 
mine:  and  I might  say  something  more  upon  it;  but  perhaps 
it  would  be  too  abstruse  for  this  present  dispute.  And,  I believe, 
reasonable  and  impartial  men  will  grant  me,  that  having  forced 
an  adversary  to  deny  that  principle,  is  reducing  him  ad,  absurdum. 


E" OTE  S . 


1.  Life  of  Leibnitz. 

Xo  more  interesting  personage  appears  in  the  history  of  modern  philosophy 
than  Leibnitz.  Frederick  of  Prussia  said  of  him,  “He  represents  in  himself 
a whole  academy”;  and  by  almost  universal  consent  he  is  admitted  to  have 
possessed  the  most  comprehensive  mind  since  Aristotle.  He  was  on  familiar 
terms  with  almost  every  prominent  character,  political,  ecclesiastical,  philo- 
sophical, scientific  and  literary,  of  his  day,  and  he  himself  played  a promi- 
nent part  in  each  of  these  spheres.  From  him  as  a statesman  we  have  a 
scheme  for  the  unification  of  Germany,  prepared  for  the  Imperial  Diet  at 
Ratisbon ; and  a far-sighted  plan  for  a French  conquest  of  Egypt,  by  which 
the  conquering  armies  of  Louis  XIV  were  to  have  been  turned  aside  from 
Germany,  and  the  Turks  from  Austria  and  Hungary;  besides  numerous 
schemes  for  reforming  the  currency  and  the  laws  of  the  German  states  and 
improving  the  condition  of  the  people.  As  a theologian  he  has  given  us  an 
essay  Against  Atheism,  a Defense  of  the  Trinity,  numerous  discussions  on 
the  arguments  for  the  being  of  God,  a great  project  for  the  reunion  of  the 
Protestant  and  Latin  churches,  an  irenical  Systema  Tlieologicum  (translated  by 
C.  W.  Russell,  London,  1850)  written  in  the  interests  of  this  reunion  project, 
and  above  all  his  great  work  La  Tlieodicee.  As  a mathematician  he  contests 
with  Sir  Isaac  Xewton  the  honor  of  discovering  the  Calculus.  As  a historian 
he  produced  an  elaborate  work  on  the  Annals  of  the  House  of  Brunsicick.  To 
the  science  of  Logic,  among  other  notable  contributions,  he  has  given  us  the 
important  doctrine  of  the  Quality  of  Terms.  As  a physicist  he  was  the  first 
to  give  the  correct  formula  for  moving  force,  and  in  his  Protagcia  he  became 
a pioneer  in  geological  investigations.  His  New  Essays  on  the  Human  Under- 
standing place  him  alongside  of  his  great  contemporary  Locke  as  a psycho- 
logist. And  as  a speculative  philosopher,  or  metaphysician,  he  was  the  first 
man  of  his  age  on  the  continent  of  Europe  and  the  founder  of  modern 
German  philosophy. 

The  standard  biography  of  Leibnitz  is:  Gottfried  Wilhelm  Freiherr  von 
Leibnitz.  Eine  Biographie  von  Dr.  G.  E.  Guhrauer.  Zwei  Bdnde,  Breslau, 
1842.  Guhrauer’s  two  volume  work  was  the  basis  of  the  Life  of  Godfrey 
William  von  Liebnitz,  by  John  M.  Machie,  12mo,  Boston,  1845.  In  his  pre- 
face Mackie  writes:  “I  have  added  little,  or  nothing,  to  the  German  work; 

and  have  taken  away  from  it  nothing  that  could  be  appropriately  introduced 
into  a popular  biography,  or  that  might  be  cqnsidered  as  possessing  any  his- 
torical interest  for  readers  without  the  confines  of  Germany.”  Excellent 
accounts  of  the  life  of  Leibnitz  are  also  found  in  Kuno  Fischer’s  Leibniz 
(Geschichte  d.  neuern  Philosophic.  Jubilaumsausg.,  Bd.  Ill)  and  in  the  little 
work  by  Merz,  Leibniz,  in  Blackwood’s  Philosophical  Classics,  1884.  Cf.,  also, 
E.  Pfleiderer,  Leibniz  als  Patriot,  Staatsmann  u.  Bildungstrager,  Leipsic, 
1870;  and  T.  Kirchner’s  Leibniz:  sein  Leben  u.  Denken,  Cotlien,  1877. 


382 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


2.  Leibnitz’s  Writings,  and  English  Translations  of  Them. 

There  is  no  complete  edition  of  the  writings  of  Leibnitz,  although  one  has 
been  projected,  since  1901,  by  the  academies  of  science  of  Berlin  and  of  Paris. 
For  an  account  of  the  different  issues  of  his  works,  consult  Kuno  Fischer’s 
Leibniz  (Geschiclite  cl.  n.  Philosophic,  Band  III.,  1902),  and  the  preface  to 
Merz’s  Leibniz;  also  Hand’s  Bibliography  of  Philosophy,  and  Barnzi’s  Leibniz 
et  L’ Organization  Religieuse  de  la  Terre  (1907),  pp.  516-518,  513  f. 

The  best  edition  of  his  philosophical  writings  is  that  of  C.  I.  Gerhardt,  Die 
philosopliischen  Schriften  von  G.  W.  Leibniz,  7 vols.,  Berlin,  1875-90.  This, 
however,  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  Erdmann’s  God.  Guil.  Leibnitii  Opera 
Philosophica  quae  extant  Latina,  Gallica,  Germanica  Omnia,  Berlin,  1840, 
and  by  the  theological  writings  and  the  correspondence  with  Wolff. 

The  best  edition  of  bis  mathematical  iconics  is  that  of  C.  I.  Gerhardt,  form- 
ing the  third  series  in  the  edition  of  Pertz,  Leibnizen’ s mathemat ische  Schrif- 
ten, lierausgegeben  von  C.  I.  Gerhardt,  7 vols.,  London  and  Berlin,  1850; 
Halle,  1855-63. 

The  best  issue  of  his  historical  and  political  writings  is  that  by  Onno  Klopp, 
Die  Werlce  von  Leibniz,  u.  s.  w.,  first  series,  10  vols.,  Hanover,  1864-77. 
With  this  should  be  compared  Foucher  de  Careil’s  Oeuvres  de  Leibniz,  Paris, 
1859-75,  vols.  Ill  to  VI. 

The  best  edition  of  his  theological  ivories  is  that  of  Foucher  de  Careil,  vols. 
1 and  II  of  his  Oeuvres  de  Leibniz. 

To  the  above  should  be  added  Guhrauer’s  Leibniz’s  Deutsche  Schriften,  2 
vols.,  Berlin,  1838-40;  Foucher  de  Careil’s  Lettres  et  Opuscules  inedits  de 
Leibniz,  Paris,  1854-57 ; and  Gerhardt’s  Brief  weclisel  zicischen  Leibniz  und 
Wolff,  Halle,  1860;  Mollat’s  Mittlieilungen  aus  Leibnizens  ungedruclcten 
Schriften,  Leipsic,  1893;  Couturat’s  Opuscules  et  Fragments  inedits  de 
Leibniz,  Paris,  1903. 

Translations  into  English. 

Since  the  publication  of  the  first  edition  of  this  work  (1890)  the  following 
four  important  contributions  have  been  made  toward  rendering  Leibnitz  into 
English : 

New  Essays  concerning  Human  Understandings  by  Gottfried  Wilhelm 
Leibnitz,  together  with  an  Appendix  consisting  of  some  of  his  shorter  pieces, 
translated  by  Alfred  Gideon  Langley,  New  York,  1896. 

Leibniz:  The  Monadology  and  other  Philosophical  Writings,  translated 

with  Introduction  and  Notes,  by  Robert  Latta,  Oxford,  1898. 

Leibniz:  Discourse  on  Metaphysics,  Correspondence  until  Arnauld,  and 

Monadology,  translated  by  George  R.  Montgomery,  Chicago,  1902. 

.4  Critical  Exposition  of  the  Philosophy  of  Leibniz,  with  an  Appendix 
[pp.  203-299]  of  Leading  Passages,  by  Bertrand  Russell,  Cambridge,  1900. 

The  following  is  a full  list  of  English  renderings  of  Leibnitz’s  writings. 
The  figures  in  [ ] refer  to  the  original  text  in  Gerhardt’s  edition,  unless 

otherwise  stated : 

1669.  Letter  to  Thomasius  (April  20-30)  [I,  15-28].  Eng.  tr.,  Langley, 
pp.  631-650. 

c.  1671.  A Fragment  [VII,  259-260],  Eng.  tr.,  Langley,  pp.  651-2. 


NOTES. 


383 


1676.  That  the  Most  Perfect  Being-  is  Possible,  and  Exists  [VII,  261-2], 
Eng.  ti\,  Langley,  pp.  714-715. 

c.  1678-9.  What  is  “Idea?”  [VII,  263-4].  Eng.  tr.,  Langley,  pp.  716-717. 
c.  1679.  Notes  on  Spinoza’s  Ethics  [I,  139  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  11-27. 
1679-1680.  On  the  Philosophy  of  Descartes  [IV,  281  f.,  283  f.,  297  f.].  Eng. 
tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  1-10. 

1684.  Thoughts  on  Knowledge,  Truth  and  Ideas  [IV,  422  f.].  Eng.  tr., 
this  vol.,  pp.  28-33 ; T.  S.  Baynes,  The  Port  Royal  Logic,  Appendix,  pp.  424- 
430. 

1686.  Discourse  on  Metaphysics  [IV,  427  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  Montgomery,  pp. 
1-63. 

1686.  Systema  Theologicum.  Eng.  tr.,  C.  W.  Russell,  London,  1850. 
1686-90.  Correspondence  with  Amauld  [II.  I f.].  Eng.  tr.,  Montgomery, 

pp.  67-248;  Leibnitz’s  last  letter,  this  vol.,  38-41. 

1687.  On  a General  Principle  useful  in  the  Explanation  of  the  Laws  of 
Nature  [III,  51  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  34-7. 

1689.  Extract  from  his  Phoranomus  [Arch.  f.  G.  d.  Phil.,  I.  577].  Eng. 
tr.,  Latta,  pp.  351-4. 

1690.  Demonstration  against  Atoms  [VII,  284-288].  Eng.  tr.,  Langley,  pp. 
652-657. 

1091.  Does  the  Essence  of  Body  consist  in  Extension?  [IV,  464  f.].  Eng. 
tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  42-6. 

c.  1691.  Essay  on  Dynamics  [Math.  Sch.,  VI,  215-231].  Eng.  tr.,  Langley, 
pp.  657-670. 

1692.  Animadversions  on  Descartes’  Principles  of  Philosophy  [IV,  350  f.]. 
Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  47-65. 

1693.  On  the  Notions  of  Right  and  Justice  [Erd.,  118  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this 
vol.,  pp.  66-9;  Latta,  pp.  282-296. 

1693.  Letter  to  Foueher  [I,  415-19].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  70-71. 

1693.  On  the  Philosophy  of  Descartes  [II,  538-48].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp. 

72-3. 

1694.  On  the  Reform  of  Metaphysics  and  on  the  Notion  of  Substance  [IV, 
468  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  74-6. 

1695.  Essay  on  Dynamics,  Pts.  I and  II  [Math.  Sell.,  VI,  234-246;  246- 
254],  Eng.  tr.,  Langley,  pp.  670-684  and  684-692. 

1695.  New  System  of  the  Nature  and  Communication  of  Substances  [IV, 

471  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  77-86;  A.  E.  Ivroeger,  J . S.  Phil.,  V,  209-19; 

Latta,  pp.  297-318. 

1695-6.  Three  Explanations  of  the  New  System  [IV,  493  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this 
vol.,  pp.  91-9;  Latta,  pp.  319-336  (1st  and  3d  expls.). 

1696.  Observations  on  Locke’s  Essay  [V,  14  f .] . Eng.  tr.,  this  vol..  pp.  100- 
105;  Langley,  pp.  13-19. 

1697.  On  the  Ultimate  Origin  of  Things  [VII,  302  f .] . Eng.  tr.,  this  vol., 
106-113;  Langley,  pp.  692-8;  Latta,  pp.  337-350. 

1697.  On  Certain  Consequences  of  the  Philosophy  of  Descartes  [IV,  336  f.]. 
Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  114-118. 

1698.  Thoughts  on  the  First  Book  of  Locke’s  Essay  [IV,  20  f .] . Eng.  tr., 
Langley,  pp.  20-23. 


3S4 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OK  LEIBNITZ. 


1698.  Thoughts  on  the  Second  Book  of  [Locke's  Essay  [IV,  23  f.]  Eng.  tr., 
Langley,  pp.  23-5. 

169S.  On  Nature  in  Itself  [IV,  504  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  119-134. 
1G98.  Letter  to  Beauval  in  reply  to  Bayle  [IV,  517-524],  Eng.  tr.,  Langley, 
pp.  706-712. 

1697-8.  Ethical  Definitions  [I,  562  f. ; VII,  74  f .] . Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp. 
135-139. 

1700-1701.  On  Coste’s  French  Translation  of  Locke’s  Essay  [V,  25  f.]. 
Eng.  tr.,  Langley,  pp.  26-38. 

1700-1701.  On  the  Cartesian  Ontological  Argument  [IV,  292  f. ; 401  f. ; 

405  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  140-146. 

1702.  Appendix  to  a letter  to  Fabri  [IV,  393-400].  Eng.  tr.,  Langley,  pp. 
699-706. 

1702.  Consideration  on  the  Doctrine  of  a Universal  Spirit  [VI,  529  1’.]. 
Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  147-156;  A.  E.  Kroeger,  J.  S.  Phil.,  V,  pp.  118-129. 

1702.  On  the  Supersensible  in  Knowledge  and  on  the  Immaterial  in 
Nature  [VI,  488  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  157-166. 

1704.  Explanation  of  Points  in  his  Philosophy  [III,  333  f.].  Eng:  tr., 
this  vol.,  pp.  167-170. 

1704.  Preface  to  the  Nouveaux  Essais  [V,  41  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp. 
171-192;  Langley,  pp.  41-63;  Latta,  pp.  357-404. 

1704.  New  Essays  [V,  62-509].  Eng.  tr.,  extracts,  this  vol.,  pp.  191-250; 
complete  tr.,  Langley,  pp.  64-629. 

1705.  On  the  Principles  of  Life  [VI,  539  f .] . Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  251- 
258. 

1707.  On  the  Platonic  Philosophy.  Eng.  tr.,  T.  Davidson,  •/.  S.  Philos., 
Ill,  pp.  88-93. 

1707.  On  Necessity  and  Contingency  [III,  400  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol., 
pp.  259-263. 

1707.  Fragment  [Gulirauer,  Leheni].  Eng.  tr.,  Langley,  pp.  712-714. 

c.  1707.  On  the  Method  of  Distinguishing  Real  from  Imaginary  Phenomena 
[VII,  319-322].  Eng.  tr.,  Langley,  pp.  717-720. 

c.  1708.  Refutation  of  Spinoza  [De  Careil].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  264- 
273;  O.  F.  Owen,  Edinburgh,  1855. 

1708.  Remarks  on  the  Doctrine  of  Malebranche  [VI,  574  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this 
vol.,  pp.  274-278. 

1710.  On  the  Active  Force  of  the  Body,  the  Soul,  and  the  Souls  of  Brutes 
[VII,  528  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  279-283;  T.  Davidson,  J.  S.  Phil.,  II, 
62-64. 

1710.  Abridgment  of  the  Theodicy  [VI,  376  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp. 
284-294;  A.  E.  Kroeger,  J.  S.  Phil..  V (Oct,). 

1711.  On  Wisdom — the  Art  of  Reasoning,  etc.  [VII,  82  1’.].  Eng.  tr.,  this 
vol.,  pp  295-298. 

1711.  Extract  from  a Letter  to  Bierling  [VII,  500-502].  Eng.  tr.,  Langley, 
pp.  721-2. 

1714.  The  Principles  of  Nature  and  of  Grace  [VI,  598  f.].  Eng.  tr., 
this  vol.,  pp.  299-307 ; Latta,  pp.  405-424. 

1714.  The  Monadology  [VI,  607  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp.  308-323;  F.  H. 
Hedge,  J.  S.  Phil.,  I,  129-137;  Latta,  pp.  215-271:  Montgomery,  pp. 
251-272. 


IXOTES. 


385 


1715.  Oil  the  Doctrine  of  Malebranche  [III,  656  f.].  Eng.  tr.,  this  vol.,  pp. 
324-328. 

1716.  Five  letters  to  Sam.  Clarke  [VII,  347  f.].  Eng  tr.,  by  Clarke 
(London,  1717),  in  this  vol.,  pp.  329-370. 

The  Extracts  from  Leibniz  classified  according  to  subjects,  given  in  Russell, 
pp.  205-299,  and  ranging  in  length  from  a single  sentence  to  a page;  and 
numerous  short  extracts  found  in  the  notes  to  Latta’s  work  and  elsewhere, 
should  be  added  to  the  above. 

3.  Expositions  and  Chixicisms  of  Leibnitz’s  Philosophy. 

Among  the  most  important  discussions  of  the  Philosophy  of  Leibnitz  are 
the  following: 

In  German: — Ldw.  Feuerbach’s  Darstellg.,  Entw.  u.  Krit.  d.  L.’schen  Phi- 
losophic, 2d  ed.,  Leipsic,  1844. 

A.  Trendelenburg’s  essays  on  L.  in  his  Historische  Beitriige,  vols.  ii 
and  iii,  Berlin,  1855,  1867. 

Hartenstein’s  TJeber  Locke’s  u.  L.’s  Lehre  von  d.  Mensch.  Verstand,  etc. 

(Several  essays  in  his  Hist.-phil  Abhandlungen) , Leipsic,  1870. 

T.  Kireliner’s  Leibniz’s  Psychologie ; also  G.  IF.  Leibniz:  sein  Leben  u. 
Denken,  Cotlien,  1876. 

J.  H.  v.  Kirchmann’s  Erlauterungen  zn  L.’s  kleineren  philo sophisch 
vyichtigeren  Schriften,  Leipsic,  1879.  Also  Erltrgn.  zu  Leibniz’s  Theo- 
dicee  by  Kirchmann,  and  Erlauterungen  zu  L.’s  Neue  Abhandlungen, 
by  Prof.  Sehaarschmidt.  The  same. 

L.  Stein’s  Leibniz  u.  Spinoza,  Berlin,  1890. 

Ed.  Dillmann,  Eine  neue  Darstellung  d.  Leibnizischen  Monadenlehre, 
Leipsic,  1891. 

E.  Cassirer’s  Leibniz’s  System  in  seinen  unssenschaftlichen  Grundlagen, 
Berlin,  1902. 

Kuno  Fischer’s  Leibniz  ( Gesclite . d.  n.  Pliilosophie.  Jubildumsausg., 
Bd.  Ill),  Heidelberg,  1902. 

In  French : — Condillac’s  Exposition  et  Refutation  (in  his  Traite  des  Sys- 
t ernes) . 

Maine  de  Biran’s  Exposition  de  la  Phil,  de  Leibniz.  An  English 
translation  of  this  null  be  found  in  the  American  Whig  Revieic,  vol. 
IX,  p.  575  ff. 

Nourisson’s  La  Pliilosophie  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1860. 

Secretan’s  La  Pliilosophie  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1840. 

E.  Boutroux’s  Notice  sur  la  Vie  et  la  Philosophic  de  Leibniz  (Introd. 
to  his  ed.  of  the  Monadology) , Paris,  1881;  and  Formation  et 
Development  de  la  Doctrine  de  Leibniz  sur  la  Connaissance  (in  his 
Introduction  a V Etude  des  Non.  Essais) , Paris,  1886. 

Nolan’s  Eclaircissements  (in  his  valuable  edition  of  the  Monadology) , 
Paris,  1887.  Also  his  earlier  work,  La  Critique  de  Kant  et  la  Meta- 
physique de  L.,  Paris,  1875. 

L.  Couturat’s  La  Logique  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1901. 

J.  Baruzi’s  Leibniz  et  l’ Organization  Religieuse  de  la  Terre,  Paris,  1907. 
25 


386 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


In  English: — Samuel  Clarke’s  Letters  to  Leibnitz  (in  Iris  Collection  of 
Papers  which'  Passed  between  L.  and  Dr.  S.  Clarke),  London,  1717. 

J.  T.  Merz’s  Leibniz  (in  Blackwood’s  Phil.  Series),  Edinburgh,  1884. 

J.  Dewey’s  Leibniz’s  Mew  Essays  concerning  the  Human  Understand- 
ing: a Critical  Exposition  (in  Grigg’s  Pliilosoph.  Classics),  Chicago, 
1888. 

A.  G.  Langley’s  Notes  to  his  trans.  of  The  New  Essays,  New  York,  1896. 

II.  Latta’s  Introduction  to  his  Leibniz:  the  Monadology  and  other 

Philosophical  Writings,  Oxford,  1898. 

B.  Russell’s  A Critical  Exposition  of  the  Philosophy  of  Leibniz , 
Cambridge,  1900.  This  important  work  should  be  consulted  on  all 
questions  of  interpretation. 

To  these  should  be  added  the  exposition  by  the  eminent  Swedish  thinker, 
Bostrom,  contained  in  the  collected  edition  of  his  writings;  and  Cesca’s 
La  Metafisica  e la  Teoria  della  Conoscenza  del  Leibniz,  Padova,  1888. 

The  student  may  profitably  consult  for  further  literature  the  last  edition 
of  Uebenveg’s  History  of  Philosophy,  ed.  by  Prof.  M.  Heinze;  and  Rand’s 
Bibliography  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Cognate  Subjects. 

The  histories  of  Philosophy  containing  the  best  accounts  of  Leibnitz’s  phi- 
losophy are  those  of  Ueberweg,  Erdmann,  and  Zeller  ( Deutsche  Phil,  seit 
Leibniz,  1873). 

ARTICLE  I. 

4.  Leibnitz  and  Descartes. 

Leibnitz  while  a mere  boy  at  Leipsic  began  the  study  of  Descartes’  writ- 
ings and  they  had  more  than  those  of  any  other  one  philosopher  determined 
his  thinking.  He  had  access  when  at  Paris  to  the  manuscripts  left  by 
Descartes  and  continued  the  study  of  his  writings,  especially  those  on  mathe- 
matics. His  own  discovery  of  the  Integral  Calculus  on  Oct.  29,  1675,  and 
of  the  Differential  Calculus  soon  after,  carried  him  far  beyond  the  Cartesian 
mathematics,  considered  by  the  followers  of  Descartes  as  their  master’s  most 
important  work.  This  achievement  not  improbably  led  Leibnitz  to  free  him- 
self more  and  more  from  the  influence  of  Descartes  in  metaphysics.  After 
his  removal  to  Hanover  he  took  a more  openly  hostile  attitude  toward  Des- 
cartes. His  writings  against  Descartes  and  Cartesianism  will  be  found  in 
Gerhardt’s  edition  of  his  philosophical  works,  vol.  iv,  pp.  274-406.  The  most 
important  of  them  are  translated  here  in  Articles  I,  VII,  X,  XIX  and  XXII ; 
cf.  also  Articles  III,  IV,  VI,  XI,  XII,  XXXI  and  passim.  His  general  attitude 
toward  Cartesianism  is  well  indicated  by  his  remark  that  “Cartesianism  is 
to  be  regarded  as  the  ante-chamber  of  the  truth,”  and  by  the  remarks  found 
in  the  third  of  the  extracts  forming  Article  I. 

5.  Literature  on  the  Philosophy  of  Descartes. 

For  the  study  of  the  philosophy  of  Descartes  the  following  additional 
works  will  be  found  of  service : 

Spinoza’s  Renati  Descartes  Principiorum  Pliilosophice  pars  I et  II  more 
geometrico  demoustratce  (English  trans.  by  Dr.  H.  H.  Britan,  Chicago,  1905). 


NOTES. 


38T 


Maine  de  Biran’s  Commentaire  sur  les  Meditations  de  Descartes  (found  in 
Bertrand’s  Science  et  Psychologie,  oeuvres  inedits  de  De  Biran,  pp.  73-125), 
Paris,  1887. 

Cousin’s  Fragments  Pliilosophiques,  vol.  ii,  Paris,  1838,  and  Fragments  de 
Phil.  Cartesienne,  Paris,  1845. 

Bouillier’s  Historic  de  la  Philosophic  Cartesienne,  Paris,  1854. 

Bordas-Demoulin’s  Le  Cartesianisme,  2d  ed.,  Paris,  1874. 

Louis  Liard’s  Descartes,  Alcan,  Paris,  1882. 

Alf.  Fouill6e’s  Descartes,  Paris,  1893. 

Y.  Brocliard’s  editions,  with  notes,  of  Les  Principes  de  Phil.,  pt.  1,  and  of 
the  Discours  de  la  Hethode.  The  same. 

Henri  Joly’s  editions  of  the  same  pieees,  Delalan  Freres,  Paris. 

Fonsegive’s  Les  Pretendues  Contradictions  de  Descartes  (in  the  Revue  Phil- 
osopliique,  1883,  pp.  511-532,  and  642-656). 

Schaarschmidt’s  Descartes  a.  Spinoza,  urkundl.  Darstellg.  cl.  Philos.  Beider, 
Bonn,  1850. 

Lowe’s  Das  Spec.  Syst.  des  Rene  Descartes,  seine  Vorziige  u.  Mangel, 
Vienna,  1855. 

Kuno  Fischer’s  Descartes  u.  seine  Schule  (the  first  part,  treating  of  Des- 
cartes and  Malebranche,  has  been  translated  into  English  by  Prof.  Gordy 
and  published  by  the  Scribners,  New  York,  1887),  Munich,  1878,  4 ed.,  Heidel- 
berg, 1902. 

Thilo’s  Die  Religionsphilosophie  des  Descartes  (in  Ztschr.  f.  ex.  Phil.,  Ill, 
121-182),  1862. 

Heinze’s  Die  Sittenlehre  des  Descartes,  Leipsic,  1872. 

Glogau’s  Darlg.  u.  Krit.  d.  Crundgedanlcens  cl.  Cartesianisch.  Metaphysilc 
(in  Z.  f.  Phil.  u.  phil.  Kr.),  1878. 

Koch’s  Die  Psychologie  Descartes' , Munich,  1882. 

Natorp’s  Descartes’  ErJcenntnisstheorie,  Marburg,  1882. 

T.  H.  Huxley’s  Lay  Sermons  [pp.  320-344],  London,  1871. 

Cunningham’s  Descartes  and  English  Speculation,  London,  1875. 

Mahaffy’s  Descartes  (in  Blackwood’s  Series),  Edinburgh,  1880. 

Id.  Sedgwick’s  The  Fundamental  Doctrines  of  Descartes  (in  Mind,  vol.  7, 
pp.  435  f. ) . 

Rhodes’s  A New  View  of  the  Phil,  of  Descartes  (in  the  Jour,  of  Spec.  Phil., 
vol.  17,  pp.  225  f. ). 

N.  Smith’s  Studies  in  the  Cartesian  Philosophy,  London,  1902. 

E.  S.  Haldane’s  Descartes:  His  Life  and  Times,  London,  1905. 

Consult  also  the  histories  of  philosophy,  especially  those  of  Hegel,  Ueber- 
w^eg,  Bowren,  and  Erdmann. 

The  best  and  only  complete  edition  of  Descartes’  own  writings,  superseding 
that  by  Cousin,  11  vols.,  Paris,  1824-26,  is  the  edition  by  Ch.  Adam  and  P. 
Tannery,  10  vols.,  Paris,  1897  f.  Of  the  most  important  philosophical  works, 
there  is  a French  edition  in  one  volume  edited  by  Jules  Simon;  a German 
translation  in  one  volume  by  Von  Kirchmann;  and  an  English  translation, 
also  in  one  volume,  by  Prof.  Veitch  (Blackwood,  Edinburgh),  republished,  in 
two  small  volumes,  by  the  Open  Court  Co.,  Chicago,  1903,  and  a volume  of 
extracts  from  his  writings  translated  into  English  by  Professor  H.  A.  P. 
Torrey,  New  York,  1892. 


3S8 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


6.  The  Search  for  Final  Causes  (Page  1). 

It,  may  be  well  to  compare  the  views  of  Leibnitz  on  this  important  subject 
with  those  of  his  philosophical  predecessors,  Bacon,  Descartes,  and  Spinoza. 
For  Bacon’s  views  consult  his  Novum  Organum,  I,  48,  65;  II,  2;  Advan.  of 
Learning,  bk.  2;  De  Augmentis  Sci.,  bk.  3,  chs.  4 and  5;  compare  also  Prof. 
Fowler’s  note  on  the  subject  in  his  edition  of  the  Novum  Organum,  and 
Kuno  Fischer’s  remarks  in  bis  Franz  Baco,  pp.  143-146.  For  Descartes’ 
views  consult  his  Meditations,  IV,  and  Principles  of  Philosophy,  I,  28;  also 
Kuno  Fischer’s  remarks  in  his  Descartes  [Hist,  of  Mod.  Phil.,  Eng.  trans., 
vol.  I,  pp.  364  f.).  For  Spinoza’s  views  consult  his  Ethics,  pt.  I,  props.  32-34 
and  the  appendix.  For  Leibnitz’s  own  views,  see  Articles  I,  IV,  VII,  § 28, 
X,  XIX,  XX,  XXXIX.  On  the  whole  subject,  see  Janet’s  Final  Causes. 

7.  Pi-iilipp  (Page  2). 

A native  of  Saxony,  not  improbably  also  of  Leipsic,  who  was  a councillor 
and  representative  of  the  Saxon  government  at  Hamburg  from  1675-1682. 
In  1682  he  became  librarian  of  the  electoral  library  at  Dresden  and  died 
shortly  afterward.  He  was  much  interested  in  the  sciences. 

8.  The  Epicurus  of  Laertius  (Page  8). 

This  refers  to  the  article  on  Epicurus  by  Diogenes  Laeertius  in  his  Lives  of 
the  Philosophers,  in  ten  books.  It  contains  some  original  letters  of  Epicu- 
rus and  comprises  a pretty  satisfactory  epitome  of  the  Epicurean  doctrines. 

ARTICLE  II. 

9.  Relation  of  Leibnitz  to  Spinoza. 

The  relation  of  Leibnitz  philosophically  to  Spinoza  has  long  been  a subject 
of  dispute.  Was  Leibnitz  ever  a Spinozist?  How  much  has  he  been 
influenced  by  Spinoza?  These  and  other  like  questions  have  given  rise  to 
numerous  essays.  The  weight  of  evidence  seems  to  show  that  he  never  was 
a real  follower  of  Spinoza  but  that  nevertheless  he  at  first  had  strong  lean- 
ings toward  the  philosophy  of  the  great  Jew  (cf.  p.  194).  Those  who  wish  to 
pursue  the  subject  will  find,  in  addition  to  the  earlier  discussions  of  the  ques- 
tion by  Trendelenburg,  Erdmann,  Guhrauer  and  De  Careil,  the  whole  subject 
discussed  anew  by  Prof.  Stein  in  his  Leibniz  in  seinem  I Wrhaltniss  zu  Spinoza 
auf  Grundlage  unedirten  Materials  entwiclclungsgeschicjitlich  dargestellt  ( in 
the  Sitzungsberichte  der  KOnigl.  preuss.  Akademie  XXV,  1888,  p.  615  ff. ) 
and  in  his  Leibniz  und  Spinoza,  Berlin,  1890. 

Between  the  years  1676  and  1680  Leibnitz  carefully  studied  the  writings 
of  Spinoza,.  He  received  a copy  of  the  Opera  posthuma,  containing  the  Ethics, 
almost  immediately  after  it,  appeared  in  January,  1678,  and  several  manu- 
scripts are  extant  in  which  he  has  given  an  extended  judgment  on  this  the 
masterpiece  of  Spinoza.  One  of  these,  together,  with  two  minor  pieces  bear- 
ing on  Spinoza,  Gerhardt  has  given  to  the  public  in  his  first  volume.  This  is 
here  translated  and  should  be  read  in  connection  with  Art.  XXIX  (on  which 
see  note  60) . 


NOTES. 


389 


10.  Literature  on  Spinoza’s  Philosophy. 

The  following  references  may  be  of  use  in  the  study  of  Spinoza:. 

(1.)  Collected  editions  of  Spinoza’s  works.  The  best  and  now  standard 
edition  is  that  of  Van  Vloten  and  Land,  The  Hague,  1882  f.  This  has  sup- 
planted Bruder’s  ed.,  3 vols.,  Leipsic,  1843-6.  A cheap  edition  is  that  of  Gins- 
berg, 4 vols.,  Heidelberg,  1875  f. 

(2.)  Translations.  There  are  two  in  German:  Spinoza’s  Sdmmtliche 

Werke  ubers.  von  B.  Auerbach,  last  ed.  in  2 vols.,  Stuttgart,  1872;  and 
Spinoza’s  Sdmmtliche  'Werke  ubers.  von  Yon  Kirchmann  u.  Schaarschmidt,  2 
vols.,  Berlin,  1868,  5tli  ed.,  1893.  The  standard  translation  in  French  is  the 
Oeuvres  de  Spinoza,  trad.  par.  E.  Saisset,  last  ed.  3 vols.,  Cliarpentier,  Paris, 
1872.  Until  recently  none  of  the  works  of  Spinoza  was  accessible  in  English. 
Now  we  have  the  following:  Descartes’  Principles  of  Philosophy,  geometric- 
ally demonstrated,  translated  by  H.  H.  Britan,  Chicago,  1905;  Cogitata 
Metaphysica,  translated  by  H.  H.  Britan,  Chicago,  1905;  the  Tractatus  de 
Intellectus  Emondatione,  translated  by  Elwes,  1887 ; by  White,  London, 
1895;  the  Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus,  translated  anonymously  in  1689, 
by  Willis  in  1S62,  by  Elwes  in  1887;  the  Tractatus  Politicus,  translated  by 
Maccall  in  1854,  by  Elwes  in  1887;  the  Epistolce  (in  part)  by  Willis  in 
1870,  by  Elwes  in  1887;  the  Ethica,  translated  by  Willis,  London,  1870;  by 
D.  D.  S.,  New  York,  1876;  by  Prof.  H.  Smith,  Cincinnati,  1886;  by  White, 
London,  1887,  2d  ed.,  1894;  by  Elwes,  London,  1887;  by  G.  S.  Fullerton 
(1st,  2d,  and  5tli  parts,  and  extracts  from  3d  and  4th),  New  York,  1892,  2d 
ed.,  1894.  Of  the  translations  of  the  Ethics,  those  of  White  and  Elwes  are  the 
best. 

(3.)  Expositions  and  Criticisms  of  Spinoza: 

In  German:  Trendelenburg’s  Ueber  Spinoza’s  Grundgedanken  (in  his  Hist. 
Beit  rage) . 

Erdmann’s  Die  Grundbegriffe  des  Spinozismus  (in  his  Verm.  Aufs.). 

Schaarsehmidt’s  Descartes  u.  Spinoza,  urkundl.  Darstellg.  d.  Philos. 
Beider,  Bonn,  1S50. 

Busolt’s  Die  Grundziige  d.  Erkenntnisstheorie  u.  Metaphysik  Spinozas, 
Berlin,  1875. 

Camerer’s  Die  Lehre  Spinozas,  Stuttgart,  1877. 

Von  Kirchmann’s  Erlduterungen  zu  Spinoza’s  Werke  (in  his  Philosoph- 
ische  Bibliothek). 

L.  Stein’s  Leibniz  und  Spinoza,  Berlin,  1890. 

Kuno  Fischer’s  Spinoza  ( Gesch . d.  n.  Phil.),  4 verm.  Auf.,  Heidelberg, 
1898. 

A.  Wenzel’s  Die  Weltanschauung  Spinozas,  Leipsic,  1907. 

In  addition  to  these,  Jacobi’s  Ueber  die  Lehre  Spinoza’s,  Herder’s  Gott, 
einige  Gesprache  iiber  Spinoza’s  System,  and  Auerbach’s  Spinoza,  a novel, 
may  be  noticed. 

In  French: — Fenelon’s  Refutation  de  Spinoza  (in  his  Traite  de  l’ Existence 
de  Dieu,  pt.  2,  eh.  Ill;  the  Eng.  trans.  contains  also  criticisms  by  the  Jesuit 
Father  Toumemine). 

Cousin’s  Rapports  du  Cartesianisme  et  du  Spinozisme  (in  his  Frag- 
ments de  Phil.  Cartesienne) . 


390 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


De  Careil’s  Leibniz,  Descartes,  et  Spinoza,  Paris,  1862. 

E.  Saisset’s  Introduction  (to  his  translation  of  the  Oeuvres  de  Spinoza, 
Charpentier,  Paris),  also  his  Modern  Pantheism  (Eng.  trans.),  pp. 
92-157. 

Janet’s  Spinoza  et  le  Spinozisme  (in  the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  vol. 
70)  and  his  French  Thought  and  Spinoza  (in  the  Contcinp.  Review, 
May,  1877). 

R.  Worms,  La  Morale  de  Spinoza,  Paris,  1892. 

L.  Brunschvieg’s  Spinoza,  Paris,  1894. 

P.  L.  Couclioud’s  Benoit  de  Spinoza,  Paris,  1902. 

In  English: — Pollock’s  Spinoza:  his  Life  and  Philosophy,  London,  1880, 
2d  ed.  1899. 

Martineau’s  Spinoza:  a Study,  London,  1882,  and  his  Types  of  Ethical 
Theory,  vol.  i,  pp.  246-393. 

John  Caird’s  Spinoza  (in  Blackwood’s  Series),  Edinburgh,  1888. 

Prof.  Knight’s  Spinoza:  Four  Essays  (by  Fischer,  Land,  Van  Vloten, 
Renan),  London,  1882. 

Flint’s  Anti-Theistic  Theories,  pp.  358-375  and  547-552. 

H.  Joachim’s  A Study  of  the  Ethics  of  Spinoza,  Oxford,  1901. 

R.  A.  Duff’s  Spinoza’s  Political  and  Ethical  Philosophy , Glasgow,  1903. 

J.  Iverach’s  Descartes,  Spinoza  and  the  New  Philosophy,  New  York, 
1904. 

J.  A.  Picton’s  A Handbook  to  Spinoza’s  Ethics,  London,  1906. 

E.  E.  Powell’s  Spinoza  and  Religion,  Chicago,  1907. 

In  addition  to  these  and  to  the  early  English  notices  of  Spinoza  mentioned 
by  Pollock  (p.  xxxiii),  the  following  may  be  added:  Howe’s  Living  Temple, 
pt.  II,  ch.  1;  Fronde’s  Spinoza  (in  his  Short  Studies  on  Great  Subjects, 
vol.  i)  ; Lewes’  Spinoza  and  his  Philosophy  (in  Westminster  Revie w,  No. 
77)  ; M.  Arnold’s  Spinoza  (in  his  Essays  in  Criticism)  ; Prof.  G.  S.  Morris’ 
Life  and  Teachings  of  Spinoza  (in  the  Jour,  of  Spec.  Phil.,  vol.  II)  ; Dewey’s 
The  Pantheism  of  Spinoza  (in  the  same,  vol.  16)  ; G.  S.  Fullerton’s  On 
Spinozistic  Immortality,  Philadelphia,  1899;  and  the  sections  on  Spinoza  in 
the  histories  of  philosophy  by  Ueberweg,  Erdmann,  and  Bowen.  Consult 
also  for  literature  Rand’s  Bibliography  of  Philosophy,  etc. 

11.  The  Conception  of  Contingent  (Page  23,  prop.  29). 

Cf.  Articles  XXVIII,  XXXVII  (p.  346)  and  XXVI  (p.  224),  for  fuller 
statements  of  Leibnitz’s  view  of  contingency  and  necessity. 

12.  Natura  Naturans  and  Natuka  Naturata  (Page  24,  prop.  31). 

“In  the  most  general  meaning  of  the  words,  Natura  Naturans  and  Natura 
Naturata  may  be  described  as  related  to  each  other  thus:  Natura  Naturata 
is  the  actual  condition  of  a given  object  or  quality,  or  of  the  aggregate  of  all 
objects  and  qualities,  the  Universe,  at  any  given  time;  Natura  Naturans  is 
the  immanent  cause  of  this  condition,  or  aggregate  of  conditions,  and  is 
regarded  as  producing  it  by  a continuous  process.  Thus  when  we  say  ‘How 
wonderfully  Nature  works,’  we  are  speaking  of  ‘Natura  Naturans’;  when  we 


KOTES. 


391 


say  ‘How  beautiful  is  Nature,’  we  are  speaking  of  Natura  Naturata.  Hence, 
Natura  Naturans  is  related  to  Natura  Naturata  as  cause  to  effect.  Or,  again, 
we  may  say  that  Natura  Naturans  is  the  active  or  dynamical,  Natura  Natur- 
ata the  passive  or  statical  aspect  of  nature.” — Fowler's  Bacon's  Novum 
Organum,  II,  1,  note  4. 


ARTICLE  III. 

13.  The  Quality  of  Terms  (Page  28). 

Cf.  Discours  de  Metaphysique , §24;  Nouv.  Essais,  II,  e.  29  f. ; Art.  XXIV, 
p.  158.  The  distinctions  here  made  by  Leibnitz  constitute  what  is  known  as 
the  logical  doctrine  of  the  quality  of  terms  and  will  be  found  explained  in  all 
the  ordinary  text-books  on  logic.  The  question  is,  What  constitutes  clear, 
distinct  and  perfect  knowledge?  The  views  of  Leibnitz’s  predecessors  should 
be  noticed.  See  Descartes’  Discourse  on  Method,  pt.  4,  and  Principles  of 
Philosophy,  I,  45,  46;  Spinoza’s  Ethics,  I,  axiom  6 and  note  to  prop.  29,  and 
II,  deff.  2,  3,  and  props.  33-43,  and  De  Emend.  Intel,  pp.  23  f.,  in  Elwes’ 
trans. ; Amauld’s  Port  Royul  Logic,  pp.  61,  62,  in  Baynes’  trans.  Consult 
also  Locke’s  views  (published  subsequently  to  this  essay)  in  his  Essay,  bk.  II. 
eh.  29,  §§  2,  4,  and  ch.  31,  § 1.  For  the  doctrine  as  presented  by  modem  logi- 
cians and  its  value,  see  Bowen’s  Logic,  Davis’  Theory  of  Thought,  Ueberweg’s 
Logilc  ( latest  ed.,  by  J.  Bona  Meyer ) . 

Leibnitz’s  other  statements  of  the  doctrine  should  be  compared  with  those 
in  this  essay. 

A brief  statement  of  the  doctrine  is  as  follows : 

Knowledge  is 

Clear.  Obscure. 


Distinct.  Indistinct  (Confused). 

Adequate.  Inadequate. 

Intuitive  = Perfect.  Symbolical. 

The  whole  process  consists  in  the  grasping  of  more  and  more  attributes. 

Clear  knowledge  is  only  of  the  constituted  whole.  I have  clear  knowledge 
of  a thing  when  I can  distinguish  it  as  a whole  from  other  things.  The 
knowledge  which  common  people  have  of  Value.  Price,  Final  Cause,  is  not 
clear  but  obscure.  The  knowledge  which  a patient  has  of  his  ailment,  which 
an  artist  has  of  a defect  in  a picture,  which  a witness  has  of  a prisoner,  is 
usually  clear  but  not  distinct. 

Distinct  knowledge  is  of  the  constituent  parts.  My  knowledge  of  a thing 
is  distinct  when  I not  only  clearly  distinguish  it  from  other  things  but  dis- 
tinguish its  different  attributes  or  characteristics.  When  I define  an  ele- 
phant as  an  animal  that  drinks  through  its  nostrils,  my  knowledge  is 
distinct  although  quite  inadequate.  Our  knowledge  of  simple  ideas  is  at  once 
distinct  and  adequate. 


392 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


Alice/ note  knowledge  is  of  the  essential  attributes.  Knowledge  may  be  said 
to  be  adequate  when  there  is  exhaustive  knowledge  of  the  attributes.  Such 
knowledge  is  possible  to  God  alone.  Again,  it  may  be  said  to  be  adequate 
when  it  suffices  for  the  object  in  view.  In  this  sense  a housewife’s  knowl- 
edge of  fish  when  she  goes  to  the  fish-market  may  be  called  adequate.  This 
is  practical  adequacy  and  is  scientifically  worthless.  Logical  adequacy  is 
knowledge  of  the  essential  attributes,  that  is,  those  which  (a)  contain  the 
common  and  persistent  basis  for  a multitude  of  others,  and  on  which  (b)  the 
subsistence  of  the  object,  its  worth  and  its  meaning  depend. 

Intuitive  knowledge  is  possessed  when  we  grasp  in  one  act  of  consciousness 
all  the  qualities  or  the  essential  qualities.  Such  knowledge,  which  is  at  once 
also  clear,  disinct  and  adequate,  is  Perfect  Knowledge.  Very  little  of  our 
knowledge  is  such ; most  of  it  may  be  adequate  without  being  intuitive,  and 
hence  is  but  symbolical. 

14.  Argument  of  Descartes  for  Proving  the  Existence  of  God. 

(Page  30.)  Cf.  note  50. 

15.  True  and  False  Ideas  (Page  31). 

Cf.  Spinoza’s  De  Emend.  Intel.;  Ethics,  I,  axiom  6,  and  II,  props.  33-43; 
Leibnitz’s  Notes  on  Spinoza’s  Ethics;  Locke’s  Essay,  bk.  II,  eh.  32;  Arnauld’s 
Port  Royal  Logic. 

16.  “Whatsoever  is  clearly  and  distinctly  conceived  is  True” 

(Page  32). 

This  is  Descartes’  famous  criterion  of  truth.  Cf.  his  Discourse  on  Method, 
pt.  IV ; Meditations,  III ; Principles,  I,  45  f . ; and  cf.  Art  VII,  p.  56 ; and 
H.  Sidgewick,  Mind,  vol.  7,  pp.  437  f. 

17.  Antoine  Arnauld’s  “On  the  Art  of  Thinking  Well”  (Page  32). 

This  is  the  celebrated  Port  Royal  Logic,  the  best  specimen  of  the  logic  of 
the  Cartesian  school,  written  by  Arnauld  assisted  by  Nicole.  It  has  twice 
been  translated  into  English.  The  last  translation,  a most  admirable  one, 
is  that  by  Prof.  Baynes,  who  has  added  in  an  appendix  an  excellent  transla- 
tion of  this  essay  by  Leibnitz.  Arnauld’s  masterpiece  is  his  work  on  True 
and  False  Ideas,  1683,  in  which  he  attacks,  and  in  many  points  anticipates 
Reid's  objections  to,  the  theory  of  representative  ideas.  He  became  an  inti- 
mate friend  of  Leibnitz  and  carried  on  with  him  a long  correspondence  on 
theological  and  philosophical  topics.  For  this,  see  Janet’s  and  Gerhardt’s 
editions  of  Leibnitz’s  works,  and  Dr.  G.  R.  Montgomery’s  Leibniz’s  Meta- 
physics, Correspondence  with  Arnauld,  and  Monadology,  Open  Court  Co., 
Chicago,  1902. 

18.  The  Question  “Whether  we  See  all  things  in  God”  (Page  33). 

This  refers  to  the  famous  doctrine  of  Malebranche.  See  next  note,  and  Art. 
XXX. 

19.  Malebranche  and  “The  Search  after  Truth”  (Page  34). 

Malebranche  has  been  called  by  Cousin  the  French  Plato.  Next  to  Des- 
cartes he  was  the  most  eminent  French  metaphysician  of  the  seventeenth 


NOTES. 


393 


century.  His  greatest  work  is  liis  De  la  Recherche  de  la  Verite,  1672.  Of 
this  there  are  two  English  translations,  the  second  by  Taylor,  London,  1712. 
The  famous  doctrine  that  ice  see  all  things  in  God  is  expounded  in  the  third 
book  in  a brief  chapter  but  in  a clear  manner.  There  is  a convenient  edition 
in  four  small  volumes  of  the  most  important  works  of  Malebranche,  edited, 
with  an  introduction,  by  Jules  Simon.  Leibnitz’s  correspondence  with 
Malebranche  will  be  found  in  Gerhardt,  vol.  I.  On  his  philosophy,  see  the 
first  volume  of  Kuno  Fischer’s  Hist,  of  Mod.  Phil.;  Olle-Laprune’s  La  Philo- 
sophic de  Malebranche;  Henri  Joly’s  Malebranche ; Locke’s  Examination  of 
the  Doctrine  of  Malebranche ; Leibnitz’s  criticisms  in  Arts.  XXXI  and  XXXVI, 
and  in  his  Examen  des  Principes  dn  Malebranche,  in  Erdmann,  LXXXV. 

ARTICLE  IV. 

20.  The  Law  of  Continuity. 

This  law  of  continuity  is  one  of  the  cardinal  points  in  the  system  of  Leib- 
nitz. For  other  statements  of  it  and  remarks  on  it  by  him,  see  Arts.  V, 
VII  (p.  61),  XXVI  (p.  179-180)  ; the  Theodicee,  I'll,  § 348;  and  Nouv.  Ess., 
Ill,  e.  6,  § 12;  IV,  c.  16,  § 12. 

ARTICLE  V. 

21.  Statement  of  Personal  Views  on  Metaphysics  and  Physics. 

This  letter  to  Arnauld  is  of  especial  interest  as  it  gives  an  epitome  of  Leib- 
nitz’s system  and  mentions  the  monad  doctrine  in  its  essential  characteristics. 
Yet  the  letter  of  Foucher  (Art.  XIII)  shows  that  Leibnitz,  as  early  as  1685, 
had  reached  in  some  of  its  main  features  his  later  published  system ; and  the 
Discours  de  Metaphysique  (the  table  of  contents  of  which  Leibnitz  sent  to 
Arnauld,  in  his  letter  to  Prince  Ernest  of  Hesse,  of  February  11,  1686),  pub- 
lished first  by  Grotefond  and  now  again  by  Gerhardt,  vol.  4,  and  admirably 
translated  into  English  by  Dr.  G.  R.  Montgomery  (Open  Court  Company, 
Chicago,  1902),  verifies  this.  Cf.  §§  8,  9,  12,  13,  15,  18,  19,  24,  27,  33,  34 
of  it. 

ARTICLE  VI. 

22.  Does  the  Essence  of  Body  consist  in  Extension  (Page  42). 

This  is  the  doctrine  of  Descartes  and  of  Malebranche.  Cf.  Descartes, 
Princip.  of  Phil.,  II,  4,  “that  the  nature  of  body  consists  not  in  weight, 
hardness,  color,  and  the  like,  but  in  extension  alone’’ ; and  Leibnitz’s  note  on 
it,  p.  60.  After  being  led  by  his  mathematical  and  physical  studies  to  reject 
Descartes’  Laics  of  Motion,  Leibnitz  was  led  on  to  a thorough  investigation 
of  the  nature  of  body,  and  on  this  he  separates  himself  from  Descartes. 
Doubtless  his  youthful  studies  on  the  Principle  of  Individuation,  as  well  as 
liis  later  studies  in  dynamics,  contributed  much  to  convince  him  that  “some 
higher  or  metaphysical  notion,  to  wit:  that  of  activity,  power,  force  is 

needed.”  These  pieces  in  Art.  VI — two  letters  to  the  editor  of  the  Journ.  des 
Sav.,  June,  1691,  and  Jan.,  1693 — are  important  in  that  they  throw  light  on 
the  process  by  which  Leibnitz  came  to  reach  the  corner-stone  of  his  system — 
the  notion  of  Substance.  Cf.  also  Art.  XI  and  Art.  XII,  §§  2,  3. 


394 


PHILOSOPHICAL,  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


23.  The  System  of  Occasional  Causes  (Page  45). 

This  is  the  system  propounded  by  Geulincx  and  advocated  by  Male- 
branche,  to  explain  the  relation  between  the  body  and  soul.  See  Leibnitz’s 
opinion  of  the  doctrine,  Art.  XX,  § 15,  and  cf.  Kuno  Fischer’s  Geschiclite 
d.  n.  Phil.,  vol.  I. 

ARTICLE  VII. 

24.  Descartes’  Principles  of  Philosophy. 

This  work  was  written  by  Descartes  in  1644,  for  the  Princess  Elisabeth,  the 
sister  of  Leibnitz’s  friend,  the  Grand  Duchess  Sophia,  and  the  aunt  of  Queen 
Sophia  Charlotte  for  whom  Leibnitz  wrote  the  Theodicee.  Prof.  Veitch  has 
translated  the  First  Part  of  the  Principles  along  with  selections  from  the 
Second,  Third  and  Fourth  Parts.  Parts  I and  II  are  entitled  respectively  Of 
the  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge  and  Of  the  Principles  of  Material 
Things,  and  give  an  epitome  of  Descartes’  philosophy.  Cf.  Spinoza’s  Renati 
Descartes  Principiorum  Philosophiae  pars  l et  II  more  geometrico  demons- 
tratae  (trans.  into  English  by  Dr.  IT.  H.  Britan,  Open  Court  Company, 
Chicago,  1905)  ; Kirchmann’s  Erlduterungen  zu  Spinoza’s  Descartes’  Prin- 
cipien;  also  Joly’s  and  Brochard’s  editions,  with  notes,  of  Descartes’  Les 
Principes  de  Philosophie. 

25.  Truths  of  Fact  and  Truths  of  Reason  (Page  49). 

Cf.  Articles  XXXV,  §§  33  and  30-36;  XXVI  (pp.  236,  237,  243). 

26.  The  Source  and  Nature  of  Error  (Pages  52-3). 

Cf.  Descartes,  Meditations,  IV,  Principles  of  Phil.,  I,  §§  29,  30,  33,  35,  42, 
43;  Bacon,  Novrim  Organum,  I,  38-68  (and  Fowler’s  notes;  also  Kuno 
Fischer’s  Franz  Baco  u.  seine  Naclifolger,  last  ed.,  pp.  159-173).  For 
Leibnitz’s  views  see  in  this  Art.  VII  his  notes  on  articles  5,  6,  13  and  especially 
on  31  and  35,  and  Nouv.  Ess.,  IV.  c.  20. 

27.  The  author  of  the  Philosophia  Mosaica  (Page  64). 

Robert  Fludd  (1574-1637),  an  English  physician  and  mystical  philosopher. 
His  Phil.  Mosaica  appeared  in  1638  at  Gouda. 

ARTICLE  VIII. 

28.  Leibnitz’s  Preface  to  iiis  Codex  Diplomaticus  Juris  Gentium  (Page  66). 

This  Preface  is  important  for  an  understanding  of  Leibnitz’s  ethical  views 
(cf.  also  his  letter  to  Coste  of  July  4,  1706,  and  pp.  135  f.) . He  often  refers  to 
it;  cf.  Nou.  Ess.,  2,  20,  §§  4,  5 ; and  elsewhere. 

ARTICLE  IX. 

29.  Two  Essays  on  Motion  (Page  70). 

These  were  written  while  Leibnitz  was  at  Mayence  and  dedicated,  the  one 
to  the  Royal  Society  of  London,  and  the  other  to  the  Royal  Academy  at  Paris. 
The  subject  of  this  Art.,  Indivisihilia,  was  one  which  engaged  the  thought  of 
Leibnitz  a great  deal. 


NOTES. 


395 


ARTICLE  X. 

30.  Descartes’  Man  (Page  73). 

I.  e.,  liis  work  entitled  L’ Homme,  published  after  his  death,  Paris,  1664. 

ARTICLE  XI. 

31.  The  Notion  of  Substance. 

If  there  is  one  conception  which  may  be  called  central  in  the  philosophy 
of  Leibnitz  it  is  the  notion  of  substance.  If,  therefore,  his  system  is  to  be 
rightly  understood,  great  attention  must  be  given  to  his  answer  to  the 
question,  “What  is  substance  ?”  Cf . Articles  XII,  §§  2,  3,  XX,  XXVII, 
XXXIV,  XXXV,  and  Noun.  Ess.,  II,  c.  13,  § 19,  and  c.  23,  § 2.  See  also 
Fischer’s  Leibniz,  pp.  325  f.,  and  H.  F.  Rail’s  Der  Leibnizsche  Substanzbegrijf 
(Halle,  1899). 

32.  Mersenne  (Page  75). 

The  intimate  friend  of  Descartes  and  former  fellow-student  of  his  at  La 
Fleche.  He  superintended  the  publication  of  some  of  Descartes’  writings, 
especially  his  Meditations.  The  writings  of  Descartes  alluded  to  in  this 
sentence  is  probably  the  Answers  to  Objections  to  his  Meditations,  especially 
the  answer  to  the  Second  Objection  (cf.  Veitch’s  translation.  Appendix). 

ARTICLE  XII. 

33.  “One  of  the  greatest  theologians  and  philosophers  of  our  time” 

(Page  77). 

He  alludes  to  Arnauld  ( cf . note  17). 

34.  “To  find  real  units”  ( Page  78 ) . 

Gerhardt’s  text  here  reads:  “Therefore,  in  order  to  find  these  real  unities, 
I was  compelled  to  have  recourse  to  a real  or  animated  point,  so  to  speak,  or 
to  a substantial  atom,  which  must  embrace  something  formal  or  active  in 
order  to  constitute  a complete  being.” 

35.  Swammerdam,  Malpighi,  Leewenhoeck,  Rigis,  Hartsoeker  (Page  80). 

Swammerdam  (1637-1680),  a Dutch  anatomist,  especially  celebrated  for 
his  investigations  in  entomology;  his  General  History  of  Insects  (Utrecht, 
1669),  and  other  kindred  works  contributing  to  the  founding  of  the  science. 

Malpighi  (1628-1694),  of  Bologna,  founder  of  microscopic  anatomy. 

Leewenhoeck  (1632-1723),  an  eminent  Dutch  niicroscopist,  discoverer  of  the 
capillary  circulation  of  the  blood. 

Rigis  or  Regius  (1632-1707),  a celebrated  Cartesian  philosopher  who 
interpreted  Descartes  in  the  manner  of  an  empiricist. 

Hartsoeker  (1656-1725),  a Dutch  mathematician  and  physicist. 

36.  The  system  of  Preestablisited  Harmony  (Pages  84-85). 

After  the  publication  of  this  Neio  System  Leibnitz  was  fond  of  calling  him- 
self “Author  of  the  System  of  Preestablished  Harmony,”  and  it  is  as  such 
that  he  is  popularly  known.  For  other  'statements  of  it  by  him,  see  Articles 
XIV,  XV,  XVI,  XXVI,  XXXIV,  XXXV,  etc. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


396 

ARTICLE  XIII. 

37.  Objections  to  the  Doctrine  of  Preestablished  Harmony. 

The  objections  urged  by  Foucher  in  this  article  are  unimportant  com- 
pared with  those  presented  by  others  of  Leibnitz’s  contemporaries.  See 
especially  the  objections  of  Bayle  in  his  Dictionary,  Art.  Rorarius ; Lami 
in  his  Connaissance  de  soi-meme,  Paris,  1699;  Clarke  in  his  Answer  to 
Leibnitz’s  5tli  Letter. 

ARTICLE  XIV. 

38.  Answers  to  Objections  to  the  Preestablished  Harmony. 

For  Leibnitz’s  answers  to  the  more  serious  objections  of  Bayle,  Lami,  and 
Clarke,  see  Gerhardt’s  ed.,  vol.  4,  pp.  517-596,  and  Erdmann’s  ed.,  pp.  746- 
7S8;  translated  in  part  by  Langley,  New  Essays  (Appendix  VIII) , New  York, 
1896. 

ARTICLES  XV  AND  XVI. 

39.  The  Illustration  of  the  Clocks. 

Erdmann,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  § 267,  8,  and  H.  Ritter  before  him,  pointed 
out  that  this  illustration  is  not  original  with  Leibnitz.  It  is  found  in  a note 
to  Geulincx’s  TvCo6l  atavrov  sive  Etliica,  first  published  at  Amsterdam  in 
1665.  L.  Stein,  Zur  Genesis  des  Occasionalismus,  Archiv  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos., 
vol.  1,  makes  it  quite  clear  that  the  illustration  was,  indeed,  in  common  use. 

For  Leibnitz’s  earlier  illustration  of  the  two  choirs,  see  his  letter  to 
Arnauld,  April  30,  1687,  Montgomery’s  trans.,  p.  188. 

ARTICLE  XVII. 

40.  Leibnitz  and  Locke. 

Leibnitz’s  attention  was  first  called  to  Locke  by  the  epitome  of  his  Essay 
published  by  LeClerc  in  the  Bibliotheque  Universelle,  1688.  On  the  appear- 
ance in  1690  of- the  Essay  itself  he  wrote  these  observations  (Art.  XVII) 
which  were  sent  through  Burnett  to  Locke.  Locke  gives  his  opinion  of 
them  in  a letter  to  Molyneux,  April  10,  1697 : “I  must  confess  to  you,  that 
Mr.  Leibnitz’s  great  name  had  raised  in  me  an  expectation  which  the  sight 
of  his  paper  did  not  answer,  nor  that  discourse  of  his  in  the  Acta  Erudi- 
torum,  which  he  quotes,  and  I have  since  read,  and  had  just  the  same 
thoughts  of  it,  when  I read  it,  as  I find  you  have.  From  whence  I only  draw 
this  inference,  that  even  great  parts  will  not  master  any  subject  without 
great  thinking,  and  even  the  largest  minds  have  but  narrow  swallows.”  When 
Leibnitz  heard  that  Locke  did  not  understand  him,  he  wrote  two  pieces, 
Echantillon  de  Reflexions  sur  le  I.  Livre  de  VEssay  de  I’Entendement  de 
V Homme  and  Echantillon  de  Reflexions  sur  le  II.  Livre,  which  were  also 
sent  through  Burnett  to  Locke,  but  these  failed  to  call  forth  any  direct 
acknowledgement  from  the  latter.  When  Coste’s  French  translation  of  the 
Essay  appeared  in  1700,  Leibnitz  wrote  a notice  of  it  for  the  Monatlicher 
Auszug,  and  entered  on  an  extended  critique  of  it — The  New  Essays  con- 
cerning Human  Understanding — which  was  completed  in  1704,  but,  on 
account  of  Locke’s  death,  not  published. 


NOTES. 


397 


41.  Literature  on  Locke. 

Locke’s  Essay,  next  to  Kant’s  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  has  been  the 
most  influential  single  work  in  modern  philosophy.  It  has  called  forth  a 
literature  which  would  itself  make  a good-sized  library.  The  standard  edition 
now  is  that  by  Professor  A.  C.  Fraser,  Oxford,  1894,  with  valuable 
Prolegomena  and  Notes.  The  following  are  among  the  most  important  works 
on  the  Essay : 

Henry  Lee’s  Anti-Scepticism j or  Xotes  upon  each  Chapter  of  Locke’s  Essay 
concerning  Human  Understanding.  London,  1702. 

Leibnitz’s  X ouveaux  Essais  sur  VEntendement  Humain.  (Vol.  4,  in  Ger- 
hardt’s  ed.)  English  translation  by  Alfred  Gideon  Langley,  New  York.  1896. 

Cousin’s  La  Philosophic  de  Locke,  1829.  English  translations  by  Henry 
and  by  Wight. 

Webb’s  Intellectualism  of  Locke.  London,  1858. 

Hartenstein’s  Locke’s  Lehre  v.  d.  menschl.  Erkenntness  in  Vergleichung  m/it 
Leibniz’s  Kritik  derselben.  Leipsic,  1865. 

Marion’s  Locke,  sa  Vie,  son  Oeuvre.  (Alcan),  Paris,  1878. 

Tlios.  Fowler’s  Locke.  London,  1880. 

Green’s  Introduction  to  the  Phil.  Works  of  Hume.  London,  1874. 

McCosh’s  Locke’s  Theory  of  Knowledge,  with  a notice  of  Berkeley.  New 

York,  1884. 

Kirchmann’s  Erlauterungen  zu  Locke’s  Versuch  iiber  den  menschlichen 
Verstand  (cf.  also  Schaarsclimidt’s  Erlauterungen  zu  Leibniz’s  Neue 
Abhandlungen) . 

Fraser’s  Locke  (in  Blackwood’s  Series),  Edinburgh,  1890;  also  his 
Prolegomena  and  Notes  to  his  edition  of  the  Essay. 

42.  The  function  della  Crusca  (Page  105). 

La  Crusca,  a celebrated  academy  of  Florence,  founded  in  1582,  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  the  purity  of  the  Italian  language,  that  is  to  say,  of 
separating  the  bran  ( crusca ) from  the  flour:  hence  the  name. 

ARTICLE  XVIII. 

43.  The  Law  of  Sufficient  Reason. 

This  Article  XVIII  was  written  by  Leibnitz  on  Nov.  23,  1697,  and  was  first 
published  by  Erdmann  in  1841.  It  deals  with  the  cosmological  argument  for 
the  being  of  God  and  the  problem  of  the  Theodicee.  The  third  sentence  gives 
the  key-note  to  the  whole:  “The  sufficient  reason  of  existence  can  be  found 
neither  in  any  particular  thing  nor  in  the  whole  aggregate  or  series.”  The 
principle  of  sufficient  reason  is  fundamental  in  the  philosophy  of  Leibnitz. 
His  system,  from  one  end  to  the  other,  is  inspired  by  an  unshaken  and 
immovable  faith  in  the  authority  of  this  principle.  At  the  very  end  of  his 
life  he  writes:  “Plut  a Dieu  qu’on  n’eut  jamais  suppose  des  prineipes  moins 
claires!  Ce  principe  est  eelui  du  besom  d’une  raison  suffisante,  pour  qu’une 
chose  existe,  qu'un  evenement  arrive,  qu’une  verite  ait  lieu”  ( 5th  Let.  to 
Clarke,  § 125) . For  other  statements  of  the  principle,  cf.  Honadology,  §§  32  f., 
Theodicee,  §§  44,  196.  Cf.  Nolan's  La  Monadologie  de  Leibniz,  p.  39  f. ; 
Ueberweg’s  Logik,  p.  270. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


398 

ARTICLE  XIX. 

44.  On  the  Consequences  of  Certain  Passages  in  Descartes. 

The  occasion  of  the  piece,  to  which  this  is  a reply,  was  a passage  in  a letter 
to  Xicaise,  in  which  Leibnitz  speaks  of  the  evil  consequences  of  Descartes’ 
denial  of  final  cause  and  of  his  view  that  matter  takes  successively  all  forms 
of  which  it  is  capable;  and  in  which  he  also  remarks:  “Aussi  peut-on  dire, 
que  Spinoza  n’a  fait  que  cultiver  certaines  semences  de  la  Philosophic  de 
Descartes,  de  sorte  que  je  crois  qu’il  importe  effectivement  pour  la  Religion, 
et  pour  la  piste,  que  cette  philosophic  soit  cliatiee  par  le  retranchment  des 
erreurs  qui  sont  melees  avec  la  verity.” 

ARTICLE  XX. 

45.  On  Nature  in  Itself. 

The  two  questions  handled  in  this  essay  are  stated  in  § 2,  What  is  nature 
in  itself?  and  Is  there  any  energy  or  force  residing  in  things?  The  first  he 
answers  (§§  2-8)  by  saying  that  Nature  is  the  handiwork  of  an  all-wise 
creator — the  expression  of  the  truths  and  ends  of  Absolute  Reason.  The 
second  question,  he  answers  (§§  9 f.)  by  his  doctrine  that  to  he  is  to  act. 

46.  Aristotle’s  Definition  of  Motion  (Page  120). 

Found  in  his  Physics,  bk.  Ill,  1,  201,  a,  10,  b,  4.  Cf.  Zeller’s  Aristotle,  Eng. 
tr.  I,  380  f.,  422  f. 

47.  Imaging  and  Intellectual  Conception  (Pages  123-4). 

The  important  distinction  between  imaging  and  intellectual  conception, 
where  imaging  is  impossible,  was  emphasized  by  Descartes  ( Prin . Phil.,  I,  73, 
and  Med.  VI) , Spinoza  (Emend.  Intel.) , and  Leibnitz  (p.  277  and  Nouv.  Essais, 
II,  c.  9,  § 8,  and  e.  29) . What  absurdities  one  may  be  led  into  by  a failure  to 
keep  this  distinction  in  mind,  may  be  seen  by  consulting  Spencer’s  First 
Principles,  pt.  I,  chs.  2-4. 

48.  The  Principle  of  the  “Identity  of  Indiscernibles”  (Pages  130-1). 

This,  as  Leibnitz  here  remarks,  is  among  his  “new  and  most  important 
axioms.”  He  says  in  writing  to  Clarke  (4,  § 5)  : “Ces  grands  prineipes  de  la 
Raison  suffisante  et  de  VIdentite  des  indiscernahles,  cliangent  l’etat  de  la 
metaphysique,  qui  devient  reelle  et  demonstrative  par  leur  moyen:  au  lieu 
qu’ autrefois  elle  ne  consistait  presque  qu’en  termes  vuides.”  Cf.  also  § 4 ft. ; 
Letter  V,  §§  21  f. ; Nouv.  Ess.,  II,  c.  27. 

ARTICLE  XXL 

49.  Ethical  Definitions. 

Cf.  Article  VIII,  and  Ne to  Essays,  bk.  II,  ch.  20,  §§  4,  5. 

ARTICLE  XXII. 

50.  The  Ontological  Argument  for  the  Being  of  God. 

On  this  celebrated  argument  consult  Anselm’s  Proslogium  and  Liber  contra 
Insipientem,  i.  e.,  Liber  Apologeticus  (English  Translations  published  by  Open 


NOTES. 


399 


Court  Co.,  Chicago;  see  also  the  French  translation  with  notes,  by  Bouchitte, 
Le  Rationalisme  Chretien,  Paris,  1842)  ; Gaunilo’s  Liber  pro  Insipiente ; 
Thomas  Aquinas’  Surnma  Theologia;  Descartes’  Meditations,  V;  Replies 
to  Objections,  especially  those  to  objections  1 and  2;  Principles  of  Philosophy, 
I,  §§  14  f. 

The  Anselmic  form  of  the  argument  may  be  stated  thus:  We  have  as  a 
fact  the  idea  of  the  greatest  possible  or  perfect  being;  an  actually  existing 
being  (in  re  esse)  has  more  perfection  than  an  ideally  existing  one  (in 
intellectu  esse ) ; therefore  God  exists.  In  other  words,  the  most  perfect 
conceivable  being  must  be  actual:  otherwise  a property — that  of  actuality, 
or  objective  being — is  wanting. 

Descartes’  additions  to  this  argument  consist  in  showing  that  the  idea  of 
God  is  a necessary  idea  of  the  reason;  that  it  is  an  idea  of  a real  infinite 
and  could  not  have  originated  in  us  or  from  any  finite  source;  that  when  we 
think  of  God,  we  must  think  of  him  not  merely  as  existing,  which  we  do 
with  everything  while  we  are  thinking  of  it,  but  as  necessarily  existing. 
Descartes’  argument  may  therefore  be  stated  thus:  We  have  among  the 

necessary  ideas  of  the  reason  the  idea  of  Absolute  or  All-perfect  Being;  this 
idea  contains  as  one  of  its  elements  necessary  existence;  therefore,  God  exists. 

Spinoza  (letter  to  DeVries)  has  stated  the  basis  of  the  ontological  argu- 
ment thus:  ‘‘The  more  reality  a being  or  thing  has,  the  more  attributes  must 
be  assigned  to  it  and  the  more  attributes  l assign  to  a thing,  the  more  I am 
forced  to  conceive  it  as  existing.” 

For  remarks  by  Leibnitz  bearing  on  the  argument,  see  Articles  III,  p.  30; 
VII,  p.  51;  XXII,  XXVI,  p.  245;  and  the  Letters  to  Jacquelot  (Gerhardt, 
vol.  3,  pp.  442  f. ) . 

He  claims:  (1)  That  the  idea  of  God  is  peculiar  in  this,  that  if  it  is  of  a 

being  possible  in  fact,  then  that  being  must  actually  exist.  But  is  the  idea 
of  God  the  idea  of  a being  possible  in  fact? 

(2)  That  merely  because  we  have  the  idea  of  God  it  does  not  therefore  fol- 
low that  he  actually  exists.  We  have  ideas  of  things  which  cannot  actually 
exist.  It  must  therefore  be  shown  that  the  idea  of  God  ds  a true  idea,  that 
is,  the  idea  of  a possible  being.  Descartes  failed  to  do  this.  [That  Leibnitz 
is  in  error  here  may  be  seen  by  examining  Descartes’  Reply  to  the  Second 
Objection,  where  Descartes  allows  that  it  must  first  of  all  be  proved  that  the 
conception  of  an  infinite  being  is  possible,  and  does  not  contain  a contradic- 
tion; but  shows  that  such  a proof  need  occasion  no  difficulties.] 

(3)  Everything  is  to  be  held  possible  until  its  impossibility  is  proved. 
Hence  there  is  a presumption  in  favor  of  the  actual  existence  of  God. 

(4)  This  presumption  is  more  than  a presumption:  it  is  a fact  that  God  is 
possible.  This  is  shown,  pp.  144-146;  see  also  Langley’s  translation  of  the 
Reiv  Essays,  appendix  X. 

For  Locke’s  examination  of  Descartes’  argument,  see  Lord  King’s  Life  of 
Locke,  Vol.  II,  pp.  134  seq.  On  the  worth  of  the  argument  itself,  cf.  Kant’s 
Critique,  Flint’s  Theism,  Dorner’s  System  of  Christian  Doctrine,  and  the 
essays  of  Huber,  Elvenieh,  Jahnke,  and  the  works  named  in  note  5.  For 
somewhat  elaborate  studies  on  the  theism  of  Descartes  and  on  the  theism  of 
Leibnitz,  consult  Saisset’s  Modern  Pantheism. 


400 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


ARTICLE  XXIII. 

51.  The  Doctrine  of  a Universal  Spirit. 

This  essay  was  written  at  C'harlottenburg,  near  Berlin,  for  the  instruction 
of  Queen  Sophia  Charlotte.  This  accounts  for  its  popular  tone. 

52.  Molinos,  Angelus  Silesius  and  Weigel  (p.  147). 

Molinos  (c.  1627-1096),  celebrated  Quietist,  born  in  Spain,  lived  and  died  at 
Rome.  Author  of  the  celebrated  Guida  Spirituale.  Cf.  Bigelow’s  Molinos 
the  Quietist,  New  York,  1882,  and  Shortliouse’s  novel,  John  Inglesant. 

Angelus  Silesius,  John  Angelus  of  Silesia,  to  whom  Leibnitz  refers  several 
times,  author  of  a number  of  devotional  pieces. 

Weigel  (1531-1588),  a Protestant  pastor  and  author  of  several  theological 
works. 

ARTICLE  XXIV. 

53.  The  Non-Sensuous  Element  in  Knowledge  (p.  157). 

This  interesting  letter  to  Queen  Charlotte,  now  for  the  first  time  published 
by  Gerhardt,  shows  in  a popular  way  the  impossibility  of  pure  empiricism 
and  presents  in  brief  Leibnitz’s  views  on  this  most  important  subject.  It  is 
interesting  to  notice  in  how  many  respects  Leibnitz  anticipates  Kant,  His 
views  are  more  fully  given  in  the  Nouveaux  Essais.  See  also  Kirohner’s 
Leibniz’s  Psychologie,  Cothen,  1876. 

ARTICLE  XXV. 

54.  Lady  Masham. 

Lady  Masham  was  the  daughter  of  Cudworth  and  the  friend  of  Locke.  In 
her  house,  at  Oates,  Locke  spent  his  last  years.  She  was  the  author  of  one 
or  two  religious  books.  The  letters  which  passed  between  her  and  Leibnitz 
are  given  in  full  by  Gerhardt. 

ARTICLE  XXVI. 

55.  The  Nouveaux  Essais. 

For  the  occasion  of  Leibnitz’s  writing  the  Nouveaux  Essais  and  for  the  lit- 
erature bearing  on  it,  see  notes  40,  41,  3.  The  work  itself  is  a dialogue 
between  Philalethe,  representing  Locke,  and  Theophile,  representing  Leib- 
nitz. Locke’s  Essay  is  followed  chapter  by.  chapter  and  almost  paragraph  by 
paragraph.  The  French  style  of  the  Work  is  so  poor  as  to  render  a readable 
translation  almost  impossible.  The  extracts  translated  here  are  from  the 
remarks  of  Theophile  alone,  and  it  is  hoped  that  they  will  convey  some  general 
idea  of  the  nature  and  value  of  the  work.  An  excellent  translation  of  the 
entire  work  by  Mr.  A.  G.  Langley  was  begun  in  the  Journal  of  Speculative 
Philosophy,  in  1885,  and  completed  and  published  in  book  form  by  The  Mac- 
millan Co.,  New  York,  in  1896  (cf.  note  2,  above). 

In  Gerhardt’s  text,  §§  5-18  of  the  first  chapter  are  placed  between  § 26  and 
§ 27.  In  the  translation,  the  order  adopted  by  Erdmann  and  Janet  has  been 
followed  as  it  accords  with  the  order  of  Locke’s  Essay.  The  headings  in  [ ] 
of  the  §§  are  inserted  from  Locke’s  Essay;  they  are  not  in  Leibnitz’s  text. 


NOTES. 


401 


56.  Analysis  of  the  Second  Chapter  of  Bic.  I.  of  the  ~N ouveaux  Essais. 

“The  controversy  between  Locke  and  Leibnitz  in  the  first  book  of  the 
A ouveaux  Essais  sur  V Entendement  Humain  relates  to  the  famous  question 
of  the  origin  of  ideas.  Locke  represents  the  empirical  school,  Leibnitz 
the  rationalistic  school.  The  first  maintains  the  hypothesis  of  the  tabula 
rasa,  the  second  the  hypothesis  of  innate  ideas.  It  can  be  said  that  they 
have  each  exhausted  the  question  and  that  they  have  said  all  that  could  be 
said  at  their  time,  at  least  in  the  terms  in  which  the  question  was  then 
stated:  for  since  then  it  has  been  presented  under  different  forms.  In  order 
to  leave  to  the  arguments  of  the  two  authors  all  their  force  we  shall  repro- 
duce them  as  far  as  possible  under  their  form  and  in  their  order,  afterwards 
we  shall  give  a resume,  in  condensing  the  whole  discussion: 

Locke’s  1st  Objection. — If  innate  principles  existed  all  men  ought  to  agree 
on  them;  now  this  universal  consent  does  not  exist  even  for  the  principles  of 
identity  and  of  contradiction ; for  there  is  a large  part  of  the  human  race  to 
whom  these  principles  are  unknown.  And,  further,  did  this  consent  exist  it 
would  prove  nothing,  could  another  way  be  shown  than  that  of  innateness 
by  which  men  might  have  arrived  at  this  uniformity  of  opinion. 

Leibnitz’s  Reply. — I do  not  base  the  certainty  of  innate  principles  upon 
universal  consent,  which,  moreover,  might  in  fact  arise  in  another  way.  This 
consent  is  an  intimation  and  not  a demonstration  of  the  innate  principle; 
but  the  exact  and  decisive  proof  of  these  principles  consists  in  showing  that 
their  certainty  comes  only  from  what  is  in  us.  Even  should  they  not  be 
known,  they  would  not  cease  to  be  innate,  because  they  would  be  recognized 
as  soon  as  they  have  been  understood.  But  fundamentally  everybody  knows 
them  and  they  are  at  each  moment  employed,  without  being  expressly 
recognized ; it  is  very  much  the  same  as  when  one  has  virtually  in  the  mind 
the  propositions  suppressed  in  enthymemes. 

2d  Obj. — To  say  that  there  are  truths  imprinted  on  the  soul  which  it  does 
not  perceive  is  a real  contradiction. 

Reply.  I think  that  we  have  a multitude  of  knowledges  of  which  we  are 
not  always  aware  even  when  we  have  need  of  them. 

3d  Obj. — It  could  then  be  said  that  all  reasonable  propositions  are  innate. 

Reply. — I acknowledge  this  as  regards  pure  ideas.  In  this  sense  it  can  be 
said  that  the  whole  of  arithmetic  and  of  geometry  is  innate,  although  it  is 
true  to  say  that  one  would  not  be  aware  of  the  ideas  under  consideration 
unless  one  saw  or  touched  something  ....  for  we  could  not  have  abstract 
thoughts  which  do  not  have  need  of  something  sensible.  This  does  not  pre- 
vent the  mind  from  deriving  necessary  truths  only  from  itself.  Only  there 
are  degrees  in  the  difficulty  of  perceiving  what  is  in  us. 

Ifth  Obj. — Latent  perceptions  suppose  at  least  memory:  undoubtedly  there 
may  be  in  the  soul  what  is  not  perceived  there;  but  it  must  always  be  that 
this  has  been  learned  and  been  formerly  known. 

Reply. — Why  could  it  not  have  still  another  cause?  For,  since  acquired 
knowledge  can  be  concealed  there  by  the  memory,  may  not  nature  also  have 
concealed  there  some  original  knowledge?  This  would  be  natural  habits 
active  and  passive  dispositions  and  aptitudes,  rather  than  a tabula  rasa. 


26 


402 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


5th  Ohj. — But  innateness  does  not  differ  from  the  simple  capacity  of  know- 
ing. 

Reply.—' The  mind  is  not  only  capable  of  knowing  them  but  also  of  finding 
them  in  itself,  and  if  it  had  but  the  simple  capacity,  or  passive  power,  it  would 
not  be  the  source  of  necessary  truths.  The  mind  has  a disposition  to  take 
them  itself  from  its  oil'll  depths. 

1st  Instance. — But  do  the  words  to  he  in  the  understanding  signify  anything  else 
than  to  he  perceived  hy  the  understanding f 

Reply. — They  mean  something  entirely  different.  It  is  enough  that  what  is  in 
the  understanding  can  be  found  there  and  that  the  sources  or  original  proofs  of 
these  truths  are  in  the  understanding  alone. 

2d  Instance.- — But  the  consent  which  the  mind  gives  without  effort  to  these  truths 
depends  on  the  faculty  of  the  human  mind. 

Reply. — Very  true  ; but  it  is  the  particular  relation  of  the  human  mind  to  these 
truths  which  renders  the  exercise  of  the  faculty  easy  and  natural  in  regard  to  them, 
and  which  causes  them  to  be  called  innate. 

6th  Ohj. — Truths  are  posterior  to  ideas;  now  the  ideas  come  from  the 
senses. 

Reply. — The  intellectual  ideas  which  are  the  source  of  necessary  truth  do 
not  come  from  the  senses. 

7th  Ohj. — Particular  propositions  are  more  evident  than  general  proposi- 
tions: and  nevertheless  they  come  from  the  senses;  for  example,  to  say  that 
to  he  yellow  is  not  to  he  sweet,  is  as  evident,  if  not  more  so,  as  to  say,  that 
it  is  impossible  for  a thing  to  he  and  not  to  he  at  the  same  time.  Shall  we 
say  then  that  all  our  sensations  are  innate  ? 

Reply. — The  one  is  the  principle  (namely,  the  general  maxim)  ; and  the 
other  is  but  the  application.  As  for  the  rest,  this  proposition,  sweet  is  not 
hitter,  is  not  innate;  for  the  sensations  of  sweet  and  of  bitter  come  from  the 
external  senses;  but  it  is  a mixed  conclusion  ( hybrida  conclusio ) where  the 
axiom  is  applied  to  a sensible  truth.  As  for  the  general  maxim,  it  is  there- 
with understood,  just  as  the  major  which  is  suppressed  in  enthymemes. 
We  do  not  always  think  distinctly  of  that  which  we  do. 

Instance. — But  it  seems  that  general  and  abstract  ideas  are  more  foreign  to  our 
minds  than  particular  notions  and  truths. 

Reply. — It  is  true  that  we  begin  sooner  to  perceive  particular  truths  ; but  this 
does  not  prevent  the  order  of  nature  from  beginning  with  the  most  simple,  and  the 
reason  of  the  more  particular  truths  from  depending  on  the  more  general. 

8th  Ohj. — Does  not  immediate  acquiescence  in  certain  truths  come  from  the 
very  nature  of  the  things  themselves,  rather  than  from  the  propositions  being 
graven  naturally  in  the  mind  ? 

Reply. — Both  are  true.  The  nature  of  things  and  the  nature  of  the  mind 
agree  here;  and  very  often  the  consideration  of  the  nature  of  things  is  noth- 
ing else  than  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  our  mind. 

9th  Ohj. — It  seems  that  if  there  are  innate  truths  it  is  not  necessary  to  learn 
them  since  they  are  known  in  advance.  But  it  is  necessary  at  least  to  learn 
the  names  and  the  words  by  which  the  truths  are  expressed. 

Reply. — I agree  to  this;  but  I could  not  admit  the  proposition  that  all  that 
is  learned  is  not  innate.  The  truth  of  numbers  is  in  us,  and  yet  we  do  not 
omit  learning  them. 


NOTES. 


403 


10th  Obj. — But  how  does  it  happen  that  children  have  no  knowledge  of 
these  truths  which  are  supposed  to  be  innate  and  to  make  part  of  their 
minds  ? If  this  were  so,  nature  would  have  taken  the  trouble  for  nothing. 

Reply. — The  perception  of  what  is  in  us  depends  on  attention  and  order. 
Now,  not  only  is  it  possible,  but  it  is  even  befitting,  that  children  pay  more 
attention  to  the  notions  of  the  senses,  because  attention  is  regulated  by  need. 

Same  objection , § 27. — “If  general  maxims  were  innate  they  ought  to  appear  with 
more  clearness  in  the  minds  of  certain  people.  Lspeak  of  infants,  idiots  and  savages  ; 
for  of  all  men  they  have  the  mind  least  altered  ancLcorrupted  by  custom.” 

Reply. — I believe  we  must  reason  otherwise.  Innate  maxims  appear  only  through 
the  attention  which  is  given  to  them  ; but  these  persons  exerKnmrery-  exert  it  for 
very  different  objects  : they  think  of  almost  nothing  save  of  the' 'needs  of  the~trt!dy, 
and  it  is  reasonable  that  pure  and  detached  thoughts  should  be  tap  prize  of  mor>-- 
noble  pains.  I should  not  like  so  much  honor  to  be  paid  to  barbarism  and  ignorance. 

11th  Obj. — If  there  are  innate  truths,  must  there  not  be  innate  thoughts? 

Reply. — Not  at  all,  for  thoughts  are  actions;  and  truths  are  habits  or  dis- 
positions; and  we  know  many  things  of  which  we  scarcely  think.  To  say 
that  a truth  cannot  be  in  the  mind  without  it  having  thought  of  it,  is  to  say 
that  there  cannot  be  veins  in  marble  before  they  are  discovered  there. 

Leibnitz  had  already  employed  this  comparison  of  the  marble  in  a pas- 
sage with  which  we  close  this  analysis  of  the  chapter;  for  it  is  the  best 
resume  of  his  whole  doctrine  (Preface  to  the  Nouveaux  Essais,  p.  175)  : “If 
the  soul  resembled  these  blank  tablets  (tabula  rasa),  truths  would  be  in  us  as 
the  figure  of  Hercules  is  in  a block  of  marble  when  the  marble  is  wholly  indif- 
ferent to  receiving  this  figure  or  some  other.  But  if  there  were  veins  in  the 
stone  which  indicated  the  figure  of  Hercules  in  preference  to  other  figures, 
this  stone  would  be  more  determined  to  it,  and  Hercules  ivould  be  there  as 
innate  in  some  sort,  although  it  would  be  necessary  to  labor  to  discover  the 
veins  and  to  cleanse  and  polish  them,  by  cutting  away  that  which  prevents 
them  from  appearing.  It  is  thus  that  ideas  and  truths  are  innate  in  us,  as 
inclinations,  dispositions,  habits  or  natural  capacities  and  not  as  actions.” 

■ — Prof.  Paul  Janet,  Nouveaux  Essais,  livre  I,  Paris,  1886. 

ARTICLE  XXVII. 

57.  Proof  of  the  Existence  of  God  from  the  Doctrine  of  Preestablished 

Harmony  (p.  253). 

Leibnitz  often  urges  this  “new  argument  for  the  existence  of  God.”  “The 
agreement  of  so  many  substances,  one  of  which  has  no  influence  upon  another, 
could  only  come  from  a general  cause,  on  which  all  of  them  depend,  and  this 
Cause  must  have  infinite  power  and  wisdom  to  pre-establish  all  these 
harmonies.”  Cf.  New  Essays,  bk.  4,  ch.  10,  §§  7,  9,  10. 

ARTICLE  XXVIII. 

58.  Contingency  and  Necessity. 

On  this  important  subject  see  further  remarks  in  the  Letters  to  Clarke  and 
in  the  Nouveaux  Essais,  II,  c.  21.  Cf.  note  11. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


404 


59.  Sevennese  Prophets  (p.  262). 

This  last  paragraph  is  an  allusion  to  a passage  in  the  letter  of  Coste  to 
Leibnitz  (Gerhardt,  vol.  3,  p.  393),  in  which  he  tells  of  certain  Sevennese 
mystics  who  were  then  creating  a sensation  in  London  by  their  jrretended 
prophecies;  one  of  them  being  a gentleman  of  good  character  and  possessed 
of  an  income  of  £2000.  Fatio  was  a cultivated  Swiss  gentleman  residing  in 
London. 

ARTICLE  XXIX. 

GO.  “The  Refutation  of  Spinoza  by  Leibnitz.” 

Among  the  manuscripts  of  Leibnitz  in  the  royal  library  at  Hanover  is  one 
entitled  Animadversiones  ad  Joh.  Georg.  Wachteri  librum  de  recondita 
Hebrceorum  philosophia.  This,  accompanied  by  a French  translation  and 
an  introduction,  was  published  at  Paris  in  1854  by  Foueher  de  Careil  under 
the  title  Refutation  Inedite  de  Spinoza  par  Leibniz.  The  editor’s  preface 
and  the  introduction  treat  of  the  relation  of  Leibnitz  to  Spinoza.  The  por- 
tion of  the  work  (about  two- thirds  of  the  whole)  which  treats  of  Spinoza,  and 
which  led  the  editor  to  give  to  the  whole  such  a pretentious  title,  is  here 
translated. 

61.  Malcuth  in  Malcutii  (p.  272). 

Cf.  Tlieodicee,  III,  § 372. 

ARTICLE  XXX. 

62.  Remarks  on  Locke’s  Examination  of  Malebranchc. 

The  work  by  Locke  which  is  here  examined  was  published  in  1706,  after  his 
death,  and  will  be  found  in  the  second  volume  of  Bohn’s  edition  of  Locke’s 
works.  Locke  and  Malebranche  stood  at  the  opposite  poles  of  thought  and 
Leibnitz  would  naturally  be  interested  in  a criticism  of  the  latter  by  the 
former.  This  Article  XXX  seems  to  consist  of  first-hand  jottings  made 
while  reading  Locke’s  work.  The  date  at  which  they  were  made  is  uncer- 
tain, but  it  must  have  been  after  1706,  and  was  not  improbably  1708. 

ARTICLE  XXXI. 

63.  Leibnitz  on  the  Nature  of  the  Soul. 

This  article  is  one  of  very  great  importance  for  the  understanding  of  the 
Leibnitzian  doctrine.  He  explains  here  his  conception  of  the  soul  and  the 
nature  of  perception. 

64.  The  Different  Classes  of  Monads  (p.  280). 

This  article  assists  us  in  characterizing  the  various  distinguishable  classes 
of  monads,  or  different  degrees  of  monad  development,  which  are  especially 
recognized  by  Leibnitz;  see,  also,  the  Monadology,  §§  19-30.  It  should  be 
remembered,  however,  that  Leibnitz  teaches,  as  his  principle  of  continuity 
demands,  that  there  is  an  unbroken  hierarchy  of  monads  from  the  lowest  to 
the  Supreme  Monad. 

I.  All  monads  are  alike : 


ROTES. 


405 


(1)  In  being  simple,  ultimate,  veritable  unities;  ingenerable  and  indestruc- 
tible realities. 

(2)  In  that  each  is  essentially  energizing  power,  force,  active  principle. 

(3)  In  that  each  possesses  the  power  of  perception  and  reflects  (mirrors) 
in  its  way  the  whole  universe.  “The  representation  of  the  external  in  the 
internal,  of  the  composite  in  the  simple,  of  multiplicity  in  unity,  constitutes 
in  realty  perception  (§3).” 

II.  According  as  they  are  or  are  not  monades  reines  ou  dominantes,  have 
or  have  not  organizing  power  over  others,  they  are  divided  thus : 

1 Simple  ( 1 ) . 

Monads  -.  i Bare  monades  vivantes  (2). 

( Dominating  or  ruling  - „ , f Animal  souls  ( 3 ) . 

( S \ Rational  souls,  or  spirits  (4). 

III.  According  as  they  possess  or  do  not  possess  sentiency,  they  are  divided 
thus : 


Monads 


Non- sentient 


Simple  monads  ( 1 ) . 

Bare  monades  vivantes  (2). 


Sentient  / Animal  souls  (3). 

( Rational  souls,  or  spirits  (4). 


IV.  According  as  they  do  or  do  not  possess  self-consciousness,  they 


are 


divided : 


1 Lacking  memory  ( Simple  monads  (1). 

1 Merely  perceptive  / Bare  monades  vivantes  (2). 

Monads  ( Possessing  memory  -j  Animal  souls  ( 3 ) . 

( Self-conscious  -j  Rational  souls,  or  spirits  ( 4 ) . 

V.  Results.  There  are  four  distinguishable  kinds  of  monads : 

1.  Simple  monads,  lacking  self-consciousness,  memory  and  organic  capacity. 

2.  Dominating  or  organizing  monads  (monades  reines  ou  dmes  vivantes) , 
lacking  memory  and  self-consciousness.  These  and  the  simple  monads  are 
the  sleeping  monads;  they  perceive  unconsciously  and  without  feeling. 

3.  Animal  souls.  These  organize  and  possess  memory,  but  lack  self-con- 
sciousness. They  are  dreaming  monads. 

4.  Rational  souls.  These  have  organizing  capacity,  memory,  and,  in  addi- 
tion, self-consciousness  and  the  power  of  recognizing  necessary  truth;  in  a 
word,  they  are  personalities.  They  are  ualced  up  monads. 

Does  a monad  of  the  lower  class  ever  pass  into  the  higher  classes?  One  of 
Leibnitz's  correspondents,  Remond.  writes  to  him  on  Jan.  9,  1715,  and  asks,  among 
others,  the  following  questions  : “Comment  (physiquement  parlant  et  sans  emploier 
des  termes  abstraits  ni  metaphoriques),  par  quels  moiens,  par  quels  degrez  une 
monade  centrale  et  dominante  qui  constitue  dans  un  certain  terns  un  animal,  peut 
venir  dans  un  autre  a faire  ou  plustot  a estre  un  Monsieur  de  Leibniz?’’  To  this 
Leibnitz  replies  as  follows  : “Puisqu’on  peut  concevoir  que  par  le  developpement 

et  changement  de  la  matiere,  la  machine  qui  fait  le  corps  d'un  animal  spermatique, 
peut  devenir  une  machine  telle  qu’il  faut  pour  former  le  corps  organique  d’un 
homme : il  faut  qu’en  meme  temps  l’ame  de  sensitive  seulement  soit  devenue 

raisonnable,  a cause  de  l'harmonie  parfaite  entre  l’ame  et  la  machine.  Mais  comme 
cette  harmonie  est  preetablie,  l’etat  futur  etoit  deja  dans  le  present,  et  une  parfaite 
Intelligence  reconnoissait  il  y a long  temps  dans  l'anlmal  present  l’homme  futur. 
tant  dans  son  ame  a part,  que  dans  son  corps  a.  part.  Ainsi  jamais  un  pur  animal 
ne  deviendra  homme,  et  les  animaux  spermatiques  humains.  qui  ne  viennent  pas 
a la  grande  transformation  par  la  conception,  sont  de  purs  animaux."  Cf.  also, 
the  il lonadology,  §§  74,  75  and  S2. 

65.  G-exii  (Page  281). 

By  genii  Leibnitz  means  angels  and  arch-angels. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


406 


ARTICLE  XXXII. 

GG.  Leibnitz’s  Theodic6e. 

This  work,  ns  is  well  known,  was  written  by  Leibnitz  in  memory  of  Queen 
Sophia  Charlotte  of  Prussia,  and  grew  out  of  conversations  and  discussions 
with  her  on  the  problems  of  liberty  and  of  evil,  occasioned  by  the  objections 
she  found  in  Bavle’s  Dictionary . It  is  the  only  large  work  by  Leibnitz  pub- 
lished in  his  life-time.  Although  written  in  a popular  style  and  diffuse, 
it  is  unquestionably  the  most  celebrated  work  on  the  subject.  The  work 
itself  consists  of  (1)  a Preface;  (2)  an  Introductory  Discourse  on  the  Conform- 
ity of  Faith  with  Reason;  (3)  the  body  of  the  work,  in  three  parts,  the  first 
on  the  nature  of  evil  in  general,  the  second  on  moral  evil,  the  third  on  physi- 
cal evil;  (4)  an  Index;  (5)  the  Abridgment,  here  translated;  (6)  an 
Examination  of  Hobbes’  work,  Questions  concerning  Liberty,  Necessity  and 
Chance;  (7)  Remarks  on  a work  by  King  on  The  Origin  of  Evil;  (8)  a more 
extended  abridgment  of  the  Work  in  Latin. 

An  excellent  abridgment  of  the  body  of  the  work,  with  critical  and  explana- 
tory notes,  has  been  issued  by  Tli.  Desdouits:  Essais  de  Theodicee  de  Leibniz. 
Extraits  relies  entre  eux  par  de  court es  analyses,  precedes  d’une  introduction 
et  d’une  analyse  generate,  et  accompagnes  d’ appreciations  critiques,  Paris,  1878. 

Two  excellent  articles  on  Leibnitz’s  Theodicy  will  be  found  in  the  Andover 
Review,  vol.  4. 

67.  Leibnitz’s  Optimism. 

The  last  word  of  the  Leibnitzian  philosophy  is  that,  all  things  considered, 
the  actual  is  the  best  possible  world.  The  doctrine  as  it  bears  upon  the  prob- 
lem of  human  existence  is  well  set  forth  in  the  apologue  of  the  Theodicee 
(§§  405-417)  in  the  story  of  Sextus.  Consult  on  this  subject  in  general, 
besides  the  Theodicee,  the  Monadology  (§  53  seq.),  The  Principles  of  Nature 
and  of  Grace,  the  Letters  to  Clarke,  Nolan's  La  Monadologie,  onzieme  eclair- 
cissement,  Fischer’s  Leibniz,  and  Erdmann,  Nourisson,  and  Feuerbach. 

ARTICLE  XXXIII. 

68.  Leibnitz’s  Rules  foe  the  Conduct  of  the  Mind  and  the  Increase  of 

Knowledge. 

Couturat,  La  Logique  de  Leibniz,  p.  180,  assigns  this  Article  XXXIII  to 
Leibnitz’s  early  years. 

Compare  with  this  article  Erdmann’s  edition  of  Leibnitz’s  phil.  works, 
Articles  XVI,  De  vero  methodo  philosophice  et  theologice;  LIII,  Preceptes  pour 
avancer  les  Sciences;  and  LIV,  Discours  touchant  la  Methode  de  la  Certitude 
et  l’ Art  d’Inventer,  pour  finir  les  Disputes  et  pour  faire  en  peu  de  Terns  de 
grands  Progres;  and  the  Nouveaux  Essais,  IV,  chap.  12,  Des  Moyens  d’Aug- 
rnenter  nos  Connaissances.  And  on  the  whole  subject,  consult  Couturat’s 
book. 

Leibnitz’s  thoughts  on  this  subject  may  be  compared  with  Descartes’  ( Dis; 
cours  de  la  Methode;  Regies  pour  la  Direction  de  V E sprit)  ; Spinoza’s  (De 
Emendatione  Intellectus)  ; and  Locke’s  ( Conduct  of  the  Understanding,  and 
tne  Essay,  bk.  4,  c.  12,  Of  the  Improvement  of  Our  Knowledge) . 


iSTOTES. 


407 


ARTICLE  XXXIV. 

69.  The  Principles  of  Nature  and  of  Grace. 

During  Leibnitz’s  residence  in  Vienna  (1712-1714)  he  was  asked  by  Prince 
Eugene  of  Savoy  to  give  in  a short  compendium  his  philosophical  system  as 
an  aid  to  the  understanding  of  the  Theodicee.  With  this  object  in  view  he 
composed  The  Principles  of  Nature  and  of  Grace,  founded  on  Reason.  A 
copy  of  the  essay,  which  was  prepared  with  the  utmost  care,  he  sent  to 
Nic.  Remond,  at  Paris,  with  a letter  (Vienna,  Aug.  26,  1714),  in  which  he 
writes : “J’ay  espere  que  ee  petit  papier  contribuerait  9.  mieux  faire  entendre 
mes  meditations  en  v joignant  ce  que  j’ay  mis  dans  les  Journaux  de  Leip- 
zig, de  Paris,  et  de  Hollande.  Dans  ceux  de  Leipzig  je  m’aceommode 
davantage  au  style  des  Cartesiens,  et  dans  cette  derniere  piece  je  tache  de 
m’exprimer  d’une  maniere  qui  puisse  Stre  entendue  de  ceux  qui  ne  sont  pas 
encore  trop  accoutumes  au  style  des  uns  et  des  autres.” 

ARTICLE  XXXV. 

70.  The  Monadology. 

This  epitome  of  Leibnitz’s  philosophy  was  written  very  shortly  after  the 
Principles  of  Nature  and  of  Grace,  and  has,  until  recently,  been  confounded 
with  it  as  the  work  written  for  Prince  Eugene.  It  is  the  most  complete 
statement  of  Leibnitz’s  system  and  merits  the  most  careful  study.  Erdmann 
calls  it  librum  Leibnicii  omnium  gravissirnum.  There  are  a number  of  anno- 
tated separate  editions  of  it,  especially  in  French'.  The  best  of  these  are 
Nolan’s  La  Monadologie  de  Leibnis,  avec  des  eclair cissements  et  des  notes 
historiques  et  philosophiques,  Alcan,  Paris,  1887 ; and  Boutroux’s  La  Monad- 
ologie de  Leibnis,  etc.,  Delagrave,  Paris,  1881.  Zimmerman’s  German  trans- 
lation, with  notes,  may  also  be  profitably  consulted.  It  should  be  said  that 
the  original  manuscript  is  without  a title  and  that  the  title,  The  Monadology, 
was  given  it  by  Erdmann,  who  published  for  the  first  time  the  original  French 
text  in  his  Leibnitii  Opera  Philosophica,  Berlin,  1840;  before  that  time  it  had 
been  known  only  in  a German  translation. 

71.  Analysis  of  the  Monadology. 

The  following  analysis  may  assist  in  understanding  the  Monadology.  Latta, 
in  his  edition,  pp.  216-217,  gives  -an  analysis  which  the  student  should  consult. 
It  should,  however,  be  remembered  that  the  thought  is  so  condensed  that  no 
very  satisfactory  analysis  of  it  can  be  given. 

Part  I. 

Substance  (or  Monad),  §§  1-30. 

1.  Existence  and  Simplicity,  1-3. 

2.  Indestructibility,  4-6. 

3.  Inner  Principle  of  their  Activity,  7-13. 

4.  Perceptions  of  the  Monads,  14-18. 

(1)  Perception,  wliat;  distinguished  from  apperception,  14-16. 

(2)  Inexplicable  mechanically,  17. 

(3)  Therefore,  monads  are  actualized  perfections  or  entelechies,  18. 


408 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OP  LEIBNITZ. 


5.  Kinds  of  Monads,  19-30. 

(1)  Sleeping  monads,  19-24. 

(2)  Dreaming  monads,  25-27. 

(3)  Waked  up  or  rational  monads,  28-30. 

Part  II. 

Principles  of  Reason  and  their  source  in  Absolute-  Reason,  God,  §§  31-48. 

0.  Principles  of  Reason  and  their  source,  31-37. 

7.  God,  the  Principle  of  Principles,  on  whom  all  contingent  things  and 
even  necessary  truths  depend,  37-48. 

Part  III. 

The  Preestablished  Harmony  and  the  Best  Possible  Universe,  §§  49-90. 

8.  Preestablished  Harmony,  what;  it  accounts  for  the  apparent  interaction 
of  the  monads,  49-52  and  56. 

9.  Why  there  is  a preestablished  harmony;  the  actual  world  the  best  pos- 
sible, 53-55. 

10.  It  accounts  for  variety  and  unity;  each  monad  mirrors  the  universe, 
56-62. 

11.  Every  particle  of  matter  is  a fullness  of  vital  monads;  there  is  life 
everywhere,  63-70. 

12.  Souls  are  not  composite;  they  always  have  bodies,  which  change  grad- 
ually. Souls  and  bodies  are  alike  ingenerable;  generation  is  but  a develop- 
ment and  death  an  envelopment,  71-77. 

13.  Hierarchy  of  the  monads:  kingdoms  of  efficient  cause,  of  final  cause, 
and  of  grace;  harmony  of  the  three,  78-90. 

( 1 ) Preestablished  harmony  between  the  kingdoms  of  efficient  causes 
and  of  final  causes,  78-82. 

(2)  The  kingdom  of  grace — society  of  free  personalities — and  the  abso- 
lute harmony  and  perfect  system,  or  “City  of  God,”  83-90. 

ARTICLE  XXXVI. 

72.  Remond  de  Montmort. 

Nicolas  Remond,  de  Montmort,  was  Chef  dcs  Gonseils  de  M.  le  Due  d’Or- 
leans.  He  was  a great  admirer  of  the  Platonic  philosophy  and  on  reading 
Leibnitz's  TheodicSe  became  a great  admirer  of  him  also,  and  carried  on  a cor- 
respondence with  him  on  philosophical  subjects.  For  this,  see  Gerhardt’s 
third  volume.  This  letter  (Art.  XXXVI)  is  of  especial  importance,  as  in  it 
Leibnitz  takes  ■ occasion  to  explain  the  points  of  contact  and  of  divergence 
between  his  own  system  and  those  of  Malebranche  on  the  one  hand  and  of 
Descartes  on  the  other. 

ARTICLE  XXXVII. 

73.  Leibnitz  Correspondence  witi-i  Clarke. 

The  occasion  of  this  correspondence  Leibnitz  describes  in  a letter  (Dec.  23, 
1715)  to  Wolff,  thus:  “The  Princess  of  Wales  [Wilhelmina  Charlotte  of  Ans- 
bach],  who  had  read  with  pleasure  my  Theodicee,  fell  into  a controversy  over 


NOTES. 


409 


it,  as  she  herself  informed  me,  with  a prelate  who  frequented  the  Court.  He 
afterward  handed  the  Princess  a paper  written  in  English  in  which  he 
defended  the  Newtonian  system  and  attacked  mine.  I answered  him  briefly 
and  sent  the  answer  to  the  Princess.”  The  correspondence  extends  to  five 
letters  on  each  side  and  was  terminated  by  the  death  of  Leibnitz.  It  was 
published  in  1717  by  Clarke,  who  gave  an  English  translation  (here  reprinted) 
side  by  side  with  Leibnitz’s  French.  The  words  in  [ ] in  the  Fifth  Letter 
(except  the  words  of  sense,  § 84,  our  notion  of,  § 87,  toithout  diminution 
§ 99,  an  order  and  merely,  § 104,  general,  § 107,  which  were  added  by  Clarke) 
are  additions  or  changes  made  by  Leibnitz  himself  in  a second  copy.  They 
are  here  inserted  in  Clarke’s  translation. 

These  letters  belong  to  the  most  important  documents  on  Leibnitz’s  philos- 
ophy, as  in  Clarke  he  found  an  antagonist  worthy  of  him,  who  pointed  out 
the  weak  points  in  his  system.  For  lack  of  space  the  letters  of  Clarke,  which 
are  accessible  to  the  student  in  Clarke’s  own  works,  are  omitted  here. 


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